The article below gives a new look at one of the military and statesmen of the Stalin era. The activities of Lev Mekhlis were covered extremely poorly and tendentiously.
Most people have the most general idea about it.
Meanwhile, there are two important circumstances that give reason to consider L. Mekhlis a person faithful to the state interests of Russia.
1. During the years of perestroika and after it, the Western agency of influence that seized power in Russia did not say a single kind word about Mehlis. On the contrary, he was treated in a number of publications of that time as "Stalin's accomplice." Enemies of the Russian people do not like Mekhlis. Just like L. Beria.
2. Mehlis retired in 1950 "for health reasons." Taking into account the murder of A.A. Zhdanov in 1948 through improper treatment and exposure by doctor Lidia Timashuk of a conspiracy of doctors, this wording does not seem like an ordinary formal reply. It should be assumed that Mehlis really could have health problems, because. in the second half of the 40s, the systematic destruction of the most loyal figures to Stalin began in order to prepare for the assassination of himself. L. Mekhlis died on February 15, 1953, literally two weeks before Stalin's assassination. It is unlikely that such a coincidence should be considered accidental.
I deliberately refrain from any editing of the article, in particular, on the question of the "merits" of G. K. Zhukov.
Let the reader judge.
In the first year of the war, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis had the same great merits as Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. At that time, at least two names were equally terrible for defeatists, alarmists and cowards: Zhukov and Mekhlis. Zhukov, feeling the approach of a great moment when it would be possible to clean the enemy's snout, forgot about the danger and felt a surge of true inspiration, and Mekhlis was such an impeccable communist in any situation that he also did not feel danger and did not succumb to panic. Only for some reason, mountains of books have been written about the role of Zhukov, and the role of Mehlis is carefully hushed up.
Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich was not a very simple person. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in his assessments and demands. To put it mildly, he did not like diplomacy. To almond - too. He was tough, including on the verge of cruelty, and sometimes, during the war years, he went beyond this line, if, of course, the situation required it. And at the same time he was principled, brave, really possessed an unbending will, a strong character. Unfortunately, he did not have a military education at the academy level and did not possess military leadership talents, like the great Rokossovsky, whom, by the way, he highly appreciated and shortly before the catastrophe of the Crimean Front, which had already become obvious to him in the near future, asked Stalin to appoint him commander of the Crimean Front in order to save the front. Alas, due to a severe wound, Rokossovsky was then in the hospital. At the same time, we must not forget that during the Civil War, Mekhlis gained unique experience in forming formations and commanding in offensive and defensive battles with an exceptionally strong enemy - Lieutenant General Ya.A., who was considered the most talented general of the White Army. Slashchev.
"Comrade Mekhlis found the Chongar River, which flowed into the Sivash. The river was frozen, through which he transported part of the 137th brigade. Part went behind enemy lines, captured the headquarters of the Whites with generals, 18 guns, several dozen machine guns, a huge amount of rifles and ammunition. .." From an article by O.F. Oleshko (former battalion commissar of the 46th division) in Literaturnaya Gazeta, November 1937.
Of course, the experience of the Civil War is one thing, and the Great Patriotic War is completely different. Nevertheless, to call Mekhlis a complete oak in military affairs, neither the tongue nor the hand turns. Lev Zakharovich understood and even understood very well what war is. But still he was not a commander.
In addition, Mekhlis never hesitated to speak directly, including in writing, about the grossest mistakes (by the way, about his own too) of the command with which he happened to serve, his miscalculations, bungling, slovenliness, negligence, neglect of simple soldiers and officers, cowardice on the verge of treason and betrayal, etc. Mekhlis was well versed in various propaganda techniques that were characteristic of his time. He had a developed intuition for meanness, cowardice, negligence and other shortcomings, which he had seen enough of even when he was the People's Commissar of State Control. For which, by the way, he was pretty hated even before the war. He was educated and erudite. He always spoke with pathos, but, we must give him his due, sincerely. He always sincerely believed in what he said. No matter how many critical arrows were fired at him, Lev Zakharovich was able to quickly grasp the end of the "Ariadne's thread" and quickly unwound even the most complex tangle of the most acute problems. Of course, he could not do without his characteristic manner of seeing everything either in white or in black, but the fact remains that he quickly caught the essence of the problem that he was sent to solve. By the way, when I realized that I was wrong, I never hesitated to admit it. Including before his subordinates (once he made such a confession to General Gorbatov).
“At every meeting with me until the release of Orel, Mekhlis did not miss the opportunity to ask me some question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and, probably, not always the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that he, although with difficulty, changes his former attitude towards me for the better.When we were already behind Orel, he suddenly said:
- I have been looking at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after your departure from Moscow and I did not quite believe what I heard good about you. Now I see that I was wrong
. Gorbatov A. V. "Years and wars"
Perhaps, in that war, no one else dared to shoot a general in front of the line without trial. And the head of the Main Political Directorate did not hesitate to do so. Here is the text of the order to the troops of the front No. 057 dated September 12, 1941, drawn up personally by Mekhlis: "... For the cowardice shown and personal leaving the battlefield to the rear, for violating military discipline, expressed in the direct failure to comply with the order of the front to come to the aid of the advancing from parts of the west, for not taking measures to save the material part of the artillery, for the loss of military appearance and two days of drunkenness during the fighting of the army, Major General of Artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No.
Mehlis was distinguished by exceptional courage, and this quality of his was with him all his life. The writer Ortenberg, who edited the newspaper of the 11th Army “Heroic Campaign” during the war with the White Finns, recalled how, together with the head of the PU, they, being in one of the divisions, were surrounded. "The army commissar of the 1st rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, gave several fighters for protection:" Break through.
... Seeing that ours could not bring down the Finnish barrier near the road, Mehlis placed the fighters in a chain, got into the tank himself and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and a machine gun. The fighters followed. The enemy was shot down from his position."
General A.F. Khrenov, then the head of the air defense engineering troops, recalled a similar case: “In one of the companies, he was caught by the order to attack. He, without hesitation, became the head of the company and led it along. None of the people around managed to dissuade Mehlis from this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich ... "
"... The more the discipline is shaken, the more despotic measures have to be resorted to to impose it ... which do not always give positive results"
“The commander ... must be trained to be demanding of subordinates, to be domineering. The rag-commander will not keep discipline.
“But the commander ... must be a fair father of a fighter. Do not allow illegal repression, assault, lynching and complete obscenities. ”rl
"To subjugate people without humiliating them." From the notes of L.Z. Mehlis
Mekhlis arrived at the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942 - the Caucasian Front) on January 20. On the eve of his arrival at this front, in the status of a plenipotentiary representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the front successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (12/25/41-01/02/42) and captured an important bridgehead.
Two days after his arrival, Mekhlis sent a telegram to Stalin with the following content: “They flew to Kerch on January 20, 1942. They found the most unsightly picture of the organization of command and control ... Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as enemy groupings. Not a single division has data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front has been in the army since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula ... " CA MO f. 32, op. 11309, d. 139, l. 17.
Usually this telegram is characterized as follows - the arrogant Mekhlis "enough" two days to get an idea of the state of affairs at the front. And where does the arrogance of Mehlis?! Even if what he wrote to Stalin corresponded to the real situation by at least one percent - I deliberately reduce it by a hundred times - then his conclusion is still objective and disturbing. The front command is not fulfilling its duties. In fact, Mehlis was right one hundred percent. Because the main provisions of this telegram were recorded in the order to the troops of the front No. 12 of January 23, 1942. The order was signed by Kozlov himself, a member of the Military Council of the Front F.A. Shamanin and Mekhlis. That is, if for a simple reason, Kozlov personally confirmed that all this is the true truth.
Why was Mehlis completely right?! Yes, because the command of the front was in ... Tbilisi. And from there, sitting in the warm offices of the district headquarters, he led the fighting! From a thousand kilometers away! But is it really possible to direct the combat operations of an entire front in this way? If the commander does not see and does not know what exactly is happening at the front, where the enemy is, what is the state of our troops, how the defense is being built on the ground, etc. and so on, then, excuse me, this is no longer the command of the front, but just a mess, fraught with the most negative consequences. Mehlis quickly figured out what was the matter. And he immediately raised the question of separating the front from the Caucasian into an independent Crimean before the Headquarters. Moreover, he raised the question of transferring control of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Kerch Peninsula. At the same time, Mekhlis immediately requested replenishment in manpower (three rifle divisions), began to demand an urgent restoration of order in artillery, air defense, and logistics. Order No. 12 dated January 23, 1942 stated this:
"one. The command of armies, divisions, regiments should take into account the experience of the battles of 15-18.01.42, immediately restore order in the units ... Have regimental artillery and anti-tank artillery in infantry combat formations ...
2. Alarmists and deserters to be shot on the spot as traitors. Those found guilty of deliberately wounding left-handed crossbows should be shot before the formation.
3. Within three days, restore complete order in the rear ... "
APRF, f. 5, op. 50, d. 441, l. 32-36.
To this it should be added that Mekhlis especially carefully checked the state of the air force and artillery of the front, on which its combat effectiveness depended to a decisive extent. It turned out that due to poor logistics, 110 defective aircraft had accumulated on the Kerch Peninsula, as a result of which less than one sortie was made per day. The combat readiness of artillery was at a low level. Lev Zakharovich was not too lazy and checked the state of military intelligence - it turned out that it was poorly organized. And commanders of all levels are responsible for this, starting with the front commander. For if intelligence works poorly, then the consequences of this are always catastrophic.
On May 6, 1942, the Stavka ordered the front to go over to the defensive. But the defense must be based on something. And there was no support. Already during the May breakthrough of our defense by the Germans, the Headquarters gave Kozlov the following instructions: “1) The entire 47th Army must immediately begin to withdraw behind the Turkish Wall, organizing a rearguard and covering the retreat with aircraft. Without this, there will be a risk of being captured ... 3) You can organize a strike by the forces of the 51st army in order to gradually withdraw this army behind the Turkish Wall. 4) The remnants of the 44th army must also be withdrawn behind the Turkish Wall. 5) Mehlis and Kozlov should immediately start organizing defense along the Turkish Wall line. 6) We do not object to the transfer of the headquarters to the place indicated by you. 7) We strongly object to the departure of Kozlov and Mekhlis to Lvov's group. 8) Take all measures so that artillery, especially large ones, is concentrated behind the Turkish Wall, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments. 9) If you manage and have time to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement ... ". 1 TsAMO RF, f. 32, op. 11309, d. 140, l. 341-345.
But after all, neither the Turkish Wall nor the Kerch contours were equipped in engineering terms and did not represent a serious obstacle for the Germans. But the orders for the construction of defensive structures on the Kerch Peninsula were given back in October-November 1941. Even worse. All three armies of the front were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and even more sharply limited the ability to repel enemy attacks in the event of a breakthrough. I don’t think that a special explanation is needed for the fact that the commander and chief of staff of the front, and not the representative of the Headquarters, whoever he may be, are personally responsible for the deployment and correct formation of troops to solve certain tasks. But when in May the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main blow fell precisely on the most unsuccessful, rather insanely criminal formation of the troops of the 44th Army of General S.I. Chernyak. The insanely criminal formation of the troops of this army - because the second echelon of this army was only 3-4 km from the front line, which gave the Nazis the opportunity, even without changing the positions of their artillery, to smash to smithereens even the operational defense of the army, and not just tactical. Which they did. They crushed the entire 44th Army.
By the way, Mekhlis' opinion about General Chernyak: “Chernyak. An illiterate person, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.
In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to replace Kozlov, Mekhlis received a very irritated message from Stalin:
Formally, it turns out that Mekhlis seems to have deservedly received "for nuts." Especially when you consider that Stalin then recalled him from the front and demoted him. In fact, something else happened. Stalin was angry that at the most crucial moment, Mekhlis, who saw perfectly well that Kozlov simply could not cope with his duties as a commander, did not switch command to himself. It is also possible and necessary to understand Mehlis. After all, formally, the representative of the Headquarters did not have the right to completely replace the front commander. He had to help him. Meanwhile, Kozlov settled himself very cleverly - since Mekhlis takes care of everything, well, let him be responsible for everything. Kozlov got his from Stalin. And how did you get it! But he is not remembered as the primary culprit in the failure of the Crimean Front. All the bumps are thrown on the head of Mehlis. And not because, unlike the front, he was desperately trying to turn the tide of the wild mess that led to the tragedy. But only because he openly demanded to replace General Kozlov for outright professional unsuitability. That is, for simply encroaching on the holy of holies of the generals - a general can be free in military affairs, but no one has the right to raise his hand to the general's status. That's what Mehlis was blamed for in the post-war period. With his demands for a change in commander, he raised the gigantic problem of the professional unsuitability of a significant part of the generals. For that, he was slandered to smithereens. Moreover, he was a commissar, and he could not stand the generals of commissars. Such is the hard truth about the affairs of Mekhlis on the Crimean front.
After the Crimean operation, the star of Mekhlis went down. In fact, Zhukov's star was also supposed to go down - the generals were already slowly learning to fight without chauffeurs. But Stalin did not dare to take him, following Budyonny, to the second echelon, but adapted him as a representative of the Headquarters - the sovereign's eye on the fronts. After the Crimea, Mekhlis no longer represented the Headquarters - he was a member of the Military Councils of the fronts, although, of course, he also tried to work as much as he could under the sovereign's eye. Only, probably, his attention was drawn not so much to the military aspects (on which he was badly burned), but, so to speak, to the accompanying ones.
On May 14, 1942, after the defeat of the Crimean Front, Mekhlis said: "It is not the fighters who are to blame, but the leadership.... We have dishonored the country and should be damned.", and asked Stalin to send him to where it is most difficult. And they sent him. On June 27, 1942, on board the leader "Tashkent", he arrived in Sevastopol in the very last days of the heroic defense
An opinion has been established in the literature that Mekhlis, wherever he gets, immediately begins to scribble denunciations to Stalin. And then to say, our generals, as the famous song says, “did a difficult battle day and night,” and then some Mekhlis gets under his feet, wants to show his significance! But now, little by little, we are beginning to realize that the life of our generals in the war was much more eventful than we imagined. I didn’t read Mekhlis’s “denunciations”, but it seems to me that you can read a lot of interesting things there - such as about generals drinking against the background of hunger in the trenches, about the decomposition of the command staff, theft ... And everything was probably noticed by the trained look of the people’s commissar of state control (which Mekhlis remained in a concurrent war). And straight to Stalin! Y-yes, you are not acting in a comradely way, Comrade Mekhlis!
And now about "rudeness and cruelty." I won’t argue with the second one (although I would call this quality a little differently - “ruthlessness”), but I’m ready to doubt about rudeness.
It would seem that the verdict of history is unanimous: both Gorbatov, and Stadnyuk, and Karpov, and Simonov unequivocally present Mekhlis as an arrogant, boorish subject, almost a sadist, who fell on the neck of another poor fellow commander (in Simonov, he passes as “Colonel-General Lvov "). Just do not forget that all these are writers who have never seen the living Mehlis. But for some time he worked as a Mekhlis deputy in the State Control (that is, he knew his boss well) I.V. Kovalev (who later became the Minister of Railways) gives him a significantly different characterization: Lev Zakharovich expressed his demands to anyone "politely, but persistently".
I think that, of course, Kovalev is right here, and not the above-mentioned comrades. And an indirect argument in his favor is that Mekhlis, as you know, diligently adopted the very style of Stalin’s behavior: he worked at night and watched movies in the morning (only he didn’t smoke his pipe - moreover, he even quit smoking completely). And Stalin, as is also known, unlike some of the "marshals of Victory", tried to control himself and not run into his subordinates. Most likely, Mekhlis also had to try to convey his opinion to others "politely, but persistently."
Mehlis is very disliked today. A lot of people didn't like him before.
Being the People's Commissar of the People's Commissariat of State Control, an honest unmercenary who cannot be bought, Mekhlis became a scourge for the party-state nomenklatura, trying to profit at the expense of the Soviet people. And although there was less than a year left before the start of the war, Lev Zakharovich managed to shake hands with many, naturally causing fear and hatred of the highest bureaucracy. The people's commissar of light industry, the people's commissar of state farms, the people's commissar of the shipbuilding industry, the people's commissar of the oil industry, got 3,288 rubles from the salary of the people's commissar of the navy, which he ate at the expense of the money allocated for social and cultural life, got the people's commissar of the meat and dairy industry and even the Prosecutor General, who, according to At the request of Mekhlis, he was forced to bring his thieving heads of departments to justice. In the first half of 1941 alone, Mekhlis organized over 400 revisions, thoroughly turning the hornet's nest of greedy scoundrels.
Today's pests, enemies, robbers, parasites, opportunists, mediocrity and just bastards pour mud and slop on the honest man of the Stalinist USSR - Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis - Colonel General, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of the 7th convocation, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st-2nd convocations, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Doctor of Economics
Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis(January 1 (13), Odessa - February 13, Moscow) - Soviet statesman and military-political figure, colonel general (July 29, 1944). Member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of the 7th convocation, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st-2nd convocations. Candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) (1934-1937), member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b) (1937-1953), member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1938-1952). Doctor of Economics (1935, without completing a Ph.D.). Chief Commissar of the Army and Navy. One of the organizers of mass repressions in the Red Army.
Biography
In 1904-1911 he worked as a clerk and was a home teacher. In 1907-1910 he was a member of the workers' Zionist party "Poalei Zion (Odessa)".
From December 30, 1937 to September 6, 1940 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.
Military-political and military ranks
On June 4, 1942, L.Z. Mekhlis was demoted by two steps to a corps commissar following the results of the Kerch disaster.
On December 6, 1942, he was recertified as a lieutenant general. Since July 29, 1944 - Colonel General.
About how L. Z. Mekhlis worked on the Crimean Front, his telegrams to Headquarters speak. Two days after the arrival, L. Z. Mekhlis sent a telegram to I. V. Stalin with the following content:
We flew to Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unattractive picture of the organization of command and control of the troops ... Komfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy grouping. Not a single division has data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front has been in the army since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula ...
Usually this telegram is characterized as follows [ ] - two days were “enough” for the arrogant L.Z. Mekhlis to get an idea of the state of affairs at the front. However, if what was written corresponded to the real situation at least partially, then the situation should have been at least alarming: it turned out that the front command was not fulfilling its duties. In fact, the main provisions of this telegram were recorded in the order to the troops of the front No. 12 dated January 23, 1942, signed by Kozlov himself, a member of the Military Council of the front F. A. Shamanin and Mekhlis.
It was L. Z. Mekhlis who, almost immediately after his arrival, raised the question of separating the front from the Caucasian into an independent Crimean before the Headquarters. Moreover, he raised the issue of transferring control of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Kerch Peninsula: the headquarters of the Caucasian Front was in Tbilisi and, due to such a serious distance from the battlefield, simply did not have time to quickly respond to the rapidly changing situation. At the same time, Mekhlis immediately requested replenishment in manpower (three rifle divisions), began to demand an urgent restoration of order in artillery, air defense, and logistics. Order No. 12 dated January 23, 1942 stated:
Mekhlis, during his tenure as a representative of the Stavka, was engaged in writing rather critical reports on senior officers. For example, here is how he spoke about the commander of the 44th Army, General Chernyak:
Chernyak. An illiterate person, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.
He tried through the Stavka to replace the commander of the Crimean Front, Kozlov, with Rokossovsky or Klykov.
In a telegram dated May 9, 1942, Stalin pointed out to Mekhlis the need to take all measures to organize a rebuff:
You hold on to the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would advance in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as the State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters.
You are demanding that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you must know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve. Your affairs in the Crimea are simple, and you could handle them yourself. If you had used attack aircraft not for side affairs, but against enemy tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have passed. You don't have to be a Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.
However, the battle order of the front was not rebuilt from offensive to defensive; the result of this was the 1942 Kerch disaster. On May 19, 1942, the Crimean Front was disbanded and its troops transferred to the North Caucasian Front.
As a result of his activities on the Crimean Front, by Directive of the Headquarters No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, Mekhlis was reduced in rank by two steps to the corps commissar and removed from the post of deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Glavpolitupr.
- 6th Army (07/04/1942 - 09/25/1942);
- Voronezh Front (09/28/1942 - 10/07/1942);
- Volkhov Front (10/08/1942 - 04/06/1943);
- Reserve Front (04/06/1943 - 04/15/1943);
- Steppe Military District (04/15/1943 - 07/09/1943);
- Bryansk Front (07/09/1943 - 10/10/1943);
- Baltic Front (10/10/1943 - 10/20/1943);
- 2nd Baltic Front (10/20/1943 - 12/15/1943);
- Western Front (12/16/1943 - 04/19/1944);
- 2nd Belorussian Front (04/24/1944 - 07/28/1944);
- 4th Ukrainian Front (08/06/1944 - 07/09/1945).
After the war
From March 19, 1946 to October 27, 1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR, at the same time Chairman of the State Staff Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
From July 30, 1949 to October 27, 1950 - Member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
After his death from heart disease on February 13, 1953 he was cremated. The urn with the ashes is placed in the Kremlin wall on Red Square in Moscow.
Family
Wife - Elizaveta Abramovna Mlynarchik (? - 1973).
Son - Leonid (born October 10, 1922). As a cadet, he took part in the fighting.
Related videos
Reviews about Lev Mekhlis
He was a truly honest man, but in some ways crazy, which was expressed in his mania to see enemies and pests everywhere.
It must be said frankly that at that time our troops turned out to be poorly adapted to wage war in the conditions of the Finnish theater. Forests and lakes, impassability and snow were a serious obstacle for them. It was very difficult, in particular, for the 44th Infantry Division, which arrived from Ukraine and immediately fell into an encirclement near Suomussalmi. This division was commanded by A.I. Vinogradov.
To investigate the circumstances of the case and provide assistance to those surrounded, at the direction of I.V. Stalin, L.Z. was sent to the 9th Army. Mehlis. His messages often passed through my hands and always left a bitter aftertaste in my soul: they were black as night. Using the rights granted to him, Mekhlis removed dozens of people from command posts, immediately replacing them with others brought with him. For division commander Vinogradov, he demanded execution for the loss of control of the division.
Later, I had to meet with Mekhlis more than once, and then I finally became convinced that this man was always inclined to the most extreme measures.
Sergei Shtemenko on the participation of Mekhlis in the leadership of the Crimean Front in 1942:
Back at the end of January 1942, the Stavka sent L.Z. Mehlis. Major General P.P. went with him from the General Staff. Eternal . They were supposed to help the front command prepare and carry out the operation to unblock Sevastopol. Mekhlis, according to his custom, instead of helping, began to shuffle the leading cadres. And above all, he replaced the chief of staff of the front, Tolbukhin, with Major General Vechny.
the offensive was postponed, the defense, contrary to the instructions of the General Staff, was not strengthened, Mekhlis only bickered with the commander.
In popular culture
Awards
Memory
- The name of L. Z. Mehlis is one of the streets of Vladivostok.
see also
Notes
- History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (in six volumes). Ed. P. N. Pospelov. T. 1. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1960. - S. 231-236.
- TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11309, d. 139, l. 17.
- APRF, f. 5, op. 50, d. 441, l. 32-36.
- Stalin IV Works. T. 18. - Tver, 2006. - S. 291.
- Abramov V. V. Kerch catastrophe 1942. - M .: Yauza, 2006.
- Mekhlis Lev Zakharovich. Curriculum vitae
- Volkova I. V., Zuev M. N. The history of Russia from antiquity to the present day. S. 490
- Mekhlis Leonid Lvovich, :: Document on the award:: Memory of the people
- Confessions of an enemy
- Mekhlis Lev Zakharovich (indefinite) (unavailable link). Retrieved 8 August 2008.
Doctor of Economics (1935).
Biography
Born into a Jewish family. He graduated from the 6th grade of the Jewish commercial school. In 1904-1911 he worked as a clerk and was a home teacher. In 1907-1910 he was a member of the workers' Zionist party Poalei Zion.
Since 1911 in the Russian army. He served in the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In 1912 he received the rank of bombardier (the rank in artillery corresponded to the rank of corporal in the infantry and cavalry). Later he received the title of fireworks. (Senior non-commissioned officer rank in artillery). Until 1917 - in the artillery.
In 1918 he joined the Communist Party and until 1920 was in political work in the Red Army (commissar of a brigade, then of the 46th division, group of troops).
In 1921-1922, he was the manager of the administrative inspection at the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (People's Commissar I.V. Stalin). In 1922-1926, he was assistant secretary and head of the bureau of the secretariat of the Central Committee, in fact, personal secretary of I.V. Stalin. In 1926-1930 he studied at the courses at the Communist Academy and at the Institute of Red Professors. Since 1930, he was the head of the press department of the Central Committee, at the same time a member of the editorial board, and then the editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper. Under him, newspaper galleys began to be delivered to Leningrad by air, and readers of the city of three revolutions received issues of Pravda every day. Since 1932, the "post link", which included the best pilots of the country, was headed by Leonard Kruse.
In 1937-1940 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.
Since 1939, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (candidate since 1934), in 1938-1952 - a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, in 1940-1941 - People's Commissar of State Control. In June 1941, he was again appointed head of the Main Political Directorate and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Mehlis was awarded the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank, which corresponded to the rank of army general.
In 1942, he was a representative of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Crimean Front, where he constantly clashed with General D.T. Kozlov. The leaders of the front headquarters did not know whose instructions to follow - the commander or Mehlis. The commander of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal Budyonny, also could not influence Mekhlis, who stubbornly did not want to obey him, referring to the fact that he receives all instructions directly from the Headquarters.
Mekhlis, during his tenure as a representative of the Stavka, was engaged in writing rather critical reports on senior officers. After one of these reports, Major General Tolbukhin was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front, who had the imprudence, in contrast to Stalin's instructions, to express an opinion about the need for the front to take into account the need to defend. He also tried through the Headquarters to replace the front commander Kozlov with Rokossovsky or Klykov. At the same time, in his reports to Stalin, he tried to distance himself from the failures suffered by the Crimean Front and place all responsibility on the front command. On this occasion, Stalin sent a telegram to Mekhlis, in which he severely criticized him for such behavior:
After the defeat of the Crimean Front in May 1942 (out of 250 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Crimean Front, 162,282 people were irretrievably lost in 12 days of fighting - 65%) was removed from the posts of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, demoted by two steps - to the corps commissioner.
In 1942-1946 - a member of the military councils of a number of armies and fronts, from December 6, 1942 - lieutenant general, from July 29, 1944 - colonel general.
In 1946-1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR. On October 27, 1950, he was dismissed for health reasons.
After his death in February 1953, he was cremated, the ashes were placed in an urn in the Kremlin wall on Red Square in Moscow.
Odessa, Russian Empire
Moscow
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Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis(January 1 (13), 1889, Odessa - February 13, 1953, Moscow) - Soviet statesman and military figure, Colonel General (July 29, 1944). Member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of the 7th convocation, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st-2nd convocations. Candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1934-1937), member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1937-1953), member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1938-1952).
Biography
In 1922-1926, he was assistant secretary and head of the bureau of the secretariat of the Central Committee, in fact, personal secretary of I.V. Stalin.
In 1926-1930 he studied at courses at the Communist Academy and in. Since 1930, he was the head of the press department of the Central Committee, at the same time a member of the editorial board, and then the editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper. Under him, the proofs of the newspaper began to be delivered to Leningrad by air, and the readers of this city received issues of Pravda every day. Since 1932, the "post link", which included the best pilots in the country, was headed by Leonard Kruse.
From December 30, 1937 to September 6, 1940 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.
On February 8, 1938, Mehlis was awarded the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank, which corresponded to the rank of general of the army.
From October 12, 1939 - a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (candidate since 1934), from January 19, 1938 to October 5, 1952 - a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee.
From September 6, 1940 to June 21, 1941 - People's Commissar of State Control.
On June 21, 1941, he was again appointed head of the Main Political Directorate and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.
Participation in the Great Patriotic War
About how L. Z. Mekhlis worked on the Crimean Front, his telegrams to Headquarters speak. Two days after his arrival, Mekhlis sent a telegram to Stalin with the following content:
We flew to Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unattractive picture of the organization of command and control of the troops ... Komfront Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy grouping. Not a single division has data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front has been in the army since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula ...
Usually this telegram is characterized as follows - two days "enough" for the arrogant Mekhlis to get an idea of the state of affairs at the front. However, if what was written corresponded to the real situation at least partially, then the situation should have been at least alarming: it turned out that the front command was not fulfilling its duties. In fact, the main provisions of this telegram were recorded in the order to the troops of the front No. 12 dated January 23, 1942, signed by Kozlov himself, a member of the Military Council of the front F. A. Shamanin and Mekhlis.
It was L. Z. Mekhlis who, almost immediately after his arrival, raised the question of separating the front from the Caucasian into an independent Crimean before the Headquarters. Moreover, he raised the issue of transferring control of the troops of the Crimean Front to the Kerch Peninsula: the headquarters of the Caucasian Front was in Tbilisi and, due to such a serious distance from the battlefield, simply did not have time to quickly respond to the rapidly changing situation. At the same time, Mekhlis immediately requested replenishment in manpower (three rifle divisions), began to demand an urgent restoration of order in artillery, air defense, and logistics. Order No. 12 dated January 23, 1942 stated:
Mekhlis, during his tenure as a representative of the Stavka, was engaged in writing rather critical reports on senior officers. For example, here is how he spoke about the commander of the 44th Army, General Chernyak:
Chernyak. An illiterate person, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.
He tried through the Stavka to replace the commander of the Crimean Front, Kozlov, with Rokossovsky or Klykov.
In a telegram dated May 9, 1942, Stalin pointed out to Mekhlis the need to take all measures to organize a rebuff:
You hold on to the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would advance in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as the State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters.
You are demanding that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you must know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve. Your affairs in the Crimea are simple, and you could handle them yourself. If you had used attack aircraft not for side affairs, but against enemy tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have passed. You don't have to be a Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.
However, the battle order of the front was not rebuilt from offensive to defensive; the result of this was the 1942 Kerch disaster. On May 19, 1942, the Crimean Front was disbanded and its troops transferred to the North Caucasian Front.
As a result of his activities on the Crimean Front, by Directive of the Headquarters No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, Mekhlis was reduced in rank by two steps to the corps commissar and removed from the post of deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Glavpolitupr.
- 6th Army (07/04/1942 - 09/25/1942);
- Voronezh Front (09/28/1942 - 10/07/1942);
- Volkhov Front (10/08/1942 - 04/06/1943);
- Reserve Front (04/06/1943 - 04/15/1943);
- Steppe Military District (04/15/1943 - 07/09/1943);
- Bryansk Front (07/09/1943 - 10/10/1943);
- Baltic Front (10/10/1943 - 10/20/1943);
- 2nd Baltic Front (10/20/1943 - 12/15/1943);
- Western Front (12/16/1943 - 04/19/1944);
- 2nd Belorussian Front (04/24/1944 - 07/28/1944);
- 4th Ukrainian Front (08/06/1944 - 07/09/1945).
Military ranks awarded:
- December 6, 1942 - lieutenant general;
- July 29, 1944 - Colonel General.
After the war
From March 19, 1946 to October 27, 1950 - Minister of State Control of the USSR, at the same time Chairman of the State Staff Commission under the Council of Ministers.
From July 30, 1949 to October 27, 1950 - Member of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
After his death in February 1953 from heart disease, he was cremated, the urn with the ashes was placed in the Kremlin wall on Red Square in Moscow.
Reviews about Lev Mekhlis
Stalin really did not like that comrades holding high government posts, especially political ones, stood out in some way among those around them. So, for example, having learned that the members of the Military Councils of the fronts, N. A. Bulganin and L. Z. Mekhlis, got themselves attendants and personal chefs, removed them from their posts on these fronts.
According to the stories of the former Minister of Health of the USSR E. I. Smirnov, in 1949 he suggested to Stalin that Mekhlis (Minister of State Control) be placed at the head of one of the government commissions. At this, Stalin “began to laugh, clutching his stomach and wiping his tears”:
Can Mekhlis be appointed to constructive deeds? Here's something to destroy, smash, destroy - for this he is suitable.
The poet, writer, publicist and journalist F. I. Chuev cites a conversation that took place between Stalin and the writers Fadeev and Makariev about the editor-in-chief of Pravda Mehlis. Stalin repeated several times to the writers' complaints: “This is a terrible man, Mekhlis. Ask for anything, but I can't do anything with him."
In popular culture
- Leo Mekhlis is bred by Konstantin Simonov in the form of a member of the military council of the Lvov front in the third part of the novel The Living and the Dead.
- He is the hero of Yuz Aleshkovsky's novel "Death in Moscow".
- He is characterized as an extremely narrow-minded, but extremely self-confident person in the novel Barbarossa by Valentin Pikul. [ ]
Awards
- 4 orders of Lenin (04/26/1937, 02/22/1938, 01/15/1949, 04/1949)
- 2 orders of the Red Banner (02/20/1928, 08/27/1943)
- Order of Suvorov, 1st class (05/23/1945)
- Order of Kutuzov 1st class (07/29/1944)
- Order of the Red Star (03/21/1940)
- Order of Virtuti Militari IV class (06.1946)
- medals
Memory
- One of the streets of Vladivostok bears the name Mekhlis.
see also
Write a review on the article "Mekhlis, Lev Zakharovich"
Notes
Literature
- Rubtsov Yu.V. Stalin's alter ego. - M., 1999.
- Rubtsov Yu.V. Mehlis: Shadow of the leader. - M.: Veche, 2011. - 384 p. - ISBN 978-5-9533-5781-4.
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An excerpt characterizing Mekhlis, Lev Zakharovich
- Voila une belle mort, [Here is a beautiful death,] - said Napoleon, looking at Bolkonsky.Prince Andrei understood that this was said about him, and that Napoleon was saying this. He heard the name sire of the one who said these words. But he heard these words as if he heard the buzzing of a fly. Not only was he not interested in them, but he did not notice them, and immediately forgot them. His head burned; he felt that he was bleeding, and he saw above him a distant, lofty and eternal sky. He knew that it was Napoleon - his hero, but at that moment Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant person in comparison with what was now happening between his soul and this high, endless sky with clouds running across it. It was absolutely indifferent to him at that moment, no matter who was standing over him, no matter what they said about him; he was only glad that people had stopped over him, and only wished that these people would help him and bring him back to life, which seemed to him so beautiful, because he understood it in such a different way now. He mustered all his strength to move and make some kind of sound. He feebly moved his leg and produced a pitiful, weak, painful groan.
- BUT! he is alive,” said Napoleon. “Raise this young man, ce jeune homme, and take him to the dressing station!”
Having said this, Napoleon rode on to meet Marshal Lan, who, having removed his hat, smiling and congratulating him on his victory, drove up to the emperor.
Prince Andrei did not remember anything further: he lost consciousness from the terrible pain caused to him by laying on a stretcher, jolts while moving and probing the wound at the dressing station. He woke up only at the end of the day, when he, having been connected with other Russian wounded and captured officers, was carried to the hospital. On this movement he felt a little fresher and could look around and even talk.
The first words he heard when he woke up were those of a French escort officer who hurriedly said:
- We must stop here: the emperor will pass now; he will be pleased to see these captive masters.
“Today there are so many prisoners, almost the entire Russian army, that he probably got bored with it,” said another officer.
- Well, however! This one, they say, is the commander of the entire guard of Emperor Alexander, ”said the first, pointing to a wounded Russian officer in a white cavalry guard uniform.
Bolkonsky recognized Prince Repnin, whom he met in St. Petersburg society. Next to him stood another, 19-year-old boy, also a wounded cavalry guard officer.
Bonaparte, riding up at a gallop, stopped the horse.
- Who is the eldest? - he said, seeing the prisoners.
They named the colonel, Prince Repnin.
- Are you the commander of the cavalry regiment of Emperor Alexander? Napoleon asked.
“I commanded a squadron,” answered Repnin.
“Your regiment honestly fulfilled its duty,” said Napoleon.
“The praise of a great commander is the best reward for a soldier,” said Repnin.
“I give it to you with pleasure,” said Napoleon. Who is this young man next to you?
Prince Repnin named Lieutenant Sukhtelen.
Looking at him, Napoleon said, smiling:
- II est venu bien jeune se frotter a nous. [He came young to compete with us.]
“Youth does not interfere with being brave,” Sukhtelen said in a broken voice.
“A fine answer,” said Napoleon. “Young man, you will go far!”
Prince Andrei, for the sake of completeness of the trophy of the captives, was also put forward, in front of the emperor, could not help but attract his attention. Napoleon, apparently, remembered that he had seen him on the field and, addressing him, used the very name of the young man - jeune homme, under which Bolkonsky was first reflected in his memory.
– Et vous, jeune homme? Well, what about you, young man? - he turned to him, - how do you feel, mon brave?
Despite the fact that five minutes before this, Prince Andrei could say a few words to the soldiers who carried him, he now, directly fixing his eyes on Napoleon, was silent ... All the interests that occupied Napoleon seemed so insignificant to him at that moment, seemed so petty to him his hero himself, with this petty vanity and joy of victory, in comparison with that high, just and kind sky that he saw and understood - that he could not answer him.
Yes, and everything seemed so useless and insignificant in comparison with that strict and majestic structure of thought, which caused in him a weakening of forces from the flow of blood, suffering and the imminent expectation of death. Looking into Napoleon's eyes, Prince Andrei thought about the insignificance of greatness, the insignificance of life, which no one could understand the meaning of, and the even greater insignificance of death, the meaning of which no one could understand and explain from the living.
The emperor, without waiting for an answer, turned away and, driving off, turned to one of the chiefs:
“Let them take care of these gentlemen and take them to my bivouac; have my doctor Larrey examine their wounds. Goodbye, Prince Repnin, - and he, having touched the horse, galloped on.
There was a radiance of self-satisfaction and happiness on his face.
The soldiers who brought Prince Andrei and removed from him the golden icon that they came across, hung on his brother by Princess Marya, seeing the kindness with which the emperor treated the prisoners, hastened to return the icon.
Prince Andrei did not see who and how put it on again, but on his chest, over and above his uniform, suddenly appeared a small icon on a small gold chain.
“It would be nice,” thought Prince Andrei, looking at this icon, which his sister hung on him with such feeling and reverence, “it would be nice if everything was as clear and simple as it seems to Princess Marya. How good it would be to know where to look for help in this life and what to expect after it, there, beyond the grave! How happy and calm I would be if I could say now: Lord, have mercy on me!... But to whom shall I say this! Either the power - indefinite, incomprehensible, which I not only cannot address, but which I cannot express in words - great everything or nothing, - he said to himself, - or this is the God who is sewn up here, in this palm, Princess Mary? Nothing, nothing is true, except for the insignificance of everything that is clear to me, and the greatness of something incomprehensible, but the most important!
The stretcher moved. At every push he again felt unbearable pain; the feverish state intensified, and he began to become delirious. Those dreams of a father, wife, sister and future son and the tenderness that he experienced on the night before the battle, the figure of a small, insignificant Napoleon and above all the high sky, constituted the main basis of his feverish ideas.
A quiet life and calm family happiness in the Bald Mountains seemed to him. He was already enjoying this happiness when suddenly little Napoleon appeared with his indifferent, limited and happy look from the misfortune of others, and doubts, torments began, and only heaven promised peace. By morning all the dreams were mixed up and merged into chaos and darkness of unconsciousness and oblivion, which, in the opinion of Larrey himself, Dr. Napoleon, were much more likely to be resolved by death than by recovery.
- C "est un sujet nerveux et bilieux," said Larrey, "il n" en rechappera pas. [This man is nervous and bilious, he will not recover.]
Prince Andrei, among other hopelessly wounded, was handed over to the care of the inhabitants.
At the beginning of 1806, Nikolai Rostov returned on vacation. Denisov was also going home to Voronezh, and Rostov persuaded him to go with him to Moscow and stay at their house. At the penultimate station, having met a comrade, Denisov drank three bottles of wine with him and, approaching Moscow, despite the bumps in the road, did not wake up, lying at the bottom of the sledge, near Rostov, which, as it approached Moscow, came more and more into impatience.
“Soon? Is it soon? Oh, these unbearable streets, shops, rolls, lanterns, cabbies! thought Rostov, when they had already written down their holidays at the outpost and drove into Moscow.
- Denisov, come! Asleep! he said, leaning forward with his whole body, as if by this position he hoped to speed up the movement of the sleigh. Denisov did not respond.
- Here is the corner of the crossroads where Zakhar the cab driver is standing; here he is and Zakhar, and still the same horse. Here is the shop where the gingerbread was bought. Is it soon? Well!
- Which house is that? asked the coachman.
- Yes, at the end, to the big one, how can you not see! This is our house, - said Rostov, - after all, this is our house! Denisov! Denisov! We'll come now.
Denisov raised his head, cleared his throat, and said nothing.
“Dmitry,” Rostov turned to the lackey in the box. “Is this our fire?”
- So exactly with and with daddy in the office glows.
- Haven't gone to bed yet? BUT? how do you think? Look, don’t forget, get me a new Hungarian at once, ”added Rostov, feeling his new mustache. “Come on, let’s go,” he shouted to the driver. “Wake up, Vasya,” he turned to Denisov, who lowered his head again. - Come on, let's go, three rubles for vodka, let's go! Rostov shouted when the sleigh was already three houses from the entrance. It seemed to him that the horses were not moving. Finally the sleigh was taken to the right to the entrance; above his head, Rostov saw a familiar cornice with broken plaster, a porch, a sidewalk pillar. He jumped out of the sleigh on the move and ran into the passage. The house also stood motionless, unfriendly, as if it didn't care who came to it. There was no one in the vestibule. "My God! is everything all right?" thought Rostov, stopping for a minute with a sinking heart, and at once starting to run further along the passage and the familiar, crooked steps. The same doorknob of the castle, for the uncleanliness of which the countess was angry, also weakly opened. A single tallow candle burned in the hallway.
Old man Mikhail was sleeping on the chest. Prokofy, the visiting lackey, the one who was so strong that he lifted the carriage by the back, sat and knitted bast shoes from the hems. He glanced at the open door, and his indifferent, sleepy expression suddenly changed into ecstatic fright.
- Fathers, lights! Count young! he exclaimed, recognizing the young master. – What is it? My dove! - And Prokofy, shaking with excitement, rushed to the door to the living room, probably in order to announce, but apparently changed his mind again, returned back and leaned on the shoulder of the young master.
– Healthy? Rostov asked, pulling his hand away from him.
- Thank God! All thanks to God! just ate now! Let me see you, Your Excellency!
- Is everything all right?
- Thank God, thank God!
Rostov, completely forgetting about Denisov, not wanting to let anyone warn him, threw off his fur coat and ran on tiptoe into a dark, large hall. Everything is the same, the same card tables, the same chandelier in a case; but someone had already seen the young gentleman, and before he had time to run to the living room, something swiftly, like a storm, flew out of the side door and hugged and began to kiss him. Another, third, similar creature jumped out of another, third door; More hugs, more kisses, more cries, more tears of joy. He could not make out where and who is dad, who is Natasha, who is Petya. Everyone was screaming and talking and kissing him at the same time. Only his mother was not among them - he remembered that.
- But I didn’t know ... Nikolushka ... my friend!
- Here he is ... ours ... My friend, Kolya ... He has changed! No candles! Tea!
- Kiss me then!
- Darling ... but me.
Sonya, Natasha, Petya, Anna Mikhailovna, Vera, the old count, embraced him; and people and maids, having filled the rooms, sentenced and gasped.
Petya hung on his feet. - And then me! he shouted. Natasha, after she, having bent him to her, kissed his whole face, jumped away from him and holding on to the floor of his Hungarian, jumped like a goat all in one place and squealed piercingly.
From all sides there were tears of joy shining with tears, loving eyes, from all sides there were lips looking for a kiss.
Sonya, red as red, also held on to his hand and beamed all over in a blissful look fixed on his eyes, which she was waiting for. Sonya was already 16 years old, and she was very beautiful, especially at this moment of happy, enthusiastic animation. She looked at him, not taking her eyes off, smiling and holding her breath. He looked at her gratefully; but still waiting and looking for someone. The old countess hasn't come out yet. And then there were footsteps at the door. The steps are so fast that they couldn't have been his mother's.
But it was she in a new dress, unfamiliar to him, sewn without him. Everyone left him and he ran to her. When they came together, she fell on his chest sobbing. She could not raise her face and only pressed him against the cold laces of his Hungarian coat. Denisov, not noticed by anyone, entered the room, stood right there and, looking at them, rubbed his eyes.
“Vasily Denisov, your son’s friend,” he said, introducing himself to the count, who looked at him inquiringly.
- Welcome. I know, I know,” said the count, kissing and hugging Denisov. - Nikolushka wrote ... Natasha, Vera, here he is Denisov.
The same happy, enthusiastic faces turned to the shaggy figure of Denisov and surrounded him.
- My dear, Denisov! - Natasha squealed, beside herself with delight, jumped up to him, hugged and kissed him. Everyone was embarrassed by Natasha's act. Denisov also blushed, but smiled and took Natasha's hand and kissed it.
Denisov was taken to the room prepared for him, and the Rostovs all gathered in the sofa near Nikolushka.
The old countess, without letting go of his hand, which she kissed every minute, sat next to him; the rest, crowding around them, caught his every movement, word, glance, and did not take their eyes off him with enthusiastic love. The brother and sisters argued and intercepted places from each other closer to him, and fought over who would bring him tea, a handkerchief, a pipe.
Rostov was very happy with the love he was shown; but the first minute of his meeting was so blissful that it seemed to him that his present happiness was not enough, and he kept waiting for something more, and more, and more.
The next morning the visitors slept off the road until 10 o'clock.
In the previous room, sabers, bags, carts, open suitcases, dirty boots were lying around. The cleaned two pairs with spurs had just been placed against the wall. Servants brought washstands, hot water for shaving, and washed dresses. It smelled of tobacco and men.
- Hey, G "bitch, t" ubku! shouted the hoarse voice of Vaska Denisov. - Rostov, get up!
Rostov, rubbing his eyes that were stuck together, lifted his tangled head from the hot pillow.
- What's late? “It’s late, 10 o’clock,” answered Natasha’s voice, and in the next room there was a rustle of starched dresses, a whisper and laughter of girlish voices, and something blue, ribbons, black hair and cheerful faces flashed through the slightly open door. It was Natasha with Sonya and Petya, who came to see if he got up.
- Nicholas, get up! Natasha's voice was heard again at the door.
- Now!
At this time, Petya, in the first room, seeing and grabbing sabers, and experiencing the delight that boys experience at the sight of a warlike older brother, and forgetting that it is indecent for sisters to see undressed men, opened the door.
- Is that your sword? he shouted. The girls jumped back. Denisov, with frightened eyes, hid his shaggy legs in a blanket, looking around for help at his comrade. The door let Petya through and closed again. There was laughter outside the door.
- Nikolenka, come out in a dressing gown, - Natasha's voice said.
- Is that your sword? Petya asked, “or is it yours?” - with obsequious respect he turned to the mustachioed, black Denisov.
Rostov hurriedly put on his shoes, put on a dressing gown and went out. Natasha put on one boot with a spur and climbed into the other. Sonya was spinning and just wanted to inflate her dress and sit down when he came out. Both were in the same, brand new, blue dresses - fresh, ruddy, cheerful. Sonya ran away, and Natasha, taking her brother by the arm, led him into the sofa room, and they started talking. They did not have time to ask each other and answer questions about thousands of little things that could interest only them alone. Natasha laughed at every word that he said and that she said, not because what they said was funny, but because she had fun and was unable to restrain her joy, expressed in laughter.
- Oh, how good, excellent! she said to everything. Rostov felt how, under the influence of the hot rays of love, for the first time in a year and a half, that childish smile blossomed in his soul and face, which he had never smiled since he left home.
“No, listen,” she said, “are you quite a man now? I'm awfully glad you're my brother. She touched his mustache. - I want to know what kind of men you are? Are they like us? Not?
Why did Sonya run away? Rostov asked.
- Yes. That's another whole story! How will you talk to Sonya? You or you?
“How will it happen,” said Rostov.
Tell her, please, I'll tell you later.
- Yes, what?
- Well, I'll tell you now. You know that Sonya is my friend, such a friend that I would burn my hand for her. Here look. - She rolled up her muslin sleeve and showed on her long, thin and delicate handle under her shoulder, much higher than the elbow (in the place that is sometimes covered by ball gowns) a red mark.
“I burned this to prove my love to her. I just kindled the ruler on fire, and pressed it.
Sitting in his former classroom, on the sofa with pillows on the handles, and looking into those desperately animated eyes of Natasha, Rostov again entered that family, children's world, which had no meaning for anyone except for him, but which gave him one of the best pleasures in life; and burning his hand with a ruler, to show love, seemed to him not useless: he understood and was not surprised at this.
One of Stalin's assistants, who held high positions in the USSR. He is especially known for his activities as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. According to many historians, it was his control that led to the tragedy of the Crimean Front.
Before the revolution
Mekhlis L.Z. was born in 1889 to Jewish parents. Prior worked in an office, gave private lessons and was a member of the Zionist party Poalei Zion. The program of this party combined traditional Jewish issues with the ideas of communism. For example, plans for the return of Jews to their historical homeland in Palestine and the restoration of the Israeli state, with plans for the reorganization of society on the basis of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
During the war, he served in the artillery, where he served as a bombardier, and then as a fireworker.
Career takeoff after 17 years
Soon after the revolution, Lev Zakharovich joins the Communist Party. During the Civil War, he served as a political worker in the Red Army. There he was noticed, and in the 22nd year he was already working as a personal secretary for himself.
In 1926-1936, Lev Zakharovich was the head of the press department of the Central Committee, a member of the editorial board and, finally, the editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper. In parallel with this, he is studying at the Institute of the Red Professors for a doctorate in economics. Moreover, he was exempted from defending his dissertation.
The Pravda newspaper (also called Krasnaya Pravda and Pravda KPRF) was the main printed publication in the USSR. Of course, it was completely ideological, strictly followed the will of Stalin and accurately reflected all the changes in the political course of the country.
Everything that was printed in this newspaper had the force of a state decree. M.N. Ryutin called Pravda "the leader's personal, immediate mouthpiece."
Since 1937. Mekhlis already holds the post of head of the political department of the Red Army (becomes a member of a collegium of 9 people, including Stalin).
This was the period of the "Great Terror", when the army command was subjected to a large-scale "purge". And the new head of the Red Army with great zeal organized repressions against the "enemies of the people."
During the two years of terror, the staff of Red Army officers was reduced by about 30%.
From Voroshilov's speech on the results of the military purge, delivered at a meeting of the Military Council on November 29, 1938:
“The purge was carried out radically and comprehensively, from the very top to the bottom. Therefore, the number of cleaned out turned out to be very, very impressive. Suffice it to say that for all the time we cleared out more than 4 tens of thousands of people.
On the Crimean front
In 1942, Mekhlis was sent to the Crimean Front, in the role of a representative of Stalin himself. There, Mekhlis began to interfere in everything, including conducting operational affairs. Having no experience and knowledge for this, he practically took command of the front. And he made decisions with little interest in the opinions of military commanders, on whom, by the way, he willingly denounced.
Already 5 days after his arrival, Mekhlis organizes an offensive operation to liberate Feodosia. The operation ended in complete failure, despite the superiority of Soviet troops in numbers. According to an eyewitness, military journalist K. Simonov, the reason for this was the strategic mediocrity of Mekhlis, who led the operation, who placed the troops too tightly and too close to the front line, so that each enemy bomb and projectile inflicted increased damage.
Things went on like this. Mekhlis kept the front under heavy pressure, and the Soviet army suffered defeat after defeat. The representative of the headquarters tried to lay all the blame on the commanders, in particular on General Kozlov, and wrote to Stalin more than once about his incompetence. But in the biography of Kozlov there were major military successes, so Stalin did not fully trust the denunciations and did not remove him from his post. But many other military leaders were removed at the insistence of Mehlis. That did not improve the situation at the front at all.
In the end, the Crimean Front was defeated. Mehlis was demoted and removed from his posts.