The general provisions of the many varieties of rational choice theory are:

• - the assumption of intentionality;
• - the assumption of rationality;
• - distinction between “complete” and “incomplete” information and, in the latter case, between “risk” and “uncertainty”;
• - distinguishing between "strategic" and "interdependent" actions.

Rational choice theory presupposes intentionality. Rational choice explanations are actually a subset of "intentional explanations." Intentional explanations do not simply assume that the individual is acting on purpose; rather, they explain social practices by referring to the respective beliefs and wishes of individuals. Often, intentional explanations are accompanied by a search for not expected (or so-called "aggregated") consequences of deliberate actions of people. Contrary to functionalist explanations, the unexpected effects of social practices are not used to explain the sustainability of these very practices. Special attention is paid by rational choice theorists to two types of negative unexpected consequences or "social contradictions": counter-completion and suboptimality.

Countercompletion is associated with a "compositional failure" that occurs whenever people act on the erroneous assumption that what is optimal for any individual in a particular situation is simultaneously the need for optimal for all individuals in this situation ( , 106; , 95).

Suboptimality refers to individuals who, in conditions of interdependent choices, choose a specific strategy, realizing that other individuals are doing the same, and also realizing that everyone can acquire at least the same amount if a different strategy is adopted ( , 122). A striking example of suboptimality for two is the so-called prisoner's dilemma, which will be discussed later.

Second, in addition to intentionality, rational choice theories imply rationality. Explanations of rational choice are in fact the subtlety of intentional explanations; they attribute, as the name suggests, rationality in social action. Rationality means, roughly speaking, that by acting and interacting, the individual has an appropriate plan and seeks to maximize the set of satisfaction of his preferences, while minimizing the corresponding costs. Thus, rationality presupposes a "connectedness assumption," which states that the individual involved has a complete "order of preference" over the various options. Based on these orders of preference, social scientists can talk about a utilitarian function that assigns a number to each option according to its rank within the order of preference. For a person to be rational, her order of preference must satisfy certain requirements. The principle of transitivity is an obvious example of such a prerequisite: the preference of X over Y and Y over Z must imply a preference for X over Z. When connectedness and transitivity are simultaneously involved, rational choice theorists burn about the "weak order of preference."

Rational choice explanations associate individual behavior with the individual's subjective beliefs and preferences, rather than with the objective conditions and opportunities facing him. Thus, it is possible for someone to act rationally based on false beliefs that oppose the best way to achieve someone else's goals or desires. However, to call someone rational, he / she must collect enough information within the bounds of the possible so that his / her beliefs are valid. The endless collection of information can also be a sign of irrationality, especially if the situation is emergency. For example, in the face of a direct military attack, prolonged study of possible strategies will have devastating consequences.

Third, there are differences between uncertainty and risk. People are expected to know with some certainty the consequences of their actions. But in reality, people often have only partial information about the relationship between specific actions and consequences. Some theorists even take the position that there are no real life situations in which people are able to rely on complete information, because, as Burke wrote two centuries ago, "you can never plan the future based on the past." There is a difference in the framework of "incomplete information" between "uncertainty" and "risk" - this distinction was first made by M. Keynes, and the theory of rational choice seeks to study choice under uncertainty as a choice under risk.

When faced with risk, people are able to attribute the likelihood of different outcomes, while when faced with uncertainty, they are unable to do so. Rational choice theorists tend to focus on risk for two reasons: either because they believe that situations of uncertainty do not exist, or because they believe that when such situations exist, rational choice theory cannot help people in their actions. In the face of risk, rational risk theory assumes that people are able to calculate the "expected utility" or "expected value" of each action.

Fourth, there is a distinction between strategic and parametric choices. Excluding the above two types of social contradiction (indicative of "strategic" or "interdependent" choices), let us turn to parametric choices. They refer to the choices that individuals face in environments independent of their choices. Suboptimality and counterfinality are examples of strategic choices in which individuals must take into account the choices made by others before deciding their own course of action. Another example: people who buy and sell shares on the stock exchange tend to take into account the choice of others before making a decision themselves. As part of rational action theory, game theory deals with the formalization of interdependent or strategic choices. It constructs ideal-type models that provide a rational decision for each player in a game where other players also make choices, and where each player must take into account the choices of others.

The Norwegian sociologist Ottar Brox (born 1932) set out to show what rational foundations local adaptations ("customs") have, which society considers as traditional or traditional ... As an example, he analyzes the "fish pot" institute. On the northern coast of Norway, once traditional for many, there was a way out in the fjord to catch fish for dinner, as they said, "catch in the cauldron." Often fishermen could catch more fresh fish than they could use, then the surplus had to be given to neighbors, friends or acquaintances. However, this “generosity” was not an expression of altruistic values, but an exchange within a barter economy. Later, the donor himself will receive the fish and other goods, or he will be helped in some other way when he needs it. This system of exchange relations was supported by customs and social norms. However, with the advent of the refrigerator, it has become more profitable to store fish than to "give" it away. These new latent forms of action were used by people willing to break norms and not sensitive to sanctions. Thus, they can function as entrepreneurs, changing the existing system of interdependence.

Another prominent Scandinavian theorist in this direction is Gudmund Hernes (born 1941), a student of Coleman, who studied the problems of education and inequality, and applied the theory of rational choice to the study of problems of power and anarchy. On his initiative and under his leadership, a large-scale study of power relations in modern Norwegian society was carried out, commissioned and paid for by the government of Norway. Hernes and his colleagues created a model for analyzing the processes occurring in the negotiation economy and in mixed administration .

The central concepts of the Hernes model are power, interest and exchange... Actor A has power over B because A controls something that B is interested in, and vice versa. This interdependence forms the basis of the exchange as actors can make decisions while facing each other. Actors can give up control over something of less interest to them in order to gain control over something more meaningful. Hernes summarizes the mutual dependence, power, and bargaining power of the parties with the following formula:

Direct power of A over B = control of A over object X + interest of B in object X = direct dependence of B on A ( , 14,).

A and B are not necessarily individuals, but rational actors who collaborate in groups for their own benefit. Parliamentarians make laws and can therefore create relationships of exchange with those for whom parliamentary votes are important. Farmers control food and thus have leverage over the authorities and the consumer. Trade unions can exercise power through a strike. Henry Milner studied the relationship between social democratic politics and rational choice theory.

From the point of view of J. Elster, it is necessary to reject the functional explanation and replace them with combinations of explanations of intentional and causal. Instead of postulating classes as collective actors, one should analyze the ways in which rational individuals come together in action to achieve a common goal. Game theory, according to Elster, is acceptable in order to give the macrotheories of Marxism a micro-basis.

LECTURE 20

RATIONALITY(from Lat. ratio - reason) - rationality, characteristic of knowledge from the point of view of its compliance with the most general principles of thinking, reason.

The concept of rationality has a long history, but only from the second half of the 19th century it began to acquire a stable content and became the subject of heated debate. This was largely due to the consideration of theoretical knowledge in its development, the understanding of the complexity and ambiguity of the justification procedure.

Any human activity has an expedient character, and this presupposes a clear awareness of the goal, its setting and the choice of ways to achieve it. In everyday and practical life, such a choice is made on the basis of everyday experience, in which a choice based on common sense and intuition will be considered rational or reasonable. However, common sense and intuition are enough only for solving relatively simple problems. In more complex cases of solving scientific problems and complex problems, one has to turn to the construction of rational choice models. When building such a model, the scheme of activity includes: 1) the exact formulation and justification of the goal or, as they say, the target function; 2) a complete listing of all possible alternatives or ways to achieve the goal; 3) an assessment of each alternative in terms of its value or utility, as well as the likelihood of its implementation in reality. Ultimately, from all the available alternatives, the one that best suits the goal is selected, both in terms of its usefulness and the likelihood of implementation.

Such a choice should not be arbitrary, but justified, reasonable or rational. The validity of such a choice is connected, first of all, with its purpose, and rationality or rationality depends on the methods and means used to achieve the final goal. Therefore, the contradictions that arise in the selection process are primarily associated with the identification of rational and irrational approaches, both to the selection process itself and the assessment of possible alternatives for its implementation.

A solution to the problem of the ratio of individual calculation and adherence to norms is offered by an alternative theory of social exchange - rational choice theory ... This theory is a scientific approach that is based on the consideration of social interaction as a process of coordinating the actions of people seeking to achieve individual goals. The rationality of the choice is determined by the optimality of the strategy of behavior. The individual chooses from alternatives - a fixed set of possible options for action - the option that will give the best result. However, the desire of all to maximize individual gain can lead to a social dilemma. - a situation in which a conflict arises between individual rationality and social rationality.

Despite the influence exerted by the theory of rational choice on the development of the theory of exchange, it was on the sidelines of the dominant direction of sociological theory. Largely thanks to the efforts of one person, James S. Coleman, this theory has become one of the "topical" in modern sociology. First, Coleman founded the magazine Rationality and Society in 1989 with the goal of spreading rational choice theory. Second, Coleman published an extremely influential book, Foundations of Social Theory. Finally, in 1992, he became president of the American Sociological Association. Taking the opportunity to promote the theory of rational choice, he spoke at a meeting of the association with the address "Rational Reorganization of Society."

Thus, the journal "Rationality and Society" is closed for many sociological studies. At the same time, macro-level approaches and their relationship with rational action remain in the area of ​​interest of the publication. In addition to such academic considerations, Coleman insists that research that follows the concepts of rational choice be practically linked to our changing world.

The problem of optimizing the strategy of behavior in a situation where individually rational actions lead to socially irrational consequences is revealed using models of mathematical game theory. The most famous of them was called "Prisoner's Dilemma" (from the English Prisoner's Dilemma).

For each of the two arrested (for participating in one crime), there are two options for action: confess or deny. The matrix of possible outcomes for the first participant (see Fig. 4) includes four cases, depending on the actions of the second participant:

1) both confess and, having shared responsibility, receive the same punishment;

2) the first confesses, while the second is unlocked, and the blame is shifted to the second;

3) the first is unlocked, the second confesses, and the blame is shifted to the first;

4) both are unlocked and receive the same minimum penalty.

Rice. 4. "Prisoner's Dilemma"

The use of models similar to the "prisoner's dilemma" in the analysis of various social phenomena forms the basis of the research strategy of adherents of the theory of rational choice. Traditionally, they are exemplified by the work of economists who have developed this approach for a long time, and in recent years also the work of the American sociologist James Coleman (1926–1995) "Foundations of Social Theory" (1990).

Coleman analyzed in terms of rational choice interactions, traditionally associated with the manifestation of feelings rather than with calculation. In particular, he showed that in the process of courtship and marriage, an individual seeks a partner as attractive as possible in terms of physical beauty, intelligence, kindness, prestige of work, income level or other qualities. Consequently, mating behavior, according to Coleman, is reduced to a rational choice from a fixed set of alternatives. But the desire of each participant in the “marriage market” to optimize choice leads to a social dilemma that can be described using the “prisoner dilemma” model. If both partners enter into a marriage for love, then each “acquires” attention and care from the other and at the same time “spends” energy and time on paying attention to the partner and taking care of him, that is, a situation of common gain arises (4). If one of the partners enters into a marriage of convenience, and the other for love, then one "wins" because "gains" without "spending", that is, a situation arises of either one-sided gain (2) or one-sided loss (3). An individually rational strategy is to marry of convenience, but if both partners choose such a strategy, then neither of them "gets" what he expects (1). The strategy of marriage of convenience is socially irrational.

Social norms limit choice, reducing alternatives to socially approved actions, and orient the participants in the interaction to maintain their reputation, that is, to maintain trust in them from the interaction partners. Thus, it can be considered rational to choose not in favor of individual interest, but in favor of the positive opinion of other people. However, the theory of rational choice underestimates the problem of forming an opinion, that is, the perception, interpretation and assessment of the actions of individuals by other participants in the interaction.

Coleman's commitment to the concept of rational choice is reflected in his main idea that "people strive to achieve their goal, and the goal (and therefore action) is shaped by values ​​or preferences." But at the same time, Coleman clarifies that, in theoretical terms, he needs a conceptually more definite idea of ​​a rationally acting subject, which can actually be borrowed from political economy. According to this concept, actors choose those actions that contribute to the maximum benefit, satisfy needs and desires.

Key concepts in Coleman's theory are actors and resources. Resources- this is what is controlled by the actors and what they are interested in one way or another. With these two elements in mind, Coleman describes how their interaction is brought to the system level:

The minimum basis for a social system of action is two actors, each of which controls the resources in which the other is interested. It is the interest in the resources controlled by the other that makes the subjects be purposeful and participate in actions that include both parties in the system of actions. It is this structure, along with the purposefulness of actors striving to realize their interests to the maximum, that determines the interdependence of their actions, giving them a systemic character.

Based on the theory of rational choice, Coleman is far from thinking that this approach will provide answers to all the questions that arise. However, he is convinced of its ability to develop in this direction, as he argues that "the success of a social theory based on rationality lies in the gradual reduction of the sphere of social activity that cannot be explained by this theory."

Coleman's focus on the rational action of the individual suggests that his approach involves linking micro and macro phenomena or explaining how the combination of individual actions affects the behavior of the system. Given this issue the most important, Coleman is interested in the transition from macro to micro level, or in how the system limits the attitudes of actors. Finally, he focuses on relationships within the micro-level - the impact of individual actions on other individual actions.

Still, Coleman's approach fails to avoid several drawbacks, three of which are major. First, he gives predominant attention to the issue of the transition from micro to macro level, not concentrating on the consideration of relations of a different plan. Second, he neglects relationships within the macro level. Finally, he establishes causality in a purely unidirectional way; in other words, it does not take into account the dialectical relations connecting micro and macro phenomena.

Sociology of Rational Choice is based on the theory of social exchange and economic theories of rational choice. The concept of the rational action of individuals is carried over to the behavior of the entire system, consisting of the same individuals. The idea of ​​transferring the principles of methodological individualism to the level of corporate actors was born in response to the inability of economists to explain such economic phenomena as the emergence of panic on the stock exchange or the relationship of trust in mutual lending societies.

The sociology of rational choice revives the ideas of utilitarianism in sociology, which views a person as a utilizer of utility.

New models of rationality. The prerequisites for the theory of rational choice arose in the middle of the 18th - early 19th centuries. in the teachings of morality of the Scottish school of morality, whose representatives for the first time proposed an individualistic concept of rational behavior of people and drew attention to its fruitfulness for explaining other social phenomena.

None other than the future founder of classical political economy, Adam Smith, who belonged to this school, applied this concept to explain market relations. Another source of its origin is the ideas of supporters of the school of utilitarianism, who refused to consider human behavior on the basis of various kinds of a priori ideas and preconceived opinions. In contrast, they began to explain their actions and behavior solely by the results to which they lead. Therefore, they stopped considering people's actions in advance as good or bad until their results were known. The founder of the school of utilitarianism I. Bentham put forward the basic principle according to which ethics should be focused on achieving happiness for the greatest number of people. In his opinion, this happiness can even be mathematically calculated as a balance of pleasure and pain in a certain behavior.

Representatives of the later emerging neoclassical theory in economics replaced the principle of evaluating behavior by balancing pleasure and pain with the principle of mutual exchange of goods, if this exchange occurs honestly. In this way, the ideas of individualism, rational, or reasonable, choice in decision-making have been used to analyze economic activity and, above all, to study market relations. Therefore, in the future, the theory of rational choice (RTS) began to be developed mainly in economic research and began to be considered as a purely economic theory.

In recent decades, this theory under the name of public choice theory (PST) has been applied and developed in political science, sociology, history and other social sciences. At present, there has even been a tendency to regard RTV as a universal theory or even a research paradigm for all social sciences and humanities. Without denying the importance and important merits of this theory, primarily in economic research, as evidenced by the award of Nobel prizes for the last year in this profile, we will try to show that this theory has certain application limits.

Therefore, without a meaningful analysis of the principles and methods of a specific social science, it cannot be automatically applied in all social sciences and humanities without exception.

Questions for self-control:

1. Explain the essence of the theory of rational choice;

2. Who is the most significant developer of the theory of rational choice;

3. What is the sociology of rational choice based on?

This paragraph has in its title the phrase social production. Why this epithet was needed Is the concept of production not enough to understand the need for the interaction of the main factors of production The fact is that the production process is carried out not by isolated subjects, but in society, in the system of social division of labor (see Chap. 5, 1). Even an individual artisan or farmer, believing that he acts completely independently of anyone else, is in fact connected by thousands of economic threads with other people. It can also be noted here that the Robinsonade method, when an individual person (one of the most widely used research methods in), living on a desert island is considered as an example, does not contradict the assertion about the social nature of production. Robinsonade helps to better understand the mechanism of rational economic behavior of an individual, but this mechanism does not cease to function if we move from the Robinson model to the realities of not individual, but social choice. It may seem that only macroeconomics is connected with the study of social production, while microeconomics deals only with individual economic individuals. Indeed, in the study of microeconomics, we will most often have to use the individual producer or consumer as an example. But it should be remembered that the aforementioned subjects operate in a system of restrictions imposed by social institutions (for example, the institution of property, morality and other formal and informal rules).

The rational use of limited economic resources in order to fully satisfy the needs of the individual, households, and other economic entities is manifested primarily in, which should be considered identical to the theory of equilibrium between the individual and the household in consumption. She explores such conditions and rules of behavior of consumers in a market economy, which ensure the achievement of the main goal - to increase their level of well-being in the face of growing needs. The conclusions and provisions of the theory of consumer choice make it possible to answer questions related to the rationalization of the use by an individual and a household of their incomes, as well as other limited resources. In modern economic theory, there are two approaches to identifying the patterns of economic behavior of a person seeking to maximize the parameters of his consumption and, consequently, his well-being.

The second, institutional approach to the problem of consumer choice, on the one hand, concretizes neoclassical "idealism", and on the other, introduces qualitatively new approaches to the study of the economic behavior of individuals. In general, abstract logical constructions are being replaced by no less complex, but more realistic postulates and substantiations of rational consumer behavior. The institutional approach to the problem of consumer choice is formed from the concepts of the "old" in-

We paid more attention to the economic way of thinking. In Chapter 1, we have significantly expanded the section on the economic approach to reality, examining in detail the problems of scarcity of resources and choice, rational behavior and marginal analysis. In Chapter 2, we use the concepts of marginal benefit and marginal cost (see Figure 2-2) to determine the optimal position of the economy on the production opportunity curve. And in the future, in the rest of the textbook, we do not miss the opportunity to recall the economic approach.

Let us now return to the problem of making decisions that allow individuals acting in the role of consumers, within the limits of their income, to choose the most preferable set of goods and services for themselves. From an economic point of view, consumer behavior is rational if the option he chooses allows him to get maximum satisfaction from the purchased set of goods and services. The theory of consumer choice is built on the basis of the hypothesis about the rationality of consumer behavior.

The fundamental premise of the theory of economic man is that all people know the alternatives available in a given situation and all the consequences that they will cause. It also assumes that people will behave rationally, that is, they will make choices in a way that maximizes some value. Even today, most microeconomic theories are based on the profit-maximizing assumption. It is obviously wrong to assume that people always behave in a rational way. Mr. Simon believed that the administrative person is a more accurate model of reality, since the managers were never fully informed and were rarely able to maximize anything. Due to the physical limitations of decision makers, Simon introduced the principle of bounded rationality. Since optimization looks too difficult for an administrative person, Simon suggested that satisfaction is a more realistic and typical procedure. The satisfaction seeker considers alternatives until he finds one that meets the minimum standard of satisfaction. Although many new quantitative methods give the manager a better understanding of the decision situation, research into actual decision-making behavior has supported this theory.

IGOR. And when it comes to redistribution, it is necessary to find a balance between the interests of those who receive and those who give. This means that the logic of state behavior is the logic of public choice, which, unlike the individual one, is made jointly, and with the help of political institutions. Economic theory studies public choice from its specific point of view, considering it as the result of the actions of rational individuals. Of course, economic analysis primarily emphasizes the similarities and

Finally, it should be said about the approaches to the study of voter behavior. In terms of the rational choice model, voters will vote only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. The size of the expected benefits is injured by the product of the increase in welfare that the voter will receive as a result of the victory of the party announcing the most favorable course of economic policy for him, by the probability that it is the vote of this voter that will have a decisive influence on the outcome of the election (an additional factor can be the subjective assessment of the voter's probability of that the party will keep its campaign promises). Since the likelihood of casting a decisive vote in most cases is not

He ended his Nobel lecture with these words. I am deeply impressed by how many economists are willing to study social issues, rather than those that have traditionally formed the core of economics. At the same time, the economic method of modeling behavior often attracts specialists from other fields who study social problems with its analytical power, which is provided by the principle of individual rationality. Influential schools of theorists and empiricist researchers, based on the rational choice model, are active in sociology, jurisprudence, political science, history, anthropology, and psychology. The rational choice model provides the most promising

Among the numerous models of human behavior in the modern economy, several of the most famous and genetically related to each other can be distinguished. First of all, this is the model of behavior of an "economic man", according to which each individual, having the freedom of economic choice, through rational behavior seeks to satisfy individual needs. This model was created by the classical and neoclassical schools of economics and dominated until the middle of the 20th century. The essence of this model lies in the desire of every person who freely disposes of their resources to achieve the maximum possible benefit from their use. The subjective basis of this model is a person as an individual, and the object structure of the created and consumed goods is represented mainly by material products of labor activity.

Within the framework of the "economic man" behavior model, one can distinguish the neoclassical concept of a shelf or absolute rationality, as well as the neoinstitutional concept of limited or satisfactory rationality. The essence of the concept of absolute rationality lies in the fact that an individual who consciously strives for the best economic choice receives the positive highest economic income of all possible alternatives. This is achieved through the competent use of information that is directly and indirectly related to the solution of economic problems. The disadvantage of the concept of complete rationality is excessive abstraction and abstraction of researchers from socio-economic re-

In addition, the desire of the individual to make the best economic choice and the related search and processing of the necessary information are always carried out in a certain institutional environment, under the conditions of formal and informal norms and rules. An individual striving to rationalize his economic activity is in the system of socio-economic and other relationships with other individuals. It is in their common interests to streamline, that is, to institutionalize the system of relationships with each other, which is impossible without the "permissions" and "prohibitions" on well-defined decisions and actions adopted and respected by all. Thus, the behavior of an "economic man" becomes rational, which is associated with the search not theoretically for the best, but in practice for the most preferable or satisfactory economic choice.

The subjectivist approach to the study of economic relations analyzes the behavior of a particular individual, and not an economic subject as such, which may be a firm, a state, etc. Such a subjective-idealistic view of economic processes equalizes all "owners theory is reduced to a description of human activity, determined by the boundaries of individual needs. The model of human behavior in the economy is here identified with the model of behavior of the "economic man", and the basic concepts are "needs", "utility", "economic choice", etc. The economic theory itself is here identified with the theories of rational human behavior when using limited resources.

The fourth feature concerns the calculation of the results, the consequences - the effectiveness of behavior. Activity is assessed by its effectiveness, i.e. by the result. In this sense, the goal of the activity is its result. Decision making is understood as the assessment of alternatives, the calculation of consequences, the choice of a course of action based on the relative value of the expected result. It is assumed that this is how the means and the ends themselves are chosen. If the achievement of a goal requires too much risk and / or cost, then, as economists believe, the economic person is called from the goal. Therefore, the rationality of economic behavior is understood as the calculation (goals, means, results) i the sequence of the named steps.

The problem of choice in its neoclassical version can be looked at in two ways. So, from the point of view of limited resources, it looks like an optimization of the behavior of an economic agent. On the other hand, choice is an attribute of a free individual, free, at least from personal dependence. As one of the initial premises of classical and neoclassical economic theory, the problem of choice has undergone a bifurcation; these aspects of it began to exist separately. This served as the basis for the emergence of two different research tendencies, based on different grounds, one - on the premise of freedom of choice, the other - on the premise of rational choice, although both tendencies can formally retain both of them. In economic theory itself, what is now called the orthodox or general economic theory, the "mainstream", in the methodological core of which one of the main places is assigned to the principle of rationality of individual choice, which was subsequently criticized by neoinstitutionalists and representatives of the new institutional economy.

The founders of the institutional school (T. Weblen, J. Commons, J.M. Clark, W. Mitchell, W. Hamilton, etc.) considered institutions as models and norms of behavior, as well as thinking habits that influence the choice of strategies for economic behavior in addition to to motivate rational economic choice. Unlike the old institutionalists, supporters of the neoinstitutional direction O. Williamson, R. Coase, D. North and others give the concept of an institution a broader meaning, considering them as the most important factors of economic interactions and, accordingly, building on this concept a system of other categories. We join the interpretation according to which institutions are the rules of the game in society, or, more formally, human-created constraints that organize relationships between people. Consequently, they set the structure of the incentives for human interaction - be it in politics,

according to this theory, social organizations (see) structure those alternatives and their consequences that individuals face, and also determine their adoption of certain rational decisions. She explains differently. social forms behavior proceeding not from the personality of the individual, but from the context of those limitations and possibilities, within which a rational choice is made.

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Rational choice theory

rational choice theory), a concept that explains social behavior as a manifestation of the rational pursuit of personal goals by individuals. R.v.t. proceeds from the fact that the individual has objectified. scale of preferences, and in each case seeks to achieve the desired result. This approach, which has long found application in economics, has recently begun to be used in other areas as well. In particular, sociologists have attempted to explain such phenomena as criminal behavior or the choice of a marriage partner in terms of costs and benefits, and social choice theorists have adapted the achievements of the R.V.T. to politics. R.v.t. often underlies the development of social norms. An important direction of R.W.t. is a theory of games that simulate a situation when one group chooses a method of action without taking into account the future actions of other people, although the result depends on the latter. Of particular importance are cases in which a rational choice for each individual leads to negative consequences for everyone. For example, everyone can consider it rational to use personal transport (a car with an internal combustion engine that pollutes the environment), although in general everyone is interested in preventing the consequences of such use. Game theory develops possible solutions to these dilemmas.

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RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

rational choice theory) is a relatively formal approach to sociological and socio-scientific theorizing (for example, based on game theory, the concept of strategic interaction and political economy), which argues that social life is predominantly capable of explaining in terms of the result of "rational choices" of individual actors. When faced with several lines of business, people usually choose the one that they think will bring the best end result. This deceptively simple proposition summarizes rational choice theory. ”(Elster, 1989) It is a form of theorizing characterized by the application of technically rigorous models of social behavior and tending to draw robust inferences from a relatively small number of initial theoretical assumptions about“ rational behavior. ”Such theories have become fashionable in the last two decades due to dissatisfaction with macroscopic and structural models, reinforced by the exaggerated importance of the rhetoric of individual rational choice in many areas of economic and political life.Despite its often impressive formal architecture and undoubted value in illuminating some areas of social reality, the theory of rational choice can be noted two important constraints (see Hollis, 1987): (a) the relative inability to overcome multiple technical difficulties (for example, regressing actors' expectations of the performance of others) that they undermine formal accuracy and undermine the immediate applicability of its models; (b) association with positivist and pragmatic epistemologies that limit the analysis of norm-driven activities that follow rules and change the rules of social

behavior. See also Exchange Theory.

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RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY) Rational choice theory, which has its origins in economics, is a rapidly developing branch of sociological theory, more accurately called the rational choice approach or paradigm. It is one of those models of purposeful action that are found in all social sciences. These models assume that social actors tend to achieve certain goals, that is, they take actions to obtain certain results. The main tenet of rational choice theory is a metatheoretical assumption rather than an empirical generalization, and it is that people act rationally. In general, purposeful action models are based on the same assumption, but the hallmark of rational choice theory is the idea of ​​optimization: by acting rationally, individuals act in an optimal way, that is, they maximize benefits or reduce costs to a minimum when choosing from a number of alternative actions. In accordance with their preferences, actors choose those actions that bring the best results. Following economists, rational choice sociologists often assume that actors are primarily concerned with their own well-being and that their preferences are self-interested. In particular, actors seek to control the resources in which they are interested (for example, wealth and other sources of material well-being, security, leisure). Thus, this approach follows the tradition of utilitarianism, and many of its representatives assume that individual actors are selfish. However, the assumption that the actors are selfish is not a necessary element of this theory, which emphasizes the purposefulness of actions and the optimization undertaken by the actors, but does not say what the goals are. It has been argued that some people may have “other-directed” preferences of an altruistic nature, which they also follow in a rational way through optimization. The main goal of rational choice theory is to explain the behavior of social systems (both large and small) rather than individual behavior. Theorists of this direction believe that the system should be explained in terms of the behavior of its constituent actors. This, in turn, requires an explanation of the actions of individual individuals and the transition from individual behavior to the behavior of the system. In accordance with the accepted postulate that people act rationally, individual actions are modeled quite simply as the results of rational choice (purposeful action, optimization and, in the opinion of many theorists, egoism). The subtleties of individual psychology are ignored in this case. Representatives of this approach are much more interested in the transition from individuals to systems and vice versa. Unlike utilitarianism, the rational choice approach does not imply that social systems can be modeled only as a collection of individual actors and actions. First, with the unification of individual actors, their interaction often leads to results that differ from the intentions of the purposefully acting individuals that make up the social system. Second, social systems have qualities that both limit the actions of individuals and affect their preferences. Consequently, within the framework of this approach, attempts are made to combine sociological explanations at the macro level (for example, at the level of the institutional structure of society) with explanations at the micro level (the level of behavior of actors within this structure) and thus solve the problem of the dualism of activity and structure. These general assumptions can be illustrated with respect to collective action and social cohesion, which is viewed by rational choice theory as something inherently problematic. An example would be the question of union membership: if a certain group of workers is represented by a union negotiating wages with employers on behalf of each member of that group, and union membership is voluntary, why would individuals choose to join a union and pay membership fees? After all, they know that employers, as a result of the actions of the union, will increase the wages of everyone, regardless of whether he is a member of the union or not. Thus, it would seem that there is no material incentive to join a trade union. The rational choice for the selfish individual, from this point of view, is to be a “free rider” - not to pay money for union membership, but to take advantage of the wage increases achieved through the collective action of his fellow workers. in the union. However, if all individuals made such rational choices, there would be no union or wage increases. The hare example suggests that (1) this approach focuses on individual actions as the main units of analysis; (2) these actions are explained by reference to the choices made by self-serving actors in response to the incentive structure proposed by the social system; (3) the actions of individuals acting rationally may have a collective outcome that is not rational or optimal for either the group or the individual. In fact, many, of course, join unions, and rational choice theory can offer various alternative hypotheses about this. Individuals may be aware of the consequences of a weakening union due to a decrease in membership and believe that joining a union to maintain its influence is in their own long-term interests. Individual preferences may include a desire to please fellow union members. Individuals may follow internalized group norms that value union membership as part of their preference. Rational choice theory is a theory of how people make choices given existing individual preferences. In order to explain the phenomena, it is therefore necessary to have additional knowledge or reasonable hypotheses about the nature and origin of these preferences. However, the latter is causing a difference of opinion. One common explanation is the reference to selfishness. According to another, preferences also reflect values ​​and beliefs that are not reducible to selfish interests and not amenable to rational choice. From this point of view, preferences are shaped by socialization; thus, this approach requires making additional assumptions about culture and social structure. The set of various possibilities from which the actors make their choice is also socially structured, that is, there are social restrictions on choice. A hypothesis that refers to selfishness is neither plausible nor useful, since it is obvious that people usually act by putting the interests of other individuals and groups ahead of their own. However, the proponents of this hypothesis in response to this claim that the choices correlated with the interests of others, such as adherence to social norms of cooperation, trust, and even altruism, in fact, can be explained in terms of the idea of ​​selfishness. From their own experience, individuals are convinced that cooperation, trust and action for the benefit of the group are rational ways to maximize their own benefit in situations where individuals are linked by relationships of interdependence, and when each of them controls the resources needed by others. The rational choice paradigm recognizes that rationality itself is a problematic concept. First, the concept of limited rationality indicates that optimization is impossible, and therefore the choice of actors is not entirely rational, but limited rational. Secondly, what appears to be rational to the actor himself may not appear to others as such, and the question of which frame of reference should be adopted is controversial. Should the theorist take the agent's preferences for granted without asking whether they are rational (from the theorist's point of view)? Doesn't the theorist define the choice of the agent as rational when there are his best options that the agent could not take into account? If limited rationality is characteristic of both actors and observers, then can the latter adequately judge the rationality of the preferences and choice of the former? The absence of a strict criterion for rational choice due to the limited rationality means that the paradigm of rational choice itself can at times be rather vague. The rational choice approach is associated with analytical theorizing based on clear premises, logical deduction and clear argumentation, and leading to explanation rather than description. He also strives for simplicity of explanation and for reducing theory to a small number of fundamental elements. A distinctive feature of this approach is the construction of accurate models, often expressed in formal terms and, thus, similar to models of economics. As a theoretical paradigm based on the idea of ​​purposeful action and methodological individualism, it is part of the Weberian tradition of sociological theory. Its closest predecessor in sociology is the exchange theory, although the latter focuses on small groups rather than larger social systems. See also: Agent / Social worker; Game theory. Lit .: Coleman and Fararo (1992a); Marini (1992); Abell (2000)

The task of choice is one of the central ones in the economy. The two main actors in the economy - the buyer and the manufacturer - are constantly involved in the selection process. The consumer decides what to buy and at what price. The manufacturer decides what to invest in, what goods to produce.

One of the basic assumptions of economics is that humans make rational choices. Rational choice means the assumption that a person's decision is the result of an ordered thinking process. The word "ordered" is defined by economists in a rigorous mathematical form. A number of assumptions about human behavior are introduced, which are called the axioms of rational behavior.

Provided that these axioms are true, a theorem is proved about the existence of a certain function that establishes human choice - a utility function. Usefulness is called the value that, in the process of choice, is maximized by a person with rational economic thinking. We can say that utility is an imaginary measure of the psychological and consumer value of various goods.

Decision-making problems with consideration of utilities and probabilities of events were the first to attract the attention of researchers. The setting of such tasks usually consists in the following: a person chooses some kind of action in the world where the result (outcome) of the action is influenced by random events beyond the control of a person, but having some knowledge about the probabilities of these events, a person can calculate the most advantageous set and sequence of his action.

It should be noted that in this formulation of the problem, the options for action are usually not evaluated according to many criteria. Thus, a simpler (simplified) description of them is used. We consider not one, but several sequential actions, which makes it possible to construct the so-called decision trees (see below).

A person who follows the axioms of rational choice is called in economics rational person.

2. Axioms of rational behavior

In, six axioms are introduced and the existence of a utility function is proved. Let us give a meaningful presentation of these axioms. Let us denote by x, y, z various outcomes (results) of the selection process, and by p, q - the probabilities of certain outcomes. Let's introduce the definition of a lottery. A lottery is a game with two outcomes: outcome x, obtained with probability p, and outcome y, obtained with probability 1-p (Fig. 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Lottery presentation

An example of a lottery is a coin toss. In this case, as is known, heads or tails fall out with a probability of p = 0.5. Let x = $ 10 and

y = - $ 10 (i.e. we get $ 10 on heads and pay the same on heads). The expected (or average) lottery price is determined by the formula px + (1-p) y.

Here are the axioms of rational choice.

Axiom 1. Outcomes x, y, z belong to set A of outcomes.

Axiom 2. Let P denote strict preference (similar to relation> in mathematics); R - loose preference (similar to the ³ ratio); I - indifference (similar to attitude =). It is clear that R includes P and I. Axiom 2 requires two conditions:

1) connectivity: either xRy, or yRx, or both together;

2) transitivity: xRz follows from xRy and yRz.

Axiom 3. The two shown in Fig. 2.2 lotteries are about indifference.

Rice. 2.2. Two lotteries that are in a relationship of indifference

The validity of this axiom is obvious. It is written in the standard form as ((x, p, y) q, y) I (x, pq, y). Here on the left is a complex lottery, where with probability q we get a simple lottery, in which with probability p we get outcome x or with probability (1-p) - outcome y), and with probability (1-q) - outcome y.

Axiom 4. If xIy, then (x, p, z) I (y, p, z).

Axiom 5. If xPy, then xP (x, p, y) Py.

Axiom 6. If xPyPz, then there is a probability p such that y! (X, p, z).

All of the above axioms are simple enough to understand and seem obvious.

Assuming that they are satisfied, the following theorem was proved: if axioms 1-6 are satisfied, then there is a numerical utility function U, defined on A (set of outcomes) and such that:

1) xRy if and only if U (x)> U (y).

2) U (x, p, y) = pU (x) + (l-p) U (y).

The function U (x) is unique up to a linear transformation (for example, if U (x)> U (y), then a + U (x)>> a + U (y), where a is a positive integer) ...