Look at the paradox of the capitalist economy: in the country of IKS there is brick, concrete, land, workers, smart heads, in short, there is everything to build many, many residential buildings that the population needs. At the same time, almost no houses are being built. Ask why? But there is no investor! - they will answer you.

Guys, to build a house you don’t need money, but bricks. Since you have bricks and the houses you need are not being built, it means “something is wrong in the conservatory.”

But what about without market investments? - you ask. The answer to this question is in our history.

During Stalin's times, industrialization was carried out with almost complete absence of market investment. Domestic opportunities for market financing were very scarce, and foreign countries were in no hurry to help. As A. Zverev wrote in the book “Notes of the Minister” (of Finance): “The Communist Party rejected the possibility of receiving foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us “human” ones.” According to some estimates (1, 2), Western loans amounted to about 3-4% of capital investments during the first five-year plan (and later it was no longer necessary), so they did not play a special role.

At the same time, industrialization proceeded at a fantastic pace.

Market investments (received by the state through the grain monopoly) during industrialization: first five-year plan, first year = 38%, second year = 18%, third year and beyond = 0%! Industrial growth: first five-year plan = +1500 new factories and enterprises, second five-year plan = +4000 new factories and enterprises. This is some kind of nightmare for a liberal market economist: investment is reduced to zero, but the economy grows and grows.

How did the financial system work, how did financiers manage to build a system without an “omnipotent investor.”

During the credit reform of 1929-30, a double-circuit monetary system was built in the USSR. Non-cash and cash were mutually inconvertible. Non-cash money ensured the functioning of construction, industry, and agriculture, regardless of market supply and demand. Cash provided market transactions.

Essentially it was an economy with two different types of money, the functions of which were different. Cash could perform all the generally accepted functions of money within a country, but its applicability was actually limited to retail trade.

The functions of non-cash money were curtailed - the function of accumulation and the function of creating treasures were taken away from them. In a socialist economy, which does not aim to make a profit, these functions turned out to be simply harmful. Deprived of these functions, non-cash money could only work within the socialist segment of the economy. Outside this segment, non-cash money simply did not exist. It was useless to steal them because they could not be spent in the market. They cannot be given a bribe for the same reason. This money could only be used for its intended purpose - to ensure economic transactions between enterprises.

Due to the fact that the industrial (non-cash) and market (cash) monetary circuits were isolated from each other, the country could invest in its own development as much non-cash money as needed and as physical capabilities allowed. Non-cash money was simply poured into the economy when it was needed and withdrawn from the economy when the need for it disappeared. At the same time, there could be no inflation, no rise in prices in principle, because non-cash money could not flow into the market circuit where cash was used.

Or how to quadruple the economy in 10 years with zero investment

Look at the paradox of the capitalist economy: in the country of IKS there is brick, concrete, land, workers, smart heads, in short, there is everything to build many, many residential buildings that the population needs. At the same time, almost no houses are being built. Ask why? But there is no investor! - they will answer you.

Guys, to build a house you don’t need money, but bricks. Since you have bricks and the houses you need are not being built, it means “something is wrong in the conservatory.”

But what about without market investments? - you ask.

The answer to this question is in our history. During Stalin's times, industrialization was carried out with almost complete absence of market investment. Domestic opportunities for market financing were very meager, and foreign countries were in no hurry to help. As I wrote A. Zverev in the book “Notes of the Minister” (finance) :“The Communist Party rejected the possibility of obtaining foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us “human” ones.”

At the same time, industrialization proceeded at a fantastic pace.

Market investments (received by the state through the grain monopoly) during industrialization: first five-year plan, first year = 38%, second year = 18%, third year and beyond = 0%! Industrial growth: first five-year plan = +1500 new factories and enterprises, second five-year plan = +4000 new factories and enterprises. This is some kind of nightmare for a liberal market economist: investment is reduced to zero, but the economy grows and grows.

How did the financial system work, how did financiers manage to build a system without an “omnipotent investor.”

According to some estimates (1, 2), Western loans amounted to about 3-4% of capital investments during the first five-year plan (and later it was no longer necessary), so they did not play a special role.

Non-cash and cash were mutually inconvertible. Non-cash money ensured the functioning of construction, industry, and agriculture, regardless of market supply and demand. Cash provided market transactions.

Essentially it was an economy with two different types of money, the functions of which were different. Cash could perform all the generally accepted functions of money within a country, but its applicability was actually limited to retail trade. The functions of non-cash money were curtailed - the function of accumulation and the function of creating treasures were taken away from them. In a socialist economy, which does not aim to make a profit, these functions turned out to be simply harmful. Deprived of these functions, non-cash money could only work within the socialist segment of the economy. Outside this segment, non-cash money simply did not exist. It was useless to steal them because they could not be spent in the market. They cannot be given a bribe for the same reason. This money could only be used for its intended purpose - to ensure economic transactions between enterprises.

Due to the fact that the industrial (non-cash) and market (cash) monetary circuits were isolated from each other, the country could invest in its own development as much non-cash money as needed and as physical capabilities allowed. Non-cash money was simply poured into the economy when it was needed and withdrawn from the economy when the need for it disappeared. At the same time, there could be no inflation, no rise in prices in principle, because non-cash money could not flow into the market circuit where cash was used.

Look at the paradox of the capitalist economy: in the country of IKS there is brick, concrete, land, workers, smart heads, in short, there is everything to build many, many residential buildings that the population needs. At the same time, almost no houses are being built. Ask why? But there is no investor! - they will answer you.

Guys, to build a house you don’t need money, but bricks. Since you have bricks and the houses you need are not being built, it means “something is wrong in the conservatory.”

But what about without market investments? - you ask.

The answer to this question is in our history. During Stalin's times, industrialization was carried out with almost complete absence of market investment. Domestic opportunities for market financing were very meager, and foreign countries were in no hurry to help. As A. Zverev wrote in the book “Notes of the Minister” (of Finance): “The Communist Party rejected the possibility of receiving foreign loans on extortionate terms, and the capitalists did not want to give us “human” ones.” According to some estimates (1, 2), Western loans amounted to about 3-4% of capital investments during the first five-year plan (and later it was no longer necessary), so they did not play a special role.

At the same time, industrialization proceeded at a fantastic pace.

Market investments (received by the state through the grain monopoly) during industrialization: first five-year plan, first year = 38%, second year = 18%, third year and beyond = 0%! Industrial growth: first five-year plan = +1500 new factories and enterprises, second five-year plan = +4000 new factories and enterprises. This is some kind of nightmare for a liberal market economist: investment is reduced to zero, but the economy grows and grows.

How did the financial system work, how did financiers manage to build a system without the “almighty investor”.

During the credit reform of 1929-30, a double-circuit monetary system was built in the USSR. Non-cash and cash were mutually inconvertible. Non-cash money ensured the functioning of construction, industry, and agriculture, regardless of market supply and demand. Cash provided market transactions.

Essentially it was an economy with two different types of money, the functions of which were different. Cash could perform all the generally accepted functions of money within a country, but its applicability was actually limited to retail trade. The functions of non-cash money were curtailed - the function of accumulation and the function of creating treasures were taken away from them. In a socialist economy, which does not aim to make a profit, these functions turned out to be simply harmful. Deprived of these functions, non-cash money could only work within the socialist segment of the economy. Outside this segment, non-cash money simply did not exist. It was useless to steal them because they could not be spent in the market. They cannot be given a bribe for the same reason. This money could only be used for its intended purpose - to ensure economic transactions between enterprises.

Due to the fact that the industrial (non-cash) and market (cash) monetary circuits were isolated from each other, the country could invest in its own development as much non-cash money as needed and as physical capabilities allowed. Non-cash money was simply poured into the economy when it was needed and withdrawn from the economy when the need for it disappeared. At the same time, there could be no inflation, no rise in prices in principle, because non-cash money could not flow into the market circuit where cash was used.

A detailed description of the phenomenon in Kurman Akhmetov’s book “Asymmetric Economy”

))
Who is guilty? I don’t really know.
Who didn’t stand up for Iran at the UN when sanctions were imposed?
Who cheated Iran with the supply of S-300s (still not delivered).
Who arranged the truce, although the advance on the fronts was bought with Iranian blood?
For whose sake should Iran give up its money? What are they, idiots?
However, I don’t particularly believe that Iran will be able to seriously increase production, because at a price of 30 bucks there will be no investment in the oil industry, and production is falling in the United States. But it looks like prices for 40 will stick around for a long time.
And, probably, we will even be faced with another “Black Monday” based on this news.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
I want to talk about economics.
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The double-circuit financial system, of course, is a pretty sound thing. And it really simplifies the fight against corruption. But to claim that this will not allow theft...
If there is at least one financial genius who writes in the comments how to steal investment money or simply organize its flow into the consumer circuit, he will receive a $500 bonus from me.

Investment money itself cannot be transferred. Yes, these pieces of paper are not convertible. But it’s quite possible to make money with their help and get consumer money.

Recently they sent me excerpts from the book “Berezhkov’s talent” about Soviet life. And even there there was a way. It was proposed to take the salary “in materials valuable on the market.”

Goods are the bridge through which investment money will flow into my pocket, turning into consumer money.

So, let’s imagine that I am the director of the AvtoTaz state enterprise under Kungurov. I have a lot of investment money that needs to be converted into consumer money. I can buy a tractor and sell it on the market, receiving real money from consumers. I can build myself a house from materials purchased with investment money. Even more, I can buy a construction 3D printer entirely with the spent investment money and print myself a house in one person. For free. I can do this for consumer money. I, as the director of AvtoVAZ, can conclude a contract for the supply of spare parts with the private enterprise of my son\nephew\mistress. In which the equipment will be located... of course, purchased with reduced investment money. By the way, many people do this now. And you will have to pay private enterprises only with consumer money. Because he won’t value investment money.

In general, there are at least two options:
1. Sell on the market the goods purchased with investment money. That is, the Money-Product-Money conversion. With modern exchanges, this is no more difficult than exchanging currencies.
2. Let your investment money grow and get private “honest” income.

Will you say that then my AvtoTaz company with this approach will go bankrupt and suffer losses? What, really? Will you close an automobile giant or another military-industrial complex enterprise? Or will you still capitalize? We need to help the domestic manufacturer, the state corporation and the only automobile plant)) We ourselves are not competitive)) Close? Leave the country without cars? Are you seriously? Oh, well, there is still a danger that the deputy chairman from the accounting department will be imprisoned, but somehow it doesn’t matter. This danger still exists.

In general, you can’t steal money directly, but you can turn it around, which is not that difficult.

But still, the idea of ​​a multi-circuit financial system is quite interesting. And there is a healthy grain here.
Especially if we divide the economy into market and planned sectors, where in the planned sector there are state industrial giants that ensure the functioning and backbone of the National Economy, and in the market sector there are the population and small firms, artels, and cooperatives.
They work according to different principles and must be separated. And financially too.

But is money needed at all in a unified planned economy? After all, the enterprise works according to plan, it can conduct its activities in natural terms, consuming raw materials and producing products. Why money if raw materials, machines, etc. can be requested from the available reserves of the State Planning Committee (that is, the same state-owned enterprises?). Especially if the economy is managed by OGAS. What problems will investment money solve? To pay for labor you need consumer money. To pay for imported components you need currency. But for what investment money is needed, that is, for mutual settlements within the United National Economy, money is not needed. Because you can get by with a completely natural exchange. You say, this will not be an equal exchange, like I took boards from the forestry department for the construction of a state plant and did not pay? And what? The forestry enterprise is the same state enterprise. The state boards simply moved to another warehouse and were used by the state. Moreover, you still can’t pay the lumberjacks with this money. They need consumption money, not investment money. In general, I don’t see much sense.

The only reason investment money is needed is not for mutual settlements, but solely for calculating the cost of goods in intermediate chains. But cost reduction must be encouraged with consumption money, not investment money.
Investment money under Stalin was actually an emulation of a market economy for social enterprises, when profit was used to stimulate cost reduction. Reduced the cost - all the plus goes towards the plant, you can develop. However, Kungurov is an apologist for the market economy.
In my naivety, I believe that market relations within a single economy are the same as market relations within a family. Yes, detailed accounting was not possible before, so we had to use market instruments. Now the OGAS system is quite feasible. And there is no need for market instruments. True, there remains a problem with motivation to reduce costs and costs.

And the investment money system does not look balanced. Let's say a factory produces bearings. He can sell them only to state-owned enterprises that produce cars, tractors, etc. As a result, this plant operates exclusively for investment money (few people need a bearing separately), and the factories that produce final products are awash in consumer money.

In general, specifically for the public sector, I don’t see much point in investment money.
But where the private sector comes into contact with the public sector, this is more interesting.
However, investment money is not needed there either.
So, we need to encourage small businesses, especially artel or cooperative ones.

Kungurov offers to give them investment money on credit. I will suggest staying on natural indicators. What is investment money? It is an expression of what the state produces. And what it doesn’t produce cannot be bought with investment money. That is, again, money in this case is just an extra intermediary.
I would create a register of items produced by enterprises on the OGAS website.
You register as a legal entity and get access to the OGAS website with a range of goods and their prices. You put the necessary materials, raw materials and industrial goods into the “basket”. You apply for a loan with them for your business. Since there is only one bank in the country (I sincerely don’t understand why the country needs TWO banks?), it is impossible to cheat.
Ordering goods, instead of receiving money on credit, will make it easier to plan expenses and purchase on credit as needed.
For artels and cooperatives, it is possible to repay loans with unused materials (such as machines, not deteriorating boards). The loan is interest-free. For private business, repayment must be made exclusively in cash and at 2-3% per annum.
Changing the form of ownership entails criminal proceedings.

Regarding imports and currency.
All external relations are exclusively through Vneshtorg. With an Aliexpress branch, etc. Foreign exchange earnings are automatically converted into rubles, and the currency is confiscated. Currency is bought by the state from the population, but not sold. Import of goods - no problem, but customs duty - 100%. That is, imported goods should be twice as expensive. This will provide the necessary supply for the domestic manufacturer.

But if we still implement the idea of ​​a double-circuit financial system, then I think that it would be suitable for investment money

There is little information on the topic of double-circuit monetary systems. Below is a selection of Andrei Devyatov’s theses on the Asian mode of production from his speech at the School of Common Sense on February 17, 2017:

Economic development is not necessarily guaranteed by a credit economy (Western model). This model is based on Newton's understanding of time as duration or a linear sequence of events (progress). In this model, future demand is monetized, and the main development tool is credit.

The Chinese model of economic development is based on a cyclical understanding of time as the order of events, and the key concept is timeliness (which is not in the Newtonian model, where all periods of time are equivalent). This model is built on the law of change, which in the economic part is based not on credit, but on dividing the monetary system into two circuits.

The Asian mode of production is a double-circuit monetary system. It was invented in China in the 12th century during the Song Dynasty, but it was used in the Yuan Dynasty during the unified state of Genghis Khan. It was thanks to this model that a single state (I Guo) from sea to sea could exist. The collapse of the model occurred after the introduction of Western elements into it.

The essence of the model is to divide monetary circulation into natural and non-cash money. The consumption of an individual is provided by natural money (gold, silver), which can be used to buy food or a cow.

Long-term infrastructure projects (dams, canals, roads) are financed from another circuit, which operates on debt securities issued by the state. In China, paper money was invented specifically for this purpose.

The two circuits - cash and non-cash - are separated, the boundaries between them are protected by the state through exchange offices where you can exchange coins for papers and vice versa.

The fundamental difference from the European method of financing is the understanding of time as a cycle. Therefore, infrastructure projects are not financed by credit, i.e. for future demand, and for the return of time in the new cycle. Because in the next life cycle, investments will not pay off with a profit (Western model), but will be used by the next generation of people for a new life cycle.

In the USSR, Stalin introduced the double-circuit system (gold ruble for the population and non-cash payments for infrastructure projects). Therefore, after the war, Stalin’s main priority was nuclear and missile projects as guarantors of the survival of future generations. The main non-cash resources from the second monetary circuit were thrown at them.

Capitalization in Stalin's understanding means happiness. The subject of capitalization is the happiness and dream of the people, and not the interest on the loan. It is a dream that can provide a colossal economic breakthrough, as the USSR demonstrated.

The collapse of the double-circuit monetary system in the USSR occurred as a result of the Kosygin reform, when they abandoned planning in pieces and switched to monetary statistical equivalents.

In a physical planning system, the main indicator is innovation. After the Kosygin reform, the introduction of innovations turns out to be unprofitable, because it is possible to ensure an increase in “monetary” statistical indicators in more “effective” ways: accelerating costs, increasing production costs, etc.