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The Six Day War was a war in the Middle East between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Algeria, on the other, lasting from June 5 to June 10, 1967.

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The July Revolution of 1952 in Egypt overthrew the monarchy. A Revolutionary Command Council was formed, consisting of officers who carried out the coup. Soon one of them, Gamal Abdel Nasser, became the president of Egypt. A republic was proclaimed. Nasser wanted to consolidate the nation and “export” the revolution to other Arab countries.

Reinforcements sent by Brigadier General Uzi Narkis to the commander of the central forces allowed him to launch an offensive with three brigades. The main ones in the operation were the paratroopers of the units of Colonel Mordechai (Mota) Gur. That same day they approached the walls of the Old City, where the garrison was commanded by Jordanian Brigadier General Ata Ali.

June 6. Second day. The Israeli advance was stopped by strong and stubborn resistance. However, the encirclement of the city was completed - parts of a tank brigade were captured in the north, another brigade occupied Latrun in the southwest. For the first time since 1947, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road was open to Israeli traffic.

June 7. The third day. Colonel Gur took the Old City by storm. Around noon it was captured, a little later -. Both sides accept the UN Security Council proposal for a ceasefire from 20:00.

Jenin-Nablus Battle

June 5. First day. The Israeli Northern Forces, led by Major General David Elazar, numbered approximately two and a half brigades. By midnight, one division and a reinforced tank brigade were approaching Jenin.

June 7. The third day. The Israelis, continuing their onslaught, took possession of it after a bloody battle. The greatly depleted Jordanian forces crossed the Jordan River, where they remained until the ceasefire.

Operations on the Syrian front

June 5 - 8. First - fourth day. held six Syrian brigades (with six in reserve) in the east of Quneitra. On the evening of June 5, Israeli air strikes destroyed approximately two-thirds of all Syrian air forces. Artillery duels took place for four days; the parties made no attempts to seize the initiative.

the 9th of June. Fifth day. Elazar received orders to urgently launch an offensive early in the morning. He concentrated troops for an initial push through the Dan Banias area north of the Golan Plateau, along the foot of the mountain. By nightfall, these forces had broken through the Syrian defenses, and three brigades reached the plateau early the next morning. At the same time, other units were fighting their way through the hills north of Lake Kinneret, and Elazar ordered units recently fighting in the Jenin-Nablus region to move north and strike the Golan Heights south of the lake.

June 10th. Sixth day. The Israelis broke through Syrian defenses in the northern Golan Heights, then intensified their frontal attack across the plateau to approach Quneitra from the north, west and southwest. At the same time, a group of troops redeployed from the Jordanian front threatened Quneitra from the south. By evening, Quneitra was surrounded and an armored unit entered the city.

The ceasefire took effect at 7:30 p.m.

War at sea

There were no major naval battles during the war.

On June 8, 1967, the US Navy vessel "", engaged in electronic reconnaissance off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula (as stated - "without identification marks") and entered the war zone, was attacked in the afternoon by Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats. The attack killed 34 American sailors and wounded 173.

According to the Israeli side, the ship was “misidentified.” According to other assumptions, the ship was attacked by the Israelis deliberately in order to prevent the United States from collecting information about military operations in the region, in particular to prevent them from detecting the movements of Israeli troops in the Galilee in anticipation of the capture of the Golan Heights.

Israeli saboteur divers were sent to the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria, but were unable to damage a single ship. 6 Israeli divers were captured in Alexandria and taken prisoner.

Losses of the warring parties

From the Israeli side. According to various sources, Israel lost 779 people killed in this war (according to the Israeli Foreign Ministry - 776 people). Of these, 338 died on the Sinai front, 300 on the Jordanian front (including 183 in the Battle of Jerusalem) and 141 on the Syrian front, according to other sources, the total irretrievable losses amounted to 983 people.

From the Arab countries that took part in the hostilities

• Egypt - 11,500 dead (according to some estimates - up to 15 thousand), 20,000 wounded, 5,500 prisoners.
• Jordan - 696 dead, 421 injured, 2,000 missing.
• Syria - from 1000 to 2500 dead, 5000 wounded.
• Iraq - 10 dead, 30 wounded.

Results of the war

In this war, Israel achieved a landslide victory in a matter of days, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. 1949 became the administrative border between Israel and the new territories.

On June 28, 1967, by decree of the Israeli government, Israeli jurisdiction and municipal boundaries of Jerusalem were extended to the Jordanian (eastern) sector of Jerusalem and adjacent parts of the West Bank. Sources and politicians at the time disagreed on whether this action constituted an official annexation or not. The unambiguous official annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel occurred on November 30, 1980, when it was adopted declaring East Jerusalem to be the sovereign territory of Israel, and the entire city to be its “single and indivisible capital.”

In total, Israel gained control of an area 3.5 times larger than its pre-war area.

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Helpful information

Six Day War
Hebrew מלחמת ששת הימים‎
translit. "Milchemet Sheshet HaYamim"
Arab. حرب الأيام الستة‎‎
translit. "Harb al-ayam al-sitta"
or Arab. حرب 1967‎‎
translit. "Harb 1967"

Accusation by Egypt and Jordan of the United States and Great Britain of fighting on the side of Israel and its exposure

On June 6, in telephone conversations between King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser, intercepted by Israel, Hussein agrees to support Egypt and accuse the United States and Great Britain of fighting on the side of Israel. However, he quickly retracts this accusation when the recording of their conversation becomes public on June 8.

Nevertheless, Nasser managed to present this accusation in a letter on June 6 to A.N. Kosygin. The media in Egypt and Jordan picked up this accusation, Syria also accused Australia of the same thing, and crowds of Muslims attacked the US and British embassies in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite its exposure, this accusation is still alive in the Muslim world, including scientific historical publications.

Mutual accusations in the execution of prisoners of war

During the disorderly retreat of the Egyptians from the Sinai, Israel captured a huge number of prisoners (estimated to be more than 20,000 people). For the most part, these prisoners, with the exception of officers, were transported through the Suez Canal and dispersed to their homes. Many Egyptians died from thirst, wounds, or went missing. About 5 thousand captured Egyptian officers, including generals, were exchanged for 10 Israeli prisoners.

In the mid-1990s, reports emerged in the Israeli and international press that Israeli soldiers had killed hundreds of unarmed Egyptians during the war.

According to the Associated Press, military historian A. Yitzhaki said in an interview with the AP that during several mass executions (during the war), the Israeli army killed about 1,000 prisoners of war in the Sinai Peninsula. According to him, on June 9-10, 1967, about 400 Egyptian and Palestinian prisoners were killed in the dunes near El-Arish after two Israeli soldiers were mortally wounded by fire from their side: “The enraged Israeli soldiers got out of the control of the officers and They shot all the prisoners." In total, he spoke of 6-7 such cases, “usually provoked.”

According to historian M. Pail, some of the participants in the executions were convicted by an Israeli military court, but information about the trials was hidden by military censorship. According to historian W. Milstein, during the war there were many cases when Israeli soldiers killed prisoners of war after they had raised their hands and surrendered.

A. Yitzhaki believed that cases of mass executions were well known to the then Minister of Defense M. Dayan and the Chief of the General Staff I. Rabin.

In addition, he said that some of the soldiers who participated in the executions were under the command of B. Ben-Eliezer (minister in 1995). Ben-Eliezer's spokeswoman said he was "not aware of any such killings." Prime Minister Rabin's secretariat later issued a statement condemning the killings and calling them isolated incidents.

G. Bron (Yediot Ahronot) personally observed how, by order of the Israeli “martial court,” at least 10 prisoners were shot, who had previously been ordered to dig their own graves. Israeli soldiers (including Bron), who watched the executions from afar, were ordered by officers at gunpoint to leave.

M. Bar-Zohar wrote that he personally observed the murder of 3 prisoners of war.

According to the New York Times, the Egyptian government reported in 1995 that it had discovered two graves in El Arish containing the remains of 30 to 60 prisoners believed to have been killed by Israeli soldiers. Deputy Foreign Ministry E. Dayan, who arrived in Cairo, offered compensation to the families of the victims, stating that “in accordance with the law on the 20-year statute of limitations, Israel will not prosecute those who could be responsible for these cases.” The Israeli Ambassador to Egypt, D. Sultan, was personally accused by the Egyptian newspaper Al Shaab of responsibility for the murder of 100 prisoners. The Israeli Foreign Ministry denied these accusations, and the ambassador was recalled from Egypt at his own request.

In 2007, after the screening of the documentary film “Ruach Shaked” by R. Edelist on Channel 1 of Israeli TV (about the Shaked battalion, then under the command of B. Ben-Eliezer), this topic was raised again. In particular, the film said that the Israelis shot 250 Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula after the end of the Six-Day War, rather than transferring them to a prison camp. At the same time, most of the Egyptians were shot while chasing the retreating units of the Egyptian commandos. The screening of the film caused diplomatic complications between Israel and Egypt, and the Egyptian side demanded that those responsible be punished.

Ben-Eliezer accused the filmmakers of numerous inaccuracies, claiming that those killed were not Egyptian soldiers, but Palestinian militants trained by Egyptian intelligence, and who died not after surrender, but during military operations. Later, R. Edelist himself said that he confused Egyptian prisoners of war with Palestinian fedayeen militants, and they were killed during the battle “during their retreat”, and were not executed, but at the same time the Israelis used “force beyond what is permissible.”

UN observers in Egypt during the Six-Day War also questioned Egypt's claim that Israeli troops allegedly killed 250 Egyptian prisoners of war. Captain M. Zorch and Private M. Stosic (both from the former Yugoslavia) said that if a large number of prisoners of war had been killed in the area, they would almost certainly have known about it. In addition, Zorch stated that he knew many local Egyptians, none of whom ever mentioned any massacres in the area.

A number of sources link Egypt's reaction to the fact that Ben-Eliezer, as Minister of Infrastructure, tried to end Egypt's monopoly on natural gas supplies to Israel. Lawyer E. Gerwitz wrote:

• Accusations of Israel executing Egyptian prisoners of war during the Sinai Campaign (1956), the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973) were first voiced by Israeli historians seeking to attract media attention. In 1994, a book by historian Uri Milstein was published in which accusations of this kind were first made. In 1995, another study by historian Aryeh Yitzhaki was published...
• As a result of such publications, a government commission was created to verify allegations of mass executions of Egyptian prisoners of war. She completed the work in early 1998. The commission's report noted that both sides, the Israelis and the Egyptians, were guilty of killing prisoners of war.
• ... the families of Egyptian soldiers killed during the Six-Day War filed a lawsuit in the Egyptian El-Arish court against the State of Israel and then head of government Ariel Sharon. They accused Israeli forces of torturing and executing 16,000 Egyptian prisoners of war, demanding compensation of $12 million. In January 2005, the court found the claim unproven.

In turn, the same historian A. Yitzhaki and Israeli soldiers who were in Egyptian captivity accused Egypt of mass executions of Israeli prisoners of war. Yitzhaki estimates the number of executed people at 100-120 people. According to Yitzhaki, “Israel is passive in everything that concerns propaganda and counter-propaganda” and “should attack, not defend.”

Egypt's Foreign Minister said Israeli accusations of executions of prisoners were "complete nonsense" and "an attempt to cover up the crimes committed against Egyptian prisoners of war."

Population movement

Arabs

According to one of the new Israeli historians, Benny Morris, during and immediately after the war, the West Bank. About a quarter of its Arab population (200,000 to 250,000 people) left Jordan. About 70,000 people fled the Gaza Strip, and between 80,000 and 100,000 people fled the Golan Heights.

According to Morris, in the city of Qalqilya and villages southeast of Jerusalem, houses were destroyed by the Israelis “not as part of battle, but as a form of punishment and for the purpose of expelling the inhabitants, ... contrary to government policy.” In Qalqilya, about a third of the houses were destroyed. However, residents of both areas were then allowed to return. There are reports of Israeli troops ordering the population to leave their homes and cross the Jordan River. From East Jerusalem, people were transported by Israeli buses to the Jordanian border, but according to Morris, there is no evidence that this was done under duress. When crossing the border, those leaving had to sign a document stating that they were doing this of their own free will.

After the war, the Israeli government said it would allow all refugees who wished to return. However, in practice, only 17,000 people out of 120,000 who expressed a desire were allowed to return.

According to Morris, taking advantage of the shock caused by the war, in Jerusalem, on June 10, the Israeli authorities began to destroy the so-called Muslim quarter of Mughrabi in the immediate vicinity of the Western Wall. In its place, a large square was created in front of this Jewish shrine.

At the same time, in a letter from the Israeli representative to the UN addressed to its Secretary General in March 1968, it was indicated that during Jordan’s control over this quarter, it turned into slums, 2/3 of its area either belonged to Jews or was in public use. In April 1968, the Israeli government officially transferred the area in front of the Western Wall for public use, and compensation was offered to private landowners (200 Jordanian dinars per family for Arabs).

In the Old City of Jerusalem, about 300 Arab families who moved in after the expulsion of 1,500 Jews from the Old City by Transjordan during the 1948 war were evicted from houses in the Jewish Quarter.

Jews in Islamic countries

Due to the Israeli victory and the defeat of the Arabs, the Jewish minority still living in Arab countries was immediately persecuted and expelled. As historian Michael Oren writes:

• “Mobs attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, burning synagogues and attacking Jews. As a result of the pogrom in Tripoli (Libya), 18 Jews were killed and 25 were wounded; the survivors were herded into detention centers.”
• “Of the 4 thousand Jews of Egypt, 800 were arrested, including the chief rabbis of both Cairo and Alexandria, and their property was requisitioned by the state.”
• “The ancient Jewish communities of Damascus and Baghdad were placed under house arrest, their leaders were arrested and fined.”
• “In all, 7,000 Jews were expelled, many with only what they could carry in their hands.”

Diplomatic implications

June 9 - a meeting of the leaders of the ruling parties and governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia is held in Moscow.

On June 9, in his address to the nation, UAR President Nasser announced his resignation and accused Western countries of secretly fighting on the side of Israel with their air forces. After mass demonstrations in his support, Nasser remained in office.

June 10 - Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia break off diplomatic relations with Israel (Romania refrained from such a step, and the GDR did not have diplomatic relations with Israel).

June 17 - July 21 - the 5th emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, convened at the proposal of the USSR, was held in New York. None of the three draft resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict have been adopted. According to A.A. Gromyko, the main reason for this was:

1) The categorical refusal of all Arab delegations to accept any formulation calling for an end to the state of war between the Arabs and Israel.
2) The categorical refusal of the United States and the countries that support them to make a decision on the withdrawal of troops without a simultaneous call by the Assembly to end the state of war.

Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko to the CPSU Central Committee

On July 4 and 14, three resolutions were adopted on the protection of civilians and the status of Jerusalem. Formally, on July 21, the session was only interrupted, and officially closed on September 18.

November 22 - The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, demanding "the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, which must include the application of both of the following principles: 1. withdrawal of Israeli military forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict 2. cessation of all claims or states of war and respect and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, without threat or use of force.”

In various countries of the Arab world, mass demonstrations took place in support of Syria, Jordan and Egypt, in a number of cases there were riots and attacks on the offices of European and American companies.

There are not many events in our long history in which the fear of a new catastrophe and the unbridled joy of salvation, jubilation and triumph are so closely intertwined. The victory over many times superior enemy forces, armed and trained by the powerful superpower of that time, revived the connection of times interrupted by Galut, and for some time the Jews again appeared before the world in their ancient role of fearless warriors and wise commanders.

Six days in June 1967 shattered many myths that had been carefully crafted over thousands of years - myths that created the repulsive image of a Galut Jew, bearing eternal punishment. These myths crumbled under the pressure of facts that caused amazement mixed with religious awe. In the Six Day War, G‑d was undoubtedly on the side of the Jews.

There was a cold war going on. The Soviet Union was at the pinnacle of military power and global influence and was completely on the side of the Arabs. Modern military equipment, Soviet military specialists and instructors, and economic assistance flowed into Egypt and Syria. As it arrived, the aggressive rhetoric of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, considered by many to be the leader of the Arab world, intensified. “When we enter Palestine,” Nasser broadcast from Cairo, “all its soil will be soaked in blood. Our immediate goal is to strengthen Arab military power, our national goal is the destruction of Israel.”

Syrian attacks from the Golan Heights on Israeli kibbutzim provoked a retaliatory strike: on April 7, 1967, the Israelis shot down six Syrian MIGs in an air battle, after which they brought armed forces into the demilitarized zone. Without any doubt about the victory of the Arabs, the Soviet Union considered the moment appropriate to unleash a major armed conflict. On May 13, a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Cairo and informed Egyptian leaders that Israel had allegedly concentrated 11 to 13 brigades along the border with Syria. The concentration of forces in the comments of Soviet parliamentarians was intended to start a war within a few days and overthrow the revolutionary Syrian government. Soviet disinformation, according to its compilers, was supposed to push Egypt into a joint confrontation with Syria and Israel.

Nasser interpreted the information given to him as a signal that the time was ripe for an attack and that the Soviets would support him. This allowed him to take an even more aggressive stance. On May 15, the nineteenth anniversary of Israel's independence, Egyptian troops moved into the Sinai and began to deploy along the Israeli border. On May 16, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the UN emergency contingent located in Sinai. General Secretary U Thant agreed to Nasser's demand without discussing the issue in the General Assembly. This was a direct violation of the terms under which Israel returned control of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. It was assumed that UN troops would not allow Egypt to close the Straits of Tiran again or start a terrorist war in the Sinai. On May 18, Syrian troops took up battle formations along the Golan Heights.

On May 23, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli and foreign ships heading to Eilat, which also violated the terms of the liberation of Sinai and the guarantee of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran given to Israel by the United States in 1956. Israel now has the legal right to start hostilities (“Casus Belli”). The blockade cut off Israel's only line of communication with Asia and the supply of oil from Iran, Israel's main supplier at the time.

Nasser was well aware of the kind of pressure he was putting on Israel. The day after the blockade was imposed, he defiantly declared: “The Jews are threatening war. My answer to them is - welcome! We are ready for war."

On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan signed a joint defense treaty with Egypt, under which Jordan joined the Egyptian-Syrian military alliance that had existed since 1966 and placed its armed forces on both sides of the Jordan River under Egyptian command.

On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Iraqi President Abdul Rahman Aref said on this occasion: “The existence of Israel is a mistake that must be corrected. Now we have the opportunity to wash away the shame with which we have lived since 1948. Our goal is clear – to erase Israel from the world map.” The armed forces in Arab countries were mobilized. The armies of Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq contributed military units and weapons to the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts.

It was a scary time. The course of events in the Middle East was gaining enormous destructive potential. A wave of anxiety for the fate of the young and not yet strong Jewish state swept through the Jewish diaspora like a nervous tremor - was it really another Holocaust? The alarm quickly grew into a wave of solidarity with Israel, which shook the entire Jewish diaspora and a large part of the Western world. This anxiety resonated most powerfully in American Jewry. IDF reservists and Jewish volunteers stormed planes to fly to Israel and fight for it.

A wave of solidarity also reached behind the Iron Curtain. In a totalitarian police state, citizens are isolated from the outside world, objective information is difficult to access, and public expressions of feelings are impossible. But there is a radio and the ability to read between the lines, and hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews clung to radios, trying to break through Soviet jammers to Western “voices.” .

How did the Soviet government behave under these conditions? It threatened direct military intervention if any power tried to actively help Israel.

Then there was a war that lasted only six days, and there was something symbolic about it. I remember her as if in a dream... We lived at that time in Sverdlovsk, a large industrial city located on the eastern slope of the Ural Mountains. The last weeks before the war and during the war I could not think about anything else. I remember being literally floored by a comment from one television commentator. He said that Israel is a foreign body in the Middle East, that it has no chance of survival, and that it is necessary to come to terms with the fact that it will disappear... Not that I knew much about Israel then, but people who survived the Holocaust found refuge there... and the commentator gloated that fate was preparing another terrible disaster for them.

On the first day of the war, the newspapers reported that the Arabs shot down 72 Israeli planes, on the second day - also like this, and I thought to myself: Good God, how many planes does Israel have, how many days will they last? Soviet propaganda clearly rejoiced at the “successes” of the Arabs. On the third day, unable to bear the Soviet gloating, I built a large antenna on the roof of our five-story building, pointed it towards the jamming station to reduce interference, and listened to the “voices” all night long.

Israel, it turns out, was winning. Soviet propaganda also changed its tone. On the third day, the state that the Soviets had sentenced to death just two weeks ago became a “BRAZED AGGRESSOR.” The reversal was so sharp, the lie so obvious, that not only Jews refused to believe it. During this day I grew up many years. Never before have I felt more like a Jew than at that moment; never before have I felt so keenly that the country in which I live and for which I work is the enemy of my people. The Six Day War helped reveal this terrible truth.

“The Soviet Union was so confident of a quick Arab victory and inclined to believe Arab propaganda, which gave false reports about the bombing of Tel Aviv and the defeat of the Israelis, that the Soviet Union representative to the UN, Nikolai Fedorenko, received instructions to block any ceasefire resolution. The Soviets wanted to give the Arab states the opportunity to fully benefit from their victory. On the third day, when it became clear that their protégés had suffered a complete and crushing defeat, the Soviet leadership experienced a real shock and began to loudly demand an immediate ceasefire at the UN. It also unleashed against Israel and Zionism a campaign of hatred and slander of such unprecedented viciousness that it could only be explained in terms of political paranoia. The Soviet Union broke diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Israel and presented it as the main instrument of world imperialism. Premier Kosygin was sent to the UN to rally support for a resolution condemning Israel for its “deliberate and planned” aggression against the Arabs. In his speech, Kosygin accused Israel of heinous crimes and fascist cruelty. The Soviet Union called for the prosecution of Israeli leaders as war criminals “whose acts exceeded those of the Nazis.”

It was clumsy but poisonous propaganda, and, like Nazi propaganda, it acted on a significant part of the local population, awakening anti-Semitic instincts in them.

As a result of the war, Israel occupied Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Israeli territory tripled in size, and about a million additional Arabs came under direct Israeli control.

Israel did not seek to annex the lands. He was interested in defensible borders. On June 19, 8 days after the signing of the armistice agreement, the Israeli government of national unity made a unanimous decision to return the Sinai Peninsula (without Gaza) to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for peace agreements, demilitarization of the Golan and free navigation through the Strait of Tiran. Israel was also ready to negotiate with Jordan regarding a settlement on the eastern border. However, at the Arab summit in Khartoum, it was decided not to negotiate with Israel, not to sign peace agreements with it, and not to recognize its existence.

The fateful period before, during, and immediately after the Six-Day War had a profound impact on the American Jewish community. After three weeks of fear and anxious anticipation and six days of victorious war, American Jews filled synagogues to express their gratitude. Some spoke of a miracle, a signal from the Almighty. American public opinion sided with Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East. As the American military bogged down in Vietnam and communism asserted itself in Eastern Europe, Israel's crushing victory provided a sense of consolation: its victory was perceived as an American victory. In the eyes of Americans, Jews emerged from this war as popular heroes.

For the Jews themselves, this victory meant much more than just heroism: it became a watershed in modern Jewish history. This war allowed the Jews once again, now in a positive sense, to realize their common national destiny. She also helped them realize that this destiny is now connected with the state of Israel. For many American Jews, the Six-Day War was a turning point in their national consciousness: it changed not only the way they perceived Israel, but also the way they perceived themselves. With the end of the war, Israel became their religion, the supreme object of their politics, philanthropy and pilgrimage, and as such the new source of their loyalty and solidarity.

“The Six Day War created among American Jewry and its leadership such a sense of open pride and Jewish identity that it allowed the community to consider an open, undefeated and self-justifying public campaign in support of Soviet Jews. In this sense, the 1967 war was truly a psychological watershed.”

The Six Day War had no less of an effect on Soviet Jews.

“I grew up with a split soul,” Zionist movement activist Joseph Begun told me. “I understood that I was a Jew, and it... burdened me.” On the other hand, there was an atmosphere of reverent attitude towards Jewry in the house - this was very important for my mother. I was in such a constant state of dichotomy. I remember when in the second grade at the beginning of the year the teacher wrote down the nationality of the students in a journal, it was a terribly humiliating procedure for me. When she called me, I couldn’t say that I was a Jew. I said that I am Belarusian. And for some time it was written in the journal that I was Belarusian. I was terribly ashamed... If I had the opportunity to become Russian at a time when I was still dark... I probably would have become one. When I began to more or less understand what was what, this feeling passed. By the Six Day War I was already quite a proud Jew, and this war helped me make the decision to leave.”

– How many years did you work in Kolyma? – I asked Vitaly Svechinsky.

– I left there in 1967. After prison, I worked for another eight and a half years as a free man... I returned immediately after the Six-Day War. On the day the war began, I was walking through a park in Magadan, I saw a stand with “Pravda” standing, people in front of it: again Israel, again the aggressor... I also stood up... and suddenly I felt - I can’t live here anymore... this is not serious... well what am I doing? Why am I wasting my life?

– How did the Six Day War affect you? – I asked Boris Einbinder.

– I was completely disappointed in the Soviet Union. I realized that it was hardly possible to change anything about him, and... that it was not my place to change anything about him. They don’t want us there, we are strangers there, let them do it themselves. On the other hand, there is a country in the world where Jews live... Well, and of course the rise, the euphoria after 1967...

The Six-Day War turned the souls of many Soviet Jews upside down. She, without a doubt, turned my life around. It was all too strong... anxiety, triumph, propaganda, revelation...

The world around began to change. The anti-Jewish jokes disappeared somewhere, they began to look at us differently, we began to look at ourselves differently. Jewry was no longer the mark of Cain, but dignity appeared in it. The fifth point magically changed its sign from a strong minus to an equally strong plus and became a source of inner joy and pride.

The process took place quickly and was accompanied by a colossal release of national energy. Thousands of passionaries of national revival began their journey, starting from this line, gradually finding each other and those who started before them.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote: “And with such a brewing self-awareness of Soviet Jews, the Six-Day War broke out and immediately swept away victoriously, it seemed like a miracle. Israel - ascended in their ideas, they awakened to a spiritual and blood relationship with it... a new and already irresistible explosion of Jewish national consciousness grew... Bitterness, resentment, embitterment, disbelief in the future accumulated to finally break through and lead to a complete break with (this ) country and (this) society – to emigration.”

Anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic propaganda continued to irritate and hurt, but it conveyed the helplessness of the Soviet leadership in a situation that it had created with its own hands: just as an Israeli victory was perceived throughout the world as a victory for the West, a defeat for the Arabs was perceived as a defeat for the Soviet Union.

“Yasha,” Kedmi turned to Yakov. 10 – On June 13, the day after the end of the war, you announced your renunciation of Soviet citizenship...

“On June 13,” he answered, “the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, and on that day I broke off my relations with the Soviet Union.”

Emanuel Litvinoff, “70 Years of Soviet Jewry”, “The Summer of 1967: “International Turmoil”. Published by “Contemporary Jewish Library Ltd.”, 31 Percy Street, London, W.I. November, 1987 Insight.

1. By November of the same year, the issue of Israel's legitimacy as a state was indirectly removed from the agenda of Egypt and Jordan, as they adopted UN resolution number 242, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops in exchange for resolving the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “200 years together”, Electronic version. www.lib.ru/PROZA/SOLZHENICYN/200let.txt

Why the Israeli army managed to win the Six Day War

The “Six Day War” (June 5–10, 1967) in the Middle East has largely become a household name. This term in a broad sense began to mean a crushing, quick defeat of a formally more powerful enemy. In a narrow sense, the successful implementation of the tactics of the first disarming strike on enemy airfields, providing the attacking side with air superiority leading to victory on the ground.

Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan at the beginning of the war had a total of up to 700 combat aircraft, Israel - about 300. On the first day of the war, the Arabs lost at airfields and in air battles, according to various sources, from 360 to 420 aircraft, Israel (in air battles and from ground air defense) - from 18 to 44 aircraft. The difference, of course, is colossal, but still the Arab Air Forces did not cease to exist (at least the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian ones were completely destroyed). Even if we take the worst loss values ​​for them, by the morning of the second day of the war, the sides had approximately quantitative equality in aviation. However, although isolated air battles took place before 9 June, the Israelis gained complete air supremacy. This was explained by the much better flight and combat training of Israeli pilots, a more advanced aviation control system, as well as the strong psychological shock of the Arabs from the defeat of June 5.

Air superiority, of course, greatly contributed to the Israeli victory on the ground, although it was not an easy ride. During the first two days of the war, the Egyptian 6th Motorized Infantry Division even managed to penetrate 10 km into Israeli territory. Nevertheless, air supremacy, a higher level of combat training and initiative of the Israeli armed forces compared to the Arab ones did their job. In addition, the Egyptian leadership fell into panic. On the morning of June 6, the commander-in-chief, General Amer, gave his troops in Sinai the order to retreat. Naturally, this retreat, in the face of continuous Israeli attacks from land and air, very quickly turned into a flight and a complete disaster. The fighting in Sinai ended on the morning of June 9, the Egyptians lost from 10 to 15 thousand people. killed and up to 5 thousand prisoners, up to 800 tanks (291 T-54, 82 T-55, 251 T-34/85, 72 IS-3M, 29 PT-76, up to 50 Shermans), a huge number of other armored vehicles. Moreover, the Israelis captured a significant part of the Egyptian tanks and armored personnel carriers in perfect working order. There were so many trophies that, despite the lack of Soviet spare parts, the practical Israelis accepted them into service (including 81 T-54 and 49 T-55), replacing the weapons and engines with Western ones. Some examples of that equipment still serve Israel today. In particular, the very successful Akhzarit armored personnel carrier was created on the T-54/T-55 chassis, which was actively used in the 2006 Lebanese war. Israel itself lost 120 tanks in Sinai - less than it captured.

In parallel, there were battles between Israel and Jordan for Jerusalem and the West Bank, and these battles were distinguished by exceptional tenacity. So, on June 6, the Jordanians even surrounded an Israeli tank battalion, but failed to destroy it. Once again the superior level of Israeli training and initiative and air supremacy prevailed. In addition, the Jordanian Armed Forces were the smallest of all the Arab armies involved in this war, making them the most difficult to resist the Jews. The sides' losses in armored vehicles turned out to be quite close (about 200 tanks for Jordan, a little over 100 for Israel). Here the fighting ended on June 7, the Arabs were driven back beyond the Jordan. The Jews took revenge for the defeats of 1948 by recapturing Latrun and the Old City of Jerusalem.

Syria “philosophically,” that is, without doing anything, watched as Israel crushed its allies, and, of course, waited for its time, which came on June 9. At noon, Israeli troops began their assault on the Golan Heights. For them, this part of the war was the most difficult, since the terrain was on the side of the Arabs. Even according to their own data, the Israelis lost twice as many tanks here as the Syrians - 160 versus 80 (interestingly, the Syrian army had both T-34/85 and German StuG III). However, the Jews stormed the heights, already knowing that they would win; the Syrians defended themselves, already knowing that they would lose. At 18.30 on June 10, an official ceasefire took place.

The Arabs lost at least 1,100 tanks, from 380 to 450 combat aircraft (including up to 60 in air battles), and up to 40 thousand people killed and captured. Israeli losses amounted to about 400 tanks (Centurion, Sherman and M48), 45 aircraft (12 of them in air battles), up to 1 thousand people killed.

Sherman tank on the road between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, 1967. Photo: AFP/East News

In 6 days, Israel managed to radically change the balance of power in the Middle East. He defeated the armies of all three Arab countries bordering him (the fourth, Lebanon, was not taken into account due to its weakness); his main enemy, Egypt, suffered especially heavy losses. Even more important was the fact that Israel's geographical position was now very favorable. As of the morning of June 5, the Arabs had the theoretical ability to cut it in half in less than an hour (at its narrowest point, from the border with Jordan to the Mediterranean coast there was only 15 km of Israeli territory). On the evening of June 10, the Jewish state was reliably protected from the north by the Golan Heights, from the east by the Jordan River, from the southwest by the Suez Canal, as well as by the Sinai Peninsula and the Negev Desert. The Israeli leadership was confident that it had ensured the security of its country for at least 20–25 years. In 1970, the geopolitical situation became even more favorable for him after Jordan de facto withdrew from the anti-Israeli front due to the conflict with the Palestinians and Syria behind them.

The Six-Day War was a triumph for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF in its Hebrew acronym). To this day, the IDF remains the best living refutation of the Anglo-Saxon thesis (which was very fond of many Russians) about the advantages of a “professional”, that is, a mercenary army. The Israeli army is, one might say, the most conscript army in the world; even women are drafted into it; no alternative service is provided for (it is “carried out” in prison). At the same time, it is distinguished by the highest level of combat training, excellent living conditions for military personnel, and the absence of hazing. The well-known explanation for this phenomenon, which is that “Israel is surrounded by enemies,” is completely meaningless. The fact of being surrounded by enemies, of course, requires the presence of a conscript army (in general, the principle of manning the armed forces of any country is determined by what tasks they face, and nothing more), but it has nothing to do with the internal structure of the army and the quality of training of personnel.

From a political point of view, Israel's behavior in June '67 was certainly aggression. At the same time, it should be noted that before the start of the war, anti-Israeli rhetoric in Arab countries entered the stage of outright hysteria and Tel Aviv could interpret it as preparation for aggression against it. Given the Arabs' significant military and geographic advantage, it would put Israel in an extremely difficult situation, so he decided to launch a preemptive strike and remind that winners are not judged. Of course, hysterical rhetoric is very often intended only for internal consumption. However, the external objects of hysterical rhetoric are not at all obliged to understand that this is all “make-believe.” The Arabs simply “responsible for the bazaar,” which was fair. If you can’t fight, sit and be silent.

As the past four decades have shown, the Six-Day War was the high point of Israeli success. After that, the retreats began. Moreover, their inevitability was laid down by this war itself. The Arabs, having lost territory, received a legal justification for their anti-Semitism. The Israelis, having captured the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip, received an absolutely hostile Palestinian population inside the country, which, as it now turns out, thanks to the incomparably higher birth rate, can very soon surpass the Jewish population in numbers. As a result, the immediate improvement in the strategic position became a powerful time bomb under the Jewish state.

The Arab armies have long ceased to risk getting involved in battle with the IDF. But with the “basic instinct” the Arabs are fine. Demographics today turn out to be much stronger than traditional ones. Militarily null Palestine is gradually achieving what heavily armed Egypt and Syria failed to do.

Tiny Israel is rightfully considered the third (after the Reich and the USSR) great tank power, which is not surprising: the Israelis are the most fought tankers of the second half of the 20th century, the grandiose tank battles of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War are not inferior in scope, intensity and dynamism to the battles of the Second World War, and it is not for nothing that the legendary Merkava is called one of the best modern tanks (if not the best), which has proven its highest efficiency both in war and during anti-terrorist operations.

A new book by a leading armor historian pays tribute to the Jewish "chariots" (that's how the word "merkavah" is translated from Hebrew), restoring the true history of the combat use of ALL types of Israeli tanks in ALL Arab-Israeli wars and refuting the many myths and fables generated by the secrecy regime, with in which everything is in order in the Holy Land - the USSR is resting! This book is a veritable encyclopedia of Israeli tank power, illustrated with hundreds of exclusive drawings and photographs.

It is not the purpose of this book to provide a detailed account of the course of this war and the events that preceded it. Our goal is the actions of the tank forces of the Israel Defense Forces, but still, at least in a summary form, both of the above-mentioned issues will still have to be covered. Moreover, the facts indicate the unsightly role played by the Soviet Union in starting this war.

On May 13, 1967, the Egyptian government received official government notification that Israeli troops were preparing an attack on Syria and that 11 to 13 Israeli brigades were concentrated on Israel's northern border for this purpose. This message was made in Moscow, in a personal conversation with the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgorny with the head of the Egyptian parliamentary delegation to the USSR Anwar Sadat. Currently, historians have enough factual material at their disposal to assert that this information was false and provocative. With its help, the Soviet Union pushed Arab countries to invade Israel.

Fueled by his generals and information received from the Soviet Union, on May 18, 1967, Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UN troops from the armistice line with Israel and the shores of the Strait of Tiran, brought Egyptian troops to these positions and closed the exit for Israeli ships from the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea. On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan joined the Egyptian-Syrian “anti-Israeli front.” A blockade of the Israeli coast was declared. The situation in the region has deteriorated sharply. All attempts by Israel during May to gain diplomatic support from the great powers - the USA, Great Britain and France - ended in nothing. No one wanted to take Israel's side, either financially or even morally.

Israeli "centurions" on maneuvers shortly before the 1967 war

Meanwhile, jubilant demonstrations took place in Cairo and Damascus - huge crowds of people carried placards expressing enthusiastic support for their governments. Newspapers came out with huge headlines: “The end of Israel!” and with drawings that depicted Tel Aviv burning with streets stained with blood and piles of skulls in the foreground.

It is easy to guess that in Israel the mood was the opposite. Israel was created by survivors of the Holocaust, in whose crematoria Europe's six million Jewish population disappeared. So the indifferent non-interference of the world watching the development of the conflict touched the most painful memories - there was nothing to count on “the just of this world.” To paraphrase the famous saying of the Russian Emperor Alexander III, we can say that in the spring of 1967 Israel had only two allies left - the army and the navy. Considering that the Israeli Navy is the same branch of the military as the Air Force and Ground Forces, it turns out that, by and large, there was only one ally - the IDF - the Israel Defense Forces.

On the evening of June 1, Moshe Dayan was appointed to the post of Israeli Defense Minister. This man was known to the Soviet average person mainly from the lines of V. Vysotsky:

At first I was not drunk, I objected twice - I said: “Moshe Dayan - One-eyed bitch, - Aggressive, beast, Pure Pharaoh, - Well, where is the aggression - There is no reason for me.”

Well, besides, there were all sorts of stories that he was a colonel in the Red Army, a Hero of the Soviet Union and was sent to Israel on the orders of the KGB. All this, of course, is nonsense. Moshe Dayan was born in 1915 in Palestine into a family of immigrants from the Russian Empire. During World War II, he took part in hostilities in Syria and Lebanon against the French Vichyists (the Vichy regime in France collaborated with Hitler). During one of the operations he was wounded (the binoculars Dayan was looking through were broken by a French bullet) and lost an eye. He was indeed awarded, but by the British, the Order of Distinguished Service. It was no more aggressive than in Israel as a whole. It is mainly a product of Soviet propaganda. To Israeli society, he was better known as a braggart and womanizer. But at the same time, as a talented military leader, capable of making quick and correct decisions at a critical moment, as a person who was not afraid to take responsibility. At that moment it was what we needed!

The cunning Moshe first started misleading the Arabs. On Saturday, June 3, 1967, photographs appeared in the newspapers of Israeli soldiers on leave spending time with their families or sunbathing on sea beaches. Moshe Dayan gave a brilliant speech in which he expressed confidence that war would undoubtedly be avoided. IDF Chief of Staff General Yitzhak Rabin seemed no busier than usual. And the Arabs believed them, which, however, is not surprising - their superiority in forces over Israel was overwhelming, and the very thought of any active actions on its part seemed simply impossible to them.

105-mm self-propelled howitzer M7 "Priest". By the beginning of the Six-Day War, the IDF had three divisions of such self-propelled guns (36 units). In Israel, the M7 self-propelled gun was called “TOMAT Priest” (TOMAT - Totah Mitnayea - self-propelled gun)

Thanks to the steps taken to misinform the enemy and the world community, the Israelis gained an important trump card - the moment of surprise.

The combat plan developed at the IDF headquarters provided for the introduction into battle of four tank brigades and the motorized infantry and self-propelled artillery formations assigned to them after a surprise air strike on Egyptian airfields. The goal of the maneuver groups was to defeat the enemy’s Sinai group and reach the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. After this, it was planned to transfer efforts to the Syrian front.

AMX-13 tanks and their crews. Israel, 1960s

By the beginning of hostilities, the strongest group of Egyptian troops was deployed in the Sinai and Suez Canal zone. Seven divisions were deployed in eastern and central Sinai. These divisions were formed according to the Soviet model and had a total of approximately 100 thousand people, 800 guns and multiple launch rocket systems and about 900 tanks (if you count the rear and airfield units, the figure will be higher, perhaps up to 170 thousand people - exact data is never not published). Three Egyptian divisions formed the first echelon. The 20th “Palestinian” division was in the Gaza Strip, the 7th Infantry was in the fortified area of ​​Rafah, at the junction of Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, and the 2nd Infantry, which occupied the fortified area around Abu Ageila, at the “entrance” to central Sinai . The second echelon consisted of the 3rd Infantry and 6th Mechanized Divisions. Two armored groups - the 4th Panzer Division and the so-called “Task Force of General Chazli” - were a mobile reserve, ready, depending on the situation, either to help the divisions defending fortified areas, or to go on the offensive and transfer the war to Israeli territory. Due to suspicious Israeli tank movements in the Negev, these forces were moved south in anticipation of an attack on the center of Sinai, according to the 1956 scheme. Both Rafah and the Um Qatif-Abu Agheila area were fortified according to the Soviet fortification system - continuous strips covered with minefields, with pre-prepared artillery and tank positions.

A unit of Sherman tanks 1.151 advances to the front line in the Sinai Peninsula, 1967. By the beginning of the Six-Day War, the IDF had 177 Shermans with a 105-mm cannon

Nasser did not agree to give up an inch of territory, even if it was beneficial from a military point of view. Political considerations outweighed military benefits - the expected Israeli offensive had to be resisted right on the border. Therefore, all directions available for advancement into the depths of Sinai were reliably blocked by fortifications, mines and positions of artillery and missile batteries. True, the readiness of the troops was not at the proper level. The situation developed spontaneously - in fact, the Egyptian headquarters itself learned that we were talking about war, and not about demonstrative maneuvers, only on the 20th of May. The plan for the war in Sinai was developed quite a long time ago and has not been updated since then. There were no preliminary exercises on it. Therefore, the placement of units in positions did not go smoothly - they had to be pulled from place to place, continuously moved, making room for more and more new reinforcements approaching the Sinai from the interior regions - Cairo and the Nile Delta. However, morale was high - the officers were confident that “a victorious offensive on Tel Aviv would soon begin.” The real plans of the Egyptian command were more modest: a strike in the south with the goal of cutting off Eilat and connecting with Jordanian troops, and then depending on circumstances.

Medium tank "Sherman" M51. 14th mechanized brigade. Sinai Front, 1967

From the three districts that form the Israeli defense system - North, South and Center - fronts were formed, as expected according to the mobilization plan. The southern command received the greatest resources. It consisted of three tank divisions and a number of separate brigades (10 brigades and several separate battalions in total), with a total of about 70 thousand people, 700 tanks and 326 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars.

The southern front opposing the Egyptian army was commanded by Major General Gavish. It was planned to operate along the coastal road, attacking the fortified area of ​​Rafah, and in the center, attacking the fortified area of ​​Abu Agheila. For this purpose, three divisions were deployed - the 84th, 31st and 38th. At that time, there were no permanent divisions in the IDF; in fact, they were headquarters that coordinated the actions of the brigades and battalions included in the divisions.

The 84th Division included two of the army's best brigades - the 7th Tank and 35th Airborne (both were personnel), as well as the 60th Reserve Tank Brigade. In addition, there was an artillery regiment (including two self-propelled gun divisions) and a group of tanks, staffed by cadets and tank school instructors. The division was commanded by Major General Israel Tal.

The 38th division consisted of three brigades - the 14th mechanized, 99th infantry, 80th parachute, and also included an artillery regiment (96 guns and heavy mortars). The division was also commanded by a man with an established reputation - Major General Ariel Sharon. His division was supposed to take the fortified area of ​​Abu Ageila. The headquarters believed that if it was possible to do this at all, then Sharon would do it.

The 31st Division was subordinated to General Abraham Joffe. It included two tank brigades - the 200th and 520th, and all of it - from privates to the division commander inclusive - consisted of reservists. General Ioffe had been in the reserves for three years and was in charge of the state environmental protection department. Joffe was tasked with leading his two brigades, nearly 200 tanks, between Rafah and Abu Ageila, through terrain that was considered impassable. He had already done something similar once - in 1956, when his brigade reached Sharm el-Sheikh, so he had the relevant experience.

There were other formations subordinate to the command of the Southern Front. One of them was the so-called 49th Imitation Division, which did not participate in the offensive, but made a major contribution to the upcoming operation. She so successfully simulated the movement of troops and hid from Egyptian reconnaissance aircraft so unsuccessfully that she inspired the Egyptian command with the idea that the offensive would take place in the same way as in 1956. As a result, the Egyptian tank reserves were urgently shifted to the south. This attempt to parry the false attack significantly prevented them from meeting the real one.

I.148A2C tanks from the 79th Tank Battalion of the 7th Tank Brigade are fighting in the vicinity of Rafah. 1967

The real attack began on June 5, 1967. At exactly 7:00 Israeli time (8:00 Cairo time), 40 aircraft took off from Israeli airfields and flew west, towards the sea. This did not cause any concern at the Egyptian radar station - it was a common thing; the clock could be checked based on the time of this morning flight. Since 1965, flights have followed the same pattern - 40 aircraft departed towards the sea, descended sharply and returned back to their airfields in the Negev. There was no alarm at any of the Egyptian airfields. The Egyptian Air Force was ready for war - fighters on duty stood on the tracks in a 5-minute state of readiness for takeoff. The night patrols of the last shift have already settled down. The day began as usual - with breakfast.

Israeli Defense Minister General Moshe Dayan

Israeli planes dived down and disappeared from radar screens. At exactly 7:45, Egyptian airfields were hit by the first airstrike. The runways were destroyed by concrete-piercing bombs, and the silver planes standing in a row on taxiways (as in the USSR) were destroyed by cannon fire. A total of 332 sorties were made against 19 Egyptian airfields (183 in the first wave, 164 in the second and 85 in the third, in addition, airfields in Jordan, Syria and Iraq were attacked as part of the third wave - another 119 sorties), which was simply an incredibly large number, if you take into account that the entire Israeli combat aviation at that time amounted to 202 aircraft (of which 197 were operational on the morning of June 5), plus 44 Fuga Magister combat training aircraft.

Of the approximately 420 military aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force (of which about 300 were combat), 309 were destroyed, including the entire four squadrons of Tu-16 and Il-28 bombers. The second wave of raids ended around 10:35 - in 170 minutes the Egyptian Air Force ceased to exist!

Israeli ground operations began at 8:30, almost at the same time as air operations - the time factor played such a big role that there was no time to wait for the aircraft to bomb.

AMX-13 tanks and motorized infantry on half-track armored personnel carriers in an Arab town in the Gaza Strip. 1967

The advanced units of the 7th Tank Brigade immediately passed Rafah and moved further along the highway, in the direction of El-Arish. But the tanks that followed them came under fierce fire in a narrow passage between the dunes. Overcoming strong resistance in southern Gaza and Rafah, the paratroopers of the 35th Brigade fought desperately. The Fuga Magister combat training aircraft came to the rescue - they were urgently adapted to the role of light attack aircraft. These aircraft carried only two 7.62 mm machine guns and two 50 kg bombs, but they were very useful in suppressing Egyptian batteries. Egyptian resistance in Rafah was soon broken, and the tank crews of the 7th Brigade rushed to El-Arish. The path here was blocked by fortified anti-tank positions. The first attempt to break through the Egyptian defenses ended in failure. Moreover, this attack turned out to be a complete surprise for the Egyptians - they did not expect such a “shock” rate of advance from General Tal’s tankers. Units of the 7th Brigade succeeded in dislodging the anti-tank units from their positions only after the third attack, at the cost of the loss of 17 “centurions.” However, the Egyptians immediately counterattacked and restored the situation, pushing the Israelis back to their original positions. General Tal personally intervened in the battle; he did not wait for reserves, but made a risky decision: the remaining “centurions” again tried to attack the Arab positions located along the highway, and the M48 battalion bypassed the enemy fortifications from the south along impassable dunes. The tankers completed the assigned task. But at what cost! Without exception, all M48 tanks participating in the attack were hit by shells or mortars, the battalion commander was killed, the chief of staff and commanders of all three companies were wounded. On the morning of June 6, El Arish was in Israeli hands.

The 31st Division also advanced according to plan. The sands turned out to be not so impassable. The Centurions, however, were in first gear, but still reached the crossroads at which they were aimed. One brigade immediately moved south to help Sharon’s division, and the other intercepted Egyptian tanks (it was the 4th Panzer Division) going to the flank of Tal’s division - they were urgently sent to the rescue of El-Arish. However, having flown closer to dusk towards Israeli tanks that had come from nowhere, the Egyptian T-55s suffered losses, and the division commander considered it best to stop to wait for the morning. Overnight, fugitives appeared in the rear of the Egyptian division - Sharon's division neutralized Um Katif in a day, and then took Abu Ageila with a night attack.

The Centurion Shot tank goes on the attack in Sinai. 1967

The success of the offensive was facilitated by the close interaction of all branches of the military. As soon as Egyptian artillery and tanks opened fire, unmasking their positions, Israeli aviation fell on them, since there were practically no enemy planes in the sky. Then the tanks and self-propelled guns in combat formations came into action. The artillerymen's task was reduced not so much to the destruction of specific targets as to the demoralization of the defenders. Self-propelled gun batteries concentrated fire on one target, after some time they transferred fire to another, then to a third. Under the cover of heavy fire, infantry dismounted from M3 armored personnel carriers burst into the trenches and fortified points of the Egyptians.

A battery of 105-mm self-propelled howitzers "TOMAT AMX" (French Mk 61) supports the advancing tanks with fire. Sinai Front, 1967

By the middle of the second day of the war, June 6, the first echelon of the Egyptian defense of Sinai ceased to exist, all fortifications were lost, two divisions (20th and 7th) were completely destroyed, and the third (2nd Infantry) was severely battered. And all this in less than 40 hours of Israeli offensive. Defense capabilities for the Egyptian army still existed - two untouched second-echelon divisions (6th mechanized and 3rd infantry) could be used, there were powerful tank units - the Shazly group and the 4th tank division. The Egyptian general staff intended to continue resistance using the Qahir plan developed before the war. In accordance with it, it was necessary to counterattack the enemy with the forces of the second echelon and impose a counter tank battle on him. But unlike the Israelis, the Egyptian troops did not know how to fight like that, and in addition, since the morning of June 6, they were under the continuous influence of Israeli aviation.

Light tank AMX-13 on the Jordanian front. The fighting here began later than in Sinai

It must be said that the Egyptians did not immediately realize the scale of the catastrophe that befell their army - all day on June 5, Cairo radio broadcast bravura messages about Arab tank divisions allegedly rushing to Tel Aviv and about Israeli soldiers fleeing in panic; crowds of people spontaneously gathered in the streets celebrating the victory. The senior military leadership, aware of the actual state of affairs at the front, did not behave entirely adequately to the situation. So, for example, while Israeli aircraft were ironing Egyptian airfields, Defense Minister Badran went to bed and ordered not to disturb him; Chief of Staff Fauzi ordered squadrons already destroyed by Israeli aircraft to launch retaliatory strikes against the Israelis; air commander Tzadki Mohammed periodically tried to shoot himself, etc. The defeat of the Egyptian army, deprived of leadership, was thus predetermined, and even the courage of ordinary soldiers on the front line could not change the situation. As Ariel Sharon put it in those days, “The Egyptians are wonderful soldiers: disciplined, tough, but their officers are worthless.” The latter were indeed distinguished by their passivity, lack of initiative, arrogant attitude towards their subordinates and obsequious attitude towards their superiors. In a difficult situation, deprived of further instructions and directions from above, they preferred to flee, abandoning their soldiers to their fate. The Israeli army, on the contrary, cultivated independence in decision-making, resourcefulness and respectful relationships between privates, officers and generals. Israeli officers really led their soldiers into the attack by their own example, so in the IDF the percentage of officers among those killed and wounded was significantly higher than that of the Arabs.

So it is not surprising that no oncoming battle took place - on June 6, the Egyptian high command, over the head of its own general staff, gave the order for a general withdrawal from Sinai.

By the beginning of the Six-Day War, only 10 Shot tanks armed with 20-pound cannons remained in the IDF. They were consolidated into Metzger's company and operated on the Jordanian front.

However, the Egyptian troops had to retreat through the strategic passes of Mitla and Jidi. Anticipating this, General Gavish ordered General Joffe to send tanks into a risky breakthrough in order to cut off the Egyptians from the passes. The brigade of “centurions” moved on a forced march to the Mitla pass, leaving behind tanks along the way that were running out of fuel. A total of nine Centurions reached the Mitla Pass at 18:00 on June 6, with four vehicles running out of fuel and being towed away! A handful of tanks and some motorized infantry on half-track armored personnel carriers dug into the ground at the pass, waiting for the approach of enemy columns. The battle continued all night, and in the morning the “centurions” of another brigade of the 38th division began to approach the pass. At the same time, Israeli aircraft began to attack Egyptian transport columns. Thousands of flaming and simply abandoned cars clogged the roads in the desert. The Egyptian soldiers decided that it would be more convenient to escape on foot. Those of them who were lucky enough to reach the canal on foot swam across to its other side, unconscious from fear.

By mid-day on June 8, all three Israeli divisions had reached the Suez Canal in the areas of Port Fuad, El Qantara, Ismailya and Suez. The Egyptian army in Sinai was finished. The Sinai “blitzkrieg” cost the Israeli army 132 tanks (63 of them were lost forever). Considering the number of armored troops of the Defense Army, the damage is quite significant. In addition, many well-trained tank crews, including officers, were killed. But if the Israeli losses were serious, the Egyptian losses were catastrophic. Of the 935 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 820 were destroyed and captured as trophies: 291 T-54A, 82 T-55, 251 T-34-85, 72 IS-3M, approximately 50 Shermans, 29 PT-76 and 51 SU -100 and, in addition, several hundred armored personnel carriers.

The 14 Panhard AML-90 armored vehicles received for testing were in service with the Duhifat company. Jordan Front, 1967

It should be noted that the Israeli plan provided for active actions only in the Sinai; on the Northern and Central fronts, troops were ordered not to take any actions other than defensive ones. However, the Jordanians asked for it themselves. On the morning of June 5, King Hussein gave the order to begin military action against Israel.

AMX-13 tank during combat operations on the Jordanian front, 1967

The commander of the Central Front, General Uzi Narkis, found himself in a very difficult situation. It had four reserve brigades (4th, 5th and 16th Infantry and 10th Mechanized), a separate tank battalion, a company of Centurion tanks and a company of AML90 armored vehicles. In total there are more than 100 tanks (mostly Sherman) and 270 artillery pieces and heavy mortars. The tanks could only be touched as a last resort, since they could be requested to the Sinai, at the disposal of the Southern Front.

Meanwhile, Jordanian heavy artillery came into action - two batteries of long-range 155-mm American guns. One opened fire on the suburbs of Tel Aviv, the second on the largest airbase in northern Israel, Ramat David airfield. Jordanian Hunter fighters attacked Israeli airfields. The machine-gun fire in Jerusalem gradually turned into an artillery duel. The Arab Legion - as the Jordanian army was called from old memory - attacked the demarcation line in Jerusalem with the aim of occupying enclaves in the demilitarized zones. King Hussein did not listen to the persuasion of the Israeli government, conveyed to it through the UN, not to start a war. He believed that a limited offensive would not provoke too strong a reaction. However, 6 thousand heavy shells fired at Jerusalem seemed excessive to the Israelis. In the city, 900 houses were damaged, more than a thousand people were injured, and 20 were killed.

At 12:30, Israeli planes attacked both Jordanian military airfields - in Amman and Mafraq. In two steps they destroyed the runways and all the planes. Jordan was left without an air force.

By mid-afternoon, King Hussein's mood had completely deteriorated. The active actions of his army in Jerusalem caused a response much stronger than what he had expected. The Israeli command decided that the movement of the Jordanians was a prelude to the general offensive of their army, and they had 7 infantry and 2 tank (40th and 60th) brigades in Judea and Samaria (“West Bank”), plus an Iraqi brigade (8th mechanized). In addition, there were 2 separate tank battalions, 2 Egyptian commando battalions, a “Palestinian battalion”, and in total up to 300 tanks and 190 artillery pieces. A concentrated strike from these forces could cut Israel in two. And it was quite a serious threat. It is enough to look at a map of Israel (preferably with the armistice demarcation line established by the 1949 and 1950 agreements) to see that at its narrowest point, only 14 km of Israeli territory separated Jordan from the Mediterranean Sea. Why, from the farthest point - Jerusalem - it was only 50 km. To improve perception - from Domodedovo to Khimki, if in a straight line through Moscow, 60 km! Moscow from north to south within the Moscow Ring Road - 39.5 km! Together with Butovo and Khimki it would fit exactly between Jerusalem and the sea! But let’s not scare the Jews; no one is going to move Moscow to Israel, especially with Butovo and Khimki. All this is said only so that the reader understands in what insignificantly small territory the events described took place. Let's return to the Six Day War.

Paratroopers of the 55th Brigade at the Jewish shrine: the Western Wall of the Second Temple - the Wall of the Plan. The emotional state of the soldiers does not need comment (in 1947–1967, Jewish access to the Western Wall was prohibited by the Jordanian authorities)

Since the battle in Sinai was generally successful, and the Syrians showed no signs of life other than shelling Israeli villages, it was decided to act. The Northern Front allocated two brigades (37th Tank and 45th Mechanized) and loaned them to the Central Front, and they immediately launched an attack on Jenin, in Samaria. The 9th Infantry Brigade was added to them, and thus the 36th Division was formed under the command of General Elad Peled.

The 10th Mechanized Brigade (a mixed battalion of Shermans and Centurions and an AMX-13 battalion) under Colonel Uri Ben-Ari, a hero of the 1956 war, moved towards Jerusalem and bypassed the city from the north. To stop the advance of the Israeli units, the Jordanians tried to organize a counterattack along the Ramallah-Jerusalem highway with the forces of the 60th Tank Brigade, armed with M48 tanks, supported by infantry on the M113 armored personnel carrier. On the march, the brigade was bombed by Israeli aircraft, and then it was met by tanks of the 10th Israeli brigade. A fierce battle broke out with the participation of more than 100 Shermans, Centurions and Pattons. At the same time, for example, the Shermans in relation to the M48 were, without a doubt, outdated tanks. But they were stronger armed, since in the Ben-Ari brigade all the Shermans were modifications of the M51. So the tanks of the Defense Army had fire superiority. However, the battle was fierce. For several hours, both sides could neither withdraw the surviving tanks from the battle nor bring in reinforcements, since the road was filled with broken equipment that could not be pulled away due to the incessant shelling. The salvation for the Israelis was a battalion of 120-mm mortars mounted on half-track armored personnel carriers. The mortar men managed to organize a continuous curtain of fire and knock out 22 Jordanian M48s trying to break through to the battlefield. The loss of vehicles that had not yet seen combat undermined the morale of the Arabs. By the morning of June 6, only 6 tanks remained in the 60th brigade.

Shermans 1,150 are fighting on the Golan Heights. A damaged AMX-13 is visible in the background

The covert attack by Egyptian commandos against the Israeli Lod airbase, carried out from Jordanian territory, also ended in failure. The Egyptians were spotted in a wheat field. The commander of the local defense did not have artillery, but he did have matches. The field was set on fire. Of the 600 commandos, no more than 150 survived.

In 1967, old enemies met on the Golan Heights - Shermans and Panzer IVs. The latter were used by the Syrians mainly as fixed firing points

On the night of June 6, Colonel Mordechai Gur's 55th Parachute Brigade attacked Jordanian positions in northern Jerusalem. A furious hand-to-hand fight broke out on Arsenalnaya Hill. Here the Jordanians fought with particular tenacity until every last one died. The paratroopers also suffered heavy losses. On the morning of June 7, paratroopers attacked the Old City, which had been in Jordanian hands since 1948. By 10:00, the Israelis reached the Jewish shrine - the Western Wall.

On the same day, the Defense Army occupied Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem. By the end of June 8, the Israelis reached the Jordan River. The ratio of tank losses on the Jordanian front was 112 vehicles for the Israelis versus 179 for the Jordanians.

By June 9, the fifth day, the war seemed over. Egypt, Israel and Jordan agreed to a ceasefire. The truce was also accepted by Syria, but with the caveat that “it will only come into force when Israel does the same.” In the meantime, Syrian guns continued to fire from the Golan Heights. The Syrians might well have gotten away with this if the USSR representative to the UN, Fedorenko, had not suddenly stood his ground and began insisting on the inclusion of additional articles in the truce resolution, demanding “condemnation of Israel for aggression and the withdrawal of its troops to their initial positions.” As a result, the resolution did not pass, the meeting was postponed, and this circumstance cost Syria very dearly. Dayan decided to take advantage of the opportunity and canceled his own “strict order not to attack the Golan.”

AMX-13 tanks at an Israeli checkpoint on the Sinai Peninsula shortly after the end of the Six-Day War

The offensive unfolded in mountainous terrain, and bulldozers had to be deployed in front of the Centurions and Shermans to create passages. The losses of both tanks and tractors from Syrian fire, as well as from mines, were very high at first. For example, in one of the battalions of the 8th Tank Brigade there were only three Shermans left on the move. The more powerful “centurions” also suffered. However, by the end of the first day, the Syrian defenses on the Golan Heights were broken through. On the same day, the UN Security Council decided on a ceasefire, which came into force on June 10 at 19:30. The Syrian front was the only one where the ratio of tank losses was not in favor of Israel - more than 80 tanks and self-propelled guns were destroyed by the Israelis (73 T-34-85, Pz.IV and T-54; seven SU-100 and several StuG III) and 160 - Syrians. Considering that Israeli troops had to storm a well-equipped defense line based on the heights dominating the terrain, this result is not surprising.

Six Day War 1967 Israeli tank crews

The events preceding the war developed rapidly. The Arab countries, believing in their enormous numerical superiority and receiving tens of billions of dollars worth of weapons from the USSR, seriously hoped to destroy the Jewish state with the support of the USSR. The USSR openly provoked the Arabs to unleash aggression against Israel, thus hoping to assert its hegemony over the strategically important Middle East.

The turning point on the road to the Six Day War occurred on May 11, 1967. when Russian representatives handed over to the Egyptians a fake fabricated in Moscow about a large-scale war allegedly being prepared by Israel. The Russian-fabricated “document” claimed that the IDF had amassed troops on the northern border to overthrow the ruling regime in Syria.

The Israeli government immediately refuted this provocative fake, inviting the Soviet ambassador to Israel to personally verify the absence of Israeli troops on the Syrian border. However, the Soviet Ambassador D. Chuvakin rejected this proposal.

Evgeny Pyrlin, in those days the head of the Egyptian department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, subsequently explained the Soviet actions this way: “We then believed that even if our side - the Egyptians - did not win, the war would give us political benefits, since the Egyptians would demonstrate their ability to fight with our weapons and with our military and political support."

The Arabs used the Russian fake as a basis for transferring Egyptian troops to the Sinai Peninsula, which gave Egypt direct access to the Israeli borders and, just as important, to the Straits of Tiran leading to the Israeli port of Eilat.

This was a flagrant violation of UN decisions that declared the Sinai Peninsula a demilitarized zone in which only UN forces were stationed.
Egypt demanded the withdrawal of UN forces from Sinai, which was immediately carried out under pressure from the USSR on the UN Security Council: UN Secretary General U Thant unexpectedly ordered the removal of UN forces from Sinai, thereby opening the way for Arab armies to the borders of Israel.

In fact, the Russians in every possible way pushed the Arabs to start a “hot” war against Israel.

On May 14, columns of Egyptian infantry and armor crossed the Suez Canal and occupied the Sinai Peninsula, blocking the Strait of Tiran from the passage of Israeli ships. This was an act of unprovoked declaration of war on Israel.

Feverish consultations began at the UN, but Russian representative Nikolai Fedorenko opposed any proposal to lift the blockade. His Canadian and Danish colleagues bluntly told Mr. Fedorenko: “There is an unpleasant feeling that the USSR is playing a game that allows the escalation of the crisis in order to force Israel to act.” The USSR Ambassador to Israel Chuvakin, in conversations with colleagues, predicted the sad fate awaiting the Jewish state.

On May 17, a new act of aggression followed - 2 Russian MiGs with Egyptian markings flew over Israeli territory - from the east (from Jordan) to the west. Their flight passed directly over the Israeli nuclear center in Dimona.

Spy satellites, as well as conventional intelligence services, provided the USSR with accurate data regarding the facility in Dimona. In light of the fact that intelligence cooperation between the USSR and Egypt was very close in those years, it is obvious that the USSR passed information about the Israeli reactor to Egypt.

Moscow was feverishly looking for ways to destroy the Israeli nuclear center - completely “unnecessary”, according to the Soviet leadership. The former head of the Middle East department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador at Large Oleg Grinevsky, said in an interview: “Our intelligence had the ability to reliable information regarding Israel's nuclear capabilities. There is information that one of the reasons Egypt launched the Six-Day War was the desire to strike Israel before that country could use nuclear weapons. In Egypt’s military plans, Dimona was listed as one of the main targets.”

On May 22, Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran in the Red Sea to Israeli shipping, which was a “casus belli” for Israel.

On May 26, the Egyptian President said “if war breaks out, it will be total and its goal will be the destruction of Israel.”

The Arabs and Russians were already anticipating their victory and the massacre of the Israelis. The bloc led by Egypt, backed by the USSR, was joined one after another by Arab countries that sent their troops to the war against Israel: Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco. On May 30, Jordan joined this bloc.

Arab countries deployed hundreds of thousands of well-equipped soldiers, 700 combat aircraft and about 2,000 tanks along Israel's borders.

The USSR concentrated over 30 surface vessels and 10 submarines, including nuclear submarines, in the Mediterranean Sea. On each of more than 30 Soviet ships, landing groups were formed, which, according to the plans of the Soviet command, were supposed to land on the coast of Israel...

Now Israel was surrounded on all sides by the armies of warlike Arab countries and the USSR, ready to strike at the Jewish state.

Israel was clearly aware of the impending threat. A war on three fronts has become a reality. In Tel Aviv alone, up to 10 thousand victims of the bombing were expected; city squares and parks were consecrated as cemeteries.

On May 23, general mobilization began in the country: about 220 thousand people were mobilized into the army, organized into 21 brigades - 5 armored, 4 mechanized, 3 paratroopers and 9 infantry.

Israeli paratroopers. 1967

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Meeting of General Staff special forces officers

Reservists

Pilots

The IDF included 275 thousand people, about 1000 tanks, 450 aircraft and 26 warships.

The following strike force groups were created: Sinai direction (Southern Front) - 8 brigades, 600 tanks and 220 combat aircraft, personnel - 70 thousand people;
Damascus direction (Northern Front) - 5 brigades, about 100 tanks, 330 artillery units, up to 70 combat aircraft, personnel - about 50 thousand people;
Amman direction (Central Front) - 7 brigades, 220 tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 400 artillery pieces, 25 combat aircraft, 35 thousand people. personnel.

Officers discussing intelligence

On the evening of June 1, Moshe Dayan was appointed to the post of Israeli Defense Minister. The appointment of this fighting general meant that Israel was ready for all-out war.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan


Chief of the General Staff General Yitzhak Rabin

Air Force Commander General Mordechai Hod (right)

The Six Day War began on June 5, 1967. Israel launched a preemptive strike against Arab countries complicit in the aggression.

At 07.45 the Israeli Air Force attacked along the entire front. Their plan of action was to seize absolute air supremacy - to strike air bases and destroy all enemy combat aircraft on the ground. The destruction of the enemy air force completely freed the hands of the Israeli Ground Forces, ready to deliver fatal blows to the enemy’s many times superior ground forces.

Israeli planes attack enemy ground forces

The Israeli Air Force used completely new tactical solutions that surprised the enemy. Instead of flying straight at their targets, the first wave of Israeli planes flew out to sea, turned around, and approached from the west at low altitude, over the crests of the waves—not at all from the direction from which the Egyptians had expected attacks.

After the first strike, which came as a complete surprise to the Arabs because their radar and communications were blinded, Israeli planes returned to the airfields to refuel and hang weapons and went into battle again. In less than two days, with a fairly small number of aircraft, the Israeli Air Force flew about 1,100 sorties, many pilots flying 8 to 10 sorties a day.

Having destroyed 300 of 320 Egyptian aircraft, the Israelis immediately moved on to destroy the air forces of other Arab states. After crushing strikes, the air forces of Iraq, Jordan and Syria were also destroyed. In air battles, Israeli pilots shot down another sixty enemy aircraft.

Paratrooper Colonel Rafael Eitan (future chief of the General Staff) and tanker general Israel Tal (future creator of the Merkava tank)

On the morning of June 5, Israeli navy ships carried out demonstrative shelling of Alexandria and Port Said. The attack by Israeli warships, which complemented the continuous air strikes, achieved one important goal: it prevented the naval bombardment of Tel Aviv by missiles with a range of 35 miles, equipped with 1,000-pound warheads. These missiles were equipped with 18 Russian missile boats transferred by the USSR to Egypt. The next morning, June 6, the Arabs, fearful of Israeli strikes, hastily withdrew their fleet from Port Said to Alexandria, putting Tel Aviv out of missile range.

After gaining air supremacy, the IDF began a ground operation. The Six Day War of 1967 was a true triumph for Israeli armored forces.
For the first time, Israeli tank formations operated simultaneously on three fronts. They were opposed by many times superior forces of seven Arab states, but this did not save the Arabs from total defeat.

On the southern front, the attack was carried out by the forces of three tank divisions of generals Tal, Sharon and Joffe. In the offensive operation, called the “March through Sinai,” Israeli tank formations, interacting with aviation, motorized infantry and paratroopers, made a lightning-fast breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses and moved through the desert, destroying the encircled Arab groups. A brigade of paratroopers was the first to break into the city of Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea. The paratroopers were the first to reach the Suez Canal, ahead of the tank units.

On the northern front, the airborne brigade stormed enemy fortifications on Mount Hermon and secured the capture of the Golan Heights. The 36th Panzer Division of General Peled advanced along difficult mountain paths, and after three days of fierce fighting reached the outskirts of Damascus.

On the eastern front, heavy fighting broke out for eastern Jerusalem. The paratroopers under the command of Colonel Mota Gur had to overcome fierce enemy resistance, hand-to-hand fighting took place for every house.

Fight in Jerusalem

The situation was complicated by a command ban on the use of heavy equipment in battle so as not to cause damage to the religious shrines of Jerusalem. Finally, on June 7, a blue and white flag with the Star of David hoisted over the Temple Mount and Colonel Gur said over the radio the words that went down in Israeli history: “The Temple Mount is in our hands! I repeat, we have taken the Temple Mount! I am standing near the Mosque of Omar, at the very Wall of the Temple!”

Paratroopers at the Western Wall of the Temple

By June 12, 1967 the active phase of the fighting was over. The IDF won a complete victory over the troops of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Israeli troops captured the entire Sinai Peninsula (with access to the eastern coast of the Suez Canal) and the Gaza region from Egypt, the west bank of the Jordan River and the eastern sector of Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. An area of ​​70 thousand square meters came under Israeli control. km with a population of more than 1 million people.

Generals Dayan, Rabin and Ze'evi (Gandhi) in the liberated Old City of Jerusalem

Arab losses during 6 days of fighting, according to the British Institute for Strategic Studies, amounted to: 70 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured, about 1200 tanks (mostly Russian-made)

Arab losses were catastrophic. Of the 935 tanks available in Sinai at the beginning of hostilities, Egypt lost more than 820: 291 T-54, 82 T-55, 251 T-34-85, 72 IS-3M, 51 SU-100, 29 PT-76, and about 50 Sherman and M4/FL10., more than 2500 armored personnel carriers and trucks, more than 1000 artillery barrels.

100 tanks were captured in full working order and with unspent ammunition, and about 200 with minor damage.

The losses of the Arab air forces amounted to more than 400 combat aircraft:
MIG-21 - 140, MIG-19 - 20, MIG-15/17 - 110, Tu-16 - 34, Il-28 - 29, Su-7 - 10, AN-12 - 8, Il-14 - 24, MI4 - 4, MI6 - 8, Hunter -30

In the hands of a soldier is an 82-mm Israeli-made “Super Bazooka”, official name MARNAT-82-mm

About 90% of all the enemy’s military equipment, often in perfect working order, all the reserves of ammunition, fuel, equipment generously supplied by the USSR to the Arabs - all this went to Israel as trophies.

Captured Russian armored vehicles captured from the Arabs at a parade in Jerusalem.

Israel lost 679 people killed, 61 tanks, 48 ​​aircraft.

The Six-Day War was not a random impromptu carried out due to existing external threats to the Jewish state. The preparation and planning of the grandiose military operation carried out during the Six-Day War was carried out by the IDF General Staff for many years.
On the eve of the war, Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Chaim Barlev, with soldierly candor, expressed his opinion on the course of the upcoming military operations: “We will fuck them (Arabs and Russians) hard, quickly and elegantly.” The general's forecast was completely confirmed.

The “father” of planning the Six-Day War was the chief of the operational department of the General Staff in the 50s. Major General Yuval Ne'eman is undoubtedly a man of genius - along with a brilliant military career, he is a world-renowned theoretical physicist whose research in particle physics has earned him a number of the most prestigious awards and almost secured him the Nobel Prize in Physics. (physicist Yuval Ne'eman discovered the omega-minus particle, but the Nobel Committee rejected his candidacy, apparently because of his general rank)

Israeli Air Force Commander General Mordechai Hod said at the time: “Sixteen years of planning were reflected in these exciting eighty hours. We lived by this plan, we went to bed and ate thinking about it. And finally we did it."

Israel's victory in the Six-Day War predetermined the development of events in the world and the Middle East for many years to come, and finally destroyed the hopes of the Arabs and their Russian allies for the destruction of the Jewish state

At 5.08 a female officer appears in the frame. This is the daughter of General Moshe Dayan, Lieutenant Yael Dayan

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