Based on Shukhevych’s trips from near Lepel, I’m figuring out where to look for information. I'm building diagrams.
***
From the end of March '42. The Ukrainian battalion is located near Lepel. Before that, he was in Minsk for a short time while the Germans made decisions. where to send it?

(It’s strange that in Minsk, because Mn was the center of the Gebitsk Commissariat of Weisrutenia, which occupied a small area - approximately the Minsk region with its surroundings. And in the end the Ukrainian battalion was sent to the 201st Security Police Division in the Wehrmacht control zone, front-line as zone, to guard the rear of the 3rd Tank Army, which fought against the Kalini Front. Surely, the decision was made not at the local level in Minsk, but in Berlin. Theoretically, according to Pobeguy, the Ukrainians were sure that they were going to the front, and not to fight with partisans. But perhaps the delay was due to the thoughts of the leadership of the 3rd Army, where to send them? "Special forces training" within the Brandenburg sabotage regiment in the conditions of the strategic retreat of the 3rd Army, apparently, was not needed at the front, and personnel in in another situation - valuable. Were they sent to fight conscientious partisan saboteurs? They simply kept them away from front-line losses, keeping in mind a potentially important political role? Or was there an option to send them to Ukraine after all in connection with some processes within the OUN?)

Just “in April 1942, near Lvov, the 2nd Conference of the OUN(B) took place, which spoke in favor of creating its own “military forces.” At the direction of the OUN(B) leader, “self-defense groups” (militants) were formed according to the scheme: “booth” (3 villages, 15-45 participants) - district hundred - kuren (3-4 hundreds). By mid-summer in Volyn, the militants numbered up to 600 armed participants."

600 people for the vast Volyn region - not much. Moreover, we are talking about both the reserve and the fighters in the forest. In the Lepel zone alone, where the Ukrainian battalion was stationed in the fall, however, in the Lobank brigade alone there were 1,700 people. and another 1500 were, if memory serves, in reserve. “Self-defense groups” are clearly what Soviet partisans called “reserves” (they are at home, but are ready to go into the forest on orders, often have weapons, and perform the functions of self-defense of their village and communications intelligence if necessary.

Bulba at this time had several hundred people. concentrated in one place (in Lemu), and the intelligence network and reserve are approximately several thousand people. Apparently, up to 10 thousand, if we focus on the number of his UPA (PS) at the end of 41. at the time of its dissolution by order of the Germans. In August '42 Bulba storms Shepetovka, having, it seems, over 500 fighters. Taking into account the allies from the UPA (M), Bulba’s army in 42. in Volyn the OUN members are definitely stronger.

For 42 years OUN structures in Polesie (Volyn) did not engage in significant battles with the Germans. The proposed structure of the OUN partisan is superimposed on the German security and police system (1 policeman per 100 inhabitants). The OUN did not establish its open control over the region at this time, i.e. OUN in Volyn in '42. established actual control over the local police and German authorities, formed its own communications system, planted food and military supplies in the forest, and created an agent network. In the spring of '43 this work made it possible to one-time take 5 thousand German police officers into the OUN UPA and announce a general mobilization of men into the ranks of this army. This army was poorly equipped with weapons (it is usually said that at least half of the fighters did not have weapons), but it seems that at least a thousand and 10 people. were armed immediately. Several thousand units, or even significantly more, of firearms were taken into account, collected, and prepared precisely during the preparatory work in 1942-early 1943.

Apparently, very small groups of OUN members were completely in the forest. Most likely, those who provided security for Klyachkivsky himself (Klim Savur) and were engaged in the preparation of forest camps, bookmarks, and communications. This is probably what motivated the first combat detachments of the OUN - Kaczynski - which emerged, it turns out, only in October 1942.

Unless we are talking about the emergence of the anti-German movement on the ground from the control of the OUN governing bodies and the spontaneous founding of small anti-German partisan detachments, retroactively announced by a decision of the OUN. Bulba writes that back in January 1942. The OUN opposed the start of an active anti-German partisan war and only changed this position in February-March.

In any case, dates are important. This means that Shukhevych could not have been unaware of the April decision of the OUN to prepare for war with the Germans. I could not help but know about the even more decisive mood of the group of OUN members led by Mitringa, who generally relied on Bulba. Shukhevych definitely knew about the preparations for the anti-German partisan campaign, which part of the OUN launched in Volyn-Polesie in 1942. It is difficult to imagine that Shukhevych, during his trips from near Lepel to Ukraine and Volyn, did not have contacts with the local leadership of the OUN(b), i.e. with Klim Savur, who directly supervised the preparation for the deployment of the mass anti-German partisan OUN.

Where could they have contacted if there was such contact?

I’m considering possible travel routes for Shukhevych and his entourage from near Lepel to Ukraine and Volyn in ’42. We probably traveled mainly by train. This is realistic either through Minsk-Baranovichi-Sarny-Rovno-Lvov or Lepel-Orsha-Mogilev-Gomel-Shepetovka-Rovno-Lvov, or if contact is needed in Krakow, Warsaw or even Berlin: Lepel-Orsha-Minsk-Brest. Considering that the Ukrainians were considered the frontline rear, and not the “Gebitskommissariat of Weisrutenia,” apparently, it was easier to argue for permission for a route through the frontline zone, to Mogilev. In general, contact could most likely have taken place either in a large city with a German garrison or in the Sarn region. I think it was difficult to explain the trip on the Gomel-Luninets-Brest railway to take advantage of some small local settlement in this forest zone. Yes, the OUN and Bulba actually acted a little in these places. Mostly closer to Sarny. Although, of course, this reflection is purely speculative, due to the lack of direct information.

Moreover, direct contact with Klim Savur Shukhevych was apparently “allowed” simply due to their status within the OUN. And if Shukhevych really intended to go into the forest after the “revolt” of the Ukrainian battalion near Lepel (if there was a riot, of course, or, for example, even prepared such a departure), then such contact was simply inevitable. Shukhevych definitely needed confidence that the intelligence network and “bookmarks” created by Savur really existed, to organize this action politically, to get an idea of ​​the possible supply and the number of supplied soldiers, about the places of deployment, the first military operations, etc. Then it was necessary to send our people to walk through the very places of future battles, to see for themselves. As a trained saboteur officer and an experienced politician in Ukrainian affairs, Shukhevych could not have prepared differently. If you were prepared, of course.

Contact between Shukhevych and Savur could probably have taken place in the summer of 42. Most likely after Bulba announced the transition to a new phase of the partisan war in July 42. This announcement created a completely political situation in Volyn and Polesie. Theoretically, Bulba could convert a significant part of the network created by Savur. Moreover, Mitringa largely agreed with Bulba. The OUN(b) had to urgently decide. Assault on Bulba in August '42. Shepetovki should have alerted them altogether. The initiative in Ukrainian affairs in Volyn went to Bulba. Throughout Belarus and in the Lepel region, incl. The same large partisan formations were being formed. The Ukrainian battalion was generally threatened with destruction. After Bulba’s assault on Shepetivka, Shukhevych had to lead people out from under Lepel also because in the event of further rapprochement between Bulba and the Soviet partisans, and Shukhevych could not help but see the general trend in this direction, he simply could not know the details and probably did not know the value Shukhevych and his people could have fallen in the eyes of the Soviet command and the Germans. The Soviet command could well have given the order to local partisans to attack the Ukrainians so that they would cease to be a factor in the political game in Western Ukraine.

That is, there could have been two contacts - one between mid-July - 19.08 (the assault on Shepetivka, if I don’t confuse the date. The second - after 19.08, probably in September. Other contacts between Shukhevych and the OUN leaders should have been tied to these same events. That is . he was supposed to have one trip at the end of July-beginning of August. Another one - at the end of August-beginning of September. On the “second" trip, Shukhevych was supposed to be determined after leaving Lepel. Both trips required contact not only with Savur, but also with the leaders of the OUN in Lvov.

Plus, in addition to this and precisely in connection with the same events and dates, relations with the Germans...

Trap for "Schur". On November 4, one of the founders of the UPA, Dmitry Klyachkivsky, turned 95 years old.
Authors: Yuri SHAPOVAL, Dmitry VEDENEEV (Doctors of Historical Sciences)

The “eternal revolutionary” Ernesto Che Guevara once admitted that he learned the art of insurgency from the experience of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. At its origins stood Dmitry Klyachkivsky (Klim Savur), although over time he found himself in the shadow of the UPA commander-in-chief Roman Shukhevych. So let’s try to take a closer look at this figure and, based on previously inaccessible documents, talk about her tragic ending.

They “falcon” from the leader
to the OUN leader
Dmitry Klyachkivsky was born on November 4, 1911 in Zbarazh in the Ternopil region, in the family of a bank employee. Graduated from the Faculty of Law of Lviv University. In 1932-1934. served in the Polish army. Until 1939 he worked in cooperative institutions in Galicia. He was fond of the Ukrainian youth sports and patriotic movement, and was also a member of the board of the Zbarazh organization of the sports society “Sokol” (which was under the influence of the OUN). In 1937, the leader of the Falcons had to spend several months in prison, but the Poles could not prove his participation in anti-government activities.

Leaflet with a photograph of the murdered Klim Savur
The process of repressive Sovietization of Western Ukraine after September 1939 stimulated the expansion of the base of the nationalist underground that opposed the Chekists. Among the latter, the contingent of operational interest was determined long before the appearance of the Red Army in the region. Back in 1925-1931. In the event of a transfer of hostilities to the territory of neighboring European states, the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR prepared lists of “Ukrainian counter-revolutionary emigration of various political colors in Poland, Romania and other states” for military counterintelligence agencies. Repressions were initially directed primarily against “socially hostile elements” from among the wealthy sections of the population and members of national political associations (in September-December 1939, 10.2 thousand cases were referred to the courts). Gradually, punitive actions are becoming widespread. By January 1941, the population of the region decreased by 400 thousand people. During 1940, more than 35 thousand people were arrested on charges of involvement in the OUN alone. Approximately every tenth convict received capital punishment. The apotheosis of terror was the extermination of about 15 thousand prisoners during the “cleansing” of prisons in the first days after the German attack. This shocked the population and stimulated the OUN members.

Even before the end of 1939, the Regional Executive (KE) of the OUN was created in Lvov - the center of the region's underground, headed by D. Miron (Orlik). With the annexation of Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia, the EC becomes the governing body of the underground in Western Ukrainian lands. District executives were subordinate to the regional government (later the territorial bodies of the underground were called wires) in Lvov, Stanislav, Drohobych, Ternopil, Lutsk (there are references to the district bodies of the OUN in Stryi and Kolomyia). District wires united 3-5 supra-district ones, supra-district wires - 3-5 district executives (wires). The latter were divided into subdistricts. The composition of the district-district send-off included a leader (“conductor”), the chief of the rebel headquarters, a military training instructor, and advisers on intelligence, security, communications, propaganda, and youth work.

As evidenced by documents captured by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, the deputy chief of the communication reference department of the KE Marta Gritsai, by September 1940, the resistance movement in the region numbered about 5.5 thousand active members, up to 14 thousand sympathizers. From 1939 to June 1941, during anti-insurgency operations, 7 guns, 200 machine guns, 18 thousand rifles, 7 thousand grenades were captured.

“Blondin” (Klyachkivsky’s pseudonym in those days) also became an irreconcilable enemy of the new government. In 1940, he headed the reference department of “Yunatstva” - the youth reserve of the OUN. In the city of Dolina, on September 10 of the same year, “Blondin” was arrested by NKVD officers, but they were unable to force him to admit his involvement in the underground or give information about other participants in the resistance movement. Neither the intra-chamber “work” nor the confrontations were successful.

In January 1941, the famous “Trial of 59” took place in Lvov over members of the OUN underground. “The majority of those convicted,” the security officers stated, “both during the preliminary and judicial investigations, pleaded guilty and did not repent; on the contrary, they declared in court that they were and remain irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet regime. And in the future, if there is such an opportunity, under any conditions they will fight against Soviet power.” 19 people were sentenced to capital punishment, 34 people to 10 years in prison, 14 people to various terms of imprisonment. The Lvov Regional Court sentenced Klyachkivsky to death, which was eventually commuted by the Supreme Court of the USSR to 10 years in prison.

Taking advantage of the chaos of the first weeks of the war, he escaped from the Berdichev prison and soon became the regional leader of the OUN (B) in Lvov, and from 1942, under the pseudonym “Okhrim,” he headed the OUN’s conduct in the North-Western Ukrainian lands (SZUZ, that is, Volyn and Polesie).

Founder of the "forest army"
The leadership of Stepan Bandera's OUN initially rejected the possibility of creating their own military structures, condemned the “partisan” as a method of activity and believed that it was necessary to wait for the mutual exhaustion of Germany and the USSR.

At the end of September - at the beginning of October 1941, the First Conference of the leadership of the OUN (B) was held near Lvov, in which 10-15 “leaders” of the organization took part, including the chief of the Security Council M. Arsenich (Arseny, Mikhail, Grigor, Berezovsky). According to the testimony of members of the Central Wire (CP) M. Lebed (Maxim Ruban) and M. Stepanyak (Dmitry Dmytriv, Sergey), the conference decided to transfer most of the personnel underground, not to enter into open conflict with the Germans in order to preserve strength and further political struggle for an independent Ukrainian state, create a legal network in administrative, public and cultural-educational institutions, launch anti-German and anti-Soviet propaganda, train military personnel and collect weapons.

But in April 1942, near Lvov, the Second Conference of the OUN(B) took place, which spoke out in favor of creating its own “military forces”. At the direction of the OUN(B) line, “self-defense groups” (militants) are formed according to the following scheme: “kush” (3 villages, 15-45 participants) - district hundred - kuren (3-4 hundreds). By mid-summer in Volyn, the militants numbered up to 600 armed participants.

In October 1942, the formation of the first combat detachments began in Volyn under the command of Sergei Kachinsky (Ostap). Taking this into account, by the resolution of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Rada dated May 30 and the holiday order of the chief commander of the UPA Roman Shukhevych dated October 14, 1947, October 14, 1942 was declared the founding day of the UPA. The attack of hundreds of Peregiynyak on February 7, 1943 on the German barracks in the city of Vladimirets marked the beginning of the anti-German struggle of the rebels controlled by the OUN (B). The course to fight the Germans was confirmed by the Third Conference of the OUN(B) on February 17-21, 1943.

So, the mentioned date of creation of the UPA is conditional. Until July 1943, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was the name given to the armed formations of Taras Bulba-Borovets, which eventually took the name “Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army” (UNRA). The personnel of these formations partially joined the ranks of the UPA under the political leadership of the OUN(B). Actually, the “Bandera” UPA as an organized military force took shape in the spring and summer of 1943, and Klyachkivsky led this process. By mid-1943, several thousand fighters were under his banner. As an informant of the Soviet state security agencies reported, on the Arms Festival on July 31, 1943, in the Svinarsky forest of the Rivne region, Savur organized a military review, in which 85 infantry hundreds (150-170 bayonets each) and almost 1,500 cavalrymen took part.

From April-May 1943, these formations were officially called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Literally overnight, up to five thousand Ukrainians who served in the police join them. Where voluntarily, and where forcibly, units of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Front (FUR), UNRA Bulba-Borovets, Melnikovsky OUN and “free Cossacks” were added to the UPA. Savur's subordinates pacified their competitors through armed action or the threat of force. In July-August 1943, a blow was struck against the Melnikovites. On August 18, 1943, Klyachkivsky gave the order to disarm the UNRA. On August 19, in the village of Chernitsa, Koretsky district, Rivne region, UPA detachments and SB militants surrounded the main forces of Borovets. In addition to several commanders, Borovets’s wife, Ganna Opochinskaya, was captured and liquidated after torture.

Part of the personnel of the rebel formations defeated by Bandera, under the operational support of the Security Council, joined the UPA. As one of the participants in the liberation movement wrote, disarmed departments are transferred to the UPA “under the police supervision of the Security Council as unreliable. The elders each receive their own “angel” of the Security Council with a noose in their pocket, and the organizational “guides” of the OUN (Melnikovskaya - Author) as a “hostile element” are predominantly liquidated. The hunt for OUN members begins in all territories, they are merged into the UPA under the supervision of the Security Council, and the most prominent ones are secretly liquidated.”

If we take into account that in Galicia the Ukrainian People's Self-Defense began to form in the summer of 1943 (from December - the UPA-"West" group), then by this time the commander of the UPA of Volyn was at the same time the commander of the insurgent movement as a whole. On January 27, 1944, due to the need to unite the leadership of the insurgent movement and the OUN, Klyachkivsky transfers his position to Roman Shukhevych, remaining the commander of the UPA-“North” (its number in the spring of 1944, according to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, was 10 thousand fighters). In this sense, the figure of Shukhevych overshadowed Klyachkivsky’s contribution to the creation of the UPA. Although contemporaries, for example, the commander of the UPA-"West" Alexander Lutsky, noted that Shukhevych borrowed many ideas of military development from Savur and his chief of staff Oleksa Gasyn.

Commanding
with character
Taking care that the UPA turned into a real force that would rely on the support of the population, Klyachkivsky introduced strict disciplinary and military legal practices. His order of May 15, 1943 established “the highest wartime penalty - death” for cooperation with the enemy, sabotage and sabotage against the UPA, espionage, murder, desertion, theft of military and personal property, armed robbery, etc.

On the territory of the SZUZ, Klyachkivsky and his assistants created a system of military organization and military administrative control. The region was divided into four operational-territorial formations - military districts (MD), where the corresponding UPA formations with the rear services attached to them were based (Zagrava, Bogun, Turiv, Tyutyunnik). The districts were divided into military superdistricts, districts, subdistricts, bushes and villages (individual settlements).

The highest body of military administrative power was the Main Command of the UPA under the leadership of Savur. It included the chief of the military headquarters (deputy for military affairs), the commandant of the underground (for administrative and economic work), and the chief of the political headquarters. The following references were subordinate to the commandant of the underground: organizational-mobilization, socio-political, security service, economic, communications, Ukrainian Red Cross, local government. The political headquarters led the political and educational departments of the UPA groups.

Savur paid a lot of attention to intelligence and the activities of the Security Service, of which he himself was the chief for some time. The formation and tasks of special agencies were determined by the “Instructions of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services.” The work of intelligence units of headquarters and formations at various levels was based on an extensive intelligence and information network among the population, which collected information about Soviet partisans, Germans, and Polish nationalists.

The armament of the rebels is evidenced by the fact that the trophies of the Soviet side in the confrontation with the OUN and UPA for 1944-1955. consisted of 2 armored personnel carriers, 61 guns, 595 mortars, 77 flamethrowers, 358 anti-tank rifles, 844 heavy and 8327 light machine guns, 26 thousand machine guns, 72 thousand rifles, 100 thousand grenades and
12 million rounds. In fact, the areas controlled by the UPA (their area reached 150 thousand sq. km with a population of up to 15 million people) turned into republics with a national-patriotic regime. One of the first measures of the rebel administration was the implementation of a fair agrarian reform and the development of school affairs.

Let's not idealize Klyachkivsky. The merciless conditions of uncompromising confrontation made Savur a cruel and firm leader. He is responsible for the escalation of the Ukrainian-Polish “Volyn massacre” of 1943-1944, for orders for the destruction of Soviet prisoners of war who escaped from German captivity, for initiating physical “cleansings” of the ranks of the UPA itself - with the aim of eradicating enemy agents and “unreliable elements”.

The atmosphere of spy mania and internal terror was successfully used by the security officers. As noted in the special report of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR (March 1945), as a result of increased disintegration in the UPA units and desertion, the terrorist activities of the Security Council against the bearers of capitulatory sentiments significantly intensified. This circumstance, along with special undercover measures to disintegrate the OUN-UPA, was used by the security officers to create discord among the rebels. In the ranks of the UPA, as stated in the report of the Rivne regional committee of the CP(b)U dated February 26, 1945, a situation has developed where every rebel is seen as a seksot, and a complete “cleansing” continues. It was enough for the security officers to carry out “primitive combinations” (tossing an anonymous piece of paper: “Such and such a person is a sexot”) for the rebel to be destroyed by their own.

Let’s not forget about Savur’s participation in establishing, albeit opportunistic, cooperation with the Germans and their allies. On April 2, 1944, Klyachkivsky, through the Abwehrkommando of Army Group Northern Ukraine, submitted a proposal to coordinate the fight against Soviet troops, provide intelligence information to the rebels, and asked for the transfer of 20 field and 10 anti-aircraft guns, 500 machine guns, 250 thousand cartridges, 10 thousand grenades.

At the same time, we must not forget about the confrontation between the rebels and the German occupiers (in the reports of Soviet partisan intelligence, the anti-Nazi actions of the UPA were seriously assessed). The armed actions of the UPA and local self-defense units significantly annoyed the Germans. During the autumn offensive of the UPA of 1943 against the Nazis alone, 47 battles and 125 skirmishes with the occupiers took place. German losses during this campaign amounted to one and a half thousand soldiers.

At the beginning of May 1943, the Pimsta Polissya rebel detachment ambushed and defeated a German column on the Kovel-Brest highway. Among the dead was the Chief of Staff of the SA, Obergruppenführer W. Lütze. During the German offensive on the Black Forest in the Carpathian region, an operation plan was received through an SB agent, thanks to which the offensive of units of the 7th Panzer Division was repelled and the civilian population was evacuated from the combat zone in advance. Efforts were also made to create our own agent positions in the enemy’s military command and control bodies. When a special headquarters “Bandenbekempfung” was created in Vladimir-Volynsky to counter the UPA, headed by SS Sturmbannführer Plätte, the Security Service was able to introduce its agents there - the plans and orders of the headquarters were transferred to the rebels.

With the arrival of the Soviets, a large-scale armed confrontation unfolds. The UPA’s capabilities were still sufficient to capture individual regional centers, but the balance of forces gradually changed not in its favor, especially since the rebels’ share of mobilized unfired recruits reached 60%.

The final
State security agencies opened an operational-search case “Shchur” against Klyachkivsky. For a long time (NB!) the NKGB did not know who was hiding under the pseudonym Savur. Only in February 1944 did foreign sources from state security agencies establish his personal data.

The search was largely helped by chance. On January 26, 1945, the operational-military group of the Kamen-Kashira regional department of the NKGB and the 169th Infantry Regiment of the Internal Troops under the command of Senior Lieutenant Savinov in the village of Rudka-Chervinskaya, Volyn region, defeated the UPA militants. 17 rebels were killed. Typhoid patients were captured by the commander of the UPA-“North” unit, Yuri Stelmashchuk (Rudy), and the nurse, Eva.

During interrogations, “Rudy,” with whom the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, General Timofey Strokach, communicated a lot, openly spoke about the deteriorating situation of the UPA. According to him, the UPA-“North” lost up to 60% of its personnel and about 50% of its weapons.

As Stelmashchuk testified, on January 30, he and Savur had a meeting scheduled in the Orzhevsky farmsteads of the Klevan district in the Ronen region. According to Stelmashchuk, Klyachkivsky hides in the forests during the day and in the houses of rebel assistants at night. At 1-1.5 km, as a rule, a “special purpose department” under the command of Vasily Pavlonyuk (“Uzbek”) is located for cover. He also described the appearance of the house where Savur was hiding. Soon, informants of the Klevan regional department of the NKGB reported that some rebel leader with militants was hiding in the forest near the village of Susk. On February 10-11, an operation was carried out during which the Uzbek militant group was defeated and the printing house of the UPA main headquarters was captured. Up to 70 rebels were killed, but Savur was not captured.

The search was continued by the operational military group of the Klevan regional department and the 233rd brigade of the NKVD Internal Troops. On February 12, in the forest northeast of the Orzhev farmstead, fresh footprints were discovered in the snow, and then the smoldering remains of a fire. Five kilometers later, the reconnaissance and search group met three armed strangers. A shootout began. Two rebels lay down, covering the retreat of the third, and were killed in a firefight. Senior Group Sergeant
D-ko tried to capture the fugitive alive, but he responded to the offer to lay down his arms with fire. The sergeant shot him with a carbine shot.

The dead were taken to Rivne. The medical examination confirmed death from a bullet wound to the right side of the back, and also that the deceased had been away from home for about three days, hiding from pursuit. In addition to documents, they found correspondence with his wife in the field bag. There is no information left about the burial place of Klyachkivsky and the rebels. The People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR, Colonel General Vsevolod Merkulov and Nikita Khrushchev were given a special report: “...One of the leaders of the OUN-UPA, known in the OUN underground under the pseudonyms “Klim Savur” and “Okhrim,” was identified among those killed.

...In July 1945, Stelmashchuk received a “fee” for valuable information: he was shot. In 1952, Dmitry Klyachkivsky, by a resolution of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Rada, was awarded the Golden Cross of Merit of the OUN. Today, a memorial sign has been erected near the site of his death.

One of the problems that historians are still puzzling over is the size of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The reason is prosaic - there are practically no statistics left from Bandera’s followers.

However, fortune has smiled on us recently. In one of the Ukrainian archives a document was found with estimates of the number of rebels.

The document was carried in a field bag by the UPA commander in Volyn and Polesie, Dmitry Klyachkivsky. This man, better known under the pseudonym Klim Savur, died in a trap by the NKVD troops in February 1945. The security officers took the nondescript document from the bag, translated it into Russian and began using it in the fight against “banditry.”

At first glance, the notes are not impressive. In their slang, such source scientists call them “pieces of paper.”

Indeed, it’s not a meter-long encrypted note-grips (grips - secret note - “A”) or some well-drawn diagram of a rebel battle. The document is riddled with numerous corrections and crossing outs. Replete with marginalia. It was probably written hastily and schematically.

Notes found by NKVD officers on the murdered Dmitry Klyachkivsky - “Savur”

It is necessary to make a reservation: since the notes are filed in the archival file, when photocopying it was not possible to “capture” the entire text on the left.

Therefore, “behind the scenes” it turned out to be the most important thing - the pseudonyms of the UPA commanders, opposite which (in three vertical two-level columns from left to right) the number of their military units is indicated.

So it is better to trust the “Historical Truth” and familiarize yourself with this document in the “translation into human language” made by the author.

The first table concerns the commander of the UPA "Rudy" and his subordinate units:

The second table is the number of hundreds and soldiers of the Dubovoy commander:

Dubovoy fighters

The tables made on the basis of Savur-Klyachkivsky’s notes reveal to us the structure and strength of the UPA-North and UPA-South “in all their glory.”

True, there is not enough data on the UPA-West.

Everything is listed according to the pseudonyms of the commanders. As you know, there were 4 army groups in the UPA-North.

The table begins with the commander of the "Turov" group - "Rudy". The heads of smaller departments (those listed below) - “Nazar”, “Lysy”, “Lupchanka”, “Sosenko” and others - were subordinate to the bearer of this pseudo.

The following persons - "Aeneas" (he led the "Bogun" group) and "Vereshchaka" (commander of the "Tyutyunnik" group) - also with their soldiers.

And finally, at the end of the table, the top leadership of the UPA-South - “Nettle” with its subordinates is indicated.

The notes are valuable because they trace changes in the numbers of the UPA-North and UPA-South in three different periods of time.

The first is “during the transition of the front.” That is, we are talking about the Soviet-German front, which in the first two months of 1944 swept through Volyn from east to west. As soon as the fighting between the Germans and the “Soviet” subsided, the rebels began to regroup their forces to go to the Soviet rear.

The second is “until the time of the big action.” It's more complicated here. What did the UPA call a “major action”? In our opinion, these are the April events - either the Battle of Gurbi, or preparation for the Kholodnoyarsk uprising.

As in 1921, Ukrainian rebels hoped to raise a nationwide uprising in Soviet-controlled territories.

How did they prepare for it in UPA-North? In particular, before sending units to the epicenter, they were renamed in honor of various cities in Northern, Central and Eastern Ukraine.

The cryptonyms of the units of the “Turov” group (“Bogun”, “Ozero”, etc.) changed to “Chernigovsky”, “Poltavasky”, “Sumsky”. In the “Zagrava” group, the “Kotlovina” detachment began to be called “Khvastivsky”, the “im. Ostap" became "Baturinsky", the detachment "named after. Kolodzinsky" - "Korsunsky".

The military districts of the UPA-South were named according to the same principle - “Kholodny Yar”, “Uman”, “Vinnitsa”.

And finally, the third period of time. Everything is clear with him - “September 1944.”

And now, to make it easier to perceive the notes from Klyachkivsky’s field bag, let’s simplify them. If possible, we will replace the commanders' pseudonyms with their real names and surnames. Indeed, historical biography is developing well in Ukraine, so it is already quite possible to do this.

So, now the notes on the number of UPA-North and UPA-South look like this:

In fact, this document became a martyrology for the military elite: almost half of the people mentioned in it (14 out of 32) died in battle in 1944. Mostly they died during clashes with internal troops and NKVD agents, but there were also suicides, some of whom were executed by their own.

Porfiry Antonyuk-“Sosenko” paid with his head for negotiations with the enemies of the UPA. For the same reason, the Security Service almost took the life of Maxim Skorupsky, the legendary smoking “Max”. He managed to escape to Galicia.

Stepan Koval-“Rubashenko” also escaped from the esbists.

Most of the commanders were 25-35 year old natives of the Volyn or Rivne regions. We counted only six Galicians. Young people who had their whole lives ahead of them. Not a single one was over 40.

The simplest and most important thing remains - to “sum up” all the numerical data given in the notes. Consequently, it turns out that at the time of the transition of the Soviet-German front through Volyn and Polesie, there were 6,920 people in the UPA-North and UPA-South cells there, in April 1944 - 6,960, and in September of the same year (de facto UPA -Yug has already disbanded) there was a sharp decline - to 2,600 people.

Dmitry Klyachkivsky, (November 4, 1911, Zbarazh, now Ternopil region- February 12, 1945) - Colonel of the UPA (rank awarded posthumously), from May 13, 1943 to January 27, 1944 - commander UPA , head of the SB (security service in the UPA until the winter of 1943) after Roman Shukhevych headed the Main Team of the UPA - appointed commander of the UPA-North. Also known under pseudonyms Klim Savur, Ohrim, Bilash, Novel, Shchur and others.

Born into the family of a bank employee. He graduated from high school and the Faculty of Law of Lviv University. Served in the Polish army in 1932-1934. Worked in the retail chain "People's Trade" in the city. Stanislavov in 1934.
Member of the OUN. In 1937 Mr. was imprisoned in a Polish prison. In 1938 - member of the board of the Ukrainian nationalist sports organization "Falcon" in the city of Zbarazh, in 1939-1940. — regional conductor (leader) of the “Yunatstva” of the OUN in the Stanislav region.
After the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR revealed the plans of the OUN (b) to organize an uprising in Western Ukraine, he was arrested on September 10, 1940 in the town of Dolina. At the “trial of 59” in Lvov he was sentenced to death; on appeal, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In July 1941 when German troops approached, he escaped from Berdichev prison.
Headed the OUN (Bandera) organization in Lviv, regional conductor of the OUN PZUZ (Pivnichno-Zakhidni Ukrainian lands - according to the OUN classification - Volyn and Polesie) since January 1942 . Since 1943 - member of the Provod (Board) of the OUN (Bandera), organizer and second - after the elimination of the SB OUN (b) of the first commander of the UPA Vasil Ivakhov - commander UPA . In 1944, he was awarded the rank of UPA major and appointed regional commander of the UPA-North. Member of the Main Military Staff of the UPA.
Managed actions forextermination of the Polish population in Volyn.
On August 18, 1943, Klyachkovsky gave the order to disarm UNRA.
In 1944, D. Klyachkovsky gave the order to exterminate the ethnic Russians who were in the UPA detachments. At the end of 1944, an order was given to exterminate Ukrainians from the East - “swindlers” in the ranks of the OUN-UPA .
On April 2, 1944, Klyachkovsky, through the Abwehrkommando of Army Group Northern Ukraine, conveyed a proposal to coordinate the fight against Soviet troops and provide intelligence information. In his message, he asked to transfer to his troops 20 field and 10 anti-aircraft guns, 500 machine guns, 250 thousand cartridges, 10 thousand grenades, etc.
Klyachkivsky’s location was reported by the captured commander of the UPA-North group, Yu. Stelmashchuk (Rudym).
On February 12, 1945, an operational military group of the Klevan regional department of the NKGB and the 233rd brigade of the NKVD Internal Troops, while combing the forest near the Orzhevsky farms of the Klevan district in the Rivne region, found 3 people. When pursued, everyone refused to surrender and were destroyed. Klyachkivsky was mortally wounded by the senior group sergeant.

By order of the State Department of Water Resources he was posthumously awarded the rank of UPA colonel. And in 1952 he was awarded the highest award of the UPA-OUN (b) - the Golden Cross of Merit of the OUN.

However, the watchdogs of Ukraine for their fellow

On July 9, 1995, a monument to Klyachkovsky was opened in his homeland in the city of Zbarazh. Another monument was erected in Rivne on Sobornaya Street near house 16.

Ernesto Che Guevara liked to repeat that he learned the art of guerrilla warfare from the experience of Ukrainian rebels, UPA fighters.

This year marks the 90th anniversary of the birth of the founder of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and its first commander Dmitry Klyachkivsky - the legendary Klim Savur. Much has been written about the “commandant” of the forest army, and in a polar spirit. We will tell you about some unknown circumstances of his death: the fateful day - February 12...

"...Sentenced to death"

Undoubtedly, he was an extraordinary personality in the military-political history of Ukraine.

Klyachkivsky was born in Zbarazh in the Ternopil region, in the family of a wealthy bank employee. Graduated from the prestigious Faculty of Law of Lviv University. In 1932 - 1934 he gained military experience: he served as a senior rifleman in the Polish army. Until 1939 he worked in various cooperative institutions in Galicia. But perhaps Dmitry’s main passion in life was the Ukrainian youth “Rukh”: Klyachkivsky gained fame as a member of the board of the Zbarazh organization of the sports society “Sokol”, which was under the strong influence of the OUN underground. In 1937, he had to spend several months in prison, but the Poles were never able to prove his guilt.

The Sovietization of Western Ukraine makes Blondin (the pseudonym of Klyachkivsky in the Stanislav region of those times) an irreconcilable opponent of the new government.

In 1940, he headed the reference department of “Yunatstva” - the youth reserve of the OUN. Here, in the city of Dolina, he was arrested by NKVD officers on September 10 of the same year. The investigation failed to “split” him - he completely denied his affiliation with the OUN and did not betray anyone. Nevertheless, on January 18, 1941, the Lvov Regional Court sentenced Klyachkivsky to death, which was later commuted by the Supreme Court of the USSR to 10 years in prison. Taking advantage of the chaos of the first weeks of the war, the youth leader escaped from the Berdichev prison and soon became the regional guide of the OUN(B) in Lvov.

The year 1943 can be considered a “stellar” year for our hero. He met him as the head of the OUN Provod in the northwestern Ukrainian lands (Volyn and Polesie), as if created for partisan warfare. Already in the spring of 1943, armed formations controlled by the OUN(B) operated here, fighting the partisans of Kovpak, Saburov and Fedorov, and the Polish nationalist formations of the Home Army. A number of “forest commanders” organized armed uprisings against the “non-Maks”, preventing the theft of people into slavery and the robberies of Ukraine.

In April - May 1943, these units were already officially called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Up to five thousand Ukrainian policemen join them. Where voluntarily, and where forcibly in the UPA, units of the Front of the Ukrainian Revolution, the People's Revolutionary Army of Bulba-Borovets, Melnikov's OUN and the “Vilny Cossacks” were placed under arms. The UPA Head Team was created, headed by Klyachkivsky, who performed under the pseudonym Klim Savur.

Commander of the UPA

By decision of the Third Extraordinary Great Gathering (Congress) of the OUN in August 1943, Roman Shukhevych became the leader of the underground and its armed formations, although Savur remained the de facto leader of the UPA until November. This did not add warmth to their relationship...

During that period, Klyachkivsky’s military-organizational talent was fully revealed. The region was divided into military districts “Zagrava”, “Bogun”, “Turіv”, “Tyutyunnik”. The military headquarters of the UPA were formed on the model of combined arms: political, operational, intelligence departments, communications, and supply units. There was a clear system of formation from the district to the kuren, hundreds (company), chota (platoon) and swarm (squad). Commanders were trained by the Druzhinniki and Forest Devils schools.

Savur paid a lot of attention to intelligence and the activities of the Security Service, of which he was the chief. Opponents of the UPA invariably noted that its informants were omnipresent. By order of the commander of May 15, 1943, military courts and revolutionary tribunals were introduced (a UPA fighter was sentenced to death for 15 offenses).

The armament of the rebels is evidenced by the fact that in 1944-1945 alone, the Soviet side captured 49 guns, 502 mortars, 77 flamethrowers, over 6,800 machine guns, as well as several tanks and even a serviceable U-2 aircraft!

In fact, the areas controlled by the UPA (their area was up to 150 thousand square kilometers with a population of up to 15 million people) turned into peculiar republics with a national-patriotic regime.

We are far from idealizing Dmitry Klyachkivsky. The harsh conditions of uncompromising confrontation, the influence of the totalitarian ideology of “integral nationalism”, which the OUN itself abandoned at the mentioned congress, made Savur a cruel person, merciless towards the “enemies of the nation”. On his conscience is the escalation of the Ukrainian-Polish “Polessia Massacre” of 1943 - 1944, orders for the destruction of escaped Soviet prisoners of war, the initiation of physical purges in the UPA itself, wells filled with the corpses of villagers suspected of loyalty to the Soviets...

On the trail of "Shchur"

From the beginning of 1944, the UPA was divided along regional lines, and Savur became the commander of the most powerful UPA-North group. With the arrival of the Soviet army, a large-scale armed confrontation unfolds. The UPA’s capabilities were still sufficient to capture regional centers, but the balance of forces gradually changed not in its favor, especially since the rebels’ share of mobilized unfired recruits reached 60 percent.

To strengthen the army formations, the Sukhumi and Ordzhonikidze divisions of the Internal Troops, five brigades and a cavalry regiment, a tank battalion of the Dzerzhinsky division from Moscow, and armored trains were sent to Volyn. In March alone, the UPA-North lost 2,594 rebels killed, and its enemy lost 112 military personnel. Gradually, the tactics of action switched to small units, and the construction of underground shelters - bunkers - began widely.

The Soviet state security agencies, which opened a “hunt” for Klim Savur, conducted the operational-search event “Shchur” with a hint of the elusiveness of the rebel commander. Indeed, for a long time the NKGB did not know who was hiding under such a pseudonym. Only in February 1944 did an overseas source report this...

Chance helped a lot. At the end of January 1945, the task force of the Kamen-Kashira regional department of the NKGB in the village of Rudka-Chervitskaya, Volyn region, defeated the UPA militants. At the same time, the commander of the “Zavikhost” detachment of the UPA-North, Yuri Stelmashchuk (Rudoy), and a nurse (Eva), who was seriously ill with typhus, were captured. From captured documents and the testimony of Rudy, who was shot in July of the same year, the approximate area of ​​Savur’s hiding place was established - Orzhevsky farms in the Rivne region... As it turned out, his unit was covered by Vasily Pavlonyuk (Uzbek).

Soon, sources of the Klevan regional department of the NKGB of the Rivne region reported that a certain “bandit leader” with militants (up to 30 people) was hiding in a forest area near the village of Susk, Alexandrovsky district. There, on February 10-11, they carried out an operation during which they defeated the Uzbek militants and captured the printing house of the UPA General Headquarters. However, target No. 1 - Savur - was never “hit”.

The search was continued by the operational military group of the Klevan regional department and the 233rd brigade of the NKVD Internal Troops. The group was led by Senior Lieutenant Kh. While combing the forest northeast of the Orzhev farm on February 12, fresh footprints were discovered in the snow, and then the smoldering embers of a fire. Five kilometers later, a reconnaissance and search group under the command of Senior Sergeant D. met three armed strangers. A shootout ensued. Two rebels lay down, covering the retreat of the third, and were killed in an unequal battle. D. tried to capture the fugitive alive, but he responded to the offer to lay down his arms with fire from the police station. The sergeant raised his carbine...

The People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR, Colonel-General Vsevolod Merkulov, and the head of the republican party organization, Nikita Khrushchev, conveyed a special message: “... Among those killed, one of the leaders of the OUN-UPA, known in the OUN underground under the pseudonyms “Klima Savura” and “Okhrima,” was identified.

In 1952, Dmitry Klyachkivsky, by a resolution of the Ukrainian Head Free Rada, was awarded the Golden Cross of Merit of the OUN and posthumously promoted to colonel of the UPA...

The armament of the rebels is evidenced by the fact that in 1944-1945 alone, the Soviet side captured 49 guns, 502 mortars, 77 flamethrowers, over 6,800 machine guns, as well as several tanks and even... a serviceable U-2 aircraft

I came across something wonderful online.

Well, many people know the quality of the materials on the site “Legend of the Sprotyvu”, as well as the details of the life activities of the mentioned Yuri Stelmashchuk.

A professional OUN member who was trained at the Abwehr school along with the “Nightingales” and was abandoned on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in a group of saboteurs a few days before the War.
This is all clear, we wrote about it.

It's interesting to consider something else here. Namely, the “manliness” of this comrade and his role in the destruction (sic!) of the “creator of the UPA” D. Klyachkivsky - Klim Savur.

To begin with, help from the same site.

Klyachkivsky Dmitro, "Klim Savur"

A modern monument to him in Rivne.

And now about the main thing.

From the message on HF deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR T.A.Strokach to N.S.Khrushchev 02/13/1945
Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U
Comrade KHRUSHCHEV

Conducting a security-military operation to clear banditry from the northern regions of the Rivne and Volyn regions, on January 26, 1945, in the area of ​​the village of Yaino, Kamen-Kashirsky district, Volyn region, a unit of the 3rd battalion of the 169 joint venture of the NKVD internal troops under the command of deputy. The company commander, Senior Lieutenant Savinov, discovered a gang with which a battle ensued. As a result of the battle, 17 bandits were killed and one was captured. The latter turned out to be the commander of the joint UPA group "Zagrava and Turiv" and the first deputy of the regional conductor of the OUN "Rudym" - Yuri Aleksandrovich Stelmashchuk, born in 1920, a native of the village of Korshuv, Senkevichevsky district, Volyn region.

In 1939, being an illegal immigrant, he fled to Germany, from where he returned to Western Ukraine in 1941 at the beginning of the war and held a number of leadership positions in the OUN and UPA. At the time of his arrest, “Ruda” was seriously ill with typhus. In addition, he was wounded in battle, and therefore it was impossible to interrogate him.

“Rudoy” was first interrogated on February 8 this year. and gave detailed testimony about the north-western group of the UPA and the regional line of the OUN, and also named the location of the main command of the UPA, led by “Klim Savur”.

Here we will pause and give a fragment of that very interrogation of Yu. Stelmashchuk - “Rudy”.

The interrogation of this “client” was actually carried out personally by Timofey Amvrosievich Strokach, in the recent past the head of the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, and at the indicated time - deputy. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.

Timofey Amvrosievich Strokach

Stelmashchuk Yuri Alexandrovich, "Rudoy"

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

accused STELMASHCHUK Yuri Aleksandrovich

...
QUESTION: When was your last meeting with Klim SAVUR?

ANSWER: The last time I met with him was on November 30, 1944 in the Orzhevsky farms, Klevan district, Rivne region, where Klim SAVUR received me in connection with my confirmation as the first deputy of DUBOVOY and commander of the UPA group formation "ZAVIKHOST".
I spent almost 24 hours with Klim SAVUR. First, he took me to one hut, where he and I had dinner, and then we went to another hut and spent the night there in the attic. “Klim SAVUR” and I spent the entire next day together in this hut; in the evening I left the Orzhevsky farms, and “Klim SAVUR” remained there.

QUESTION: Where is Klim SAVUR located now?

ANSWER: Based on the fact that “Klim SAVUR” stipulated a meeting with me on January 30, 1945 in the Orzhevsky farms, Klevan district, Rivne region, I believe that to this day he and his personal guard, consisting of 2-3 good armed bandits, must be located in the specified villages, where he has a reliable support base.

1-1.5 km from “Klim SAVUR” there is always a SOP (“special purpose detachment”) covering it under the command of “UZBEK” consisting of 60 people armed with light machine guns, machine guns and rifles.
As far as I know, “Klim SAVUR” never hides in underground shelters, preferring the forest during the daytime, and safe houses at night, the owners of which are local residents loyal to him.

In particular, I believe that one of these apartments belongs to an elderly, prosperous peasant woman from the Orzhevsky farms, whose husband and son, as Klim SAVUR told me, were active participants in the UPA and died in 1943 in battles with the Germans.

In this house, as I have already shown, on November 30, 1944, I had dinner with “Klim SAVUR”.
I don’t know the last name or first name of this woman; she lives with her 16-year-old daughter and seventy-year-old mother-in-law. Her house is located in the western part of the Orzhevsky farms, opposite an abandoned stone warehouse, at a distance of 100-120 meters from it.

This two-room house is wooden, covered with thatch, and there is one window on the right side of the front door.

I remember well the decor of the room where we had dinner with “Klim SAVUR”: in the middle there is a table covered with a clean white tablecloth, on the left by the window there is a manual sewing machine, next to there is a pot of flowers, in the left corner of the room there is an ordinary wardrobe, on the right there is a metal bed, There are several icons and portraits of Taras SHEVCHENKO and Ivan FRANKO hanging on the walls.

I know the location of the indicated house well and can accurately indicate it.

The second hut, where I spent the night with Klim SAVUR, is located in the southern part of the Orzhevsky farms. This hut, both in appearance and in interior decoration, is much poorer than the hut where I dined with “Klim SAVUR”. Its owner is a woman, 30-32 years old, short, plump, dark brown-haired.

I can also indicate the location of this hut.

I personally read the protocol, wrote it down correctly from my words, and I sign for it.
Stelmashchuk

(The interrogation ended at 19:40)

INTERROGED - DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERIOR AFFAIRS OF THE USSR -
LIEUTENANT GENERAL
T. Strokach

DEPUTY CHIEF NEXT. DEPARTMENT OF UBB NKVD USSR -
CAPTAIN G.B.

Now let's continue the chronicle of events.

From the same message from T.A Strokach:

From the testimony of “Rudoy” it was clear that “Klim Savur”, starting in the fall of 1944, was in the Orzhev farmstead, Klevansky district, Rivne region, where “Rudoy” last reported to “Klim Savur” on November 30, 1944. At the same time, the subsequent meeting of “Rudy” with “Klim Savur” was determined for January 30 this year. on the same farms.

According to “Rudy”, “Klim Savur”, hiding in the farmsteads, was always with a group of no more than 3-5 people.

Based on the testimony of “Rudy,” I organized and carried out a security and military operation. In accordance with the operation plan, on the night of February 10 this year. In order to capture Klim Savur, the village of Orzhev and adjacent settlements were surrounded and subjected to a thorough search for three days by forces of 20 and 24 brigades of the NKVD internal troops.

During the operation on February 12 this year. in the forest, 2 kilometers west of the village of Orzhev, Klevan district, Rivne region, a detachment of the 20th brigade under the command of the chief of staff of the 233rd rifle battalion, senior lieutenant Khabibulin, discovered an armed group of 3 people, which, noticing the Red Army soldiers, opened fire and began to retreat. It was not possible to capture the retreating bandits alive, since they fired heavily from machine guns and killed one Red Army soldier.

Let us once again interrupt Timofey Amvrosievich’s message and indicate some details from the report of the direct participants:

“The first day of the operation ended with the destruction of the bandit group of the leader of “Uzbek” numbering 22 people, as it later turned out, the personal guard of “Klim Savur”. The second day also did not bring significant results, and the main goal of the operation was not achieved.

Continuing to persistently and scrupulously carry out searches 12.2, detachment 233 OSB under the command of the chief of staff of the battalion, senior lieutenant Khabibulin, discovered an extinguished fire in the forest, which caused Comrade Khabibulin to suspect that bandits might be hiding in this area.

The squad continued their search with even greater care. One trail was discovered, moving along which the detachment noticed the movement of unknown persons in the bush. Comrade Khabibulin decided to cordon off the bush, for this purpose he divided the detachment into three groups and set the task: to act with one group on the left, the other on the right, and with the third group Comrade Khabibulin decided to move straight to the discovered bush.

When approaching the bushes, the group was fired upon by machine gun fire, and after some time three unknown men were discovered who were trying to hide and were shooting back as they ran. As a result of the pursuit, all three were killed. As it later turned out, among the dead was the “Commander-in-Chief of the UPA” Klim Savur and with him two unknown persons. The dead were found with 3 machine guns, 5 magazines for machine guns, 2 pistols, 150 rounds of ammunition, a field bag with UPA documents and maps.

Thus, as a result of an organized, quick and unexpectedly carried out operation and persistent search, the “Commander-in-Chief of the UPA” Klim Savur was killed.”

And again the word of Comrade. Strokachu:

As a result of the battle, all three bandits were killed. With the corpses, 3 machine guns, 3 pistols, the Order of the Red Star, a guards badge and a field bag with operational documents of the OUN-UPA, as well as a photograph of “Klim Savur” were found.

Among the documents there is data on the size and presence of UPA gangs under the command of “Rudy”, “Dubovoy”, “Eney”, “Vereshchak” and a number of other important documents.

All three corpses were delivered to the city of Rivne. Based on the photograph captured in the documents, as well as the bandit leaders “Rudym” held in our custody and the former assistant of “Dubovoy” in the household department “Karym”, “Klim Savur” was accurately identified. The remaining two corpses have not been identified.

According to “Rudy” and “Kary”, “Klim Savur” has recently been a member of the Central Line of the OUN, the commander of the entire so-called UPA and the main conductor of the northeastern and northwestern regional wires of the OUN - NVRO.

In addition, during the operation, according to Rudoy, ​​two safe houses of Klim Savur were found in the Orzhev farmstead, the owners of which were arrested by us. OUN literature and photographs of various individuals, including leaders and members of the Central OUN of 1940, were confiscated from one of the apartments.

There, on the Orzhev farm, in an underground shelter, a completely serviceable printing press, 200 kilograms of type and 2 cans of paints were discovered and confiscated.

When cleaning the Orzhev farm during February 10-12 this year. 26 bandits killed, 79 captured, 181 detained as accomplices, 48 ​​evaders from conscription into the Red Army, 113 subject to filtering. 65 caches discovered and destroyed.

The following trophies were captured: light machine guns - 1, machine guns - 8, rifles - 21, pistols - 5, grenades - 15, cartridges - 2350, radios - 2.

We continue the operation to clean up the entire Klevan region. I'll send you the details by mail.

That's all.

This is how the Bandera leaders were destroyed, essentially, by the hands of their own “brothers.”

There is little left to add.

Destroyed Dmitry Klyachkivsky - "Klim Savur":

Destroyed him during the operation - Art. Sergeant Demidenko. By the way, a native of Donbass.

So, Donbass people, you have another reason to be proud!