On October 10, 1917, a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, at the suggestion of Lenin, made a historic decision on an armed uprising, which was successfully implemented.
In the Kazan province, preparations for an armed uprising were led by the Kazan Committee of the Bolshevik Party, headed by Ya.S. Sheinkman, N. Ershov, G.Sh. Olkenitsky, I. Volkov, A.I. Bochkov and others. Kazan became one of the cities in which the counter-revolution put up stubborn resistance to the rebels.
By the evening of October 25, the cadets and other anti-Bolshevik forces, under pressure from the rebels, retreated to the Kazan Kremlin, which was completely surrounded. After the news of the victory of the revolution in Petrograd, power passed into the hands of the city's Revolutionary Committee.
On October 26, 1917, Soviet power was established in Kazan, and in Bugulminsky district only on February 22, 1918. The main struggle against the counter-revolution took place at first in Kazan. The events carried out in connection with this (punitive operations) can be called the first cases of the Kazan security officers.
Few documents have been preserved about the initial period of activity of the Chekists of Tatarstan, since they were probably destroyed by the Chekists themselves before the temporary capture of Kazan by the Komuchevites in August 1918. The surviving documents allow us to assert that the functions of the Cheka in Kazan and the province were performed by: the investigative commission of the Revolutionary Headquarters from October 26, 1917, the investigative commission of the Kazan Provincial Council from November 19, 1917, the department for combating counter-revolution of the investigative commission of the provincial revolutionary tribunal from November 27, 1917, judicial -investigative commission from December 8, 1917, revolutionary investigative commission from February 27, 1918, extraordinary commission of inquiry to combat counter-revolution, profiteering and sabotage from July 1, 1918. These names are contained in the protocols of the Kazan Council. Without their analysis, there may be a misconception that the emergency commission was created only on July 1.
The Kazan Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution was created in January 1918. V.P. wrote about this in her memoirs. Braude, one of its first participants, emphasizing that it was formed on the basis of the department for combating counter-revolution of the revolutionary investigative commission of the provincial tribunal, this is also evidenced by the surviving covering letter of the chairman of the Kazan gubchek G.Sh. Olkenitsky, with exactly this signature on the document on February 4, 1918, who sent the cadets arrested in Kazan to Moscow, to the Cheka. As for the resolution of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Council on July 1, 1918, that the commission would henceforth be called the Extraordinary Investigative Commission to combat counter-revolution, profiteering and sabotage, this is apparently connected with the March 1918 call of the Cheka to local Soviets to organize commissions with the same name.
At the beginning of its work, the Kazan Cheka did not have any apparatus and was located in one room. Individual party members or Bolshevik sympathizers were sent from factories and military units to carry out arrests.
Girsh Shmulevich Olkenitsky (1893-1918) was appointed chairman of the Cheka, his deputy was Vera Petrovna Braude (1890-1961), and secretary Isidor Davydovich Frolov (1896-1918). Note that only Vera Petrovna could devote herself entirely to work in the Cheka, since Olkenitsky simultaneously remained the secretary of the Kazan Committee of the RSDLP(b), and Frolov was a member of the Presidium of the Provincial Council, a member of the board for managing the Kazan Military District, and from March 1918, first commissioner of the Kazan province.
At first, the security officers were engaged not only in the fight against counter-revolution, profiteering and sabotage, but they were also subordinate to the criminal police and the department for combating banditry. The soul of the first composition of the Kazan Gubernia Cheka was Olkenitsky. He was only 25 years old when an assassin's bullet struck him. His colleague Frolov, an active participant in the battles with anti-Bolshevik forces, was also killed. On August 6, 1918, he was wounded and sent to the hospital, but on the way the car was intercepted by a White Guard patrol.
Along with the Gubernia Cheka, before the creation of the district Cheka (autumn 1918), the Chistopol judicial investigation commission (from December 20, 1917) and the Kozmodemyansk commission (from February 24, 1918) functioned. Revolutionary committees and military-revolutionary headquarters were often created in the districts, which took over the leadership of the fight against anti-Bolshevik forces. Thus, on March 8, 1918, the military-revolutionary headquarters of the Chistopol Council considered the issue of taking measures against the actions of counter-revolutionaries. A protocol has been preserved, which shows how such issues were resolved then. The military commissar of Chistopol, the Bolshevik Miksin, said that in the evening all representatives of the “White Idea” were gathering at the Theological School. Proposals were immediately made to conduct reconnaissance, search the house and arrest everyone gathered there. There are many similar documents, and they all testify to the nationwide nature of the fight against counter-revolution. It was on the help and assistance of the broad masses of workers that the Kazan Gubernia Cheka began to rely in its activities.
In connection with the intensification of anti-Bolshevik forces in Kazan at the end of February - March 1918, the Bolshevik organization of the city, the Council, decided to create the Revolutionary Headquarters of the Kazan Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies to protect the city and province and preserve revolutionary order in them. The revolutionary headquarters received unlimited powers from the Council to carry out its functions. The composition included the Bolsheviks Ya.S. Sheinkman, K. Yakubov, S. Said-Galiev. K. Grasis was appointed its chairman, I. Frolov represented the Cheka and the military commissariat.
National Soviet organizations provided significant assistance to the Revolutionary Headquarters and security officers in suppressing the rebellion. On January 17, 1918, it was established by decree signed by V.I. Lenin Commissariat for Muslim Affairs of Inner Russia. The remarkable Tatar revolutionary M. Vakhitov was appointed its commissioner, and G. Ibragimov and Sh. Manatov were appointed deputy commissioners.
On February 18-21, 1918, under the Kazan Council, the Muslim Commissariat was organized with departments of labor, military, communications, public education, combating counter-revolution, finance, social security, publishing. Its active workers and department heads were the Bolsheviks S. Said-Galiev, G. Kasimov, K. Yakubov, Kh. Urmanov, B. Ziganshin. At that time, Adi Karimovich Malikov, a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1917, one of the first Tatar security officers, who during the civil war headed the headquarters of the 2nd Tatar Brigade, and then the Special Department of the Red Banner Caucasian Army, worked in the department for combating counter-revolution of the Muslim Commissariat.
On July 1, 1918, the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Kazan Gubernia Department decided henceforth to call the commission to combat anti-Bolshevik forces the “Extraordinary Investigative Commission to combat counter-revolution, profiteering and sabotage,” its estimate was approved, it was decided to issue weapons only with the permission of the Cheka, it was allowed to issue warrants for searches and arrests.
In mid-1918, the Volga region became the main arena of action in the flaring up civil war. The importance of the Kazan province as the closest rear base of the Eastern Front increased. As a result, the volume of work for the region's security officers has increased significantly. Now their task was to clear the rear base of the front from infiltrators and spies, alarmists and provocateurs, especially from former military specialists who occupied responsible positions at the headquarters of the Eastern Front and other military institutions. In this regard, the emergence of military counterintelligence agencies is connected.
To successfully fight the white movement on the Eastern Front and in connection with the Czechoslovak uprising, the Council of People's Commissars on July 16, 1918 decided to organize an Extraordinary Commission to combat counter-revolution on the Czechoslovak Front. All commissions for the fight against counter-revolution and sabotage in the front-line zone were reassigned to her. The commission was headed by Martyn Yanovich Latsis. Thus, Latsis became the head of the Cheka for the Kazan province. Arrived in Kazan on July 27, 1918.
With great energy, Latsis set to work. A front-line Emergency Commission was formed. It consisted of 4 departments: organizational and instructional, administrative, investigative and secret.
All local emergency commissions in the region were subordinated to the Emergency Front Commission, but it was created on the basis of the Kazan Gubernia Cheka. “The first thing,” Latsis recalled, “was the transformation of the Kazan Extraordinary Commission into the Cheka of the Czechoslovak Front.” The Extraordinary Commission moved to Gogolevskaya Street and began expanding its apparatus. But this matter progressed extremely slowly. From Moscow they gave me only two intelligence comrades with me. In Kazan, there were about 10 employees of the old Commission. It was with this apparatus that we had to get to work.
Emergency commissions immediately began to be created in the armies of the Eastern Front. They consisted of two divisions: to combat counter-revolution and to combat malfeasance. The main task of the army Chekas was the prompt elimination of enemy infiltrators and provocateurs.
The front-line Cheka was supposed to coordinate the actions of the security officers of the army and front-line provinces. Such tasks were solved as: strengthening the combat capability of the army, clearing the rear of anti-Bolshevik forces.
In July, due to the intensified civil war and the outbreak of the White Terror, the rights of the Cheka were expanded. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee authorized the use of execution on the spot.
After the fall of Kazan, Latsis moved to Sviyazhsk, where he took up organizational work: creating army and county emergency commissions. Then, by order of Latsis, district Chekas of the Kazan province were created: Cheboksary - on August 11, Sviyazhskaya - on August 15, Tsarevokokshaiskaya - on September 1st, Laishevskaya - on September 28th, Spasskaya - on October 11th, Arskaya - on October 20th. The district Cheka consisted of 3-11 security officers and detachments of 20-40 people.
Kazan was liberated on September 10. In October, the Kazan Gubernia Cheka resumed its work. Latsis reported this at a meeting of the Kazan Committee of the RCP(b) on October 8, 1918. At the beginning, Latsis also served as chairman of the Kazan Gubernia Cheka, but soon he was replaced in this post by K.M. Carlson.
On October 2, 1919, at a meeting of the provincial committee of the RCP (b), a new board of the Kazan provincial Cheka was approved. In connection with Carlson’s transfer to KGB work in Ukraine, the chairman became a party member since 1907, delegate of the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) Zh.F. Devingtal. Members of the board of the Kazan Gubernia Cheka were approved by M.E. Endakov, A.P. Shkele, Mikhailov and Meshcheryakov. By the end of the year, there were 3 VOKhR battalions in the Kazan province - 2126 soldiers.
On June 25, 1920, the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was solemnly proclaimed in Kazan. The Temporary Revolutionary Committee of the TASSR, created that day, also included the Chairman of the Cheka G.M. as the head of the department. Ivanov. After the approval of Tatar autonomy at the First Congress of Soviets of the TASSR at the end of September 1920, the Kazan Gubernia Cheka was renamed the Tatar Cheka, and a little later the All-Tatar Extraordinary Commission.
Thus, for the period 1917 - 1920. The Kazan Extraordinary Commission has undergone a number of changes. Having begun its work with the investigative commission of the Revolutionary Headquarters, the counter-revolutionary struggle gradually took shape in the Extraordinary Commission, which was proclaimed in Kazan on July 1, 1918. Then, in connection with the opening of the Eastern Front, the Kazan Provincial Cheka was transformed into the Cheka of the Czechoslovak Front. In July 1918, the rights of the Cheka were expanded in connection with the fierce civil war and the outbreak of the White Terror. It was allowed to use the death penalty - execution. After the liberation of Kazan from the white interventionist troops on October 10, 1918. The Kazan Gubernia Cheka resumes its work in the fight against counter-revolution, profiteering and sabotage. It should be noted that on October 2, 1919, a new board of the Kazan Gubernia Cheka was approved. It should be especially noted that after the proclamation of Tatar autonomy at the end of September 1920, the Kazan Gubernia Cheka was renamed the Tatar Cheka, and a little later the All-Tatar Extraordinary Commission.
§46. In the flames of civil war
The beginning of the civil war was marked by the October Revolution. However, in the first post-October months, armed clashes between supporters and opponents of Soviet power were local in nature and a few individual detachments took part in them. Since mid-1918, a large-scale and fierce civil war has been unfolding, complicated by the intervention of the Entente countries. It covered the territory of the entire Soviet Russia. Twice the territory of the Kazan province became the arena of hostilities.
Socio-economic measures of the new government. Social and economic life in the region began to change significantly in the first six months of the existence of Soviet power. Workers' control was introduced at industrial enterprises. Measures began to be taken to nationalize plants, factories, and banks. According to the Decree on Land, by the end of the summer of 1918, the working peasantry received free of charge about 700 thousand acres of land that previously belonged to the landowners, the state, the estate and the church. The redistribution of land took place in conditions of confrontation between various groups of the peasantry. The Bolsheviks' support for the poor caused opposition from rich peasants, who began to withhold grain.
In May, by decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, it was announced food dictatorship. The decree prohibited free trade in bread and fixed prices for it. All those who hid surplus grain and did not take it to dumping points were declared “enemies of the people.” Failure to comply with these requirements entailed imprisonment and confiscation of property. To seize “surplus” food, armed food detachments were organized from workers and poor peasants. It was part of the policy" military communism».
In June, committees of the poor began to be created. They were given exclusive powers to confiscate land and food. Became a reality split villages. And gratuitous seizures deprived the most enterprising part of the peasantry of interest in developing their economy. This worsened the food problem. Strict and meager standards for the consumption of all types of products through the card system were established.
Other Bolshevik measures also created a climate of civil confrontation. In February 1918, the Cheka announced that it would take emergency measures, including execution on the spot, against counter-revolutionaries, spies, saboteurs, speculators and other malicious enemies of the revolution. In mid-June, People's Commissar of Justice I. Stuchka signed a decree stating that “revolutionary tribunals are not bound by any restrictions in choosing measures to combat counter-revolution, sabotage, etc.”
In June, the Mensheviks were expelled from the Kazan Council and the governing bodies of local trade unions. In July, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, protesting against the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, started a rebellion in Moscow. It was suppressed and more than 10 of its participants were shot. Representatives of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party for the most part lost their seats in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and local Soviets. Locally, the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did not dare to take up arms. However, in the Kazan province after the Moscow events, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries were also removed from power. At the end of July, Kazan security officers disarmed the fighting Left Socialist Revolutionary squad and arrested some of the members. By the beginning of August, the party of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, and earlier the parties of the Mensheviks and Right Socialist Revolutionaries, was outlawed.
Before the capture of Kazan. Komuch. An important factor in the development of the civil war was the mutiny of the 45th Czechoslovak Corps. At the end of May 1918, Czechoslovak units, in response to the order of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs L.D. Trotsky about the disarmament of Erpus began to capture stations along their route. Before the beginning of June, Chelyabinsk, Novonikolaevsk, Penza, Syzran, and Tomsk were taken. Soon the legionnaires began to operate in the Middle Volga region. The rebellion of the Czechoslovak Corps united and activated all anti-Bolshevik forces. In the occupied territories, Soviet power was overthrown. New governments were formed, which included the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. With the help of Czechoslovak units, power in the Volga region passed into the hands of Committee members Founding meetings (Komucha; the committee itself existed illegally even during the Soviet era).
On June 8 in Samara, Komuch declared himself a “temporary government.” He proclaimed the restoration of democratic order in the country, established an 8-hour working day, allowed the convening of workers' conferences and peasant congresses, the activities of factory committees and trade unions, and formed the People's Army. Komuch canceled the decrees of the Soviet government, returned nationalized enterprises to their former owners, restored city dumas and zemstvos, and allowed freedom of private trade. The landowners actually got the opportunity to take away the land transferred to them from the peasants and the right to harvest winter grain.
First of all, Komuch created counterintelligence, which was a punitive apparatus. He used terror in the same way as the Bolsheviks. Military courts operated, and extrajudicial killings were practiced. Chairman of Komuch, Socialist Revolutionary V.K. Volsky wrote: “The committee acted dictatorially, its power was firm, cruel and terrible. This was dictated by the circumstances of the civil war. Having taken power in such conditions, we had to act and not retreat in the face of blood. And there's a lot of blood on us. We are deeply aware of this. We could not avoid it in the brutal struggle for democracy. We were forced to create a security department, which was responsible for the security service, the same emergency service, almost worse.”
The Kazan right-wing Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks supported Komuch. Many members of the Kazan Menshevik organization joined the People's Army. Tatar, Chuvash, and Mari national organizations created committees to provide assistance to the Komuchevites.
Members of the Muslim socialist faction of the Constituent Assembly of I.S. became active figures in the Samara Komuch. Alkin, G.H. Teregulov, F.F. Tuktarov, F.N. Tukhvatullin and others. In August 1918, Ko-much developed the “Basic provisions of the project on the national autonomy of the Turkotatars of internal Russia and Siberia.” The document confirmed the right of peoples to solve their own social, cultural, and religious problems. The Milli Majlis was declared the highest legislative body of this autonomy.
KazanskayaepicAugust- September 1918 G.
On July 22, units of the People's Army and Czechoslovak legionnaires occupied Simbirsk. Then they moved north to Kazan, and on August 5 they landed troops in the area of the Kazan piers. Kazan and the entire province were declared under martial law.
The population of Kazan then was about 146 thousand people, 20 thousand of them were workers. There were about one thousand Kazan Bolsheviks. Kazan had a huge garrison; the headquarters of the Eastern Front was located here.
Kazan was defended by units of the 5th Zemgale Latvian Regiment, the Muslim Communist Detachment, the International Battalion named after K. Marx, a number of internationalists, the 1st Muslim Socialist Regiment, the 1st Tatar-Bashkir Battalion, a detachment led by Mullanur Vakhitov, workers' ranks and others formation. Despite superior forces, the city could not be held. One of the last centers of resistance was the area of the power plant, where a detachment operated under the command of M.Kh. Sultan-Galieva.
By the morning of August 7, Kazan completely passed into the hands of the givnik. One of the organizers of the assault on the city, sub-colonel V.O. Kappel telegraphed to Samara that the Oteri numbered no more than 25 people.
It was announced in Kazan power Komucha. The Russian gold reserves, delivered to Kazan for storage in May 1918, ended up in the hands of the Omuchevites. Within a month, about one thousand people became victims of the White Terror. Among them were Ya.S. Sheinkman, M.M. Vakhitov, one of the trade union leaders A.P. Komlev, Justice Commission of the Kazan Province M.I. Mezhlauk. The founders tried to create functioning authorities. However, these attempts were unsuccessful. Kazan University professors, teachers, and clergy, including Muslims, have declared their support for Komuch and his People’s Army. But the real help from the population was insignificant. Hostile intent reigned in the working-class outskirts. On September 3, Kazan workers raised an armed uprising. True, it was defeated.
The situation created on the Eastern Front in connection with the fall of Kazan was assessed by the Bolsheviks as critical for their power. V.I. Lenin wrote in early August that the fate of the revolution was being decided near Kazan.
Energetic measures were taken to strengthen the Eastern Front. Near Kazan in mid-August the 5th Army was formed under the command of P.A. Slavena. The Volga military flotilla led by F.F. was sent here. Raskolnikov. The naval commissar was the writer L.M. Reisner, who described the events of the Kazan epic in a series of essays “Front”. The group had three armored trains and 16 aircraft.
Sviyazhsk became the center of reformation of the red units. Here the People's Commissar of Military Affairs restored order with an iron hand. To stop panic and desertion, he threatened to resort to shooting every tenth person. On August 29, 1918, tragedy broke out. Then, in the St. Petersburg workers’ regiment that fled from their positions, 20 people were shot, including the commander and commissar.
By September, a large group of Red troops was created near Kazan. The plan envisaged that the offensive would proceed in three converging directions. Offensive operations began on September 5. Two days later, the red units gained a foothold in the Verkhny Uslon area. V.I. Lenin hurried the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic and recommended not to take into account the price of victory. So, he telegraphed L.D. in code. Trotsky . to whom: “In my opinion, you cannot spare the city and postpone it longer, because merciless extermination is necessary, since it is only true that Kazan is in an iron ring.”
Kazan was returned by two o'clock in the afternoon on September 10. In the battles for the city, along with infantry and cavalry units, ships of the Volga Military Flotilla, the 1st Aviation Group and the 23rd Corps Aviation Detachment took part. The poet D. Bedny, the future Soviet writer, machine gunner V.V. took part in the Kazan operation. Vishnevsky. The commander of the Left Bank Group of the 5th Army, Ya.A., died in the battles. Yudin, and later, on the Kama - deputy commander of the Volga military flotilla N.G. Markin.
The forces of the founders were clearly insufficient to organize the defense. Their troops left Kazan. Together with them, the city, fearing reprisals for supporting the People's Army, left several tens of thousands of people, mainly representatives of the intelligentsia, office workers, and clergy. On the way, they were fired upon by Red planes. As the chairman of the Kazan Cheka M.I. wrote. Latsis, “Kazan is empty, not a single priest, monk, or bourgeois. There is no one to shoot. Only six death sentences were imposed.” During the capture of Kazan, all the monks of the Zilantov Monastery were shot, from the territory of which they fired at the attackers.
After capturing Kazan, units of the Red Army during September ousted the enemy from Mamadysh, Elabuga, then Chistopol, Agryz, and by mid-November Bugulma. The partisan brigade I.S. took part in the battles of Naberezhnye Chelny, in the battles of Menzelinsk and some other settlements. Kozhevnikova. By the end of 1918, there were no troops of the Sharod Army of Komuch and the Czechoslovak Corps left on the territory of the Kazan province.
The Kazan epic of August - September 1918 became Kingpin point In the history of the civil war, in honor of the return of Kazan, a red banner was raised in the Kremlin over the residence of the Soviet government. For the first time, mass awards were given to personnel and military units. The strategic initiative on the eastern front passed to the Red Army.
Continuationsocialistreconstructionlife. Nationalquestion. As soon as the territory of the Kazan province ceased to be threatened by immediate military danger, the reconstruction of all aspects of life on new principles was continued. Old Bolshevik organizations began to be restored and new ones to be created. At the end of October 1918, at the Kazan provincial conference of communists, the first provincial committee of the RCP (b) was elected, headed by E.I. Veger.
The number of members of trade unions also grew. Workers' control bodies have resumed their activities at most enterprises. The process continued nationalization industry. From large enterprises, the production of Alafuzov and the Krestovnikov brothers passed into state ownership.
In the fall of 1918, committees of poor people operated in two-thirds of the villages of the Kazan province. They continued to seize grain from wealthy peasants and sowed enmity between different strata of the village. From September 1918 to March 1919, with the help of committees of poor people and food detachments, more than 6 million poods of grain were exported from the villages of the province for next to nothing or without payment at all.
Judging by the documents of those years, the peasantry for the most part had a negative, and sometimes even hostile, attitude towards the grain monopoly, towards the activities of the poor committees and food detachments. After all, their actions often bordered on looting and permissiveness. All this caused peasant unrest, which was brutally suppressed. A similar thing happened in Arsky district in the late autumn of 1918. When the peasants refused to hand over grain for free, a large detachment with an artillery battery arrived here. As a result of the clash, 31 peasants were killed and eleven were wounded.
Peasants' dissatisfaction with the grain monopoly, excessive taxes, and requisitions was one of the reasons « chapannaya wars», which covered the Mamadysh and Chistopol districts in the early spring of 1919. It was restless in the Tsivilsky district. Once again military force was used. In Mamadyshsky district, a detachment consisting
from communists and Red Army soldiers, opened fire on a crowd of peasants. Two people were killed and six were wounded. In the fall of 1918, attempts were made to create communes, state farms, and artels in the countryside. However, they survive; were bad. Of the 75 organized collective farms, only a few remained by the end of the year.
Among the numerous problems that the provincial authorities sought to solve, a prominent place was occupied by ^ national question. In the executive committee of the Kazan Provincial Council, a national L department was created with subdivisions for work among the Tatars (Muslims), Chuvash and Mari. The publication of the newspapers “Esh” 5 (“Labor”) in the Tatar language and “Kanash” (“Council”) in Chuvash has resumed. However, these measures were half-hearted.
On November 4-12, 1918, the First All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East (CONV) was held in Moscow. Here the state policy on the national issue, the activities of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities and the Central Muslim Commissariat received all-Ma critical assessment. At the congress, a decision was made to liquidate the Russian Muslim Communist Party, created on the initiative of the Kazan Conference of Muslim Communists in June 1918. Muslim communist committees were transformed into Muslim sections and bureaus under local Olshevik committees. To coordinate the work of sections and bureaus, the Central Bureau of Muslim organizations of the RCP (b) was created under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. By March of the following year, the Central Bank, whose members were also M.Kh. Sultan-Galiev, _£-L. Yakubov, united almost 10 thousand communists. Yo In Kazan, under the provincial party committee, a Muslim bureau and sections of the Chuvash communists and the DB-Mari communists were created. Muslim bureaus are also organized in the district-IX committees of the RCP(b). Muslim and other national commissariats worked under the provincial and district Sotakh of the Kazan province.
Againonmilitaryposition. As a result of the events that took place in Omsk on November 18, 1918, full power was transferred to A.V. Kolchak (by that time Komuch had renounced his claims to all-Russian power). Kolchak accepted the title of “supreme ruler of the Russian State” and the title of supreme commander in chief. By the spring of 1919, he managed to create significant armed forces numbering up to 400 thousand people. On March 4-6, the Siberian Army went on the offensive, the third stage of which was supposed to capture Kazan. In mid-March, she began advancing towards the Volga towards Simbirsk and Samara.
The Eastern Front again became the main front of Soviet Russia. Here again the fate of the revolution was being decided.
Soon the territory of the province again became an arena of hostilities. Kolchak's troops occupied a number of districts in its eastern and southeastern parts, Menzelinsk, Bugulma, Elabuga, and a number of other settlements. Preparations were underway for crossing the Vyatka near Mamadysh and the Kama near Chistopol. In April, Kazan became a front-line city. It was separated from the front line by only 80 kilometers.
The Kazan Council declared the province “in danger” and introduced martial law on its territory. Almost 70 percent of local communists went to the front line, the rest joined the communist battalion. Volunteer detachments went to the front. The formation of special purpose units began.
The situation was quite difficult. The “chapan war” has not yet subsided. A.V. Kolchak had already appointed a temporary governor of the Kazan province. Lists of Kazan party and Soviet workers subject to repression were prepared. By decision of the provincial committee of the Bolsheviks, in the event of a possible capture of Kazan, a partial evacuation of the city began, and a plan for underground work was prepared.
In order to defend the city, a fortified area was created. D.P. was appointed its chairman. Malyutin. Hundreds of workers and peasants were involved in the work from the end of March to the beginning of April as labor conscription. With their hands, positions fenced with barbed wire were erected over 400 kilometers.
In April, the Central Muslim Military Collegium, headed by M.Kh., moved to Kazan from Moscow. Sul-tan-Galiyev. She began creating national formations of the Red Army. Thus, with her participation, the First Separate Volga Tatar Rifle Brigade of 1.6 thousand soldiers was formed.
Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council L.D. visited Kazan several times. Trotsky. Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M.I. also spoke here. Kalinin, who traveled around the front-line provinces of the Volga region at the head of the propaganda train “October Revolution”.
The overall preponderance of forces was in favor of the “reds”. The fact is that neither the agricultural nor the national policies of the Kolchak government were popular. For the peasants, the threat of restoring the power of the landowners was quite real. The slogan of “united and indivisible Russia” caused discontent among national forces. During the reception with A.V. Kolchak, the leaders of the Tatar national movement G. Barudi, S. Urmanov and G. Iskhaki were directly stated that there could be no talk of any national governments or national parliaments.
On the territory of the Kazan province, on the Soviet side, the Northern group of troops of the Eastern Front operated mainly under the command of a graduate of the Kazan cadet school V.I. Shorina. It included the 2nd and 3rd armies. M.Kh. was appointed one of the members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 2nd Army. Sultan-Galiev.
At the end of April 1919, a counteroffensive by Soviet troops began. In cooperation with the Volga military flotilla, units of the 2nd Army occupied Chistopol and Elabuga in May. In the same month, the 27th Infantry Division of the 5th Army under the command of N.I. Vakhrameeva took Bugulma.
By the beginning of June, the territory of modern Tatarstan 5 was completely liberated from the Kolchakites. This was the last major military action on its territory during the civil war.
The joy of victory was overshadowed by the Kazan events of June 25. Then there was unrest in the Tatar reserve battalion, which numbered about 7 thousand soldiers. The Red Army soldiers, dissatisfied with the conditions of service, grabbed their rifles and went out of the barracks into the street. The crowd joined them. Several institutions were destroyed and weapons were seized. The head of the political department of the Central Muslim Military Collegium, Kamil Yakubov, who arrived at the barracks, was killed. Military units moved to quell the unrest. About 30 people died in the clashes on both sides. Following the protest, Kazan security officers shot 8 hostages from among the “local bourgeoisie” and 11 Red Army soldiers from the reserve battalion.
The last outbreak of the civil war on the territory of the Kazan province was forked mutiny (it covered the territory of three Volga provinces). The uprising began in the village of Novaya Yelan, Menzelinsky district. The food detachment that arrived here at the beginning of February 1920, in response to the refusal of the peasants to fully comply with the food surplus, made arrests among them. The head of the detachment refused to satisfy the demands of the village residents for the release of those arrested. Then the peasants decided to kill the detachment and began to send messengers to neighboring villages calling for an uprising.
On February 9, the chairman of the Menzelinsk Cheka and the chief of the Zainsk police were killed in Novaya Elani. The next day, the rebels massacred party and Soviet workers in Zainsk. By the second half of February, the rebellion covered almost the entire Menzelinsky district, a number of volosts of the Bugulma and Chistopol districts. Participants in the rebellion, armed mainly with pitchforks, axes, and shovels, spoke under the slogans “Down with the communists and the civil war, long live Soviet power,” “Down with the communists and the civil war, long live the Constituent Assembly.” At first, units of the Reserve Army were sent to suppress the uprising. Then the troops of the Turkestan Front were involved in hostilities. The order for the troops ordered them to act energetically and decisively, without stopping before using artillery. In mid-March 1920, the rebellion was suppressed. During these events, more than 800 Red Army soldiers, party and Soviet workers and about three thousand rebels died.
EducationTatarASSR. As we remember, in the spring of 1918, a project for national statehood of the Tatars and Bashkirs was put forward in the form of the TBSSR. On March 23, the Pravda newspaper published the “Regulations on the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic,” the territory of which practically coincided with Idel-Ural. On the same day, People’s Commissar for Nationalities Affairs I.V. spoke with an article “On the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic”. Stalin.
In April and May, meetings were held in Moscow on the issue of the TBSSR. At the last of them, some participants, including member of the Kazan Provincial Council K.Ya. Grasis, accused the People's Commissar for Nationalities of pandering to bourgeois nationalists and left the meeting room. Despite this, at the May meeting it was decided to hold the Founding Congress of the TBSSR in Ufa. However, the congress, scheduled for September 13, 1918, did not take place.
Meanwhile, the problem of national self-determination of the Tatar people in one form or another required a solution. In October 1918, the Labor Commune of the Volga Germans was created, and in March of the following year the Bashkir Republic was created. Some other peoples were also on the path to creating various forms of national autonomy.
The question of Tatar statehood dragged on. This began to cause concern among wide circles of the Tatar population. By that time, two approaches to the problem had emerged. Some proposed to continue work on the creation of the TBSSR, others - to form a separate Tatar Republic.
At the end of November - beginning of December 1919 in Moscow The Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East took place. He decided to implement the Narkomnats Regulations on the Tatar-Bashkir Republic and elected the Revolutionary Committee of the TBSSR. However, all the delegates from Bashkiria spoke out against the creation of a united republic.
The issue was transferred to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Politburo of the Central Committee on December 13, 1919, at the suggestion of V.I. Lenin abolished the Regulations on the TBSSR. The resolution stated: “In view of the fact that a significant part of the All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East and, in particular, all representatives of the communists of Bashkiria are against the creation of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic, one should not be created. The issue of the Tatar Republic should be discussed separately if a statement about this is received from the Tatar communists.”
This statement was not long in coming. On January 26, 1920, the Politburo of the Central Committee approved “in principle the organization of the Tatar Socialist Soviet Republic, without prejudging the issue of its territory, internal organization and relationship to the entire Federative Soviet Republic.” In the same month, a commission was created to study and determine the boundaries of the future republic. Among the materials presented to her in March was the draft Regulations on the Tatar Autonomous Republic. G.Sh. participated as an expert in this work. Sharaf. The government commission included I.V. Stalin, L.B. Kamenev, E.A. Preobrazhensky, M.F. Vladimirsky, S.S. Said-Galiev, M.Kh. Sul-tan-Galiyev and some other figures. On May 27, 1920, the decree on the formation of the TASSR was signed by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V.I. Lenin, Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M.I. Kalinin and Secretary of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee A.S. Enukidze.
The Tatar ASSR was formed as part of the Russian Federal Republic. It included the territories of a large part of the Kazan province, as well as several counties and volosts of the Simbirsk, Samara, Ufa and Vyatka provinces. The proposed inclusion of the Belebeevsky and Birsky districts of the Ufa province into the TASSR did not take place for political reasons.
The idea of creating a Tatar Republic was not understood by all local workers. In their
memoirs of the former chairman of the Kazan provincial executive committee I.I. Khodorowsky wrote: “...It seemed indisputable to us that the formation of the Tatar Republic was an unnecessary, harmful and unrealizable idea.”
V.I. Lenin, having met with the Kazan delegation, once again emphasized that a republic must be created. After long discussions, member of the Kazan Council S.S. was approved as chairman of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of the TASSR. Said-Galiev. (The candidacy of M.Kh. Sultan-Galiev, who had much greater political authority, was rejected by Stalin under a far-fetched pretext.)
In a solemn ceremony on June 25, 1920, power was transferred to the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of the TASSR. It was this day that for several decades was celebrated as the day of the proclamation of Soviet statehood of the Tatar people.
At the end of September, the Central Executive Committee was elected, then a government was formed - the Council of People's Commissars. B. Mansurov was elected chairman of the Central Cycling Committee, and S. Said-Galiyev was elected head of government. The tasks of managing some spheres of life of the young republic were assigned to the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs, Justice, Education, Health Care, Social Security, Agriculture, Food and Finance.
At the same time, the issue of granting autonomy to the Chuvash and Mari peoples was being resolved. By decrees of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, the Chuvash Autonomous Region was formed in June 1920, and the Mari Autonomous Region was formed in November.
Thus, the civil war on the territory of the Kazan province, as well as the entire country, was characterized not only by military actions of the warring parties. “Red” and “white” terror became its indispensable companion.
During the years of the civil war, the statehood of the Tatar people was created in the form of an autonomous republic - the TASSR, which satisfied some of its aspirations. The republic maintained this status until August 1990.
QuestionsAndassignments
1. Describe the socio-economic policy of the Soviets in the Kazan province in the first post-October months. Did it change at the end of 1918 - beginning of 1919? 2. How did the socialist parties and national organizations of the region react to the creation and activities of Komuch? 3. What do you know about the “Sviyazhsk tragedy” of August 1918? 4. Imagine Komuch’s policy after the capture of Kazan and the attitude of the population towards it. 5. What was the significance of the Kazan epic of August - September 1918 for the course and outcome of the civil war? 6. Tell us about the events in Arsk district, the “chapan war.” What caused them? 7. How did the government of A.V. approach the problem of national self-determination? Kolchak? 8. Determine the reasons behind the “fork uprising.” 9. Why was the project of national statehood of the Tatars and Bashkirs in the form of the TASSR not implemented? 10. Prepare a story about the creation of the Tatar ASSR. What do you see as the significance of this event for the Tatar people?
ChapterHP. TATARREPUBLIC B 20- eyy.
The 1920s took their place in the national history of the Soviet period. The socio-economic policy of the now monopolistic ruling party, which has become more liberal, has undergone significant changes. At the same time, there was a tightening of the political regime. The Stalinist concept of nation-state building was established. All this had a direct impact on the processes taking place in the republic in those years.
The first landings of the interventionists. — The situation on the Eastern Front. — Mobilization into the Red Army. — Former tsarist officers serving in the Red Army. — Treason of the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, Muravyov. — Creation of the Cheka at the fronts.
At the beginning of March 1918, military vessels of the British flotilla appeared near the Kola Peninsula under the command of General Poole, an experienced intelligence officer and an ardent enemy of Soviet power. Soon, detachments of Anglo-American troops landed in Murmansk, and then in Arkhangelsk, and a month later, detachments of American and Japanese troops landed in the ports of the Far East. Foreign military intervention began with the treacherous capture of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and the southeastern coast of the Far East.
The intervention caused a significant increase in the subversive activities of the internal counter-revolution.
The spearhead of this activity was directed against the Red Army as the main bulwark of defense of Soviet power. Forces are being sought that could resist the Red Army detachments. For these purposes, through embassies, military missions, through agents in the Right Socialist Revolutionary Party and in all other ways, counter-revolutionary agitation is being intensively carried out among officers of the old Russian army towards prisoners of war located on Russian territory.
The soldiers and officers of the Czechoslovak corps, formed under the tsarist government from prisoners of war and Czechs and Slovaks who voluntarily went over to the Russian side, were subjected to the most intensive counter-revolutionary treatment. At the request of the corps personnel, the Soviet government almost immediately after the revolution allowed him to return to Western Europe, allocating the required number of trains, fuel and food. It was a humane action of the workers' and peasants' state. Geographically, the shortest route was through the center of Russia. But the flames of class struggle were blazing in this territory, and the troops of the Kaiser’s Germany stood in the way. The evacuation of the corps through the northern ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk was also excluded. There was no doubt that external and internal enemies were using the corps to fight Soviet power in the immediate vicinity of its vital centers.
Therefore, a decision is made to send the Czechoslovaks through the Far East. It was a long way, but the only reliable one in that situation.
By the spring of 1918, trains of Czechoslovaks stretched for thousands of kilometers along the entire Siberian Railway from Penza to Vladivostok. And along this entire path they were subjected to intense anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda by agents of internal counter-revolution and Entente intelligence services. The Czechoslovakian soldiers were instilled with the false idea that the route of their evacuation from Russia through the Far East was chosen by the Soviet government in order to prevent their return to Western Europe. A way out of this situation was also suggested: to seize weapons and equipment from military warehouses, turn to the center of Russia and forcefully seek a return to Western Europe, smashing the not yet strong volunteer detachments of the Red Army along the way.
Counter-revolutionary propaganda played its role. The mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps broke out on May 25, 1918.
The White Guards and White Czechs pressed our units. Dozens of cities and a significant part of the territory of the Far East and Siberia fell into their hands. The Eastern Front became the main one, but far from the only one. In the north, the Red Army was opposed by Anglo-American interventionists and White Guards, in the west by the Germans, in the south by gangs of white generals and Cossack atamans.
The Red Army soldiers fought selflessly, showing steadfastness and heroism. However, the general balance of forces, as the flames of the civil war flared up, gradually took shape in favor of the enemies of Soviet power. Three quarters of our territory was in their hands. The interventionist and White Guard units were well armed and numbered about a million people. The supply of reinforcements to the Red Army units, which were waging bloody battles with enemies pressing on all sides, decreased sharply. The voluntary principle of recruiting the Red Army no longer ensured the maintenance of the required number of troops. On May 29, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution establishing the principle of compulsory military service.
The introduction of a new recruitment procedure through mobilization made it possible to begin creating powerful Armed Forces of the Soviet state. This had to be done urgently. Mobilization did not exclude voluntary enlistment in the army. By the end of 1918, the total strength of the Red Army exceeded 1.5 million people, and by the end of 1919 there were already 3 million people in its ranks. But the rapid mobilization had not only positive aspects. Along with the entry into the army of the proletarian masses of the population, there was an influx of semi-proletarian and bourgeois elements. As mobilization progressed, the ratio of workers and peasants changed sharply towards an increase in the share of peasants. Not all peasants at that time understood the need for armed defense of Soviet power. They were not characterized by proletarian discipline and organization. The predominance of peasants in the army could lead to the strengthening of petty-bourgeois sentiments. The Communist Party and the Soviet government understood this and took measures to slow down the development of undesirable processes.
In this regard, there was no general mobilization. The first calls were carried out in proletarian urban centers and the districts and regions closest to them. This made it possible for the first time to significantly increase the working class in the army, which contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for the subsequent acceptance of a large number of recruits from peasants.
Unfortunately, in general, changes in the social composition of the army could not be stopped. Soviet Russia was predominantly a peasant country. The peasantry made up over 80 percent of the population. In addition, it was impossible to completely deprive factories of labor.
The mobilization among peasants caused anti-Soviet protests. They were led by the Socialist Revolutionaries. Under the influence of the counter-revolutionary agitation of the Socialist Revolutionaries, revolts broke out in a number of districts and volosts of Vitebsk, Oryol, Moscow, Tula, Kaluga, Ryazan, Tambov, Smolensk and other provinces.
The Social Revolutionaries relied on kulak-White Guard elements in the countryside. They acted carefully, for sure. In the Oryol province, for example, they did not give away their intentions until those who were mobilized received weapons. When about two thousand rifles were in the hands of the peasant recruits, the Socialist-Revolutionaries led
They marched to Livny and took the city by storm.
Even more serious difficulties had to be encountered when mobilizing former non-commissioned officers. The kulak-SR elements well understood the importance of the junior command staff for the Red Army. This category of those liable for military service had command experience and participated in the battles of the First World War. The Social Revolutionaries and their accomplices did everything to thwart the conscription of non-commissioned officers, even to the point of organizing anti-Soviet protests.
However, the most negative consequences of mobilization began to be felt in connection with the conscription of former tsarist officers and generals into the Red Army. The shortage of command personnel for the Red Army made itself felt immediately after the number of the Red Army masses increased significantly.
By the summer of 1918, the army lacked more than 55 thousand command personnel. To a certain extent, this need was satisfied by the graduates of the Red commanders' courses, organized in Moscow and some other cities of Russia and staffed by proletarian youth, as well as workers and poor peasants who served in the tsarist army or attended the Red Guard school. But these shots were not enough. There was only one way out - to fill the lack of command personnel by recruiting former officers of the old army to serve in the army. Paradoxically, the armed struggle of workers and peasants against the bourgeoisie and landowners was to be partly led by people from the nobility and capitalists.
“The task of uniting the armament of workers and peasants with the command of former officers, who for the most part sympathize with the landowners and capitalists, is a most difficult task,” wrote V. I. Lenin.
At first, when commanders were elected by soldiers, those tsarist officers who enjoyed the trust of the masses of soldiers were given command positions in the Red Army. This trust was earned in the revolutionary struggle or, more often, in battles on the fronts of the World War.
There were many officers who wanted to serve in the Red Army. But with the increase in the army, the introduction of mobilization for both the rank and file and the command staff, the order in which commanders were elected complicated and slowed down the recruitment of new units with command personnel and thereby became obsolete. It had to be abandoned. By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of April 22, 1918, the election of command personnel was abolished. From now on, commanders were appointed.
The Soviet government took into account that among the former officers and military officials who had the opportunity to voluntarily join the ranks of the Red Army, there may be those who would seek to undermine the army from within. It was necessary to deny access to the army to hostile elements. This means was the preliminary certification of all persons who expressed a desire to occupy command positions in the Red Army. The certification was carried out by a certification commission created by the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs. On May 16, 1918, it was transformed into the Higher Attestation Commission. In its actions, the commission was guided by the Rules developed and introduced by the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs on June 18, 1918.
According to the Rules, every former officer who wanted to take a command position in the Red Army had to submit an application to the local military registration and enlistment office. The application was considered, and if the military registration and enlistment office or other body of Soviet power did not have information about the involvement of the applicant with elements hostile to Soviet power, he was enrolled in the reserve. At the same time, lists of all former officers wishing to serve in the Red Army were published in the local press or simply posted in prominent places. Residents who knew facts compromising persons applying for a command position were asked to report them to the military registration and enlistment office or other body of Soviet power.
The first conscription of old military specialists was announced by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of July 29, 1918. In total, from July to the end of 1918, about 37 thousand people were appointed to command and other positions as military specialists in the Red Army, including 22,295 officers and generals, 2,455 military officials, 2,508 military doctors and 9,713 military paramedics and pharmacists. However, a significant part of the former officers avoided conscription, continuing to work in various institutions and enterprises. There were more than 400 of them at the Izhevsk plant alone.
Some officers did not limit themselves to passive sabotage, but took up arms. They formed gangs and waged an armed struggle against Soviet power. Thus, more than 500 former officers took part in the rebellion that broke out in the summer of 1918 in the Chernensky district of the Tula province. The rebellion was led by Colonel Durnovo.
An even greater danger to the Red Army was posed by those officers who, upon joining its ranks, were waiting for the right opportunity to join the counter-revolutionary struggle.
The counter-revolution's reliance on old military specialists was not accidental. They represented a great force in the army. By the end of 1918, former officers and non-commissioned officers of the old tsarist army made up more than 75 percent of the entire command staff of the Red Army.
The principled attitude of the party and the Soviet state towards bourgeois specialists was expressed in the Appeal of the Council of People's Commissars to all workers of June 10, 1918. It stated that former officers who served honestly and conscientiously in the Red Army should enjoy complete immunity and protection from the Soviet authorities. But the conspiratorial officers, traitors,
the accomplices of Skoropadsky, Krasnov, and the Siberian Colonel Ivanov must be mercilessly exterminated.
V.I. Lenin, defining the political position of old military specialists, wrote:
The most noticeable betrayal for the Soviet state was the betrayal of the commander of the Eastern Front, Colonel of the Tsarist Army, Muravyov. Following the performance of the Left Social Revolutionaries in Moscow, he organized a rebellion in the troops entrusted to him. The party had doubts about the reliability of the commander of the Eastern Front before, but they were not confirmed by solid evidence. The Eastern Front was the main one at that moment. The bulk of the field units of the Red Army, equipment and equipment were concentrated here. Muravyov knew military affairs well and had extensive command experience. However, the risk of leaving Muravyov as front commander was great. The Center requested the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. A member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front, K. A. Mekhonoshin, reported that during the Left Socialist Revolutionary rebellion, Muravyov publicly renounced membership in the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, citing the fact that the party opposed Soviet power. Muravyov was left in command of the front. However, the chairman of the RVS P. A. Kobozev, members of the Revolutionary Military Council K. A. Mekhonoshin and G. I. Blagonravov were asked to establish careful control over Muravyov’s activities and not leave him unattended.
Muravyov's headquarters was located in Kazan. However, he chose the city of Simbirsk as the place of his hostile activities, where at that time many responsible positions in the Soviet state apparatus were occupied by the Left Social Revolutionaries. Among them, in particular, were military, food and land commissars.
The mutiny began on July 10, 1918. Long before this, Muravyov began to gradually withdraw the units most loyal to Soviet power from Simbirsk and gather units loyal to him there. Thus, on the instructions of Muravyov, communist squads were withdrawn from Simbirsk and sent to Bugulma. On his orders, members of bandit anarchist detachments, disarmed by the communists at one time, were released from prison.
Muravyov arrived in Simbirsk on the ship Mezhen, accompanied by a detachment of a thousand people.
The commander-in-chief did not warn anyone about his arrival in Simbirsk. But this did not cause much suspicion, since it was wartime. Something else was strange. Muravyov refused to attend the meeting of the provincial executive committee, where he was invited, having learned about his arrival, and demanded that the entire composition of the provincial executive committee come to his ship. There he also summoned some military leaders and officials of the provincial party committee and the Soviets. He invited those who appeared to cooperate with him. Those who refused were arrested.
Muravyov's troops landed from barges and armored trains and occupied the post office, telegraph office, and railway stations. At the Simbirsk railway station, the new commander of the 1st Army, M.N., was arrested. By evening, Muravyov’s detachments, reinforced by an armored car, were surrounded by the party sponge and the provincial executive committee.
After this, Muravyov announced his refusal to obey the orders of the Soviet government, then he began to send telegrams to all parts of the country in which he outlined his program for the “liberation of mankind,” called for the resumption of hostilities against the Germans, and addressed the rebel Czechoslovaks, offering his leadership to them.
The provincial executive committee of Simbirsk, headed by chairman I. Vareikis, took decisive measures against the conspirators. Communist agitators were sent to the rebel units. The leaders of the conspiracy were arrested, and Muravyov, who offered armed resistance, was killed.
Muravyov's adventure cost the Soviet government dearly. The troops of the Eastern Front, having lost control for some time, retreated significantly. The cities of Bugulma, Melekes, Sengilei, Simbirsk, and Kazan were surrendered to the enemy.
“.Treason of the left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov. — said V.I. Lenin, “cost the lives of tens of thousands of workers and peasants in the war with the White Guards.”
The facts of treason and betrayal in the Red Army in the conditions of foreign military intervention and civil war required an immediate improvement in the general organization of the fight against counter-revolution in the Soviet Armed Forces, the creation of special bodies that could decisively eradicate treason and betrayal in the ranks of the army. To a certain extent, this work was carried out by the bodies of Military Control. But their main task was and continued to be the fight against espionage. The bodies of Military Control suppressed individual counter-revolutionary manifestations and created conditions for their prevention in the future. But Military Control was not fully prepared for the fight against internal counter-revolution.
In the cadres of the Military Control, a significant layer was made up of military counterintelligence officers of the old tsarist army and the army of the period of power of the Provisional Government. In terms of their social origin, way of thinking, and personal connections, these employees of the Military Control bodies were closer to the former officers of the old army who served in the Red Army than to the Red Army masses and commanders who came from workers and peasants. Some specialists in this profile went to work in Military Control, while others went to intelligence and counterintelligence of the White armies. Thus, the bodies of Military Control could not always successfully combat
internal counter-revolution.
Part of the work to combat internal counter-revolution in the army was carried out by emergency commissions - All-Russian and local. Thus, the Cheka, in the course of exposing the ambassadorial conspiracy, also known as the Lockhart case, revealed the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the naval attache of the English embassy Cromie, the head of the British mission R. Lockhart, the English intelligence officer Sidney Reilly, the American spy K. Calamatian, the French consul Grenard and others.
With the help of its employees and with the help of the commander of the 1st division of Latvian riflemen Eduard Berzin, the Cheka established that Sidney Reilly carried out subversive activities against the Red Army, trying to involve some of the Latvian riflemen in the military operations of the Anglo-American landing in Arkhangelsk against the Soviet state and in the preparations for that the time of anti-Soviet uprisings in Moscow. The seasoned English intelligence officer also tried to provoke the riflemen guarding the Kremlin to arrest members of the Council of People's Commissars, seize the State Bank, the Central Telegraph, the telephone exchange and other important institutions of the capital. Trying to organize a counter-revolutionary conspiracy among the Latvian units of the Red Army, Reilly met E. Berzin and, believing that he had recruited him, gave Berzin 1 million 200 thousand rubles to organize the conspiracy. As a result of the arrests made by the Cheka in connection with the assassination attempt on V.I. Lenin and the murder of Uritsky, military espionage materials and other evidence of subversive activities against the Red Army were discovered. Thus, at the safe house of Sidney Reilly in Sheremetyevsky Lane, where the Art Theater actress Elizaveta Otten lived, the former matron of the gymnasium, Maria Friede, was detained as a result of an ambush. A document signed “Agent No. 12” was confiscated from her. The document contained espionage information of a military nature. It spoke about the formation of Red Army divisions in Voronezh, about the Tula Arms Factory, and about the quantity of products produced by the cartridge factory. It was also said that, due to a shortage of cotton, the production of ammunition at the plant was halved. During interrogation, Maria Friede admitted that she received the package with the document from her brother, who worked in the department of the head of military communications. The document was intended for S. Reilly. At M. Friede’s apartment, where the security officers went after her arrest, M. Friede’s mother was detained with a bundle. It also contained military spy materials that belonged to her son Alexander Frida. One of the documents stated:
“In Tambov, the formation of Red Army units is proceeding extremely slowly. Of the 700 Red Army soldiers ready to be sent to the front, 400 fled. In Lipetsk they refused to go to the formation at all, saying that they would defend the interests of the Soviets only in their district. There is also a complete lack of ammunition, weapons and shells.”
Signed: “Agent No. 26.” Alexander Friede admitted to collecting information about the military, economic and political situation of the Soviet Republic on the instructions and orders of the American spy Kalamatiano.
Another document that fell into the hands of the Cheka, signed “Agent No. 26” (under this number, as it later turned out, customs officer P. M. Solyus was listed), also addressed to Kalamatiano:
"Novgorod. The formation of Red Army units is slow. The population of the province is strongly opposed to Soviet power. In Vladimir, work on Vsevobuch was stopped due to the lack of command staff, guns and food. In Sarapul, local military commanders mobilized soldiers born in 1893-94 and sailors born in 1889. In Moscow, order in the first and second artillery divisions is maintained exclusively by instructors from the first Soviet school. Of the 5 thousand soldiers for replenishment, 4 thousand fled. According to the soldiers, Lenin’s situation is hopeless...”
Here the agent was clearly, as they say, wishful thinking.
Soon, while trying to enter the Norwegian embassy, Kalamatiano himself was detained, presenting a passport in the name of student S. N. Serpovsky. In the massive cane he was carrying, encryption and up to thirty receipts for money were found. Each one ended with a number instead of a signature. The obviousness of the complete failure forced Calamatiano to confess and give the names of the people hiding under the numbers. He also admitted to the authorship of the instructions that he gave to the agents in contact with him. The instructions, also found on the cane, stated:
“The message should encrypt particularly important data as follows: troop numbers are designated as the number of pounds of sugar and molasses, as well as the price for them. Spirit of the troops - the situation in the sugar industry. Numbers of artillery units - manufacture and prices for it. Desertion from the ranks of the Red Army - emigration from Ukraine."
In the Kalamatiano network alone there were seven agents who collected information about the military, political and economic potential of the Soviet Republic. The Cheka arrested spies and counter-revolutionaries and brought them before the Revolutionary Tribunal.
In October 1918, the Cheka authorities, together with the Naval Control of the Baltic Fleet, stopped the espionage activities of British intelligence at the naval general headquarters. Its agents regularly sent information to London about the situation in the Baltic and Black Seas, about the combat readiness and combat capability of the naval vessels of the Soviet Republic, etc. During the investigation, it was established that there were traitors in the Naval Control itself.
The carefully prepared treason on the cruiser Krechet was prevented. A group of officers who remained on the ship after the revolution gathered around themselves, through deception and promises, a group of several dozen of the most politically backward sailors and intended to use it to raise an uprising. In case of failure, it was planned to take the cruiser abroad and hand it over to the British.
The fight against counter-revolution and espionage in the army was also carried out by local emergency commissions. The question of this was raised back in June 1918 at the First All-Russian Conference of the Cheka. The goal of the bourgeoisie, it was noted at the conference, is to disintegrate our army, to use it in its own interests, and we, as a body of political struggle, need to take upon ourselves the work of protecting the army from counter-revolution.
The work of emergency commissions to combat counter-revolution in the army in the rear and especially in the front-line areas intensified significantly in connection with the outbreak of hostilities in the east of the Soviet Republic. 13 June 1918 Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front
A.F. Myasnikov issued an order that actually contained a program of actions for local emergency commissions near the front line in the conditions of the outbreak of civil war. The order stated that “in the front line... a fair number of very suspicious persons are noticed, i.e.
counter-revolutionaries, provocateurs, traitors, troublemakers, traitors, saboteurs, spies and speculators. The Right Socialist Revolutionaries also belong to this camp of social scum. It is necessary to clear the front and all front-line settlements from these evil elements. In view of this, it is proposed that all local emergency commissions for the fight against counter-revolution, sabotage and profiteering take the most urgent and energetic measures to search for the above-mentioned criminals and bring them before military courts.”
The same order established military courts.
Fulfilling their duties, local emergency commissions of the Volga region did everything in their power to combat counter-revolution in the rear of the Red Army. But they could not fully solve this problem either. The Cheka of the front-line areas were largely civilian bodies and the life of the army; they did not know its specifics and features. In addition, local Chekas were formed and organized their work on a territorial principle, and not in relation to the system of military units stationed on their territory, which often changed their areas of location.
All these reasons created an urgent need to create a special body to combat counter-revolution in the army. Extraordinary commissions formed directly in military formations became such a body. The first major step in creating the Cheka in the army and combining their efforts with the activities of local Chekas in the front-line areas was the decision of the Soviet government to form an emergency commission to combat counter-revolution on the Czechoslovak (Eastern) Front on July 16, 1918, signed by V. I. Lenin.
The resolution stated that the commission was being created to successfully combat the growing counter-revolution in connection with the Czechoslovak uprising. The Council of People's Commissars instructed member of the Cheka board M. Ya. Latsis to head the commission. Latsis was a prominent Soviet party and government figure. He had been a member of the party since 1905. He took an active part in the first Russian revolution. He was repeatedly subjected to repression by the tsarist government. During the October Uprising of 1917 in Petrograd, he was a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. In 1919 he was Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Cheka.
After arriving on the Eastern Front, M. Ya. Latsis was introduced to the Revolutionary Military Council and approved as chairman of the Revolutionary Tribunal of the front.
Regarding his appointment to the Czechoslovak Front, Latsis, in a conversation with a correspondent of the Izvestia newspaper, said:
“If the fight against the Czechoslovaks is dragging on and is not going at the pace that we have the right to count on, this is largely explained by the fact that until now in the front line of the Czechoslovak region there has not been proper unity in the actions of the Soviet bodies in the fight against counter-revolution. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovaks are strong not so much on their own as with the support of the counter-revolutionary layers and classes of the front line, which greatly complicates the radical struggle against the Czechoslovak adventure.”
With the formation of the commission by M. Ya. Latsis, which soon received the name Front-line, the beginning was made of uniting the activities of all organs of the fight against counter-revolution at the front and in the front-line zone and the creation of the Cheka in army formations. The Kazan and Simbirsk provincial Chekas, the Arzamas district Cheka, and after the liberation from the White Czechs and White Guards of the Samara province were directly subordinated to the front-line commission - the Samara provincial emergency commission. Operational tasks of the Front-line Cheka were also carried out by some other provincial emergency commissions - Saratov, Astrakhan, Nizhny Novgorod, Vyatka, Penza. Having such powerful support from the Front-line and local provincial Cheka, the army emergency commissions of the Eastern Front quickly gained strength and experience. The Extraordinary Commission at the headquarters of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front was engaged, for example, in identifying persons who soldered Red Army soldiers, and also identified speculators and plunderers of military property, especially on the railways.
The army Chekas paid a lot of attention to work in front-line villages, where the influence of the kulaks was strong and where there was a serious danger of disorganization of the army. The commission's employees, as was done, for example, in the 2nd Army, went to areas liberated from the enemy and helped restore Soviet power there, clearing the districts of the remnants of White Guard gangs. A lot of work was done by the Frontline Extraordinary Commission in the districts of the Kazan province in those days when the battles for Kazan were going on.
In August 1918, a conspiracy was discovered in the 4th Army, one of its leaders was a military intelligence officer, a former rich Cossack, an officer of the 17th border guard regiment Burenin. He made his way into the ranks of the Red Army and, thanks to his experience and education, quickly took the high post of head of the army's intelligence department. Burenin contacted the counter-revolutionary Cossack “Yaik government” and passed on secret information for it. Among the conspirators was the commander of the cavalry regiment of the Ural Division, a former tsarist officer Bredikhin.
Bredikhin and Burenin carried out their spy duties zealously. As it turned out later during interrogations, Bredikhin even had gratitude from the “Yaik government.” However, the owners demanded even more active and decisive action from Burenin and Bredikhin. Thus was born the plan of treacherous sabotage, which was supposed to put the 4th Army out of action. It was assumed that on the night of August 20, Bredikhin would alert the regiment, ostensibly to pre-empt an attack by the Cossacks and move out to meet them. Having left the trenches, he had to give the password for that night to the Cossacks. Then the regiment will maneuver to the side, which will give the enemy the opportunity to occupy the regiment's location.
The Cossacks found themselves in the rear of the division without a fight. Using the password, that same night in small groups they were supposed to infiltrate the location of other units of the division, destroy the headquarters and the detachments left unprotected on the flanks. The enemy will introduce other units into the gap created and achieve success along the entire front. But although the sabotage was prepared carefully and secretly, the betrayal was discovered in a timely manner, and Burenin was arrested. Having learned about the arrests at headquarters, Bredikhin and some other traitors from his inner circle fled. The remaining participants in the conspiracy were arrested and put on trial.
The security officers also successfully fought against enemy scouts, spies, as well as saboteurs, provocateurs, alarmists and persons who took the path of abuse of power. So, for example, when the commissar of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front V.V. Kuibyshev became aware that one staff employee during a business trip showed tyranny, demanding a separate locomotive and carriage for himself, was drinking and playing cards, he gave instructions to the army Cheka take care of this matter. The violator of military discipline and order was brought to strict liability by the army Cheka.
The duties of military security officers were charged primarily with fighting political crimes and offenses that led or could lead to a weakening of the combat effectiveness of the Red Army units. However, in practice, it was very difficult to strictly outline the range of affairs that the army Chekas were supposed to deal with. Anti-Soviet agitators, White Guard spies, speculators, plunderers of national and military property, moonshine dealers who soldered military personnel, saboteurs, looters, malicious violators of military discipline - this is not a complete list of those from whom the Red Army was purged with the help of military security officers. The volume of work of army emergency commissions is evidenced by, for example, the fact that only the emergency commission of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front from July to October 1918 was forced to initiate 145 cases against counter-revolutionaries of various kinds, spies, deserters, saboteurs, etc.
The accumulated positive experience of the army Chekas on the Eastern Front, as well as the emerging parallelism in their work with other bodies in the fight against counter-revolution, required a generalization of the practice of their activities and, on this basis, a clearer definition of the organizational structure and assignment of responsibilities. For this purpose, the front-line Cheka is developing regulations and instructions for the army Cheka to combat counter-revolution on the Czechoslovak front. According to the Regulations, the purpose of the army Cheka is recognized as “the fight against counter-revolution in all its manifestations, espionage, drunkenness, crimes in office, etc. in the army environment.”
The Instructions recorded the real position that the army Chekas occupied in the system of military-political bodies of the army. Army Chekas were organized under the political departments of the armies, their staff was determined, and their activities were monitored and monitored. Front-line commissions were declared by the Regulations to be the highest authority in the sense of giving instructions, instructions and orders. According to the Instructions, the Army Chekas, unlike the bodies of Military Control, had all the rights of a punitive body, including the application of capital punishment, the decision on which was made by a majority vote of the commission members.
Army security officers were ordered to conduct strict constant supervision over various specialists from the non-proletarian ranks who worked at headquarters, military and civilian institutions. The Army Chekas maintained close contact with political departments and party cells in the units. In cases of counter-revolutionary action or sabotage on a large scale in any military unit, Cheka employees were obliged to conduct an investigation and take measures appropriate to the situation.
The experience of creating army Chekas on the Eastern Front was soon used on the Southern Front. Chekas are also formed here to combat counter-revolution in the field armies of the front. Thus, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Department of the Southern Front, a front-wide emergency commission is formed with the subordination of all commissions in the area of operation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Department of the Southern Front. Candidates for appointment to the board of this commission were nominated by the political department of the Revolutionary Military Council and the Astrakhan regional party committee.
At the end of November 1918, the Second All-Russian Conference of the Cheka was convened, which decided to create the Cheka at the front and in the armies of all fronts. The conference spoke in favor of granting front-line army Chekas the right to independently appoint commissars of these commissions in military units and formations. The resolution stated that the front-line and army Chekas were subordinate in their activities to the Cheka and the military department. The conference instructed the Cheka to develop, together with the military department, precise instructions for the front-line and army Chekas.
In connection with the creation of a relatively harmonious Cheka system in the army (front-line Cheka - district Cheka - army Cheka), the front-line Cheka was subject to dissolution. After the II All-Russian Conference of Extraordinary Commissions, the process of creating emergency commissions in the army accelerated significantly. They began to form on almost all fronts. The chairmen of the army and local Chekas were elected by the Revolutionary Council, and approved by the front-line Cheka. The commissars of these Chekas in divisions, regiments and battalions were appointed by political commissars of army units and formations. All military Chekas were maintained at the expense of the military department. They worked under the guidance and control of the political departments of the armies.
The Army Cheka consisted of two departments. The first department was designed to fight espionage, counter-revolution, the spread of false rumors, provocations, drunkenness and other crimes. The second department monitored the correct execution by army officials of the decrees of the central and local authorities, and fought against waste, theft and other crimes.
The front-line Chekas were also charged with protecting political commissars, commanders, chiefs of staff, members of military councils and other responsible military leaders from the terror of counter-revolutionaries.
The formation of the Cheka in the army also required a single centralized body to guide them. On December 9, 1918, the Collegium of the Cheka formed a military department to lead the fight against counter-revolution in the army. One of the first important practical steps of the military department of the Cheka was the creation of a military registration bureau. All officers of the old army who lived in Moscow or came to Moscow had to register and register with this bureau. They had to register even if they changed their place of residence. At the same time, a special bureau was created at the Moscow District Military Commissariat, headed by security officer A. Kh. Artuzov. The activities of the special bureau contributed to strengthening the connection between the Cheka and the Moscow Cheka with units of the Moscow garrison.
Thus, in the summer of 1918, two types of government bodies emerged, participating in the fight against the subversive activities of international and domestic counter-revolution against the Armed Forces. These were the bodies of Military Control, which fought mainly against espionage in the Red Army everywhere, and the Army Cheka, designed to suppress counter-revolution in the military environment at the fronts, to organize and control this work in the front line.
Dolgopolov Yu. B.
From the book “War Without a Front Line”, 1981
St. Petersburg historian about the “democrat” Kolchak, mass executions in the Kazan province and the Sviyazhsk decimation of Trotsky
Realnoe Vremya recently published publications about the retreat in the Civil War and the Red Terror perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. The materials caused discussions among our readers, some of whom felt that there was an idealization of the white movement. Our newspaper turned to the famous historian, associate professor at the Institute of History of St. Petersburg State University Ilya Ratkovsky. In an interview with Realnoe Vremya, the expert talked about what the Red and White Terror was, whether Kolchak was a democrat and how the Bolsheviks were able to win over the masses.
Terror of the Reds vs Terror of the Whites: fundamental differences
- Ilya Sergeevich, what were the fundamental differences between the white and red terror?
White and red terror have both common features and differences. Firstly, the Red Terror was more regulated and controlled by the authorities. He was more public. Thus, newspapers published lists of people executed and the crimes for which they were executed (although these lists were not complete). You can also point to a whole series of red amnesties, under which hundreds and thousands of people were released. White terror in some cases was regulated by public orders, for example, Admiral Kolchak, generals Rozanov, Volkov and others. However, more often he passed through the “secret part”, without publications in newspapers. I will point out the order of Lieutenant General N.M. Kisilevsky on June 7, 1919 about the deployment of a network of concentration camps in the south of Russia in Azov, Novorossiysk, Stavropol, in Medvezhensky and Svyatokrestovsky districts of the Stavropol province. Miners, workers of other professions, former military officials who “forgot their oath,” etc., were sent there. Up to 20 thousand people would die for various reasons in the Azov camp alone. But officially, publicly, this did not happen. Not published. The Reds directly declared terror, the Whites practically did not use such terminology, preferring various other terms. Despite the fact that concentration camps, hostages, mass executions, destruction of populated areas - the whites had all this.
The second difference is the direction of the terror. The Red Terror positioned itself as aimed at suppressing the exploiting classes, the bourgeoisie and their representatives represented by various parties. Basically, its victims were officers who did not cooperate with the Soviet regime, partly the clergy and wealthy village circles. The Red Terror was also used to eliminate banditry: up to a third of the Cheka executions were executions of criminals. Lists of executed criminals were often published in Soviet newspapers. The leadership of the white movement preferred to declare the complete destruction of the Bolsheviks and Bolshevik agents, Soviet leaders, etc. This was very widely interpreted. If a person was a participant in any unauthorized movement, he automatically became a potential Kremlin agent. Strikers, dissatisfied residents of villages and cities, and, of course, suspicious elements, which included Jews, Latvians, Hungarians, Chinese, etc. Certain categories of workers, for example, railway workers, suffered greatly from the repression. Martial law and the possible death penalty for them back in 1917 proposed to be approved by L.G. Kornilov. Of course, sailors. At the same time, I will note one more point: if many “formers” became victims of the Red Terror, the overwhelming majority were men 20-40 years old, then both men and women became victims of whites if they were subjected to the “pernicious” influence of new revolutionary ideas.
There were several reasons for the emergence of terror as a mass phenomenon during the civil war. There was a common factor: the civil war factor. Often this was a reaction to resistance to mobilization processes from above. Let's say the Slavgorod uprising, which was brutally suppressed by Ataman Annenkov. Livensky riot, which was suppressed by the Reds. There was, of course, an intervention factor. Representatives of foreign powers did not really “restrain” their behavior in Russia.
Martial law and the possible death penalty for certain categories of workers were proposed to be approved by L.G. back in 1917. Kornilov
The key factor was the social factor: the split in society, already very deep before the First World War, only intensified. The blood of the First World War played its role. Social hatred of the lower classes for the upper classes, of the upper classes for the lower classes - all this existed. The revolutionary year of 1917 changed little. Some wanted to drive the army and rear back into the disciplinary space, including through the restoration of the institution of the death penalty and concentration camps (Kornilov’s summer project of 1917). Others want to achieve not only the abolition of these possible measures, but also to get rid of such initiators forever. Therefore, in the fall of 1917, Moscow cadets lynched 200 soldiers of the Kremlin garrison, and in Mogilev (Stavka), not finding Kornilov, who had time to leave, the arriving soldiers raised General Dukhonin at bayonets, who released the general.
It was a struggle for their statehood and their idea of it. Some did not see them as a place for the exploiting classes. Others wanted to put the lower classes in their place. There were motives of social revenge, and there were motives of personal revenge. They took revenge for what was lost, they took revenge for what they did not receive.
“Democrat” Kolchak, fascinated by the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”
- Today there are two extremes. One of them - romanticization of the white movement. Is Kolchak really - such a democrat, as some figures claim? Which forces or bodies of that time were more democratic (KOMUCH, Constituent Assembly, etc.)?
Definitely Admiral A.V. Kolchak was not a democrat. There were practically no such people among the military. For Kolchak it was more than a rejection of the idea. He hated liberals, even his main opponent V.I. He placed Lenin much higher than A.F. Kerensky, whom he openly despised. He was not a supporter of the constitution either. All the talk about “Russian Washington” was just an echo of propaganda, including that of the Americans. He was and remained a monarchist, and an ideological monarchist of an extreme right-wing bias, who read the Protocols of the Elders of Zion with enthusiasm. In the fall of 1918, representatives of the white movement in the East of Russia were “awaiting” precisely such a figure. It is characteristic that immediately after the Kolchak coup, political censorship was established in the coverage of the events that took place. Minister of Internal Affairs A.N. Hattenberger already in the first hours after the coup on November 18 sent out a special circular to the provincial and volost commissars. In it, he demanded to prevent discussion in the press and at meetings of “what is happening,” expressing a recommendation not to stop, if necessary, before taking decisive measures, up to and including the arrest of both individuals and the boards and leaders of parties and organizations.
Definitely Admiral A.V. Kolchak was not a democrat. There were practically no such people among the military. For Kolchak it was more than rejection of the idea
This was just the beginning of the hard-line New Deal. All protests against the new authorities were harshly suppressed; there was no liberalism or democracy. An example is the suppression of the December uprising in Omsk, where up to one and a half thousand people were shot. The entry in the diary of General Pepelyaev is typical: “Liberal rabbits babble about extrajudicial executions.” Kolchak was ill during the suppression of the uprising, but after recovering, he was promoted to new ranks and titles of organizers of the massacres. So, staff captain P.M. Rubtsov (the head of the firing squad) was promoted to lieutenant colonel on December 23, 1918.
Kolchak responded to new speeches with new measures. The March 1918 order of General Rozanov on the execution of hostages, the execution of every tenth person and the destruction of rebellious villages following the Japanese example is widely known. It is less known that this is not a general’s, but an admiral’s initiative. The order itself was transmitted along the chain from Kolchak to Rozanov, and Kolchak’s original source of Rozanov’s order was recently discovered. The order was in effect for more than three months and cost 8 thousand lives during the suppression of the Yenisei uprising alone. So Kolchak was not a democrat.
KOMUCH was formally more democratic, but it is difficult to consider it as such, given how this regime was established in the Volga region. It is difficult to consider a regime that shot 5 thousand people on its territories within a few months as democratic. Kazan, Ivashchenkovo, Samara - these are just three examples of thousands of executions in the region. And there were other cases.
By the way, what are your impressions after the film “Admiral” with Konstantin Khabensky and Liza Boyarskaya in the lead roles?
For me, this movie is a beautiful picture that has little to do with history. The actors are good, the film is not. Even harmful, since it creates a distorted image of the events of the civil war, and even the biography of Kolchak. However, a lot has been written about this...
“For me, this movie is a beautiful picture that has little to do with history. The actors are good, the film is not. Even harmful, since it creates a distorted image of the events of the civil war, and even the biography of Kolchak.” Photo kg-portal.ru
Executed in Kazan
You mentioned that the White Terror also occurred in Kazan. Tell us in more detail about the white and red terror in the Kazan province.
The Whites did not stay in Kazan very long. On August 6 and 7, 1918, through the joint efforts of the 1st Czechoslovak Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Josef Jiří Švec, together with a detachment of V.O. Kappel, with support from inside the city by a Serbian battalion under the command of Major M. Blagotich, Kazan was taken. According to the memoirs of Kappel resident V.O. Vyrypaev, according to the verdict of the military court in the city, 350 soldiers of only Latvian riflemen who were captured were immediately shot. Other “international” executions of Austrians, Serbs, Czechs, Jews, etc. also took place in the city. Both those captured and those captured in the hospital were destroyed. In total, about 500 people were killed during such international executions, including the aforementioned Latvian execution. Soviet and party workers were also killed. Among others, during these days, the chairman of the Kazan Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) Ya.S. was shot near the walls of the Kazan Kremlin. Sheikman, leader of the Bolsheviks of the Bondyuzhny plant and the first chairman of the Yelabuga district Council of Deputies S.N. Gassar, Commissioner of Justice of Kazan M.I. Mezhlauk, trade union leader A.P. Komlev, representative of the Samara party organization Khaya Khataevich, the organizers of the working groups, brothers Egor and Konstantin Petriev and many others. On August 19, 1918, the entire composition of the Central Muslim Military Collegium, headed by its chairman Mullanur Vakhitov, was shot.
A description of the Kazan events was left by a member of KOMUCH, a Menshevik in 1918, and then a Bolshevik figure I.M. Maisky: “... already in the evening, crossing the central part of the city, I was involuntarily carried away by the stream of people, rapidly rushing somewhere in one direction. It turned out that everyone was running towards some large quadrangular yard, from inside which shots were heard. There stood groups of captured Bolsheviks: Red Army soldiers, workers, women - and against them - Czech soldiers with raised rifles. Through the gap in the fence one could see what was going on in the yard. A volley rang out and the prisoners fell. Before my eyes, two groups of 15 people in each were shot. I couldn't stand it anymore. Seized with indignation, I rushed to the Social Democratic Committee and began to demand that a deputation be immediately sent to the military authorities to protest against the extrajudicial executions. The committee members just shrugged their shoulders in response.” In total, in the first days, according to archival materials, more than a thousand people will be shot in Kazan.
1st Infantry Regiment in Kazan, August - September 1918. Photo humus.livejournal.com
Later, after the suppression of the uprising of Kazan workers on September 3, 1918 by the White Czechs and White Guards (city commandant General V. Rychkov) with the help of artillery and armored cars, more than 600 more people would be shot in the city. Executions also accompanied the later withdrawal of white units from the city. On September 22, funerals will take place for about 50 victims of white terror in the city. In total, more than one and a half thousand people will become victims of whites in the city and counties.
Red repressions also took place near Kazan. The most famous are the August Sviyazhsk executions of Trotsky. In the conditions of the battles for this key city, he gave the order to shoot every tenth member of the Soviet army who fled from the front; among others, the regiment commander was shot. There were also retaliatory measures after the liberation of Kazan. They were conducted by the famous security officer M.Ya. Latsis. In the first days, the number of people shot by the Cheka was minimal: six people. First of all, this was determined by the mass flight from Kazan of the “bourgeois population” of the city, who feared retaliatory reprisals. In one of the St. Petersburg archives, I found a telegram from Latsis to the Petrograd Bolshevik Zaks, where he explained this situation: “Kazan was depopulated, only workers remained, there was no one to judge, he sent an expedition around the district.” A similar telegram, but in the Moscow archives and to another Bolshevik figure, was revealed by the famous civil war specialist S.S. Voitikov. Therefore, the Red Terror in the region could not initially be carried out due to the lack of an object of implementation. Although some lynchings did take place. This is how the Red Army lynching of 10 monks and novices of the Zilantov Assumption Monastery is known. Later the situation changed. There were also executions of participants in the Kazan massacres, officers of the tsarist army and others. However, they did not reach the level of the White Kazan terror. Attempts to justify these repressions by the security officer Latsis in the November magazine “Red Terror” were suppressed by E. Yaroslavsky and V.I. Lenin.
How the Whites Lost the Information War to the Reds
- Why is there such polarization between adherents of the white and red movements?
Actually, the answer can already be found in the question you asked. Adepts are zealous adherents of an idea. In this case, adherents of the white movement cannot forgive the Reds for military defeat (they do not recognize moral defeat) and its consequences. For them, all Sovietness, all the “Bolshevik” power of the twentieth century is a consequence of the victory of the Reds. Some of them have ancestors belonging to the “overthrown” layers of the population, others simply associate themselves with the white movement, a single and indivisible Russia. The latter, not the majority, are often descendants of the “red side” in the civil war. Perhaps this is due to the tragic pages of our history in the 1930s, when a number of descendants of those who suffered from collectivization and repression already associated themselves not with the Soviet regime, but with its opponents, having forgotten about the previous choice of their ancestors. The events of the civil war were forgotten, the resentment remained... In turn, the “red” adherents have something to remember. Not only the civil war, but also the Great Patriotic War, where Hitler was supported by quite a lot of white figures. And the modern arrogance of the “new whites”, as well as the “new Russians” towards the lower classes, causes a reaction of rejection.
The Red Terror of the Civil War took place against the background of White Terror and was a consequence of the internal Russian struggle to establish Soviet power. A manifestation of the split in society
- Are the repressions of 1937 a continuation of the Red Terror?
These are different phenomena. The Red Terror of the Civil War took place against the background of White Terror and was a consequence of the internal Russian struggle to establish Soviet power. A manifestation of the split in society. Later events were aimed at the preventive elimination of the so-called “fifth column”, as it was understood by the Soviet leadership. There was no mass anti-Soviet terror during this period. The determining factor was the external, not the internal factor. Therefore, among the victims of the repressions of the 1930s, representatives of “foreign” nations predominated (for example, in Polish cases, as well as Greek, Estonian, etc.), as well as previously dispossessed special settlers. Thus, the reasons and orientation are completely different.
- Why did the Reds and not the Whites win the civil war?
There was also more massive support from the masses, and there was work with the masses. Peasants and workers could associate themselves with the Bolsheviks, but this was problematic with the white movement. The Reds offered and campaigned for what was understandable and close, the Whites did not offer and, especially, did not campaign. They gave from above what they considered necessary and possible for themselves. The red choice was a social choice, the white one an individual choice. We can say that millions defeated thousands.
Timur Rakhmatullin, archival photos used
Reference
Ratkovsky Ilya Sergeevich- Associate Professor, Institute of History, St. Petersburg State University, Ph.D.
- In 1992 he graduated with honors from the Faculty of History of St. Petersburg State University.
- From 1993 to the present, he has been working at the Faculty of History of St. Petersburg State University (now the Institute of History of St. Petersburg State University).
- In 2004, for his great contribution to personnel training, development of education and science, and in connection with the 280th anniversary of St. Petersburg State University, he was awarded a Certificate of Honor from the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation.
- Areas of interest are the history of government institutions in Russia, the history of the revolution and civil war in Russia, the history of the Cheka-NKVD of the USSR, the history of the Great Patriotic War.
- Author of more than 150 scientific and scientific-methodological works, including several monographs.
- In 2017, his monograph “Chronicle of the White Terror in Russia (1917-1920)” was published. M., Algorithm, 2017.
The history of Kazan in 1918 is full of dramatic collisions and incidents. This is due to the consequences of two revolutions, the beginning of a civil war, the flame of which at first smoldered, and then began to flare up with increasing force.
We can say that a similar situation was typical for many Russian cities of that time. However, there was something unique and special in the history of our city at this time that needs to be mentioned.
Since ancient times, Kazan has been at the crossroads of trade routes and thereby connected East and West. In 1918, our city also became a kind of crossroads. It was here in August-September of that year that the fate of the revolution was decided, which means the future route our country would take was determined. In addition, in Kazan there were issues of “local” significance, no less, and in some ways even more important, than events of a republican scale.
A characteristic feature of any revolution is a surge in activity in the creation of mass media. At the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918, up to 50 titles of various newspapers were published in Kazan and the district centers of the province, of which only 10 were party-Soviet, the rest were bourgeois and petty-bourgeois publications. Thus, in Kazan the organ of the provincial executive committee “Banner of the Revolution”, the left-wing Socialist Revolutionary “For Land and Freedom”, and the Menshevik “Rabocheye Delo” were published (the last two newspapers were published until May 1918).
A serious alternative to the Bolshevik party organization, which numbered no more than a thousand people, was represented by the party organization of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, which numbered three thousand people. The Kazan Provincial Executive Committee was headed by the Bolshevik Ya.S. Sheinkman, but the Left Socialist Revolutionaries had many representatives in the executive committee. They also occupied other responsible positions. Thus, the Left Socialist Revolutionaries headed the Kazan Garrison Committee and had a majority in the provincial food committee. In addition, the first commander of the Eastern Front (the first front to arise in the civil war) was also the left Socialist Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov.
Not so numerous (only a few hundred members), but also very influential, was the organization of the Cadet Party. It relied on the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and the clergy. In addition, by the summer of 1918, about 5 thousand officers of the former tsarist army were stationed in the city, who had a strong underground organization.
Thus, almost the entire spectrum of political forces was represented in Kazan. In conditions of choice and search for a compromise path, such political pluralism could have a positive meaning. However, another trend prevailed. The tendency is not towards agreement, but towards opposition. The situation was aggravated by the fact that each of these parties had either significant political weight and influence among the masses, or real armed force, which in the conditions of the civil war was a very significant argument in the fight against political opponents. It is no coincidence that Kazan became the scene of conspiracies, most of them unfulfilled and unfulfilled. Here the actions of the organization of officers and the “Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom” under the leadership of B.V. were discovered and prevented. Savinkova.
Facts of terror took place on both sides. If on the part of the counter-revolutionary forces they consisted mainly in the murder of prominent Soviet officials, then on the part of the Soviet government these were arrests and preemptive strikes. The Bolsheviks had a special body to carry out such a policy - the Provincial Department of the Cheka, created in January 1918 and headed by G.Sh. Olkenitsky. Later, he himself became a victim of terror by the forces of counter-revolution. It was in Kazan that the first created front-line Cheka was located from July to September.
The city's population in June 1918 was 146 thousand people. Kazan was the center of a multinational province. In this regard, the national issue was high on the agenda. Attempts to solve it were made both “from above” and “from below”. There was no shortage of projects. Thus, there was an idea to create the Ural-Volga state as part of the RSFSR. This project was developed by G. Sharaf. This state was to include the territory of Kazan, Ufa, part of the Vyatka, Orenburg, Perm, Samara and Simbirsk provinces. For the practical implementation of the project, a special Board was created headed by G. Sharaf. Moreover, during the work of the second All-Russian Muslim Military Congress (8 (21).I – 20.II (3.III) 1918), the day for the proclamation of the “Idel-Ural” State was set - March 1. In response to this, the Kazan Council created a revolutionary headquarters, and the congress delegates were arrested. The remaining part of the delegates continued their meetings in the Zabulachnaya part of the city, proclaiming a republic of the same name there. At the congress, the Muslim People's Commissariat was formed, the Muslim Revolutionary Headquarters headed by G. Munasypov was created, and the formation of Tatar national detachments began.
Troops were sent to disperse the Zabulachnaya Republic. The Tatar troops were disarmed. Then all the arrested delegates of the congress were released, but with the obligation not to take any action to organize the Ural-Volga state. Later, in March 1918, the activities of the All-Russian Muslim Military Council (Harbi Shuro) were banned, and in March-May all national governing bodies elected at the All-Russian Muslim congresses were dissolved.
The People's Commissariat of the RSFSR developed an alternative project for the proposed form of national statehood of the Tatars and Bashkirs - the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic. The corresponding decree was signed on March 22, 1918. The Central Muslim Commissariat, headed by M.M., took part in its development. Vakhitov. However, this project was not destined to come to life.
The drama of the situation, according to Professor A.L. Litvin, was that “both sides advocated recognition of the power of the Soviets. But some proceeded from the understanding of the Soviets as a democratic institution of power, others saw in them an organ for implementing the ideas of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the violent assertion of power and, advocating initiatives from the localities, they supported only those that coincided with the opinion of the center.”
Later, historians will write: “The events associated with the attempt to proclaim the Volga-Ural state, the murder of Vaisov, the arrests and military defeat of the “Zabulachnaya Republic” are the beginning of the civil war in the region.” However, such awareness will only come with time.
In the meantime, Kazan is a rear city. It is with this in mind that part of the gold reserves of the Soviet Republic is brought here. A significant part of it was brought here from Petrograd back in 1915, when the Germans captured the Baltic states. Jewelry from Moscow, Tambov and Samara was delivered in early May 1918. As of June 1, 600 million rubles worth of valuables in gold, as well as about 200 million rubles of silver, were concentrated in Kazan. After the Komuchevtsy and Czechoslovakians left the city, gold, silver and platinum were exported for a total amount of 651,532,117 rubles 86 kopecks. The gold reserves were returned to Kazan only on May 3, 1920. At the same time, in the certificate of the presence of gold in the Russian Federation, the returned values were calculated at 395,222,772 rubles 81 kopecks.
Despite the fact that the city was considered a rear city, as early as April 1918, armed detachments were being trained in Kazan. A volunteer artillery brigade, a Muslim socialist regiment, a socialist detachment of sailors and other units were formed here. Not long before this, the 1st Soviet Kazan infantry courses opened. Military units formed in Kazan fought against A.I. Dutova. International units were also formed near Kazan (the Karl Marx battalion). In June 1918, the Academy of the General Staff was evacuated here from Yekaterinburg. Later, military formations fighting in this direction will be regrouped and consolidated into the Fifth Army of the Eastern Front.
The mutiny of the Czechoslovak Corps radically changed the situation in the region. The city turned from the rear to the front. On May 31, the Kazan provincial executive committee decided to declare the province under martial law. I.I. was appointed provincial military commissar. Mezhlauk. The situation worsened even more in the second half of July, when a real threat of capture of Komuch by the People's Army loomed over Kazan. Commander of the Eastern Front I.I. On July 20, Vatsetis declared not only the province, but also the city under martial law.
According to V.I. Lebedev, one of the political leaders of Komuch, it was decided to take Kazan for the following reasons: here “all the gold of the Russian state was located... There was also a colossal amount of all sorts of quartermaster and artillery equipment and weapons... There were a lot of officers in Kazan, among whom a significant number were organized to act against the Bolsheviks and whom the Bolsheviks had already begun to mercilessly shoot. In addition, Kazan was a large political center of Russia and the main center of the Volga region.”
An attempt to take the city on the move on August 5 failed. We had to land troops in the area of the village of Bolshie Otary, and later in the area of the piers. Only after long and stubborn battles did the city fall on August 7th. The battles for the liberation of Kazan lasted for a month until September 10.
Without exaggeration, we can say that it was near Kazan that the forces of the warring parties were born. To a much greater extent, this applies to the Red Army, since its five armies, which were in their infancy, were opposed by well-trained and organized units of the Czechoslovak Corps, as well as officer units, headed by one of the most talented military leaders of the White Army - V. ABOUT. Kappel. As for volunteerism, it did not play a significant role in the People's Army.
Much has been said and written about the significance of the battles for Kazan. The number of works in which this issue is reflected in one way or another has now exceeded one hundred. The history of the battles for the city is devoted to the monograph by M.K.Mukharyamov, A.L.Litvin. However, it is difficult to say better than the eyewitnesses and participants in those events. Let’s give the floor to Larisa Reisner, the intelligence commissar of the Fifth Army headquarters, a participant in the battles for the city: “...Everyone understood the situation like this: another step back would open up the Volga to Nizhny and the path to Moscow for “them”; further retreat would be the beginning of the end, a death sentence for the Republic of Soviets. And since retreat from the Volga then meant complete collapse, the ability to hold on, to stand, leaning your back against the bridge and fighting off on all sides, gave the right to real hope... Retreat means the Czechs in Nizhny and Moscow, Sviyazhsk and the bridge do not give up “This means the recapture of Kazan by the Red Army.”
The victory near Kazan was called in the newspaper “Izvestia Narkomvoena” “Valmy of the Russian Revolution” (Valmy is a city in France, near which the first defeat of the counter-revolutionary coalition was inflicted during the revolution).
It is not surprising that it was near Kazan that many things happened for the first time: for the first time, aviation was used here on such a scale; for the first time, a military unit was awarded the Red Banner (we are talking about the 5th Zemgale Regiment, which received this banner for the defense of the city); For the first time, it was near Kazan that decimations were used - by order of Trotsky, every tenth soldier of one of the military formations was shot.
Thus, in Kazan in 1918, issues of not only “local” significance were being resolved: (to be or not to be Tatar statehood, and if so, in what form?), the importance and significance of which is difficult to overestimate. Near Kazan, the fate of the revolution was decided, the choice of the path that Russia was to take was made. The condition for this choice was political pluralism. However, the escalating civil war turned political opponents into class and implacable enemies; The main argument in this case was force.
The history of Kazan in 1918 is full of many dramatic pages. However, during the civil war, such a fate of the city and its inhabitants was not the exception, but rather the rule. It is the task of descendants to know, remember and learn from such events the necessary lessons with which our history is so rich.
Albert VALIAKHMETOV,
postgraduate student of the Department of Historiography and Source Studies of KSU
"Kazan Stories", No. 12, 2003
/jdoc:include type="modules" name="position-6" />