Heavy cruiser Tallinn. "Pocket battleships": the loser and the lucky one of Hitler's fleet. Why him

The last of the laid down German heavy cruisers met a most strange fate. After its launch, which took place two years after its laying, on July 1, 1939, its completion slowed down significantly. The reason was the lack of labor and the first failures of the German industry, which had hitherto worked like clockwork. The turbine blades arrived with significant delays, which slowed down the installation of all main mechanisms. But the fate of the ship was decided not by technology, but by politics. On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, which provided, in particular, for intensive economic exchange. The USSR supplied large quantities of food and raw materials, intending to receive modern military equipment in return. In accordance with Stalin's quite reasonable considerations: “A ship purchased from a supposed enemy is equal to two: one more from us and one less from the enemy,” special attention was paid to attempts to purchase large warships. The acquisition of almost all large units of the German fleet was discussed, but in reality the Germans had to give up only one - the Lutzov. This choice once again shows that heavy cruisers were of least interest to Hitler, who was already embroiled in a war with strong naval opponents and had lost hope of achieving naval parity with Britain in traditional balanced fleets. So the loss of a ship, not very suitable for individual raider actions due to its power plant, could not greatly affect the plans of the German fleet, which was clearly incapable of a direct collision in battle with the English. On the other hand, the USSR received one of the most modern and technically advanced cruisers, although in an unfinished state.

On February 11, 1940, an agreement on the purchase of Lyuttsov was signed. For 104 million Reichsmarks, the USSR received a ship that had the upper deck completed, which had part of the superstructures and bridge, as well as two lower main-caliber turrets (however, the guns were installed only in the bow). This, in fact, is where the story of the German heavy cruiser Lützow ends and the story of the Soviet warship begins, which first received the designation “Project 53”, and from September 25, the name “Petropavlovsk”. On April 15, the “purchase” with the help of tugs left the Deshimag shipyard and on May 31 was towed to Leningrad, to the Baltic Shipyard. To continue the work, an entire delegation of 70 engineers and technicians, under the leadership of Rear Admiral Engineer Feige, arrived with the ship. Then the game began with dishonest intentions. According to German-Soviet plans, it was supposed to put Petropavlovsk into operation by 1942, but in the fall the work slowed down noticeably - due to the fault of the German side. The war with the Soviet Union had already been decided, and the Germans did not want to strengthen the enemy. Deliveries were initially delayed and then stopped altogether. The explanations of the German government consisted of numerous references to difficulties in connection with the war with England and France. But even after the fall of France, construction did not speed up at all, and even slowed down even more. Entire wagons with cargo for Petropavlovsk “by mistake” ended up at the other end of Europe instead of Leningrad.

The game without rules continued. In the spring of 1941, Rear Admiral Feige went to Germany on “sick leave,” from which he never returned. Then the rest of the specialists began to leave; the last of them left the Soviet Union on June 21, just hours before the German attack. It is not surprising that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the heavy cruiser was only 75% ready, and most of the equipment was missing. The guns were only in the low bow and stern turrets supplied with the ship; In addition, several light anti-aircraft guns arrived from Germany (one twin 37-mm mount and eight 20-mm machine guns were installed). Nevertheless, the plant workers and the team led by Captain 2nd Rank A.G. Vanifatiev made every effort to bring the cruiser to at least a conditionally combat-ready condition. By June 1941, the ship was fully equipped with officers and petty officers and approximately 60% with enlisted personnel. After the start of the war and the threatening advance of the enemy towards the northern capital, from July 17, by order of the commander of the Naval Defense of Leningrad, the forces of the crew and workers hastily put into operation the existing artillery and the power equipment necessary for its operation - diesel generators. At the same time, the ship, which was clearly not in danger of going to sea, lost a significant part of its crew. From its composition, 2 marine companies were formed and sent to the front. Only the most necessary people remained on the cruiser - artillerymen, diesel mechanics, electricians. They had to work around the clock with their equipment, putting it into operation. The team was helped by workers from the Baltic plant, whose number was almost equal to the number of remaining military sailors.

On August 15, the naval flag was raised on the Petropavlovsk and it joined the Soviet fleet. In accordance with its condition, the cruiser was included in the detachment of newly built warships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. By this time, the first level of the superstructure, the base of the bow and stern bridges, the chimney and the temporary lower part of the mainmast rose above the hull.

On September 17, from the early morning, the Germans began shelling “their” ship. One of the first shells hit the hull and disabled the cruiser’s only source of energy - generator room No. 3. The team not only had to interrupt the shooting; she turned out to be helpless against the fire from subsequent hits, since the supply of water to the fire mains stopped. Meanwhile, as a result of a direct hit, a fire broke out in the diesel fuel tank. The fire began to spread throughout the cruiser. During the unfortunate day of September 17, the helpless ship received 53 hits from shells of various calibers, mostly 210 mm - the “norm”, quite sufficient to sink even a fully combat-ready heavy cruiser. The crew had to abandon ship; First of all, the wounded were transferred to the shore. A lot of water entered the hull, and on August 19 the cruiser sat on the ground. It was only saved from capsizing by the embankment wall, onto which the Petropavlovsk leaned on its side. The damage turned out to be very significant; the area of individual holes reached 25 sq.m. The team suffered 30 casualties, including 10 killed.

Light anti-aircraft artillery began to be removed from the ship; his machine guns were installed on the ships of the Ladoga flotilla. The difficult situation at the front prompted the command to further “cut down” the crew, which was reorganized. A small group of specialist technicians remained on board, mainly from the electromechanical combat unit and several officers. After an examination, it was decided that the cruiser could still be raised and its artillery, which was of significant value for the besieged city, brought into combat readiness.

The work had to be carried out mainly at night in conditions of maximum stealth and camouflage, since the enemy was only 4 km away. EPRON rescue ships quietly approached the board, but since they had to limit themselves to the smallest units, the power of their drainage equipment was not enough to lift the Petropavlovsk. Ice then covered the bay and rescuers were forced to leave. Meanwhile, the small crew did not stop fighting. It was decided to pump out water sequentially from each compartment, first sealing it. Initially, only low-power portable pumps were used, but after draining the aft engine compartment, it was possible to put power station No. 1 into operation. Gradually, stationary standard pumps located in the compartments came into use. German technology turned out to be worthy of these truly heroic efforts (work was still carried out only in the dark), and the ship began to float. For camouflage, water was again taken into some of the drained compartments every morning in order to hide changes in the sediment from the Germans. The ship's pumps could operate in completely flooded rooms and drain them quickly enough to take the next step toward saving the ship at night. All this work was carried out in the midst of the cold blockade winter of 1941/1942. The personnel suffered not only from cold and dampness, but also from a lack of food: although rations in the navy remained at acceptable levels to support life, people also needed to work a lot physically. However, during the winter and spring, 2 more diesel generators were put into operation.

“Petropavlovsk” was in a completely unfit state for exactly a year. Only on September 10, 1942 was it possible to completely restore the waterproofness of the hull, and the next day make a test ascent. In the morning he was put on the ground again. The operation was carried out so secretly that most of the personnel of the infantry unit located nearby on the shore in the trenches did not notice anything. Finally, on the night of September 16-17, the cruiser finally surfaced and, with the help of tugs, proceeded to the wall of the Baltic Shipyard.

According to all the rules, the repairs should have been continued at the dock, but it turned out to be impossible to bring the cruiser to Kronstadt along the Sea Canal, which was completely under fire from the enemy. We had to carry out the work the old fashioned way, as almost 40 years ago in Port Arthur. The factory produced a huge caisson measuring 12.5 x 15 x 8 m, which was alternately brought to the holes, water was pumped out and wounds inflicted by enemy shells were repaired. At the same time, work continued in the premises and on deck to restore artillery weapons, electrical equipment and mechanics. And after their completion, the equipment had to be mothballed: work on the hull was carried out too slowly.

The repairs continued throughout the next year, and already in January 1944, the three remaining 203-mm guns began to speak from the new parking lot near the Trade Harbor (the left gun in the bow turret was completely disabled in 1941). The cruiser became part of the 2nd artillery group of the fleet along with the battleship "October Revolution", the cruisers "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" and two destroyers. Its artillery was commanded by First Lieutenant J. C. Grace. "Petropavlovsk" took part in the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinskaya offensive operation, firing 250 shells on the first day, January 15, 1944. From January 15 to 20, this number increased to 800. And in just 31 shellings, 1,036 shells were fired at the enemy. The crippled ship's guns were not spared too much: it accounted for about a third of the firing and shells fired by the 2nd artillery group of the fleet. Its final commissioning was marked up, so saving guns and ammunition no longer made any sense.

According to reports from coastal observation groups and our troops, the artillery actions turned out to be very effective. On January 19 alone, the cruiser-battery was credited with 3 guns, 29 vehicles, 68 carts and 300 killed enemy soldiers and officers. But gradually the front moved away, and it became increasingly difficult to fire. The ship fired its last salvos on January 24, 1944.

Thus, in essence, the combat life of the “Russian German” ended. On September 1, “Petropavlovsk” was renamed “Tallinn”. The war was drawing to a close, but there were no changes in the fate of the long-suffering ship. After the victory, a fundamental opportunity arose to complete the work begun five years ago, since Soviet shipbuilders got their hands on the damaged and unfinished Seydlitz. However, prudence prevailed, and the alien, already outdated cruiser was never completed. It was used for some time as a non-self-propelled training vessel, and then as a floating barracks (on March 11, 1953, it was renamed Dnepr, and on December 27, 1956 it received the designation PKZ-112).

On April 3, 1958, the former Lützow was removed from the lists of the fleet and towed to the ship cemetery in Kronstadt, where during 1959–1960 it was dismantled for metal.

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Why him? Probably due to his “unluck” - I like the “Lutzow” very much as a ship, but even in model reincarnations he was unlucky - the only existing model released by Heller is incredible in its wretchedness. In addition, I always wanted to have a “pickpocket” in my collection, but “Spee” seemed painfully hackneyed, and besides, I didn’t like its tower-like superstructure purely visually. I wanted to try myself in deep conversion - I’ll be honest: I’m tired. The project lasted almost 2.5 years.

A little history

The ship is the lead in a series of German “pocket battleships” that appeared as a result of the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, according to which post-war Germany could not have more than 6 ships in the battleship class, and newly built units could not exceed 10,000 “long” tons in displacement, and the caliber of guns limited to 280 mm (11 in). A total of three units were built: "Deutschland", "Admiral Scheer" and "Admiral Graf Spee".
"Deutschland" (future "Lutzow"), was laid down on 02/09/1928, launched on 05/19/1931 at the Deutsche Werke shipyard in Kiel.

During the interwar period, he performed representative functions and “showed the flag.” Since 1933 - flanker ship of the German Navy. In 1934-1936. made visits to Scotland and Scandinavia, made a transatlantic crossing to South America, and cruised in the North and Central Atlantic with the Admiral Scheer.
The Spanish Civil War, which began in 1936, called for "pocket battleships" to serve the Iberian Peninsula. On July 19, the German squadron, which included, in particular, the Deutschland and the Admiral Scheer, set off for the shores of Spain, where they took part in the evacuation of 9,300 foreigners. Then the ship began to be plagued by misfortunes. On the evening of May 29, on the roadstead of the island of Ibiza, it was subjected to an air strike by Republican aviation and received 2 bomb hits. One bomb hit near the bridge and exploded between the decks, and the second fell next to the third stern 150 mm gun. A strong fire broke out in the space between decks. 23 sailors were killed, 73 were injured, many received burns. The ship itself had to urgently return to Germany for repairs.
In March 1939, with Adolf Hitler on board, he took part in the occupation of Memel (Klaipeda).

He met the beginning of the war at sea - on August 24, 1939 he went out for raiding into the Atlantic, to a position south of Greenland. But his successes in this field were more than modest: he sank only two ships versus eleven from the Spee (the English Stonegate and the Norwegian Lorenz W. Hansen) with a total capacity of about 7,000 tons, and in November 1939 he returned to Germany.
In 1939, the battleship Deutschland was renamed the heavy cruiser Lützow, but this did not bring him any luck. In November 1939, he went to the Skagerrak to intercept merchant ships, but to no avail.

The opportunity to show himself came during the invasion of Norway on April 9, 1940. There he acted as part of a group intended to occupy Oslo along with the heavy cruiser Blücher, the light cruiser Emden, 3 destroyers and several small ships.

But as we all know, everything did not go according to plan - the Norwegians absolutely did not want to give up without a fight and during the operation the Blucher was sunk; "Lutzow", in turn, received three hits from 280-mm shells. The central gun of the main caliber bow turret was disabled and a fire broke out on the ship. After the capture of Oslo, the damaged “pocket battleship” was ordered to urgently return to Kiel. But the path home also turned out to be thorny: on the night of April 10-11, at about 2 a.m., he was attacked by the English submarine Spearfish and was hit by a torpedo. The hull behind the stern tower broke (in fact, the stern was half torn off), 4 compartments were flooded; the ship took on about 1,300 tons of water. The ship was towed to Kiel, where it remained for repairs for more than six months. Already on July 9, 1940, during the bombing of Kiel, a bomb hit the ship. After repairs, it was actually ready for action only by the beginning of 1941. It was assumed that in July 1941 the Lutzow would set off on a new Atlantic raid, but this did not happen. During this repair, the appearance of the ship changed significantly: a beveled “Atlantic” stem appeared, one of the bow anchor ports on the port side was welded, and a demagnetization system was installed along the sides.

On June 13, the Beaufort was again attacked by British torpedo bombers and was hit in the middle of the hull. Two engine compartments and one of the compartments with couplings were flooded. "Lutzow" lost speed, took on 1000 tons of water and received a threatening list - about 20°. Again to Kiel for repairs - until January 1942.
During Operation Rosselsprung in July 1942, he was supposed to operate against the famous convoy PQ-17, but ran into an uncharted rock before leaving Bogen Bay, and was forced to return to Narvik. The Atlantic raid planned for the summer was canceled again.

At the end of December 1942, he took part in Operation Rainbow (Regenbogen) against convoy JW-51B, together with the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and 6 destroyers under the command of Admiral Kümmetz. The battle was a series of short skirmishes. "Admiral Hipper" was damaged by the British cruisers "Sheffield" and "Jamaica", the German destroyers "Frederick Eckoldt" and "Beitzen" were sunk, the British had a destroyer ("Esheites") and a minesweeper sunk; the convoy was practically undamaged. The result of this operation was an order from Hitler prohibiting the further active use of large warships.

Subsequently, "Lützow" formally remained in service, being in Narvik - with a reduced crew, and at the end of September 1943, the "pocket battleship" moved to Germany and was put into regular repairs and modernization, which took place until March 1944 in Liepaja ( Libau). It was assumed that after modernization it would become a purely training vessel.

Since the autumn of 1944, the “pocket battleship” Lützow was used mainly to support the retreating German ground forces on the eastern front.
In April 1945, "Lutzow" was in Swinemünde. In the middle of the month he was attacked by British aircraft. Close explosions of the 5.5-ton Tallboys (there were no direct hits) caused such damage to the ship that its hull gradually filled with water, and the Luttzow sat on the ground at a shallow depth. Its guns continued to take part in defensive battles against Soviet troops.

On May 4, 1945, when the Germans left Swinemünde, the Lützow was blown up by the crew; the body was completely burnt out.

But in the end, he did not even manage to die with dignity: in the spring of 1946, Soviet rescuers raised the ship, and on September 26, the Lützow was finally sunk in the central part of the Baltic Sea on July 22, 1947, after several high-explosive bombs were detonated on it. His last photo:

This is the unenviable and somewhat useless fate of this ship, although depending on how you look at it, it did less evil.

Why him?

Probably due to his “unluck” - I like the “Lutzow” very much as a ship, but even in model reincarnations he was unlucky - the only existing model released by Heller is incredible in its wretchedness. In addition, I always wanted to have a “pickpocket” in my collection, but “Spee” seemed painfully hackneyed, and besides, I didn’t like its tower-like superstructure purely visually. I wanted to try myself in deep conversion - I’ll be honest: I’m tired. The project lasted almost 2.5 years.

Assembly

The model represents the ship in 1942, at the time of Operation Rosselsprung, which it never took part in. This period was chosen because of its interesting camouflage.
Literature used (what I remember):
1) Pocket battleships of the Deutschland class by Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmulke
2) Marine-Arsenal, Die Panzerschiffe der Kriegsmarine special band 2, by Siedfried Breyer
3) Marine-Arsenal, Panzerschiff “Deutschland”, by Siedfried Breyer
4) Kagero, The heavy cruiser “Lutzow”
5) Momografie morskie 7, 9
6) Gunpower 17 German naval artillery 1

An incredible amount of different things were purchased from the aftermarket. I don't remember everything exactly:
1) Set on Spee from Eduard
2) Set on Spee from Ka-models
3) German radars from Flyhawk (FH350061)
4) Machines from Flyhawk 3.7 cm and 2 cm (FH353001 and FH353002)
5) 20 mm four-barreled anti-aircraft guns (VTW35056) and a set of German searchlights (VTW35058) from Veteran
6) All kinds of trunks from Master Model
7) Resin life rafts (I don’t remember from whom)

The construction process is more or less laid out in the forum thread; I won’t go into much detail here. I’ll just say that the only things that are native to the model are the body and the plane, and even then, both have undergone modifications. The rest is all homemade from Evergreen plastic of varying thicknesses. Main battery turrets, 150 mm and torpedo tubes were poured out of resin, which was of course not very successful, but for the first time it was ok. I used Vallejo paints, Vallejo ready-made washes, and Satin Vallejo varnish. I’m extremely pleased with everyone - after Humbrol it’s just some kind of holiday. I can’t say anything good about the Academia model itself; I haven’t checked it for compliance with the prototype (Spee). In terms of quality - incredible firewood - I have never seen worse. I also used the boats from the kit - I had to cover them with a tarpaulin, as it was not possible to finish the interior. The boats have undergone extensive refurbishment. I'll post some photos of the process:
Beginning: cutting out the Lützow hull from the solid Spee massif:

Superstructure everyday life:

Pipe passions:

Artillery and crane works:

"Lutzow" is the fifth heavy cruiser of the "Admiral Hipper" class, planned for adoption by the German Kriegsmarine. Laid down in 1937, launched in 1939. In February 1940, sold to the Soviet Union,

received the name "Petropavlovsk", in August 1941, in a conditionally combat-ready state, it was included in the USSR Navy, and participated in the defense of Leningrad from Nazi troops.

In September 1944 it was renamed “Tallinn”, in 1953 - “Dnepr”, in 1956 - “PKZ-12”. Its completion was not completed, in 1958 the ship was excluded from the lists of the Soviet fleet, and in 1959 - 1960 it was dismantled for scrap.

History of creation and design features

In June 1936, approval was given to begin the construction of two additional large cruisers, similar to the first three units of the Admiral Hipper class, but armed with 12 150 mm guns.
This was a political step designed to demonstrate Germany's desire to remain within the legal framework of international maritime treaties. In July, an order followed both for the ships themselves and for the turrets and guns for them.

The base structures of the main battery turrets were designed according to a special requirement with a diameter similar to that of the 203 mm gun mounts of the first three Hipper-class ships.
A special requirement was to design the bases of the turrets in such a way that they would have the same diameter as the twin 203 mm mounts of heavy cruisers.
This was done in order to quickly re-equip with 203 mm guns if necessary. But already in 1937, it was decided to build the cruisers, which received the letter designations “K” and “L,” as heavy ones, initially with 203 mm artillery.

Construction

The fifth and last cruiser of the Admiral Hipper class was laid down on August 2, 1937 at the DeSchiMAG shipyard in Bremen, where its sister Seydlitz was already under construction. During construction, the ship had the letter designation “L”; when launched on July 1, 1939, it received the name “Lutzow”.
Prior to this, the same name in the German fleet was borne by the Derflinger-class battlecruiser, which was lost during the Battle of Jutland on May 31, 1916. Both ships were named after Adolf von Lützow, a German national hero, a baron who led the guerrilla war behind Napoleon's troops who occupied Germany.

After the ship was launched, its completion slowed down, due to a lack of labor and some disruptions in German industry. In particular, turbine blades arrived with long delays, which slowed down the installation of all main mechanisms.

After the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR on August 23, 1939, military-technical cooperation between the two countries intensified. The USSR supplied Germany with a lot of raw materials and food, and in exchange wanted to receive samples of the latest military equipment.
On February 11, 1940, the cruiser "Lutzow", being in an unfinished state (the ship was completed up to the upper deck, had part of the superstructure and bridge, as well as two lower main-caliber turrets with guns installed only in the bow of them), was sold to the Soviet Union for 104 million Reichsmarks.
The cruiser, designated Project 53, was towed to Leningrad, to the Baltic Shipyard, from April 15 to May 31. An engineering delegation from Germany arrived with the cruiser to continue the work.
However, in connection with the planned war with the USSR, Germany did not want to strengthen its future enemy and therefore delayed in every possible way the supply of basic components. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the ship was 70% ready.

The Great Patriotic War

On August 15, 1941, the naval flag was raised on the Petropavlovsk and it joined the Soviet fleet (in a conditionally combat-ready state, in fact the ship continued to remain unfinished). Commander - Captain 2nd Rank A. G. Vanifatiev.

During the war, the cruiser used the 4,203 mm guns mounted on it against coastal targets. In September 1941, it was seriously damaged by numerous shell hits. On September 1, 1944, Petropavlovsk was renamed Tallinn.

After the war

After the end of World War II, the cruiser Tallinn was never completed. For some time it was used as a non-self-propelled training vessel, and then as a floating barracks (on March 11, 1953, it was renamed “Dnepr”, and on December 27, 1956 it received the designation “PKZ-112”).
On April 3, 1958, it was excluded from the lists of the fleet and dismantled for scrap during 1959 - 1960.

Main characteristics:

Standard displacement is 14,240 tons, full displacement is 19,800 tons.
Length 199.5 m (at the waterline), 212.5 m (between perpendiculars).
Width 21.8 m.
Draft 5.9 - 7.2 m.
Reservation board - 40…80…70 mm,
traverses - 80 mm,
deck - 30 + 30 mm (bevels 50),
towers - 160…50 mm,
cutting - 150...50 mm,
barbettes - 80 mm.
Engines 3 TZA, 9 steam boilers.
Power 132,000 l. With.
Speed 32 knots.
Cruising range 6800 nautical miles at a speed of 16 knots.
Crew 1400 - 1600 people.

Weapons:

Artillery 4 × 2 - 203 mm/60 SK C/34.
Anti-aircraft artillery 6 × 2 - 105 mm/65, 6 × 2 - 37 mm/83, 10 × 1 - 20 mm/65.
Mine and torpedo armament: 4 three-tube 533 mm torpedo tubes.
Aviation group 1 catapult, 3 - 4 seaplanes.

During the Second World War, German “pocket battleships” of the Deutschland class proved themselves to be universal ships, suitable for both raider operations and combat with enemy cruisers. However, their fates were different. While the battle path of one of the “losers” of the German fleet, the cruiser Deutschland (Lützow), ran from repair to repair, the cruiser Admiral Scheer showed high combat effectiveness and became famous for its successful raids.

In pre-war Germany, heavy cruisers were clearly divided into two subtypes. “Pocket battleships” were built exclusively for raiding operations, and “classic” heavy cruisers were built for squadron operations, but taking into account possible raiding. As a result, both were engaged almost exclusively in anti-trade operations and, at the end of World War II, in artillery support for ground forces.

Let's start the review with “pocket battleships” - amazing ships that, in fact, were “mini-dreadnoughts”. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the Weimar Republic could not build ships with a standard displacement of more than 10,000 tons to replace the old battleships of the pre-dreadnought era. Therefore, the German designers of the 1920s were given a non-trivial task - to fit into this framework a ship that would be more powerful than any cruiser of that time and, at the same time, could elude a battleship. At the same time, it was supposed to be used as a raider to combat enemy trade (which means it should have had a greater range).

All three qualities were combined thanks to the use of a diesel power plant, as well as the fact that the Allies did not limit the main caliber to the Germans. Therefore, the new ships received six 280-mm guns in three-gun turrets, which obviously exceeded the armament of the most powerful “Washington” cruisers of that time (six or eight 203-mm barrels). True, the speed of the new ships was noticeably inferior to the cruisers, but even 28 knots made it safe to meet with most of the dreadnoughts of that time.

Heavy cruiser Deutschland after entering service, 1934
Source – A. V. Platonov, Yu. V. Apalkov. German warships, 1939–1945. St. Petersburg, 1995

The initial design of the ships, officially called “battleships” but nicknamed “pocket battleships” by journalists, was created in 1926. The budget for their construction had been discussed in the Reichstag since the end of 1927, and construction of the lead Deutschland began in 1929. The Deutschland entered service in the spring of 1933, the Admiral Scheer in 1934, and the Admiral Graf Spee in 1936.

Later, the “pocket battleship” project began to be criticized as an attempt to create universal combat units to perform all tasks at once. However, in the early 30s, new ships caused a real stir among Germany's neighbors. In 1931, the French “responded” to the Germans by ordering 23,000-ton Dunkirk-class battlecruisers, after which the Italians became concerned and began upgrading their old dreadnoughts to the standard of fast battleships. Having developed a new project, the Germans launched a “battleship race” in continental Europe.

As a result of construction, the standard displacement of “pocket battleships” went beyond the limit of 10,000 tons and amounted to about 10,770 tons for the Deutschland (which was still being built under the restrictions) and 12,540 tons for the Admiral Graf Spee. Note that exceeding the limit by 5–10% was typical for all Washington cruisers, except the very first.

The armor of the new German ships turned out to be very strong. The Deutschland was protected by a full inclined (12°) outer belt along the citadel (80 mm thick in the upper half and up to 50 mm thick at the lower edge). At the ends of the citadel, near the cellars, the thickness of the upper part of the belt decreased slightly (to 60 mm), but lighter armor continued behind 60 mm traverses (18 mm in the bow to the stem and 50–30 mm in the stern to the steering gear). The vertical armor was supplemented by a 45 mm internal inclined belt, running parallel to the outer one, so that the total thickness of the two belts was up to 125 mm - more than that of any other cruiser of the interwar period.

Reservation of German “pocket battleships” (“Admiral Graf Spee”)

The horizontal armor consisted of two decks: the upper one (along the entire citadel, but above the edge of the belt and not structurally connected with it in any way) and the lower one, which lay on top of the inner belt, but just below its upper edge. The thickness of the lower deck was 30–45 mm, and there was no gap at all between the armor belts. Thus, the thickness of the horizontal armor was 48–63 mm. The main caliber turrets had frontal armor 140 mm thick, walls 80 mm thick and a roof ranging from 85 to 105 mm thick.

The quality of this armor is usually rated low, since it was made using technology from the beginning of the First World War. But on subsequent ships of the series, the armor was somewhat strengthened: the outer belt reached 100 mm over the entire height by reducing the thickness of the inner belt to 40 mm. The lower armor deck also underwent changes - it continued to the outer belt, but at the same time its thickness decreased to 20–40 mm in different areas. Finally, the thickness of the so-called upper longitudinal armored bulkheads, located deep in the hull between the armored decks, increased from 10 to 40 mm. The armor protection was supplemented by side bulges, which were not found on most cruisers of that time.

In general, the protection of the German “pocket battleships” makes a strange impression - it looks too patchwork, uneven and “smeared” along the entire length of the ship. At the same time, in other countries they preferred to follow the “all or nothing” principle, armoring only vital elements as much as possible, and leaving the rest completely unprotected. The horizontal armor of the "pocket battleship" looks too weak, especially for a raider with large caliber guns intended for long-range combat. On the other hand, the booking turned out to be spaced, that is, more effective; in addition, the projectile, before penetrating deep into the ship, had to overcome several layers of armor located at different angles, which increased the likelihood of a ricochet or triggering a fuse on the armor. How did this protection perform in combat conditions?

"Deutschland" ("Lutzow")

This ship became one of the most unlucky German cruisers. For the first time, it came under enemy attack on the evening of May 29, 1937, when, on the roadstead of the Spanish island of Ibiza, two Soviet SB aircraft bombed it from an altitude of 1000 m, delivering a diversionary strike on the island as part of an operation to escort the Magellanes transport (Y-33) to Cartagena ) with a load of weapons. The crew of Senior Lieutenant N.A. Ostryakov achieved success - two bombs hit the ship, and another exploded at its side. According to German data, we are talking about 50 kg bombs, and according to Soviet sources, bombs weighing 100 kg were used.

"Deutschland" in 1937. This is the color it had while off the coast of Spain.
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The damage inflicted on the “pocket battleship” turned out to be quite impressive. The first bomb destroyed the 150-mm artillery mount No. 3 on the starboard side and set fire to the refueled aircraft standing on the catapult. The second bomb hit the armored deck in the area of the bow superstructure on the port side and pierced it (at the same time, 150-mm shells exploded in the fenders of the first shots). A fire started between the armored decks, threatening the forward 150-mm magazine, which had to be flooded. Personnel losses were 24 killed, 7 died from wounds and 76 wounded.

"Deutschland" after being hit by air bombs near Ibiza, March 29, 1937
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The ship, already renamed Lützow, received further damage early in the morning of April 9, 1940 in the Oslo Fjord, when, together with the heavy cruiser Blücher, it came under dagger fire from Norwegian coastal batteries. "Lutzow" received three 150-mm shells from the Kopos battery (located on the eastern shore of the Oslofjord), fired almost point-blank, from a distance of no more than ten cables. Apparently, all three shells were high-explosive or semi-armor-piercing.

The first hit the middle gun of the bow turret and disabled it. Apparently, the hit was directly in the embrasure, as 4 people were wounded, and the electrical wiring, optics and hydraulics of the right gun were damaged. The second shell passed over the belt in the area of the 135th frame and exploded behind the barbette of the bow tower, destroying the furnishings of several living quarters (2 paratroopers from the 138th Mountain Jaeger Regiment were killed and 6 wounded). The third shell hit the port side cargo boom and exploded above the deck, destroying the reserve seaplane, breaking the searchlight cables and causing a local fire of ammunition; 3 sailors from the 150 mm guns were killed and 8 wounded. In general, the Norwegian shells landed quite “successfully”: the hits somewhat weakened the firepower of the German ship, but did not cause any damage to its survivability. In total, 6 people were killed and another 22 were injured.

This was followed by two torpedo hits. The first of these occurred on April 10, the night after the German landing in Oslo, when the Lutzow was returning to base. Of the six 533-mm torpedoes fired by the British submarine Spearfish from a distance of 30 kb, one reached the target, hitting the steering compartment. The stern was broken throughout the last three compartments and did not come off only thanks to the heavy-duty armored deck. Three aft compartments filled with water, 15 people who were there were killed, and the rudder was jammed at 20° to starboard. The ship took on about 1,300 tons of water and sank noticeably with its stern. However, the shafts survived, the power plant received no damage, and the bulkhead between the 3rd and 4th compartments was hastily strengthened. By the evening of April 14, tugboats managed to drag the ship to the Deutsche Werke shipyard in Kiel. Repairs combined with modernization took more than a year, and the cruiser entered service only by June 1941.

"Lutzow" after torpedo damage on April 10, 1940. The broken stern is clearly visible
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The next time, "Lutzow" was damaged literally immediately after launching a new operation - "Sommerreise", carried out with the goal of breaking through the Danish Straits. Early in the morning of June 12, 1941, it was attacked by British Beaufort torpedo bombers from the 42nd Squadron of Coastal Command and received one 450 mm air torpedo from six hundred meters. It hit almost the center of the hull - in the area of the 7th compartment on frame 82. Anti-torpedo protection did not save us from damage; two engine compartments and a compartment with connecting couplings were flooded, the ship took on 1000 tons of water, received a list of 20° and lost speed. Only by the next morning did the German sailors manage to make 12 knots on one shaft. The cruiser reached Kiel, where she again underwent repairs - this time it took six months.

In the “New Year's Battle” on December 31, 1942, “Lutzov” first came into fire contact with enemy ships. But he fired relatively little, which was caused, first of all, by unsuccessful maneuvering, poor coordination and indecision in the actions of the German formation. In total, Lützow fired 86 main-caliber shells and 76 anti-mine caliber shells (first from a distance of 75 kb at destroyers, then from 80 kb at light cruisers). The shooting of “Luttsov” was ineffective, although he himself was not hit.

"Lutzow" parked in Norway. The ship is surrounded by an anti-torpedo network
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

Then, due to the poor condition of the diesel engines, the “pocket battleship” was sent to the Baltic, where it served as a classic coastal defense battleship. In October 1944, it was actively used for shelling the coast in the Baltic states - as a rule, without adjustments from coastal posts. The ship no longer took part in naval battles; On October 14, it was attacked by the submarine Shch-407, but both torpedoes missed the target. On February 8, 1945, Lützow was used to fire at coastal targets near Elbing, and on March 25, near Danzig.

Finally, on April 4, near Hela Spit, the ship was hit by a shell fired by a coastal battery (apparently of 122 mm caliber). The shell hit the aft superstructure, destroying the admiral's quarters. And on April 15, while parked near Swinemünde, the “pocket battleship” came under attack from British Lancaster heavy bombers from the 617th squadron. The Lützow was hit by two 500-kg armor-piercing aerial bombs - one destroyed the main-caliber bow command and rangefinder post along with the top of the mast and the radar antenna, and the second pierced all the armored decks and landed directly in the bow magazine of 280-mm shells. Interestingly, none of these bombs exploded! But the close explosion of a heavy 5.4-ton bomb that fell into the water made a huge hole in the ship’s hull with an area of 30 m2. "Luttsov" tilted and sat down on the ground. By the end of the day, the team managed to pump out water from part of the premises, commission the bow 280-mm turret and four 150-mm starboard guns. On May 4, when Soviet troops approached, the ship was blown up by the crew.

"Lutzow" landing on the ground in Swinemünde, 1945
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

"Admiral Scheer"

This ship, on the contrary, became famous for its raider actions. True, unlike the Deutschland, he was lucky - during the entire war he never encountered strong enemy ships. But the Admiral Scheer came under British bombs on September 3, 1939. Of the eight high-speed Blenheim bombers that attacked Wilhelmshaven from a strafing flight, four were shot down, but the last one still scored hits. Moreover, all three 227-kg bombs that hit the German ship did not have time to arm the fuses due to their low altitude.

Heavy cruiser "Admiral Scheer" after entry into service, 1939
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

The next military clash occurred more than a year later. On the evening of November 5, 1940, while in the North Atlantic, the Admiral Scheer came across convoy HX-84 - 37 transports guarded by the only auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay. Having opened fire on it with its main caliber, the Scheer achieved hits only from the fourth salvo, but the British 152-mm guns did not hit the German ship even once. At the same time, the Scheer fired with medium caliber and achieved several hits on transport ships, so we can say that the statement about the complete uselessness of 150-mm artillery on “pocket battleships” is a bit of an exaggeration.

The sinking of the auxiliary cruiser Jervis Bay
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

It took twenty minutes to sink Jervis Bay with 283 mm shells, but this was enough for it to begin to get dark and the convoy had time to disperse. The Germans managed to sink only five transports, and several more were damaged, but not finished off in the ensuing darkness. It is worth noting that against large unarmored ships, 283 mm shells turned out to be much more effective than 203 mm shells, while 150 mm shells did not prove to be very effective (one or two hits were not enough to disable the transport). The next time the Scheer used its main gun was in the same raid - on February 22, 1941, it sank the Dutch transport Rantau Pajang, which was trying to escape in a rain squall. In general, the almost six-month raid of the “pocket battleship” turned out to be extremely successful - the Scheer sank or captured 17 enemy ships, mainly using 105-mm anti-aircraft artillery. Even traditional problems with diesel engines did not prove insurmountable, although immediately after the raid the ship had to undergo a 2.5-month repair of the power plant.

The next combat raid of the Admiral Scheer took place only in August 1942 - it was the famous Operation Wunderland against Soviet shipping in the Arctic Ocean. Despite lengthy training and the use of aerial reconnaissance aircraft, the results of the operation were modest. The “Pocket Battleship” managed to intercept and sink only one ship – the icebreaking steamer “Alexander Sibiryakov” (1384 GRT), which was supplying the island of Severnaya Zemlya. The Germans intercepted him around noon on August 25 and shot him slowly - in 45 minutes, 27 shells were fired in six salvoes from distances from 50 to 22 kb (according to German data, four hit the target). The two 76-mm Lander cannons on the Sibiryakov did not hit the German ship, and could not have hit them, but they fired desperately throughout the battle.

Sinking "Sibiryakov", view from the board of "Admiral Scheer"
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

However, the Sibiryakov crew did the most important thing - they managed to report about the battle and the German "auxiliary cruiser" on the radio, thereby disrupting the secrecy of the entire operation. Therefore, the commander of the Scheer, Captain Zur See Wilhelm Meendsen-Bolken, decided to stop it, and as a conclusion, destroy the port of Dikson by landing troops there.

The moment for the attack was chosen exceptionally well: both coastal batteries defending Dikson (130 mm No. 226 and 152 mm No. 569) were removed from their positions and loaded onto ships for transportation to Novaya Zemlya. However, after a radiogram from the Sibiryakov, the command of the White Sea Flotilla gave the order to urgently deploy the batteries and prepare for the appearance of the enemy. In just over a day, two 152-mm howitzer guns of the 1910/30 model were installed directly on the wooden deck of the pier.

Scheme of the battle at Dixon on August 27, 1942
Source – Yu. Perechnev, Yu. Vinogradov. Guarding sea horizons. M.: Voenizdat, 1967

On August 27, at 1 a.m., “Scheer” approached Dixon’s internal roadstead from the south and at 1:37 a.m., from a distance of 35 kb, opened fire on the port and the ships stationed in it. From the third salvo, several 283-mm shells hit the auxiliary patrol boat "Dezhnev" (SKR-19), but by mistake the Germans used armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing shells, which pierced the ship's hull without exploding. "Dezhnev" received at least four hits, two 45-mm anti-aircraft guns were disabled, 27 people were killed and wounded.

However, before landing on the ground, the steamer managed to cover the port with a smoke screen, and most importantly, the Kara transport loaded with explosives. “Scheer” transferred the fire to the “Revolutionary” transport, setting it on fire, but also failed to sink it. At this time, coastal battery No. 569 finally opened fire. Despite the complete absence of instruments and the lack of control personnel, her fire was assessed by the Germans as "pretty accurate". The battery personnel reported two hits, but in reality they failed to achieve any hits, but the commander of the Sheer, not knowing the situation, chose to disengage from the battle and cover the ship behind Cape Nakovalnya.

152-mm guns of coastal battery No. 569
Source – M. Morozov. Operation “Wunderland” // Flotomaster, 2002, No. 1

By half past three, the Admiral Scheer circled the peninsula and began shelling Dikson from the south, in 40 minutes having fired a significant part of the ammunition - 77 main-caliber shells, 121 auxiliary-caliber shells and two and a half hundred 105-mm anti-aircraft shells. When the German ship appeared in the Previn Strait, battery No. 569 opened fire again, firing 43 shells during the entire battle. The Germans mistook the smoke screen over the port for fires, and at 3:10 the raider commander gave the order to withdraw, ending Operation Wunderland. In fact, not a single person died in Dixon, and both damaged ships were put into service within a week.

The next time the Admiral Scheer’s artillery came into action more than two years later, already in the Baltic. On November 22, 1944, he replaced the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which had consumed all its ammunition, and opened fire from a long distance on Soviet troops storming the last German positions on the Sõrve peninsula (Saaremaa island). In two days, the ship burned through almost all of its main caliber ammunition. The effectiveness of his fire is difficult to determine, but it should be stated that these almost continuous attacks were able to ensure a relatively calm evacuation of German troops from the peninsula to Courland. Moreover, during a raid by Soviet aviation on the afternoon of November 23 (three Bostons and several groups of Il-2s), the Scheer was hit on the decks by one light bomb (or missile), as well as damaged from explosions near the side. These attacks did not cause serious damage, but forced the German ship to move away from the shore and cease fire until nightfall.

Soviet aircraft attack on the Admiral Scheer near the Syrve Peninsula on October 23, 1944
Source – M. Morozov. Boar hunting // Flotomaster, 1998, No. 2

In February 1945, the Admiral Scheer was used to shell the coast in the area of the Samland Peninsula and Königsberg, this time firing without adjustment. In March, he fired along the shore in the Swinemünde area, and then went to Kiel to replace worn out main caliber barrels. Here on the evening of April 9, the ship came under a massive British air raid. Within an hour, she received five direct hits, a large hole in the starboard side from close explosions of heavy bombs, and capsized upward with her keel at shallow depths.

"Admiral Scheer", sunk in Kiel
Source – V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012

During the Second World War, “pocket battleships” proved to be universal ships, suitable for both raiding operations and combat with enemy cruisers. Their armor, despite the insufficiently high quality of steel, reliably protected against 152 mm shells at all distances and heading angles and most often withstood hits from 203 mm shells. At the same time, even one hit from a 280-mm gun could cause serious damage to any "Washington" cruiser - this was clearly shown by the battle at La Plata on December 13, 1939, during which the "Admiral Graf Spee" (sistership " Deutschland" and "Admiral Scheer"). The main problem of the “pocket battleships” turned out to be not weapons, not protection, but control in battle, that is, the notorious “human factor”...

Bibliography:

A. V. Platonov, Yu. V. Apalkov. German warships, 1939–1945. St. Petersburg, 1995
V. Kofman, M. Knyazev. Hitler's armored pirates. Heavy cruisers of the Deutschland and Admiral Hipper classes. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012
Yu. Perechnev, Yu. Vinogradov. Guarding sea horizons. M.: Voenizdat, 1967
S. Abrosov. Air war in Spain. Chronicle of air battles 1936–1939. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2012
denkmalprojekt.org

The unfinished "Lutzow" fires at German troops advancing on Leningrad

In 1940, as part of an active trade exchange with the Third Reich, the USSR bought for 104 million. Reichsmark unfinished heavy cruiser of the Admiral Hipper class. The Germans called it "Lutzow" (a fairly popular name among them - in the First World War this name was borne by the battle cruiser that died in the Battle of Jutland, in the Second World War this name was given to the pocket battleship "Deutschland" after the sale of the heavy cruiser). The ship was first named "Tallinn", and then renamed "Petropavlovsk".

Upon reaching 100% readiness, "Luttsov" would have to have the following performance characteristics:

Standard displacement 13900 tons, 3 propellers, power of three turbo-gear units 132,000 hp, speed 32 knots, length between perpendiculars 200 m, width 21.6. average depth 4.57 m. Cruising range at 18 knots 6800 miles. Reservations: belt 127 mm, deck 102 mm, turrets 127 mm. Armament: 8 - 203 mm guns, 12 - 105 mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 - 37 mm, 8 - 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, 12 torpedo tubes, 3 aircraft.
www.battleships.spb.ru/0980/tallinn.html

Sistership "Luttsova", heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper". During the war, both ships found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades.

In accordance with Stalin’s quite reasonable considerations: “A ship purchased from a supposed enemy is equal to two: one more from us and one less from the enemy.”, special attention was paid to attempts to purchase large warships. Almost all units of the German fleet were debated, but in reality the Germans had to give up only one - the Lutzovs. This choice once again shows that heavy cruisers were of least interest to Hitler, who was already embroiled in a war with strong naval opponents and had lost hope of achieving naval parity with Britain in traditional balanced fleets. So the loss of a ship, not very suitable for individual raider actions due to its power plant, could not greatly affect the plans of the German fleet, which was clearly incapable of a direct collision in battle with the English. On the other hand, the USSR received one of the most modern and technically advanced cruisers, although in an unfinished state.

A little about the condition of the ship:
By the summer of 1941, the cruiser was already 70 percent ready. However, none of its premises were finally completed. The ship's armament included only the 1st and 4th main-caliber two-gun turrets and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery.
www.shipandship.chat.ru/military/c031.ht m
The Germans undertook to complete its construction in the Soviet Union and, within the agreed timeframe, to equip it with the missing equipment, weapons and ammunition. The unfinished cruiser was transferred to Leningrad. Deliveries of the missing equipment in 1940 initially went smoothly, according to the agreed schedule, but from the beginning of 1941, interruptions began. Before the German attack on the Soviet Union, the company supplied only half of the main caliber artillery, but at the same time - full ammunition for the guns.
www.kriegsmarine.ru/lutzov_tallin.php

Price.

Actually, what we see is that an expensive, unfinished ship is bought from a potential enemy for considerable money (more on this a little later). Doesn't remind you of anything? Regarding prices - 104 million. Reichsmarks - is it a lot or a little?
For example, the construction of one of the most famous ships of the Second World War, the battleship Bismarck, cost the Reich treasury 196.8 million. Reichmarks.

Hitler's expensive toy - the battleship Bismarck

One heavy Tiger tank cost an average of 800 thousand. Reichsmark. That is, it is not difficult to notice how expensive toys the large warships of the main classes were. Actually, in the case of the notorious Mistral, it is not difficult to establish that the purchase price of one ship is dozens of units of the same modern armored vehicles
Of course, we must remember that the cost of building such a ship in the country of origin and the cost of selling it to another country are somewhat different things, so it is possible that there is a certain trade percentage in the cost of the Lutzov. As a matter of fact, it is very likely that such a percentage is included in the Mistral offered to us. Of course, in this regard, the desire of our admirals to build these ships at home is completely understandable - in this case, in addition to other benefits, unnecessary overpayment can be avoided.

Necessity

The question of why Stalin needed "Luttsov" is very interesting. Despite all the weakness of the Kriegsmarine, the USSR Navy was inferior to it in a number of indicators, and even the purchase of the Luttsov changed little. Moreover, the ship was in an average state of readiness. The course of events in the Baltic, where the Baltic Fleet was locked in its bases for almost the entire war, showed this perfectly - heavy ships showed themselves more in the defense of Leningrad than in purely naval operations.
Cruiser "Maxim Gorky"
As a result of this, the unfinished cruiser was used during the war as a floating battery, methodically shooting at the Germans with the ammunition they supplied.

When the enemy approached Leningrad, work was found for the 8-inch guns of the new unit. On September 7, Petropavlovsk opened fire on German troops for the first time. Obviously, the Germans decided at one time that shells without guns were not too dangerous, and supplied all the ammunition, inflicting a double blow on themselves, reducing the ammunition reserve for their heavy cruisers and making it possible to fire from the four guns of the Soviet ship with virtually no restrictions. During the first week alone from the moment Petropavlovsk joined forces against troops, it fired 676 shells.
However, on September 17, a shell from a German battery hit the hull and disabled the cruiser’s only source of energy - generator room No. 3. The team not only had to abort the shooting; she turned out to be helpless against the fire from subsequent hits, since the supply of water to the fire mains stopped. During the unfortunate day of September 17, the helpless ship received about 50 hits from shells of various calibers. A lot of water entered the hull and on August 19 the cruiser sat on a pound. It was saved from capsizing only by the embankment wall, onto which the Petropavlovsk leaned on its side. The team suffered 30 casualties, including 10 killed.

The Tallinn/Petropavlovsk heavy cruiser never entered service as a full-fledged heavy cruiser - neither during the war nor after its end.
It was later used for various non-core tasks, and then logically disassembled. So, it seems like they bought an expensive “unfinished” building of very dubious value, they didn’t have time to finish it in time for the war, and they didn’t use it for its intended purpose. Yes, but if you look from the other side - there were significant benefits from the ship, how can you evaluate the artillery support provided during the defense of Leningrad, when the fate of the city hung in the balance? How much did the shells that the unfinished cruiser threw at the Germans cost? The question is rhetorical.

Now there is a lot of debate about why Russia needs the Mistral. We must understand that we are not Nostradamus, and we don’t know how history will go. Of course, the possibility cannot be ruled out that they will pour a lot of money into the ship, and the return from it will be a fool’s errand. But you also need to understand that situations are also possible when such a purchase will pay off with interest. I am not saying that the purchase of the Mistral is definitely correct, but one must understand that such very dubious purchases, even from the point of view of experts, can be beneficial in certain circumstances. After all, of course, when they took the Lutzow from the Germans, they could hardly imagine that it would bring benefits in a very unexpected way.
Regarding the Mistral, of course, not only the ship itself is important, but also the technological base attached to it, which can be mastered (if we are given it, of course) during the construction of ships of this class at domestic shipyards. Actually, we can remember that in 1939-1940 the Soviet Union was interested in the drawings of Bismarck-class battleships, since the issue of building large warships was very relevant, as was the interest in foreign analogues. That is, interest in foreign ships is not the prerogative of the current government. Facts of similar expensive contracts before 1917 are widely known. As we see, there were such facts after the Revolution.

Expensive "pig in a poke"
Where and how our admirals will drive the Mistral is of course an interesting question - it depends on them how to get the most benefit from an expensive purchase. Actually, I personally don’t see anything criminal in such purchases for our Navy, especially if we manage to get a contract for the construction of these ships at our shipyards and access to French technologies.
In the worst case, these ships will allow us to survive in a period of timelessness, until we again launch programs for the construction of large ships - it’s better to have at least one of these than none at all. And we do not foresee any serious large surface ships until the hypothetical implementation of projects to create AUGs and attempts to modernize and commission Orlan-class nuclear cruisers. Without fish, as they say, there is cancer in fish.
PS. You can, of course, blame the collapse of our shipbuilding industry, for which, in modern times, the construction of frigates with corvettes is almost a feat, but this is unproductive. Ships will not appear as a result of this, but they are needed now to fill the growing holes associated with the obsolescence of the remnants of the Soviet Navy. So, personally, I am cautiously optimistic about the purchase.