It was here, more than 50 kilometers southwest of Vitebsk, on July 6, 1941, that more than two thousand combat vehicles of the USSR and the Third Reich fought to the death in a brutal, bloody battle. And this is more than twice the amount of equipment that was involved in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, where, according to the official Soviet version, 1,200 Soviet and German tanks and self-propelled artillery units fought (by the way, according to later updated data, their number did not exceed one thousand on both sides).
However, in any case, it turns out that the tank battle near Senno is truly unique in terms of the number of armored vehicles involved in the entire history of wars! However, unlike the Kursk Bulge, about which a great many books have been written and many films have been made, almost nothing was known about the battle in the Vitebsk region for a long time.
There is one simple explanation for this: if at Prokhorovka the Soviet troops won a victory, which became one of the turning points in the war, then in Belarus they suffered a crushing defeat and suffered huge losses.
By the beginning of July 1941, the situation at the front for the Soviet side was becoming critical. After Minsk was taken and the main forces of the Soviet Western Front were practically destroyed, the Wehrmacht believed that the road to Moscow was now open for them. In particular, on July 3, the Chief of the German General Staff, Colonel General Halder, wrote the following in his diary: “In general, we can already say that the task of defeating the main enemy forces in front of the Western Dvina and Dnieper has been completed”...
However, the general was hasty in his assessments - soon the Wehrmacht was in for an unpleasant surprise: on July 5, on the way to Vitebsk, the advanced German units encountered fierce resistance from Soviet troops and were stopped.
But the main “surprise” for the German troops was a completely unexpected enemy tank counter-attack in the direction of Lepel, which began early in the morning of July 6. The Soviet command assigned the two mechanized corps of the 20th Army of the Western Front the task of defeating enemy tank groups isolated from the main forces and stopping their advance on Vitebsk.
The most fierce battle in the counterattack took place near the small town of Senno, where thousands of engines roared, gun shots merged into one polyphonic chorus, and the burning armor was generously poured with human blood. By the end of the day, Soviet tank formations managed to completely capture this settlement. However, holding the city turned out to be difficult: the next day Senno changed hands three times, but by the end of the day it was still under the control of Soviet troops.
On July 8, the German side sent all its reserves in the area to storm the city. After bloody battles, Soviet troops had to leave Senno and retreat to the Vitebsk-Smolensk highway. Meanwhile, some of the Soviet tanks continued their attack on Lepel. Perhaps they would have been able to consolidate their success, but the enemy also managed to bypass the Soviet positions and capture Vitebsk on July 9. As a result, even before crossing the Dnieper, the Wehrmacht had a direct road to Smolensk, and then to Moscow. There was no further point in continuing the counterattack, and the commander of the 20th Army, Lieutenant General Kurochkin, ordered the attack on Lepel to be suspended.
The remnants of the Soviet units retreated under the cover of darkness, hiding behind forests, but many did not manage to escape from the encirclement. In addition, many armored vehicles ran out of fuel and ammunition.
It was here, according to the official version, that the most famous participant in the Battle of Senno, Stalin’s son Yakov Dzhugashvili, a junior officer of the 14th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 14th Tank Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps, was captured.
Causes of defeat
What are the reasons for the failure of the Soviet Lepel counterattack? According to historians and military experts, the main one is the poor preparation of the operation and the lack of time to obtain the necessary intelligence information. Communication was very poorly established, as a result of which the counterattack participants often had to act blindly.
Moreover, a significant part of the Soviet tank crews had to go into battle literally from the wheels. At the time the order to carry out a counterattack was received, many units were sent by rail to the Kiev Special Military District, and some trains had already managed to unload west of the capital of Ukraine.
In addition, in many respects, Soviet equipment was inferior to the armored vehicles of the Third Reich. Outdated tanks T-26, BT-5, BT-7 could not successfully compete with more modern German vehicles. Soviet engines were inferior to German ones in power, and 20-mm tank armor was penetrated by a projectile of any caliber. The situation was especially aggravated by outdated gasoline engines, because of which, according to participants in the events, Soviet tanks burned like candles. And several dozen T-34s and KB could not change anything here.
The Soviet troops also suffered significant losses from the active actions of German aviation. This is what Major General of Tank Forces Borzikov wrote in one of his reports: “The 5th and 7th mechanized corps are fighting well, the only bad thing is that their losses are very large. And the most serious ones come from aviation...”
Results and lessons from Senno
The failure of the tank breakthrough to Lepel led to the loss of combat effectiveness of two Soviet mechanized corps, which were sorely lacking during the subsequent Battle of Smolensk. In addition, as a result of this defeat, a huge gap was created on the Western Front, which German strike formations immediately tried to take advantage of. The losses were truly irreparable.
According to modern experts, during this counterattack the Soviet army lost over eight hundred tanks and about 5 thousand soldiers and officers. However, the opposite side also turned out to be pretty shabby.
Despite the fact that the Lepel counterattack did not achieve its goal, the Soviet tank units managed to temporarily push the enemy 40 kilometers towards Lepel and defend the occupied lines for several days, drawing on a significant enemy reserve. As a result, German troops lost a whole week, and the offensive pace of the Wehrmacht in the first days of the war slowed down greatly.
Another indirect result of the Lepel counterattack was the gradual restructuring of the Red Army. According to the Directive Letter of July 15, 1941, in addition to the decision to disband the clumsy mechanized corps, the question was raised of the need to transition to a system of small armies of five, maximum six divisions without corps departments and with the direct subordination of divisions to army commanders.
What lessons can be learned from the experience of those days? Probably, first of all, it is not always possible to immediately “beat the enemy on his territory,” as pre-war Soviet propaganda promised. Despite the fact that almost 70 years have passed since then, this topic does not lose relevance, especially at a time when NATO, “friendly” to us, is getting closer and closer to our borders... It is no coincidence that today the example of Senno is already widely considered in the preparation of modern Russian tankers and was included in a number of specialized manuals.
However, until now, even in the Belarusian State Museum of History, there is very little material regarding the Lepel counterattack: only a few photographs and a modest model of the tank are presented on a small stand.
In connection with the difficult situation that arose in early July 1941, the command of the Western Front took measures aimed at creating a stable defense along the banks of the Western Dvina in the Polotsk fortified area and preventing a breakthrough of enemy troops at Senno, Orsha, and between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers.
At this line, units of the 39th-47th enemy motorized corps, which were part of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups, operated. They did not have a continuous offensive front, which was typical for the initial period of the war.
To rectify the situation, troops of the 19th Army, under the command of I.S., were transferred to the line. Koneva. But railway transport was overloaded, and the concentration of formations of this army was delayed. It was necessary to forestall the breakthrough of the enemy's motorized corps into the Vitebsk area. In connection with the threat of such a breakthrough, the Military Council of the Western Front, with the consent of headquarters, made a decision - the troops of the 20th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno - Lepel. The total impact depth was planned to be more than 100 kilometers.
To defeat the Lepel group, which was assessed as the main one, the commander of the 21st Army was tasked with the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps to launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno with further development of the success of the 7th mechanized corps on Kubliki, and the 5th go - on Lepel.
On July 6 at 5 o'clock the 17th, 13th tank and a detachment of the 109th motorized rifle divisions set out in columns along designated routes.
At first, the Nazis offered no resistance, but the troops advanced too slowly. It was pouring rain, causing traffic jams on the muddy roads. As they approached the Masyuki and Oboltsy line, the tank divisions encountered organized resistance from the advanced units of the 47th Motorized Corps. With a swift attack, our troops shot down enemy detachments and by 20 o'clock, having advanced to a depth of 14-16 km, they reached the line: 17th Tank Division - Serkuti, Budino; 13th - Zamoshye, Oboltsy; detachment of the 109th motorized rifle division - 7 km west of Vyazmichi.
On the morning of July 7, the commanders of the tank divisions sent forward one advance detachment at a time, destroying individual pockets of resistance; they advanced to the Uzdorniki, Antopolye line, where they met organized defense.
On July 8, the corps troops resumed their offensive. The 17th Panzer Division, despite the strong impact of aviation, broke through the enemy defenses and successfully moved forward throughout the day. By 6 p.m., the 34th Tank Regiment was fighting at the Spechka-Dubnyaki line, covering the open flank of the corps from the north. The 33rd tank and 17th motorized rifle regiments, working closely together, fought at the turn of the station. Grazino, Topino.
At 16:00 on July 8, the 17th Tank Division of the Germans, with the support of aviation, from the Senno direction carried out a powerful counterattack on the right flank of the 17th Tank Division of our mechanized corps. The main blow fell on the 34th Tank Regiment, and the auxiliary blow fell on the right flank of the 33rd Tank Regiment. For three hours in the Dubnyaki area, Art. Grazino, Mal. Belitsa was in a fierce tank battle. Having suffered losses in tanks, the Nazis were forced to abandon the attack on Mal. Belitsa.
Advancing along the railway, the Germans cut off the rear echelons with fuel and ammunition in the area of Budno Ryas by the end of the day.
Thus, as a result of the attack undertaken by the enemy, the corps troops were put in danger of encirclement. During July 9 and 10, they fought defensive battles.
On July 10, by order of the headquarters of the 20th Army, the 5th Mechanized Corps was withdrawn from the battle and concentrated north of Orsha.
As a result of the battles on July 8-10 in the Tsotovo area, the 5th mechanized corps had losses: 13th tank division - 82 tanks, 11 vehicles, 3 tractors, 1 armored vehicle; 17th tank division - 44 tanks, 8 tractors, 20 vehicles; hull parts - 111 armored vehicles, of which 20% were stuck in swamps.
In total, losses in people and equipment amounted to 60%.
Complex and difficult battles were fought by units of the 7th Mechanized Corps.
On July 5, 1941, units of the 7th Mechanized Corps marched in two echelons in the direction of the river. Chernogostinki. The columns were continuously bombed and attacked by aircraft.
In addition to bombs and machine guns, the Germans dropped barrels of phosphorus liquid and fuel from planes onto our equipment. Our aircraft were not in the air. Therefore, large losses on our part largely explain the actions of enemy aircraft.
During the night from 07/05/41 to 07/06/41, all units took their starting position for the offensive in the forests and groves east of the river. Chernogostinka.
On the morning of July 6, 1941, the commander of the 27th TP, Major Romanovsky, with a group of heavy and light tanks, together with infantry and artillery, conducted combat reconnaissance of the enemy located along the western bank of the river. Chernogostinka. After an unsuccessful attack, the tanks retreated to their original position, the infantry remained on the eastern bank of the river. Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Kharaborkin died during this reconnaissance.
07/07/41 The 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment began an attack on the enemy’s front line in the morning and captured the opposite bank of the river, slowly moving west. At 6.30 the 27th and 28th tank regiments left their original positions to attack.
At the same time, at the artillery position, artillery base, and the deployed reserve of the corps commander, who was on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostinka, and the tanks of 27 TP broke into the depths of the defense, the howitzer artillery regiment of the division and units in the Ostrovno area was attacked by enemy dive bombers and fighters, which successively, in waves, bombarded the tanks and infantry, inflicting significant losses on them. Nevertheless, tanks 27 and 28 TP, which crossed the Chernogostinka River, penetrated 3-5 km deep, but were met from the groves by strong anti-tank fire and were forced to retreat to their original positions.
By 17.00 on July 7, 1941, the surviving tanks and units concentrated on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostinka. The enemy continuously bombed crossings and KV tanks. A group of tanks from the 27th TP, led by the regiment commander, Major Romanovsky, broke through the enemy’s anti-tank defenses and went into the depths of the defense. 27 TP brought 51 tanks into battle. In total, 126 tanks took part in the battle on July 7, 1941: 24 of them were KV-1, T-34. Over 50% of the tanks and more than 200 people were killed and wounded in the battle.
On July 8, the command of the 7th Corps learned that the enemy, having concentrated large forces north of Senno, had gone on the offensive. The German 17th Tank Division and an airborne force (numbering up to an infantry regiment) landed on July 5, armed with Oerlikon heavy machine guns, operated there.
It was necessary to contain and pin down the tank divisions in the Senno area. The 14th and 18th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive from north to south.
Bringing new mechanized units into battle, the enemy was increasing its forces in the Senno area every hour. The command of the 7th Corps made a decision: the corps units would fight to retreat to the area of the crossing of the Obolyanka River near the village of St. Rigi.
The battles near Senno on July 8 acquired the character of a so-called “puff pie” - several lines of attack and defense were formed, enemy units that were surrounded rushed to break through.
Fierce fighting in the Senno area revealed a superiority of forces on the enemy’s side. Our 14th Panzer Division was in danger of being surrounded. Using forest roads, units of the 14th Panzer Division made their way to the east through Kordany, Koroli and took up defense in the Liozno area.
As during the counterattack, in defensive battles units of the 7th and 5th mechanized corps showed high combat training, stamina, and the indomitable desire of the soldiers to defeat the enemy. The overall results of the battles indicated that the 5th and 7th mechanized corps basically completed the task assigned to them: for four days, conducting offensive and defensive battles, they wore down the enemy (causing him great damage), and significantly reduced the striking force of the 47th. The enemy's 1st and 39th motorized corps slowed down his advance to the defense line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper.
In tank battles, the advantage was on the enemy's side. This is explained by the fact that his aircraft reigned supreme in the air and our units suffered losses in tanks from bomb attacks.
I would also like to note that this was one of the largest tank battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 6, 1941, the 13th and 17th tank divisions brought 613 tanks (5MK) into battle, and the 14th and 18th tank divisions brought 801 tanks (7MK).
For the battles on the Chernogostinka River on July 7, 1941, 25 people were presented with government awards, including the battery commander, senior lieutenant Dzhugashvili Yakov Iosifovich (Stalin’s son).
The main disadvantages in organizing a counterattack in the Lepel and Sennen directions are:
Due to the fact that little time was allocated for preparing the battle, the headquarters of the 5th mechanized corps was not able to organize close cooperation with the 7th mechanized corps. In addition, the counterattack of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps was not supported by active actions of rifle formations of the armies, as well as aviation;
The logistical support for the corps' offensive was not organized clearly enough, with great interruptions, since the rear units and subunits at that time had not yet arrived at their destination;
The commanders and staffs of the divisions and regiments of the 5th and 7th MK had no practical experience in organizing and conducting combat;
The corps involved in the counterattack did not operate outside of tactical communication, independently in different directions;
The fighting indicates the high activity of our troops in the first month of the war. The combat experience of the initial period of the war in the use of mechanized corps was used by the Soviet command in the further struggle and made it possible to determine their role and place in the defensive and offensive operations of fronts and armies.
The largest tank battle in history...
On June 23, 1941, the largest tank battle in world history began in western Ukraine, which lasted a week. On the Brody-Rovno-Lutsk section, the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd mechanized corps and the German 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th tank divisions collided.
On June 22, in these 5 Soviet corps there were 33 KV-2, 136 KV-1, 48 T-35, 171 T-34, 2,415 T-26, OT-26, T-27, T-36, T-37 , BT-5, BT-7. Total - 2,803 Soviet tanks. That is, more than a quarter of the tank forces concentrated in the 5 western military districts of the USSR. It is also worth noting that the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps fought west of Brody - the most powerful of the Soviets - 892 tanks, of which 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. On June 24, the 8th Tank Division (325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-34s as of June 22) from its composition was reassigned to the 15th Mechanized Corps.
On June 22, the opposing 4 German tank divisions had 80 Pz-IV, 195 Pz-III (50mm), 89 Pz-III (37mm), 179 Pz-II, 42 BefPz. In total - 585 German tanks. This is about a sixth of all German tanks allocated to the entire Eastern Front. In addition, from June 28, the 9th German Tank Division entered this battle (as of June 22 - 20 Pz-IV, 60 Pz-III (50mm), 11 Pz-III (37mm), 32 Pz-II, 8 Pz- I, 12 Bef-Pz).
On June 23, the 10th and 37th tank divisions of the 15th mechanized corps under Major General Carpezo attacked the right flank of the German group with the goal of breaking the ring around the Soviet 124th Rifle Division in the Milyatin area. At the same time, the 212th motorized division of the corps had to be left in the rear due to a lack of trucks. Swampy terrain and Luftwaffe airstrikes slowed the advance of the armored divisions (the 19th Panzer Regiment was completely stuck in the swamp and did not take part in the fighting that day), and the German 197th Infantry Division managed to organize a strong anti-tank defense on its flank. By evening the German 11th Panzer Division arrived.
On June 24, the German 11th Panzer Division advanced towards Dubno, overcoming the resistance of the Soviet 37th Panzer Division and inflicting heavy losses on it. The Soviet 10th Tank Division, defending and counterattacking, was stopped near Lopatin by German infantry defenses. On the same day, the 8th Mechanized Corps was sent to the Brody area. According to the recollections of the corps commander, Lieutenant General Ryabyshev, up to half of the light tanks were lost along the way (i.e., about 300 BT).
On June 25, the German 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions took Lutsk and began advancing towards Rivne. They encountered units of the 9th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the badly damaged 22nd Mechanized Corps took up defensive positions near Lutsk along with the 27th Rifle Corps. The 20th, 35th, 40th, 43rd tank divisions of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps arrived in the Rivne area. They were supposed to attack the German 11th Panzer Division. From another direction, the same division was to be attacked by the 12th and 34th tank divisions of the 8th mechanized corps.
On June 26, the Soviet counteroffensive began. The actions of the mechanized corps were not coordinated, and not all units of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps managed to arrive at the site of the fighting. Only tank units took part in the battle, with little support from motorized rifles. They managed to cut the Lutsk-Rivne road, and units of the 43rd Panzer Division took Dubno, but only after the bulk of the German 11th Panzer Division had left the city, heading east.
The Germans, sensing a threat, deployed the 13th Panzer Division south of Lutsk, contrary to the original plan to move east. In addition, the Germans sent the 75th, 111th, 299th Infantry Divisions to clear the communications of the 11th Panzer Division.
The 15th mechanized corps went to join the 8th mechanized corps. Meanwhile, the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps ordered the 34th Panzer Division and the advance detachment of the 12th Panzer Division to cut the highway along which the German 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were supplied. And from the direction of Lvov, the 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps went east to join in the counterattack.
On June 27, the offensive of the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and the 19th mechanized corps of Feklenko began to slow down. Their advanced units were almost destroyed, the remaining units were forced to retreat. The remnants of the advanced units of the mechanized corps were cut off at a distance of about 10 kilometers. The German 13th Panzer Division was sent to their final destruction, which flanked them and then turned east towards Rivne.
The German 13th Panzer Division reached the rear of the remnants of four Soviet tank divisions, and over the next two days these Soviet units moved east after the German division. At the same time, the German 11th Panzer Division captured the main crossing in the Ostrog area, and the Soviet command was forced to gather all possible (but small) reserves to block the German 13th and 11th Panzer Divisions.
On the southern flank of the German group, the Soviet offensive developed somewhat more successfully. There the 12th and 34th tank, 7th motorized divisions of the 8th mechanized corps and the 14th cavalry division were assembled for the attack. The 8th Tank Division from the 4th Mechanized Corps finally arrived to help the 10th Tank Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps. However, only about half of the original number of tanks remained in these units (about 800 tanks).
The Soviet 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions advanced approximately 5 kilometers, but were unable to penetrate the defenses of the German 111th Infantry Division. The Germans then moved forward the 13th Panzer Division, followed by the 111th Infantry Division. They were able to break through a corridor between the 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which operated north of Dubno, and the 8th mechanized corps, which attacked south of Dubno. The Soviet 7th Motorized Division was attacked from the rear by the German 16th Panzer Division, and the German 75th Infantry Division struck the Soviet 12th Panzer Division, cutting off its main units from the forward detachments.
On June 28, the German 13th Panzer Division reached the Rovno area, but it had no infantry support as the Germans threw infantry into the Dubno area. The 9th and 22nd mechanized corps were able to move away from Dubno and take up defensive positions north and southeast of Lutsk. This created a “balcony” that delayed the German Army Group South on its way to Kyiv. It is believed that as a result of this, Hitler decided to change the strategic decision and send additional forces to the south, removing them from the Moscow direction.
On June 28, elements of the Soviet 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions fought west of Dubno, but the main tank units tried to withdraw.
Meanwhile, the 5th Mechanized Corps arrived in the Ostrog area (as of June 22 - 1070 tanks, without KV and T-34), which managed to stop the advance of the German 11th Panzer Division. (According to other sources, only the 109th motorized division and the tank regiment of the 5th mechanized corps fought near Ostrog). On the same day, the defense south of Brody was strengthened by units of the Soviet 37th Rifle Corps. But the Germans also sent the 9th Panzer Division to the left flank of the Soviet defense (in the Lvov area). This maneuver completely destroyed the left flank of the Soviet defense.
By this time, Soviet tanks had almost no ammunition and fuel left.
Difficulties escalated into disaster on June 29. In the morning, the German 13th Panzer Division advanced east of Rovno, while Soviet troops withdrew north and south of the city, paralleling the German movement. Soviet tanks were increasingly left without fuel, and German infantry destroyed the remnants of the Soviet 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions.
On June 30, the German 9th Panzer Division attacked the remnants of the Soviet 3rd Cavalry Division. It then cut off the Soviet 8th and 10th Panzer Divisions, completing their encirclement. By this time, the commander of the Soviet 6th Army ordered all his units to withdraw to positions east of Lvov. And at that time the Germans were gathering units of the 13th and 14th tank divisions south of Lutsk in order to create a fist for a strike in the direction of Zhitomir and Berdichev.
By July 1, the Soviet mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. About 10% of the tanks remained in the 22nd, 10-15% in the 8th and 15th, and about 30% in the 9th and 19th. The 4th Mechanized Corps under the command of General A.A. Vlasov found itself in a slightly better position - it managed to withdraw with about 40% of its tanks.
However, compared to other Soviet fronts, the South-Western was able to inflict significant damage on the Germans with its mechanized units.
In connection with the difficult situation that arose in early July 1941, the command of the Western Front took measures aimed at creating a stable defense along the banks of the Western Dvina in the Polotsk fortified area and preventing a breakthrough of enemy troops at Senno, Orsha, and between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers.
At this line, units of the 39th and 47th enemy motorized corps, which were part of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups, operated. They did not have a continuous offensive front, which was typical for the initial period of the war.
To rectify the situation, troops of the 19th Army, under the command of I.S., were transferred to the line. Koneva. But railway transport was overloaded, and the concentration of formations of this army was delayed. It was necessary to forestall the breakthrough of the enemy's motorized corps into the Vitebsk area. In connection with the threat of such a breakthrough, the Military Council of the Western Front, with the consent of headquarters, made a decision - the troops of the 20th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno - Lepel. The total impact depth was planned to be more than 100 kilometers.
To defeat the Lepel group, which was assessed as the main one, the commander of the 21st Army was tasked with the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps to launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno with further development of the success of the 7th mechanized corps on Kubliki, and the 5th on Lepel .
On July 6 at 5 o'clock the 17th, 13th tank and a detachment of the 109th motorized rifle divisions set out in columns along designated routes.
At first, the Nazis offered no resistance, but the troops advanced too slowly. It was pouring rain, causing traffic jams on the muddy roads. As they approached the Masyuki and Oboltsy line, the tank divisions encountered organized resistance from the advanced units of the 47th Motorized Corps. With a swift attack, our troops shot down enemy detachments and by 20 o'clock, having advanced to a depth of 14-16 km, they reached the line: 17th Tank Division - Serkuti, Budino; 13th - Zamoshye, Oboltsy; detachment of the 109th motorized rifle division - 7 km west of Vyazmichi.
On the morning of July 7, the commanders of the tank divisions sent forward one advance detachment at a time, destroying individual pockets of resistance; they advanced to the Uzdorniki, Antopolye line, where they encountered organized defense.
On July 8, the corps troops resumed their offensive. The 17th Panzer Division, despite heavy air pressure, broke through the enemy defenses and successfully advanced throughout the day. By 6 p.m., the 34th Tank Regiment was fighting at the Spechka-Dubnyaki line, covering the open flank of the corps from the north. The 33rd tank and 17th motorized rifle regiments, working closely together, fought at the turn of the station. Grazino, Topino.
At 16:00 on July 8, the 17th Tank Division of the Germans, with the support of aviation, from the Senno direction carried out a powerful counterattack on the right flank of the 17th Tank Division of our mechanized corps. The main blow fell on the 34th Tank Regiment, the auxiliary one - on the right flank of the 33rd Tank Regiment. For three hours in the Dubnyaki area, Art. Grazino, Mal. There was a fierce tank battle in Belitsa. Having suffered losses in tanks, the Nazis were forced to abandon the attack on Mal. Belitsa.
Advancing along the railway, by the end of the day in the Budno Ryasno area the Germans cut off the rear echelons with fuel and ammunition.
Thus, as a result of the attack undertaken by the enemy, the corps troops were put in danger of encirclement. During July 9 and 10 they fought defensive battles.
On July 10, the 5th Mechanized Corps, by order of the headquarters of the 20th Army, was withdrawn from the battle and concentrated north of Orsha.
As a result of the battles on July 8-10 in the Tsotovo area, the 5th mechanized corps had losses: 13th tank division - 82 tanks, 11 vehicles, 3 tractors, 1 armored vehicle; 17th tank division - 44 tanks, 8 tractors, 20 vehicles; hull parts - 111 armored vehicles, of which 20% were stuck in swamps.
In total, losses in people and equipment amounted to 60%.
Complex and difficult battles were fought by units of the 7th Mechanized Corps.
On July 5, 1941, units of the 7th Mechanized Corps marched in two echelons in the direction of the river. Chernogostinki. The columns were continuously bombed and attacked by aircraft.
In addition to bombs and machine guns, the Germans dropped barrels of phosphorus liquid and fuel from planes onto our equipment. Our aircraft were not in the air. Therefore, large losses on our part largely explain the actions of enemy aircraft.
During the night from 07/05/41 to 07/06/41, all units took their starting position for the offensive in the forests and groves east of the river. Chernogostinka.
On the morning of July 6, 1941, the commander of the 27th TP, Major Romanovsky, with a group of heavy and light tanks, together with infantry and artillery, conducted combat reconnaissance of the enemy located along the western bank of the river. Chernogostinka. After an unsuccessful attack, the tanks retreated to their original position, the infantry remained on the eastern bank of the river. Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Kharaborkin died during this reconnaissance.
07/07/41 The 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment began an attack on the enemy’s front line in the morning and captured the opposite bank of the river, slowly moving west. At 6.30 the 27th and 28th tank regiments left their original positions to attack.
At the same time, at the artillery position, artillery base, and the deployed reserve of the corps commander, who was on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostinka, and the tanks of 27 TP broke into the depths of the defense, the howitzer artillery regiment of the division and units in the Ostrovno area was attacked by enemy dive bombers and fighters, which successively, in waves, bombarded the tanks and infantry, inflicting significant losses on them. Nevertheless, tanks 27 and 28 TP, which crossed the Chernogostinka River, penetrated 3-5 km deep, but were met from the groves by strong anti-tank fire and were forced to retreat to their original positions.
By 17.00 on July 7, 1941, the surviving tanks and units concentrated on the eastern bank of the river. Chernogostinka. The enemy continuously bombed crossings and KV tanks. A group of tanks from the 27th TP, led by the regiment commander, Major Romanovsky, broke through the enemy’s anti-tank defenses and went into the depths of the defense. 27 TP brought 51 tanks into battle. In total, 126 tanks took part in the battle on July 7, 1941: 24 of them were KV-1, T-34. Over 50% of the tanks and more than 200 people were killed and wounded in the battle.
On July 8, the command of the 7th Corps learned that the enemy, having concentrated large forces north of Senno, had gone on the offensive. The German 17th Tank Division and an airborne force (numbering up to an infantry regiment) landed on July 5, armed with Oerlikon heavy machine guns, operated there.
It was necessary to contain and pin down the tank divisions in the Senno area. The 14th and 18th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive from north to south.
Bringing new mechanized units into battle, the enemy was increasing its forces in the Senno area every hour. The command of the 7th Corps made a decision: the corps units would fight to retreat to the area of the crossing of the Obolyanka River near the village of Strigi.
The battles near Senno on July 8 took on the character of a so-called “layer cake” - several lines of attack and defense were formed, enemy units that were surrounded rushed to break through.
Fierce fighting in the Senno area revealed the superiority of forces on the enemy side. Our 14th Panzer Division was in danger of being surrounded. Using forest roads, units of the 14th Panzer Division made their way to the east through Kordany, Koroli and took up defense in the Liozno area.
As during the counterattack, in defensive battles units of the 7th and 5th mechanized corps showed high combat training, stamina, and the indomitable desire of the soldiers to defeat the enemy. The overall results of the battles indicated that the 5th and 7th mechanized corps basically completed the task assigned to them: for four days, conducting offensive and defensive battles, they exhausted the enemy (inflicting great damage on him), noticeably reduced the striking force of the 47th and The enemy's 39th motorized corps slowed down its advance to the defense line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper.
In tank battles, the advantage was on the enemy's side. This is explained by the fact that his aircraft reigned supreme in the air and our units suffered losses in tanks from bomb attacks.
I would also like to note that this was one of the largest tank battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 6, 1941, the 13th and 17th tank divisions brought 613 tanks (5MK) into battle, and the 14th and 18th tank divisions brought 801 tanks (7 MK).
For the battles on the Chernogostinka River on July 7, 1941, 25 people were nominated for government awards, including the battery commander, senior lieutenant Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin’s son).
The main disadvantages in organizing a counterattack in the Lepel and Sennen directions are:
Due to the fact that little time was allocated for preparing the battle, the headquarters of the 5th mechanized corps was not able to organize close cooperation with the 7th mechanized corps. In addition, the counterattack of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps was not supported by active actions of rifle formations of the armies, as well as aviation;
The logistical support for the corps' offensive was not organized clearly enough, with great interruptions, since the rear units and subunits at that time had not yet arrived at their destination;
The commanders and staffs of the divisions and regiments of the 5th and 7th MK had no practical experience in organizing and conducting combat;
The corps involved in the counterattack did not operate outside of tactical communication, independently in different directions;
The fighting indicates the high activity of our troops in the first month of the war. The combat experience of the initial period of the war in the use of mechanized corps was used by the Soviet command in the further struggle and made it possible to determine their role and place in the defensive and offensive operations of fronts and armies.
German tank Pz.Kpfw. II from the 17th TD, destroyed during the battles near Senno.
It was here, more than 50 kilometers southwest of Vitebsk, on July 6, 1941, that more than two thousand combat vehicles of the USSR and the Third Reich fought to the death in a brutal, bloody battle. And this is more than twice the amount of equipment that was involved in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, where, according to the official Soviet version, 1,200 Soviet and German tanks and self-propelled artillery units fought (by the way, according to later updated data, their number did not exceed one thousand on both sides).
However, in any case, it turns out that the tank battle near Senno is truly unique in terms of the number of armored vehicles involved in the entire history of wars! However, unlike the Kursk Bulge, about which a great many books have been written and many films have been made, almost nothing was known about the battle in the Vitebsk region for a long time.
There is one simple explanation for this: if at Prokhorovka the Soviet troops won a victory, which became one of the turning points in the war, then in Belarus they suffered a crushing defeat and suffered huge losses.
By the beginning of July 1941, the situation at the front for the Soviet side was becoming critical. After Minsk was taken and the main forces of the Soviet Western Front were practically destroyed, the Wehrmacht believed that the road to Moscow was now open for them. In particular, on July 3, the Chief of the German General Staff, Colonel General Halder, wrote the following in his diary: “In general, we can already say that the task of defeating the main enemy forces in front of the Western Dvina and Dnieper has been completed”...
However, the general was hasty in his assessments - soon the Wehrmacht was in for an unpleasant surprise: on July 5, on the way to Vitebsk, the advanced German units encountered fierce resistance from Soviet troops and were stopped.
But the main “surprise” for the German troops was a completely unexpected enemy tank counter-attack in the direction of Lepel, which began early in the morning of July 6. The Soviet command assigned the two mechanized corps of the 20th Army of the Western Front the task of defeating enemy tank groups isolated from the main forces and stopping their advance on Vitebsk.
The most fierce battle in the counterattack took place near the small town of Senno, where thousands of engines roared, gun shots merged into one polyphonic chorus, and the burning armor was generously poured with human blood. By the end of the day, Soviet tank formations managed to completely capture this settlement. However, holding the city turned out to be difficult: the next day Senno changed hands three times, but by the end of the day it was still under the control of Soviet troops.
On July 8, the German side sent all its reserves in the area to storm the city. After bloody battles, Soviet troops had to leave Senno and retreat to the Vitebsk-Smolensk highway. Meanwhile, some of the Soviet tanks continued their attack on Lepel. Perhaps they would have been able to consolidate their success, but the enemy also managed to bypass the Soviet positions and capture Vitebsk on July 9. As a result, even before crossing the Dnieper, the Wehrmacht had a direct road to Smolensk, and then to Moscow. There was no further point in continuing the counterattack, and the commander of the 20th Army, Lieutenant General Kurochkin, ordered the attack on Lepel to be suspended.
The remnants of the Soviet units retreated under the cover of darkness, hiding behind forests, but many did not manage to escape from the encirclement. In addition, many armored vehicles ran out of fuel and ammunition.
It was here, according to the official version, that the most famous participant in the Battle of Senno, Stalin’s son Yakov Dzhugashvili, a junior officer of the 14th Howitzer Artillery Regiment of the 14th Tank Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps, was captured.
Causes of defeat
What are the reasons for the failure of the Soviet Lepel counterattack? According to historians and military experts, the main one is the poor preparation of the operation and the lack of time to obtain the necessary intelligence information. Communication was very poorly established, as a result of which the counterattack participants often had to act blindly.
Moreover, a significant part of the Soviet tank crews had to go into battle literally from the wheels. At the time the order to carry out a counterattack was received, many units were sent by rail to the Kiev Special Military District, and some trains had already managed to unload west of the capital of Ukraine.
In addition, in many respects, Soviet equipment was inferior to the armored vehicles of the Third Reich. Outdated tanks T-26, BT-5, BT-7 could not successfully compete with more modern German vehicles. Soviet engines were inferior to German ones in power, and 20-mm tank armor was penetrated by a projectile of any caliber. The situation was especially aggravated by outdated gasoline engines, because of which, according to participants in the events, Soviet tanks burned like candles. And several dozen T-34s and KB could not change anything here.
The Soviet troops also suffered significant losses from the active actions of German aviation. This is what Major General of Tank Forces Borzikov wrote in one of his reports: “The 5th and 7th mechanized corps are fighting well, the only bad thing is that their losses are very large. And the most serious ones come from aviation...”
Results and lessons from Senno
The failure of the tank breakthrough to Lepel led to the loss of combat effectiveness of two Soviet mechanized corps, which were sorely lacking during the subsequent Battle of Smolensk. In addition, as a result of this defeat, a huge gap was created on the Western Front, which German strike formations immediately tried to take advantage of. The losses were truly irreparable.
According to modern experts, during this counterattack the Soviet army lost over eight hundred tanks and about 5 thousand soldiers and officers. However, the opposite side also turned out to be pretty shabby.
Despite the fact that the Lepel counterattack did not achieve its goal, the Soviet tank units managed to temporarily push the enemy 40 kilometers towards Lepel and defend the occupied lines for several days, drawing on a significant enemy reserve. As a result, German troops lost a whole week, and the offensive pace of the Wehrmacht in the first days of the war slowed down greatly.
Another indirect result of the Lepel counterattack was the gradual restructuring of the Red Army. According to the Directive Letter of July 15, 1941, in addition to the decision to disband the clumsy mechanized corps, the question was raised of the need to transition to a system of small armies of five, maximum six divisions without corps departments and with the direct subordination of divisions to army commanders.
What lessons can be learned from the experience of those days? Probably, first of all, it is not always possible to immediately “beat the enemy on his territory,” as pre-war Soviet propaganda promised. Despite the fact that almost 70 years have passed since then, this topic does not lose relevance, especially at a time when NATO, “friendly” to us, is getting closer and closer to our borders... It is no coincidence that today the example of Senno is already widely considered in the preparation of modern Russian tankers and was included in a number of specialized manuals.
However, until now, even in the Belarusian State Museum of History, there is very little material regarding the Lepel counterattack: only a few photographs and a modest model of the tank are presented on a small stand.
Tanks Pz.Kpfw. II Ausf. C. 17th TD of the Wehrmacht destroyed during the fighting in the Senno area
Soviet tanks T-34 (to the left has serial number 723-11, commander Lieutenant Bokovikov, right number 97-767, tank commander Sergeant Lyubar) and BT-7, stuck on July 7, 1941 while fording the Chernogostnitsa river near Vitebsk during participation in the counterattack near Senno and Lepel.
Tank BT-7, overturned by an explosion of an aerial bomb. Western Front, 5th MK, Senno area, July 1941
Soviet tanks T-34 and BT-7, stuck on July 7, 1941 while fording the river. Chernogostnitsa near Vitebsk during participation in the counterattack near Senno and Lepel. Vehicles from the 27th Tank Division of the 14th Tank Division of the 7th MK of the 20th Army of the Western Front.
two KV 14 td 7 mk and Pz were blown up by mines on July 6.07. 2 - flamengo - 101 bt, near the bridge over the Chernogostitsy river
tank KV-2 14td 7 mk participated in the defense of Vitebsk, knocking out 10 tanks and crushing several guns - July 1941
Germans inspect stuck tanks after the attack - Tolochino - July 1941
Pz-IV, Western Front, July, Senno area.
The tank was installed in the town of Senno, Vitebsk region. It was here that the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place. (about 2 thousand tanks)