In the plans of the German command, the city of Kalinin (now my city of Tver) was given importance as a large industrial and transport hub, which was planned to be used for a further attack on Moscow, Leningrad and the northeast of the European part of the USSR.
The enemy came close to the city on October 13, 1941. Residents of the city of Kalinin remembered this day with the roar of shells, exploding bombs, and the flames of fire. “Proletarka”, “Vagzhanovka”, and the Carriage Building Plant were on fire. Enemy tanks broke through in the Migalovo area.
The city was defended by units of the fifth and two hundred and fifty-sixth rifle divisions, schools for junior lieutenants and fighter battalions. The enemy threw 15 divisions and a third tank group here. The forces were unequal, and on October 14 the enemy managed to capture the city.

The northern part of Kalinin and Zatverechye remained under the control of the Red Army. The fighting in the city did not stop for another three days. On October 17, the city completely came under German control.


With the beginning of the occupation, a local administration was formed, with the help of the German authorities, and the Nazi intelligence services and punitive authorities were active. On the Soviet side, agents and stations and an anti-fascist underground operated in Kalinin. Throughout the entire period of occupation, fighting took place in Kalinin and in its immediate vicinity; the city itself was under martial law. Due to the importance of the operational area, the Kalinin Front was formed on October 19, 1941, initially consisting of the 22nd, 29th, 30th, and a few days later the 31st armies. Colonel General I.S. Konev was appointed commander of the front. At the end of October, the front in the Kalinin area stabilized.

On December 5, 1941, the troops of the Kalinin Front went on the offensive.
This was one of those offensives that shattered the myth of the invincibility of Hitler's army. The main role in the liberation of Kalinin was assigned to the 29th and 31st armies. Advancing from different sides, they were supposed to unite in the village of Negotino.
The enemies did not expect such an onslaught. Hastily leaving their positions, abandoning the wounded, the enemies retreated. After a 45-minute artillery barrage on the morning of December 16, the assault on the city began. By 3 p.m. Kalinin was completely cleared of fascist occupiers.

On November 15, 1941, a new stage of the attack of fascist troops on Moscow began. A large German group struck the weakened 30th Army, and by the end of November 17, its troops were divided into three groups: the 5th Infantry Division retreated beyond the Volga, and German troops reached the Volga Reservoir. One of the most tragic and critical moments in the defense of Moscow came. By decision of the Headquarters, the 30th Army was transferred to the Western Front, and the center of gravity of the struggle moved to its defense zone. At the end of November, the troops of the Kalinin Front launched a series of scattered attacks with small forces in separate directions, which did not provide significant assistance to the Western Front.


During the Kalinin defensive operation, the enemy's attempts to make a breakthrough between the Western and Northwestern fronts and the plans of the German command to deeply envelop Moscow from the north were thwarted. Up to 35 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. The total losses of the Kalinin Front amounted to over 50 thousand people.

Soviet troops managed to stop the further development of the Wehrmacht offensive, and repeated attempts were made to liberate the city.
This is how the liberators saw the city.






The city is largely destroyed, half wounded, but the joy of the first days, when the Red Army returned to the city, is clearly captured on the faces of the people, and the joy sounds in the raised voices of the people, is reflected in the free movements, in the lively readiness to tell, help, explain. On fences and shop windows, touching announcements from the first days have been preserved, when Proletarskaya Pravda had not yet resumed - this newspaper, the brainchild of Kalinin workers, is being published again. These advertisements on buildings and storefronts can be read back to back, like a poem of restoration. They are handwritten in ink, written by Soviet people who took the initiative to rebuild the city. The Voroshilov weaving factory asks all workers, workers, craftsmen to register and announces the hiring of labor. “The health department has resumed its work and is in need of construction workers, roofers, glaziers, and craftsmen.” School number such-and-such “requests all students and teachers to appear on such-and-such a date.” “Professors, teachers and students of the pedagogical institute are asked to register.” Dozens and dozens of advertisements from institutions, enterprises, schools, cooperative artels. Now many of these organizations are already operational.


December 16 is a great day not only for my city, but for the whole country. It was on this day in 1941 that Kalinin was liberated from the yoke of the Nazi invaders. It was this military operation that became one of the first victories of Soviet soldiers on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

On November 4, 2010, the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev signed decrees conferring the title “City of Military Glory” on Vladivostok, Tikhvin and Tver. Three cities were awarded this title for the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the city’s defenders in the struggle for freedom and independence of the Fatherland.

Every centimeter of the land of my Tver contains the memory of battles, heroism, and deaths. And we must remember this. Remember and honor the feat of our ancestors. And the title “City of Military Glory” obliges us to honor this feat doubly.

The clouds over Tver lay very low.
Hundreds of tombstones, stones, obelisks
Reminds me of bloody battles

Somewhere the weeping willows are sad,
Laying their branches on the graves.
There is a quiet noise about the heroes of the oak forest.
Tver is a city of military glory!
War's unhealed wounds ache.
There are few veteran fighters left,
After all, we won that bloody battle.
Tver is a city of military glory!
A fire will break out on the Avenue of Heroes.
How we sometimes miss our grandfathers,
The hands of their loved ones, hot, rough.
Tver is a city of military glory!
The fighters fought until their last breath.
Difficult time, period, era.
Finish to the brown lava flow!
Tver is a city of military glory!
In the evening it’s loud, anxious and long
The ringing of bells flows over the Volga!
In memory of our brave defenders!

Tver is a city of military glory!

My city - my love and pain, my city, rising above the Volga. My city...You are infinitely dear to me and familiar to every street, to every house. I love your streets. My whole life has been spent here. Everywhere and always you are in my heart.
Your fate was difficult and difficult. How many difficult trials have befallen you, how many lives of your citizens have you paid for your right and happiness to be a Great City on the Great Russian River!

On December 16, 1970, in the center of Tver, where the Tmaka River merges with the Volga, the Obelisk of Victory was opened. It shot up 45 meters as a symbol of the sacred memory of those who gave their lives for the Motherland, for our happiness. Day and night the Eternal Flame burns in a niche of the granite wall.

Through the pages of the Pravda newspaper, Alexander Ognev, front-line soldier, professor, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation
2011-11-25 18:40

Falsification of history is an attempt to brazenly replace Russia itself. Anti-Sovietists chose the history of the heroic feat of the Soviet people, who liberated the world from German fascism, as one of the main objects of falsification. It is clear that sincere patriots do not accept this game of thimble-makers. Therefore, Pravda readers warmly approved the article published by the newspaper on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War by front-line soldier, Doctor of Philology, honorary professor of Tver State University Alexander Ognev and strongly recommended that the newspaper continue publishing his exposures of history falsifiers. Fulfilling the wishes of readers, the editorial board of Pravda decided to publish chapters of the study by Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation A.V. Ognev in the Friday issues of the newspaper.

Strategic outpost

The German command attached special importance to the region of the city of Kalinin (present-day Tver). Back in the second half of July 1941, it ordered (“Top secret! For command only!”) Army Group Center to allocate the 3rd Tank Group “with the task of advancing in the direction of Kalinin, cutting off communications connecting Moscow and Leningrad...” September 16 In 1941, the directive from the command of Army Group Center on the preparation of Operation Typhoon stated: “9A must use all opportunities to also break through the wooded area in front of the northern flank of the army and advance troops in the direction of Rzhev.” The order to continue the operation “in the direction of Moscow” dated October 7, 1941 set the task for the 9th Army, together with the 3rd Tank Group, to reach the Gzhatsk-Sychevka line in order to subsequently advance on Kalinin and Rzhev.

The headquarters of the German Army Group on October 8 stated: “The enemy has no large forces at his disposal that he could oppose to the further advance of the army group towards Moscow... For the immediate defense of Moscow, according to the testimony of prisoners of war, the Russians have divisions of the people’s militia, which, however, are partially have already been brought into battle, and are also among the surrounded troops.” Such an underestimated assessment of the condition of the Soviet troops contributed to the German command’s decision to turn significant forces in the direction of Kalinin.

Halder wrote in his diary on October 9, 1941: “The 9th Army is concentrating forces on the northern flank to attack the Rzhev region... A telephone conversation with von Bock... I asked to strengthen the left flank of the army group and direct it to Kalinin... North of the cauldron near Vyazma are ours The troops are regrouping for a further flank attack on Kalinin." The book “On the Right Flank of the Battle of Moscow” (1991) states: “Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the troops of the 22nd, 29th, 30th and 31st armies retreated to the Ostashkov-Rzhev line. In the defense of our troops in the Kalinin operational direction, a gap up to 80 kilometers wide was formed. The fascist German command sent the 3rd Tank Group into this gap... Significant forces of the 9th Army were also aimed at the Kalinin operational direction. In total, up to 20 percent of the Nazi troops intended to capture Moscow operated here.”

On October 10, German troops, as noted in Volume IV of the “History of the Second World War 1939-1945,” entered the Sychevka area. The 3rd Tank Group turned to the Kalinin direction in order to “capture the city of Kalinin on the move, bypass Moscow from the northwest, and also launch an offensive north to the rear of the North-Western Front, and under favorable conditions, strike at Yaroslavl and Rybinsk.” .

However, the German troops, despite their great superiority, failed to break into Kalinin. Only after three days of fighting did they capture the city on October 14th. It seemed that this would allow them to develop a further offensive, using the highways to Moscow, Bezhetsk and Leningrad. But the Red Army troops repulsed the Germans’ attempts to advance along the Bezhetsk highway immediately after the capture of Kalinin. The fifth battery of the 531st artillery regiment under the command of Lieutenant A. Katsitadze played a role in this. When the fascist tanks approached the Tveretsky Bridge and began to cross the river along it, 4 guns of the battery, hidden behind a blank fence with a gate, opened accurate fire on them. For three days, a battery and a group of infantrymen did not allow the enemy to cross the bridge, and on October 17, the regiments of the 256th division arrived. The German offensive in the direction of Bezhetsk was thwarted.

At the beginning of October, the Soviet military command did not expect that the Kalinin operational direction would appear. One must sin against the facts to suggest: “Maybe Kalinin was simply sacrificed for the sake of Moscow?” And ask: “Why was the bridge across the Tvertsa covered by anti-tank guns, while the bridge across the Volga, which, we note, was guarded by NKVD officers, remained unharmed? As if to drive a tank fist across two rivers.” This was the result of miscalculations, confusion, and shortcomings in the management of our troops. Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. Stalin immediately demanded from Konev, who headed the Kalinin Front: “Destroy the railway and highway bridges in the city of Kalinin by means of aviation.” But many attempts to destroy them from the air have failed.

Colonel General I. Konev, who arrived in Kalinin, managed, under the most difficult conditions, to restore the front of the Soviet strategic defense in the city area, which was of great importance for the successful battle near Moscow. Arriving in Rzhev, where the headquarters of the 29th Army of General I. Maslennikov was located, he ordered him to regroup his troops and strike from the west to the rear of the enemy advancing on Kalinin. “The plan,” Konev explained later, “came down to the following: to castle the 29th Army from the northern to the southern bank of the Volga and, advancing along the coast to the east in cooperation with the group of General Vatutin and the 256th Infantry Division, hit the rear of the enemy group, breaking through to Kalinin. A quick and precise execution of this maneuver would inevitably, in my opinion, stop the enemy advancing on Kalinin from the south. But Maslennikov, apparently not understanding the situation, did not complete the task, secretly appealing my decision to Beria, who had a connection with him... Contrary to my order, he moved the army along the northern bank, deciding to cross to the southern bank near Kalinin, moreover, he referred to the permission of Army General G .TO. Zhukov, but the front commander could hardly cancel my order without informing me, who was located directly in this area. One way or another, the planned and actually possible strike was not carried out.”

The battles for Kalinin are directly related to the battles for our capital. Subsequently, the former chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Group, General Charles de Bolot, claimed that “the Battle of Moscow was lost on October 7.” In his opinion, all formations of his troops and the 3rd Panzer Group should have been thrown at Moscow. He wrote: “By October 5, excellent prospects had been created for an attack on Moscow” - and considered the turn of the 3rd Tank Group to Kalinin a terrible mistake in Operation Typhoon.

However, the command of the “Center”, not without reason, did not take advantage of this tempting but risky prospect: if strong German formations had not turned to Kalinin, traffic on the Bologoe-Kalinin-Moscow railway would not have been disrupted. Those divisions of the Northwestern Front that fought fierce battles for Kalinin would have been immediately sent to help the troops in the Moscow direction.

Operational group of General Vatutin

The capture and retention of Kalinin made it possible for the Germans to bypass Moscow from the north. On October 17, 1941, the Kalinin Front was created with a length of 220 kilometers. It was headed by Colonel General I. Konev. It included the 22nd, 29th and 30th armies, transferred from the Western Front, the 183rd, 185th and 246th rifle divisions, the 46th and 54th cavalry divisions, the 46th motorcycle regiment and 8th tank brigade. An important task of the front was to occupy the Kalinin region. Fierce fighting took place around him. As a result of almost daily attacks by Soviet troops, the commander of Army Group Center von Bock issued a directive on October 23 to suspend the offensive through Kalinin.

The command of the Center group on October 14 issued the order: “The 3rd Tank Group... while holding Kalinin, reaches the Torzhok area as quickly as possible and advances from here without delay in the direction of Vyshny Volochek in order to prevent the main enemy forces from crossing the river. Tvertsa and the upper reaches of the river. Msta to the east. It is necessary to conduct enhanced reconnaissance to the Kashin-Bezhetsk-Pestovo line. It is also necessary to hold the Kalinin-Staritsa line further south until the arrival of units of the 9th Army. The 9th Army, in cooperation with the right flank of the 3rd Tank Group, destroys the enemy in the Staritsa, Rzhev, Zubtsov area, which is still resisting... The main direction of the further attack is on Vyshny Volochek.” On October 18, the headquarters of Army Group Center sent a telegram to the 9th Army: “The command of the Army Group considers it necessary to once again remind that the retention of the city of Kalinin is of great importance.”

By the end of October 16, the Germans had reached the Medny area, but on October 19-21, as a result of successful counterattacks by our army, the regional center was liberated from the enemy. Mednoye turned out to be the center of fighting for a short time because it blocked the Germans’ path to Torzhok and Vyshny Volochek. Advancing north, the Germans planned to create another “cauldron”, encircling the Red Army troops in the upper reaches of the Volga.

Following the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the commander of the Northwestern Front created an operational group under the command of the front chief of staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutina. It included the 183rd and 185th rifle divisions, the 8th tank brigade of Colonel P. Rotmistrov, the 46th and 54th cavalry divisions and the divisions of the 22nd and 29th armies retreating to Kalinin. In total, this group had more than 20 thousand people, 200 guns and mortars and 20 tanks. It was supported by 20 aircraft allocated by the North-Western Front.

On October 15, 16 and 17, the 8th Tank Brigade fought intense battles in the area of ​​​​Kalinin and Medny along the Leningradskoye Highway. The main role in disrupting these far-reaching plans belongs to the decisive counterattacks of the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front under the command of Lieutenant General N. Vatutin. As a result of the offensive operations of N. Vatutin’s group, which were unexpected for the enemy, the enemy’s 1st Tank Division and 90th Motorized Brigade were defeated. The enemy's attempts to encircle the 22nd and 29th armies and isolate the troops of the Northwestern Front were thwarted.

German troops broke through to Maryino, seized the crossing over the Logovezh River, intending to take Torzhok. In this critical situation, Rotmistrov made the mistaken decision to withdraw the brigade to the Likhoslavl area. Konev, in a telegram to Vatutin, demanded: “Rotmistrov should be arrested and tried by a military tribunal for failure to comply with combat orders and unauthorized departure from the battlefield with the brigade.” Vatutin, having analyzed the situation, ordered Rotmistrov: “Immediately, without wasting a single hour of time, return to Likhoslavl, from where, together with units of the 185th Infantry Division, quickly strike at Mednoye, destroy the enemy groups that have broken through, and capture Mednoye. It's time to put an end to cowardice!" This order was carried out. In the future, P. Rotmistrov did not allow such “unauthorized departures”, brilliantly commanded the formations entrusted to him and became the Chief Marshal of the armored forces.

Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov was born in the village of Skovorovo, Selizharovsky district, Tver province, his parents are peasants. In 1916 he graduated from primary school. In 1919, Rotmistrov voluntarily joined the Red Army, in March 1921 he participated in the suppression of the uprising in Kronstadt, and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1931 he graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, in 1937 became a regiment commander, and in May 1941 - chief of staff of the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the war, this corps was surrounded. Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences A.S. Malgin in the brochure “Outstanding military leader of tank forces, Honorary citizen of Tver, Hero of the Soviet Union, Chief Marshal of armored forces P.A. Rotmistrov" reported: "Part of the personnel of the department and headquarters of the corps, being surrounded, tried to get through to their troops, moving on foot all the time towards the front line. For more than two months they made their way behind enemy lines through the forests of Lithuania, Belarus and the northern Bryansk region, bypassing populated areas and destroying individual enemy units. Only on August 28, 1941, corps headquarters officers and personnel from other units came across the front line to their troops with personal weapons and in military uniform.”

At the end of August 1941, Colonel P. Rotmistrov was appointed commander of the 8th Tank Brigade. On September 23, she arrived on the Northwestern Front in the Valdai region. There the brigade conducted successful military operations against the Germans.

It must be admitted that “the command of the Kalinin Front made a miscalculation by undertaking the disbandment of General Vatutin’s operational group at a crucial moment in the defensive operation. It was a real force of five connections. The opportunity for immediate action to liberate the city of Kalinin was missed,” this is how Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. assessed the situation years later. Konev. General N. Vatutin pointed this out in the report on the combat operations of the operational group: “At the most crucial moment, the troops of the operational group are transferred to the 31st Army, which could not quickly establish contact with the troops. In the following days, new orders follow from the Kalinin Front for the army, according to which the entire group of troops of the operational group is distributed among the armies and some divisions are transferred to reserve. Thus, the troops of the task force as a single organism disappeared. The only striking force in the Kalinin area was dispersed among the armies. This was a mistake by the Kalinin Front command..."

This serious mistake prevented Kalinin from being released earlier, back in October. Soviet troops at the end of October were unable to achieve victory, but at the same time managed to stabilize the front. The Germans were unable to continue the offensive and were forced to go on the defensive.

Strategic Heroic Raid

An important role in turning the general situation around Kalinin was played by the heroic raid of the 21st Tank Brigade on the German rear. Arriving by rail at the Zavidovo and Reshetnikovo stations, concentrating in Turginov, the brigade received an order from the commander of the 30th Army to move along the Volokolamsk Highway, destroying enemy reserves, and, together with the 5th Rifle Division, capture Kalinin. On the morning of October 17, 27 T-34 tanks and 8 T-60 tanks headed for Kalinin, but encountered heavy fire from anti-tank guns and were subjected to continuous bombardment from the air. Only 8 tanks reached the southern outskirts of Kalinin, and only the T-34 tank under the command of Senior Sergeant S. Gorobets broke into the city and carried out a legendary raid on the city. He appeared from the direction of "Proletarka", walked through the city, fired at the commandant's office, caused a commotion among the Germans and went back to his troops.

On October 25, 1941, the Izvestia newspaper reported on the feat of the tank crew of senior political instructor Gmyri, who broke into the German airfield (now the Yuzhny residential area is located here): “The appearance of the Soviet tank caused an incredible commotion here. One after another, the bombers began to take off. One bomber never left the ground: Gmyri’s tank crushed its tail. The second plane was shot down by a cannon on takeoff. The rest still managed to get into the air... Enemy bombers bombarded the brave tankers with bombs.” But the damaged car made its way to its own.

The command of the German 3rd Panzer Group was forced to recall the 1st Panzer Division, which was advancing to Vyshny Volochek, in order to support the 36th Motorized Division defending in Kalinin. The 3rd Panzer Group was unable to complete the main task for which it was turned from Moscow to the north. Military researchers note: “The enemy was unable to develop an offensive on Torzhok, Likhoslavl and Bezhetsk, the threat of encirclement of the 22nd and 29th armies, isolation of the troops of the North-Western Front was eliminated, the uninterrupted operation of the Rybinsk-Bologoe railway line was ensured... Nazi German command was forced to transfer the 6th, 36th, 161st infantry and 14th motorized divisions to the Kalinin area, removing them from other directions.” A significant part of the German troops were drawn into stubborn battles around Kalinin and could not participate in the attack on Moscow.

“The results of the battles for Kalinin,” noted historian A. Isaev, “for the 3rd Tank Group were truly catastrophic. Its 1st Tank Division on September 28, 1941 consisted of 111 combat-ready tanks. On October 31, 1941, the number of combat-ready vehicles decreased to 36 vehicles. On September 10, the 6th Panzer Division had 171 combat-ready tanks. On October 16, she had at her disposal only 60 tanks ready for use in battle.”

Kalinin Front and its commander

The Kalinin Front absorbed 13 divisions of the German Army Group Center, as a result of which they were not used against the Western Front. Their attempts to break through to Torzhok-Vyshny Volochek and encircle the troops of the North-Western Front were repulsed. “However, in the management of troops by the command and headquarters of the Kalinin Front,” noted in the study “On the Right Flank of the Battle of Moscow,” mistakes were made in assessing the capabilities of the enemy and their troops. This led to the failure of the front troops to fulfill the plans of the High Command. The front failed to either encircle the enemy group in Kalinin in October or cover the Moscow direction in mid-November 1941. In his decisions, the front commander did not always take into account the specific situation in each army's zone of operations. Therefore, his orders often did not correspond to the real situation and could not be carried out or were carried out by army troops, as a rule, with a delay.”

The defense line of the 30th Army was not strong enough; in mid-November it consisted of rifle and motorized rifle divisions, a tank brigade and a motorized regiment. The defense was patchy and there were no reserves. At the end of October, the commander of the 30th Army reported to Konev that “the army does not have enough combat personnel and equipment, and few mining equipment... The left flank of the army is a particularly weak point.” This became all the more acute as it became increasingly clear that the German command was preparing for a new offensive in the defense zone of the 30th Army in order to break through to Moscow from the north-west. But the front command, having made a serious miscalculation, did not take the necessary measures in a timely manner to strengthen the defense of the 30th Army.

On the morning of November 15, superior enemy forces launched a surprise attack. By the end of the day they reached the Volga. And only after this I. Konev decided to strengthen the 30th Army with the 185th Infantry, 46th Cavalry Divisions, 8th Tank Brigade and a motorcycle regiment. If this had been done earlier, then the 30th Army probably would not have found itself in such a critical situation when it was forced to act in three dismembered groups. On November 17, the 30th Army was transferred to the Western Front. “As a result of mistakes made in troop management by the command of the Kalinin Front, and the unsuccessful actions of the troops of the 30th Army, the front troops,” noted in the same work “On the right flank of the Moscow Battle,” - this time the task of covering the Moscow direction from the north-west they could not fulfill it. The center of gravity has completely moved to the Western Front."

On November 27-29, the commander of the Kalinin Front, I. Konev, carried out several scattered attacks with small forces in separate directions, but they were not successful. According to Zhukov, Konev “was clearly cautious at the moment his front went over to the counteroffensive,” he incorrectly assessed the current operational-strategic situation and, instead of an operation to defeat the right wing of Army Group Center, he planned to carry out an operation only to capture the city of Kalinin.

The Supreme Command headquarters, signed by Stalin and Vasilevsky, emphasized: “Private attacks in different directions by troops of the Kalinin Front on November 27-29 are ineffective.” On December 1, 1941, she ordered: “1. The Kalinin Front, having concentrated an attack group of at least five to six divisions over the next two or three days, strike from the front (claim) Kalinin, (claim) Sudimirka in the direction of Mikulino Gorodishche and Turginovo. Task: by reaching the rear of the enemy’s Klin grouping, to facilitate the destruction of the latter by the troops of the Western Front.” On the morning of December 1, at the direction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, a conversation took place between Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky and Konev about this directive. Konev referred to his lack of tanks and lack of forces, and proposed, instead of providing assistance to the Western Front, to carry out a local operation to capture the city of Kalinin. Such an operation pursued local interests and did not actually take into account the overall goal.

Vasilevsky told Konev: “Thwarting the German offensive on Moscow and thereby not only saving Moscow, but also beginning a serious defeat of the enemy can only be done through active actions with a decisive goal. If we don't do this in the next few days, it will be too late. The Kalinin Front, occupying an extremely advantageous operational position for this purpose, cannot be aloof from this. You must collect literally everything in order to hit the enemy, and he is weak against you. ...Comrade Stalin allowed to immediately transfer to you for this purpose another one, the 262nd Infantry Division of the North-Western Front. She starts loading today at 18.00. The division has over 9 thousand people and is well armed. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it not only possible, but also necessary to remove the divisions I have indicated from the front and concentrate for this attack. I don’t understand your statement that all these divisions have only 2-3 thousand people. I have before me a report from your headquarters, received on November 24, 1941, according to which the 246th Infantry Division has 6,800 people, the 119th - 7200, the 252nd - 5800, the 256th - 6000 people, etc. If in these divisions, as you stated, the artillery is really weak, then you can strengthen them at the expense of the artillery regiments of the Reserve of the High Command, of which you have 9.” After convincing instructions from A. Vasilevsky, I. Konev, asking to strengthen his front, promised to act as Headquarters ordered: he would deliver the main blow to Turginovo, and would do everything to “be sure to break through the defenses and get behind enemy lines.”

The headquarters was very concerned about ensuring the exact execution of this order. Vasilevsky in his book “The Work of a Whole Life” recalled: “On the afternoon of December 4, being at the next report in the Kremlin with Stalin, I received instructions on the night of December 5 to go to the headquarters of the Kalinin Front in order to personally convey to the front commander the directive to go on a counteroffensive and explain him all the requirements for it... December 12, 1941, when B.M. Shaposhnikov had already recovered, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in our presence, conveyed to the commander of the Kalinin Front via direct wire: “The actions of your left group do not satisfy us. Instead of throwing all your might at the enemy and creating a decisive advantage for yourself, you... introduce individual units into action, allowing the enemy to wear them down. We demand from you that you replace the petty tactics with the tactics of a real offensive.” The commander tried to refer to the thaw, the difficulties of crossing the Volga, the Germans receiving reinforcements, etc., but in conclusion he said: “I understand, everything is clear, accepted for execution, I’m pressing with all my might.”

Offensive

The troops of the Kalinin Front launched a decisive offensive on December 5, 1941. On that day, Halder wrote in his diary: “The enemy broke through our front in the area east of Kalinin... Some confusion arose in Army Group Center.”

December 6: “As a result of the enemy’s attack on the northern flank of the 3rd Tank Group, it became necessary to withdraw troops located south of the Volga Reservoir; they need to be withdrawn to Klin.”

December 7: “The enemy made a breakthrough from the north to Klin. In the area east of Kalinin, the enemy also penetrated our front in a number of areas, but these penetrations have so far been localized.”

December 8: “In the area east of Kalinin, seven enemy divisions went on the offensive. The situation here is still tense. I consider this section of the front the most dangerous, since here we do not have any troops in the second line.”

December 9: “An extremely strong enemy onslaught southeast of Kalinin will apparently allow him to recapture the city.”

As a result of heavy fighting, the 31st Army reached the Volokolamsk Highway. Units of the 29th Army were breaking through to the operationally important Kalinin-Staritsa road. This really threatened to encircle the German group in Kalinin. On December 16, 1941, the city was liberated from the enemy. In 2010, Tver was awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory”.

Corporal of the 161st German Infantry Division Diedrich Bosch wrote to his wife: “Kalinin, morning of December 15, 1941. My dear Gezina! We must leave this city. It will all be blown up and set on fire at noon.” German corporal Hans Lex wrote on October 19, 1941: “We were already standing 5 kilometers from Leningrad, today we are standing 150 kilometers from Moscow and now we are advancing on Moscow... On October 16, 1941 we had a very difficult battle near the city of Kalinin... You write, that the censorship opened my letter. But this doesn’t bother me, because it’s better to spend 10 years in prison than to stay one month in Russia.”

In the essay “Fighter,” Fadeev noted the feat of a Red Army soldier who was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: “In 1941, in the battles for Kalinin, at an enemy bunker that did not allow us to move forward and took many lives of our people, Paderin was seriously wounded and in a fit of great moral upliftment, he closed the bunker embrasure with his body.”

The Main Personnel Directorate of the Red Army reported: “Political instructor of the 190th rifle regiment. Tsanov Kamen Kostovich died heroically on October 15, 1941 in street battles for the city of Kalinin. Tsanov is a Bulgarian political emigrant, sentenced in absentia by the anti-people court of Bulgaria to death for his struggle for his free democratic homeland, he was included in the lists of active “reds”. After Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, on the third day of the war he volunteered for the front. One of the streets of Tver is named in his honor.” On October 17, 1941, near the city of Kalinin, the regiment commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M.A., died. Lukin.

Not subject to oblivion

B. Polevoy wrote about the struggle of Soviet people against the occupiers in Kalinin: “An underground organization began to operate in the city from the very first day... Large commissary warehouses burned down in the Vagzhanovka area. They burned for three days, a lot of German property was lost... Workshops where the Germans were repairing damaged equipment were set on fire... A bomb was thrown into the officers' casino, which was located in the Tekstilshchik club. Well, two policemen were somehow hanged at night in the city garden... Subsequently, the commandant ordered twenty-five hostages to be shot.”

The consequences of the occupation of Kalinin by German troops were extremely difficult. The Germans burned and destroyed more than 50 enterprises, 7,700 buildings, bridges across the Volga and Tmaka, a drama theater, a philharmonic theater, a theater for young spectators, a Hermitage cinema, burned the Gorky library, many schools, and kindergartens. With anger and pain, A. Fadeev, in the article “Monster Destroyers and People-Creators,” published in Pravda on January 14, 1942, told about what the Nazis had done in Kalinin: “Twelve corpses of young people were found in one of the basements of the city ; two of them were sixteen years old. All were killed with a blunt object: some had their eyes gouged out, some were tortured by hanging them by their feet. Four girls were first raped, then killed... A stable was set up in the building of an excellent surgical hospital in Kalinin.”

He continued: “In the village of Rubtsovo, Morkino-Gorodishchensky village council, Kalinin region, the Germans drove the entire population, women and children, out of the outskirts, and shot them with machine guns... The population of the villages of Danilovsky, Nekrasovsky and Borisovsky village councils, totaling up to 2000 people, the Germans drove out in the bitter cold for the Tmaka River and began to shoot with machine guns and machine guns... The ancient Russian city of Staritsa, the birthplace of the first Russian traveler merchant Afanasy Nikitin, a city famous for its monastery - a monument of Russian architecture, a city located on two sides of the upper Volga, extraordinary in its beauty - was destroyed and almost entirely burned by the Germans.”

Not only the famous writer testified to the atrocities of the invaders. Colonel N. Deev reported: “Many Kalinin villages were plundered and destroyed. On the “Red Link” collective farm in the Kalininsky district, the Germans took all the horses, cows, and sheep and destroyed the apiary. They took all the collective farm bread and vegetables. Collective farmers were confiscated from their personal livestock, warm clothes, and shoes.” N. Krotov, a native of the village of Petryankha, Shatura district, Moscow region, a soldier of the sapper battalion, wrote about the Germans, who were “driven far beyond Kalinin”: “They completely ruined the collective farmers, ate all the food, took all their clothes, shoes, burned houses, took off their felted boots from their feet, even children, and killed many women; Not even the good stuff, but cups, spoons, cast iron lamps - they took everything with them.”

Having become familiar with such disgusting behavior of the occupiers, one can concretely imagine under what incredibly difficult conditions the Soviet people had to revive more or less normal everyday life after their liberation from the “charms” of the new German order.

After the breakthrough of the 31st Army of the Red Army in the zone of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, there came a brief, but very important respite for the warring parties.

For the Germans, everything that happened was a surprise. Previously, they always beat, always caught up, pursued, won. And now they were defeated.

The Soviet and German command began to strengthen their troops. The command of the 9th Army first of all strengthened the most vulnerable sector, located southeast of Kalinin.

The 251st Infantry Division, defending against the 22nd Army, was hastily withdrawn and sent to reinforce the group in the breakthrough area. The 110th Infantry Division was also transferred there and was brought into battle on December 8th.

The enemy command considered this section of the front to be the most dangerous, since it did not have reserves here.

"The 9th Army reports that the enemy has had only limited success in attacking north of the reservoir; the Army is bringing everything its command has on hand to block the enemy's road, but this will take time."

And on the 10th he will take a brief respite:

"Attacks against the 9th Army have weakened somewhat."

In the Kalinin Front zone, the situation remained tense. Due to the fact that the 29th Army was unable to capture the city of Kalinin on time, the command of the Kalinin Front clarified its decision, according to which:

“The 29th Army received the task of attacking in the direction of Mamulino with the forces of the 246th, 252nd and 243rd rifle divisions and capturing Kalinin with a blow from the southwest;

The 31st Army, continuing its offensive in the southwestern direction, was supposed to reach the river line by the end of December 12. Shosha, to the front Mikulino-Gorodishche, Turginovo. At the same time, the forces of the 256th, 247th rifle, 54th cavalry divisions and the 143rd separate tank battalion (attack in the direction of Lebedevo, Mamulino) were intended to encircle and destroy the enemy group in Kalinin and in cooperation with the 29th take over the city with an army" .

The start of the offensive was scheduled for 10 o'clock on December 11. According to this decision, the destruction of the enemy in the Kalinin area and the capture of the city was entrusted not only to the troops of the 29th Army, as was the case earlier, but also to part of the forces of the 31st Army.

Continuation of the offensive

The Wehrmacht continued to recruit additional forces, mainly into the offensive zone of the 31st Army, and strengthen defensive positions on the Kalinin sector of the front.

The German command, by expanding the defense areas of the 26th and 6th Infantry Divisions, freed up parts of the 110th Infantry Division, sending one regiment to the Kalinin area in the offensive zone of the 29th Army (thus thickening the battle formations of the 161st and 129th Army located there). th infantry divisions), and up to two regiments - against the troops of the 31st Army. At the same time, from December 12, units of the 251st Infantry Division were brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 31st Army in the Zakheevo area.

These enemy measures slowed down the advance of the front forces, and the task assigned to them was not fully completed.

Battery of Soviet 76.2 mm regimental guns mod. 1927 fires at the enemy in the Kalinin direction

Considering the importance of the offensive of the troops of the Kalinin Front during the entire operation near Moscow and its relatively weak strength, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command carried out major measures to strengthen the front.

On December 11, the 359th and 375th rifle divisions were transferred to him, which were transferred on December 7, and already from December 12 began to arrive at the station. Kulitskaya (15 km northwest of Kalinin).

At the same time, Headquarters informed Colonel General I.S. Konev about the transfer to the front of the newly formed 39th Army (including six rifle and two cavalry divisions) to enter the battle in the Rzhev or Staritsky direction. The concentration of the army was planned in the Torzhok area from December 14 to 24.

Due to the delay in the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the front command of part of the forces of the 31st Army, in cooperation with the troops of the 29th Army, immediately liberate Kalinin, and with the remaining forces persistently continue a continuous offensive to the southwest, so that together with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front defeat the enemy.

On December 12, Joseph Stalin himself called I. Konev and had a telephone conversation with him. Here is his transcript

RECORDING OF DIRECT WIRE NEGOTIATIONS between J.V. STALIN and THE COMMANDER OF THE KALININ FRONT I.S. KONEV December 12, 1941

Finished 20.10

Kalinin front. At the Konev apparatus. Moscow.

At the device

STALIN, SHAPOSHNIKOV, VASILEVSKY . The actions of your left group do not satisfy us. Instead of putting all your might on the enemy and creating a decisive advantage for yourself. You... bring individual units into action, allowing the enemy to wear them down. We demand that you replace the petty tactics with the tactics of a real offensive.

KONEV. I report: everything that I had collected was thrown into battle. The grouping of our troops consists of five rifle divisions, one motorized brigade, turned into a division, one cavalry brigade consisting of 300 active sabers. Tank battalions were able to be assembled only as part of light tanks by the end of December 10.

The thaw complicated matters. Through the river It is impossible to transport heavy tanks across the Volga. Personally, I am not satisfied with Army Commander 31 Yushkevich. We have to push and push all the time... Two rifle divisions have been sent for reinforcement. Today, one concentrated on the outcome. It takes two to three days to put things in order - distributing weapons, mastering weapons. Second Division - two echelons unloaded

Your instructions are understood and accepted for execution. About the enemy:

The enemy, in addition to the defenders of the 161st and 162nd Infantry, partially threw up 129 Infantry, one regiment of 110 Infantry. Today in Chupriyanovka two battalions of a division of unknown number were destroyed. In addition, yesterday aviation noted the movement of up to 800 vehicles from Pushkino to Kalinin. All these enemy forces have been significantly damaged by our actions.

All enemy counterattacks are successfully repulsed. Fifty guns were captured in the battles, eight of them heavy - caliber 150 mm, 203 mm, 305 mm. Lots of other property. All.

STALIN. What's your latest situation?

KONEV. Today we captured Maryino and Chupriyanovo. There is a battle for the capture of Salygino and Grishkino. Our tanks burst into Grishkino. In the Mozzharino-Grishkino sector there are up to two enemy regiments. Otherwise no change. All.

STALIN. There are no more questions. I think that you understand the instructions given to you. Act boldly and energetically. All. Goodbye.

KONEV. I understand, everything is clear, accepted for execution, I press with all my might.

STALIN.All. Goodbye.

Central Asia Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, f. 96a, op. 2011, d. 5, l. 202-203. Verified with ticker tape. Published abbreviated

Joseph Stalin expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of the troops of the Kalinin Front, believing that Konev was wasting his forces in vain

Konev understood everything and began to work on improving attacking tactics

On December 12, a new powerful offensive by the forces of the Kalinin Front began. The German combat report of the GA "Center" recorded an increase in the onslaught from the forces of the Kalinin Front on December 12:

"9th Army. The Russians continue to stubbornly attack southeast and west of Kalinin, at the junction between 27 ak and 6 ak. The enemy is not pursuing the 86th Infantry Division, which has retreated to the railway.

The attacks were especially fierce near Cherkasov, where in the morning 9 attacks were repelled by forces ranging from company to battalion. According to the testimony of prisoners, the direction of the main attack was shifted to this area. The 246th Infantry Division was established here for the first time.

The transfer of individual regiments and battalions of already known divisions to strengthen the attacked areas allows us to conclude that the Russian command no longer has reserves in the Kalinin area "

The report of the General Staff of the Red Army for the 12th says:

“The 29th Army on the right flank occupied the previous defensive lines; on the left flank, units of the 252nd and 246th Infantry Division resumed the offensive at 14.00 on 12/11. The results are being clarified.

The 31st Army, overcoming stubborn fire resistance and enemy counterattacks, continued to develop its offensive:

256 Infantry Division repelled enemy attacks at the line (claim) ELEVATOR - CHERRY - elev. 140.2;

As a result of enemy counterattacks, the 250th Infantry Division (without the rifle division) left AK-SINYINO and fought east of this point;

54 cd from the area at elevation. 140.2 (eastern AKSININO) advanced to the northwest;

The 119th Infantry Division fought at the line SENTSOV - MARINO - CHUPRI-YANOVO;

The 262nd Rifle Division continued to fight for the capture of the FEDOSO-VO - KUZMINSKOE area;

5 rifle divisions with 916 rifle regiments (250 rifle divisions) captured the GORODISCHE area and fought for the SMOLINO-GOLENIKHA area."

Red Army soldiers inspect an overturned German tank Pz.Kpfw.38 during the Kalinin operation

The 119th Infantry Division operated successfully. About the battles of the 119th Infantry, Chief of Staff of the 31st Army S. Shchedrin says this:

" On December 12, the 119th Division, after a fierce battle, drove the Germans out of Maryino and began to develop an offensive on Shcherbinino and Chupriyanovo. Here the Nazis put up stubborn resistance. Before dark, our infantrymen made little progress, preparing to resume the assault in the morning.

But even before dawn, the division was ordered, covered by one regiment at Shcherbinin, with the main forces to attack Starkovo, Podsosonye and liberate Salygino, Burashevo and Balykino.

The division commander doubted the appropriateness of this decision, but the chief of staff of the army, who was here, confirmed the order of the army commander, and the division commander, leaving small barriers at Maryin, began to lead the division to a new direction."

At the same time, the situation with the 247th Infantry Division developed very dramatically - its headquarters ran into a German detachment, and a battle ensued. Further, Shchedrin writes about an incident with the 247th Infantry Division fighting nearby:

"At this time, the enemy, after a strong artillery attack, launched a counterattack from Shcherbinin, throwing back weak barriers, and occupied Maryino, liberated the day before by the division at great cost, and an enemy company of machine gunners attacked the headquarters of the 247th division. The division commander was slightly wounded and lost control of the troops .

While defending the division headquarters, the deputy chief of the army's armored forces, Major Shah, died a hero's death."

“By noon, the army commander changed his decision and ordered the liberation of Maryino again. Only late at night did the 119th Division manage to take its starting position, and the fight for Maryino continued until December 15.”

Commander of the 119th Infantry Division. HELL. Berezin, with his determination, saved the situation in the 247th Infantry Division by attacking and again occupying the village of Maryino

Meanwhile, the planned capture of Kalinin made it possible to free the forces tied up in this area as quickly as possible and send them to attack the rear of the enemy group, which was retreating under the pressure of the armies of the right wing of the Western Front. In addition, this made it possible to open a railway connection on the Moscow - Bologoye - M. Vishera section, which was of great strategic importance.

The commander of the 31st Army strike group (consisting of the 250th, 247th, 256th and two regiments of the 119th Infantry and 54th Cavalry Divisions, two tank battalions, two RKG artillery regiments, two rocket artillery divisions and three ski battalions) continue attack on Mamulino, Lebedevo, Salygino with the aim of encircling Kalinin, and with the rest of the army forces - advance in the direction of Tsvetkovo, Mikulino-Gorodishche. The commander of the 29th is to assemble a group of at least two divisions and advance on Danilovskoye in order to cut off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and southwest.

Thus, the 31st Army received the same direction for its offensive, while the troops of the 29th Army, instead of attacking Borikhin, had to attack in the direction of Danilovskoye, more deeply enveloping the Kalinin enemy grouping.

German guards on the road to Kalinin, they tried to exploit their fire advantage as best they could

“The 29th Army on the right flank occupied its previous position, on the left flank it fought stubborn offensive battles at the line KRAS-NOVO - the southern bank of the VOLGA River - the northwestern outskirts of the city of KALININ:

246 SD; Having captured KRASNOVO, she repelled repeated enemy counterattacks from the REBEEVO direction;

The 252nd Infantry Division conducted offensive battles, but, encountering strong fire resistance from the enemy, was unsuccessful;

The 243rd Rifle Division fought for the capture of the northern part of KALININ.

The 31st Army, overcoming strong fire resistance and frequent enemy counterattacks, conducted offensive battles in the area south and southeast of the city of KALININ:

256 Infantry Division captured the eastern outskirts of KOLESNIKOVO;

The 250th Infantry Division fought stubbornly in the AKSINKINO area;

247 RD with 159 TB, repelling enemy counterattacks from the BURASHEVO, SALYGINO directions, by the end of the day on 12.12 they were fighting in GRISH-KINO. The division defeated up to a battalion of infantry and destroyed up to a company of enemy machine gunners;

The 119th Infantry Division, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, captured the MARYINO-CHUPRIYANVO area. The division destroyed up to two battalions of the SS infantry regiment in the battles for ChUP-RIYANOVO."

Overcoming fierce enemy resistance, units of the 246th Infantry Division of the 29th Army, commanded by Major General V.I. Shvetsov, began an offensive.

However, due to the fact that the 252nd Rifle Division at that time was preparing for an attack on Kalinin, a concentrated attack on Danilovskoye on the front of the 29th Army did not work out. As for the actions of the troops of the 31st Army, on that day they also did not achieve the desired result and fought mainly on the same lines.

...........................................................................................

Reinforcements were arriving. From 12 o'clock on December 13, the 46th Cavalry Division, transferred from the Western Front, was included in this army. The division continued the offensive it had previously begun in the direction of Redkino, securing the left flank of the army from Turginovo.

In connection with this transfer (of the 46th Cavalry Division) a new demarcation line was established between the Western and Kalinin fronts: through Kalyazin, Elizavetino and further along the Moscow Sea to Turginovo (all points for the Western Front).

"e) Our troops successfully retreated to a new line in the area southeast of Kalinin. Kalinin is held by our units"

“9th Army. Attacks against the central and southern sections of the 86th Infantry Division were repelled. To the north of this area, the enemy onslaught is still strong. Attacks supported by tanks on the Kalinin-Lotoshino highway were not successful.

The enemy, who tried to conduct reconnaissance in force in the 6th Army Corps sector, was thrown back onto the highway leading to the city of Staritsa. The main Russian efforts are concentrated on the area south of Kalinin, where continued strong attacks are expected."

Every day the Red Army liberated village after village

In the zone of the 29th Army, the 246th Rifle Division fought intense battles for Danilovskoye. It was decided to target the 252nd Rifle Division in a southern direction with the task of attacking Opavino and Borikhino in the morning of December 15th. In the Gorodnya area, the concentration of the 375th Infantry Division continued, which was supposed to be used on the main direction of the army’s advance.

The strike group of the 31st Army fought fierce battles with the counterattacking enemy on the previous lines. The offensive in the center and on the left flank developed more successfully. The 262nd Rifle Division, repelling up to six enemy counterattacks, captured the heavily fortified strongholds of Bashkeevo and Star by 21:00 on December 14. Pogost.

The 5th Infantry Division, advancing on the left flank, reached the Trunovo-Mezhevo line by 10 p.m. The 46th Cavalry Division was advanced to the Trunovo area to operate in the immediate rear of the enemy.

To strengthen the army, by order of the front command, the 359th Infantry Division was transferred to its composition, which had already begun concentration in the area of ​​​​the station. Chupriyanovka.

“9th Army. After fighting with varying success, the enemy resumed attacks southeast of the city of Kalinin and attempted, as a result of frequent attacks, to expand the wedge area.

Air reconnaissance detected movement on the Kushalino-Kalinin highway in a southerly direction (probably we are talking about bringing in reinforcements). The Russians left Krasnov to the west of Kalinin (1 km south of the Omtich district).

Aviation actively supported the actions of ground troops on the eastern flank of the 6th Army Corps. Observation of artillery activity in front of 6 AK and 23 AK confirms the assumption of the withdrawal of artillery from the front in front of both corps. The artillery was probably transferred to the Kalinin area."

"Battles are being waged near Kalinin with varying degrees of success. So far, the results of these battles are generally favorable for us."

The offensive of the troops of the Kalinin Front during December 13–14 did not develop much in depth. The reason for this is mainly due to the insufficient means to suppress the defense. But despite this they were successful - the Germans decided to leave Kalinin

Von Bock writes on the 14th:

In the morning, Strauss reported that the situation southeast of Kalinin had forced him to “reduce” his front again. Since this posed an immediate threat to Kalinin, he asked permission to issue an order for the evacuation of Kalinin in case such a need arose. I agreed. "

On December 14, the commander of the GA "Center" Von Bock agreed to the proposal of the commander of 9A to begin the evacuation of Kalinin

All that remained was to obtain Hitler's approval, for which Von Bock sent a request

It must be taken into account that the enemy offered stubborn and active resistance, because he understood that the rapid advance of the troops of the Kalinin Front in the southwestern direction threatened disaster for his 4th and 3rd tank armies, which were hastily retreating to the west at that time after the defeat, suffered by them to the north and northwest of Moscow.

The planned offensive of the strike group of the 31st Army in the direction of Lebedevo and Mamulino also did not take place.

The begun regrouping of its forces was delayed by strong enemy counterattacks against the 119th and 247th rifle divisions. Therefore, the formations intended for the offensive fought in areas where they were previously located.

However, the enemy’s means to strengthen the group in the Kalinin area using reserves had already been exhausted, and the troops in the first echelon of defense were exhausted in intense battles.

The success of the 262nd and 5th Rifle Divisions, which they achieved on December 14 on the left flank of the army, deprived the enemy of the opportunity to conduct new counterattacks. Nevertheless, if we give a general assessment, it must be said that the formations of the strike group of our 29th Army, as in previous days, did not interact with each other very clearly.

The attack in the direction of Dani-Lovskoe was not sufficiently concentrated, as a result the enemy retained this settlement. At the front of the 31st Army, the 5th Infantry and 46th Cavalry Divisions had some success, capturing Perkhurovo, Starikovo, and Lukyanovo in the afternoon.

The remaining units of the army did not make much progress. Despite the delays caused by stubborn and active enemy resistance, the successful advance of the 30th Army of the Western Front and its entry to the river line. Lama created a threat to the rear of the 9th Nazi Army.

"9th Army. South of Kalinin, patrol actions and local attacks (against 251 Infantry Division).

The concentration of forces in front of the 251st and 110th Infantry Divisions indicates preparation for new offensive actions. This is also evidenced by the strengthening of the enemy in the Ignatovo area (northern flank of the 251st Infantry Division).

To the west of Kalinin, numerous attacks on Cherbovo were repelled.

Our group advancing on Krasnov was attacked from the rear. The outcome of the battle has not yet been decided.

A small detachment of paratroopers was discovered in the 6th Ak area.

The attack against 206 infantry (23 ak) was unsuccessful.

The report that one of the enemy divisions has taken over a sector of a neighboring formation is probably related to the withdrawal of forces from the front line to be used for a special purpose."

German anti-aircraft gunners fire at the advancing Red Army forces at the railway bridge near Kalinin

M. Shchedrin writes:

“On December 14 and 15, our troops, decisively breaking enemy resistance, successfully advanced. The infantrymen of the 5th and cavalrymen of the 46th divisions knocked out the invaders from the settlements of Mishnevo, Sentyurino, Polukarpo-vo, Mezhinino, Loginovo, Lukino, Mezhevo, Novenkaya, Trunovo, Perkhurovo, Lobkovo and fought for Stepankovo. The 262nd Division liberated Fedosovo, Kuzminskoye, Stary Pogost, Baksheevo, Chudovo from the enemy and started the battle for Maslovo and Zakheevo.

The Siberians cleared Maryino, Shcherbinin, Chupriyanovo, Pominovo, Osekino of the Nazis and fought for Obukhov. On the evening of December 15, the Germans set fire to Malye Peremerki and Kurovo. Fires broke out in different parts of Kalinin."

In this regard, the stability of its defense at Kalinin was significantly weakened, and besides, the attacks of our troops in this area became more and more persistent.

Liberation of Kalinin

By December 15, units of the 31st and 29th armies were closer than ever to liberating Kalinin. Having approached and encircled the city, the military council of the Kalinin Front turned to the residents of the city.

Here is his text:

"APPLICATION OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE KALININ FRONT TO THE RESIDENTS OF KALININ WITH A CALL TO HELP THE RED ARMY IN THE LIBERATION OF THE HOMETOWN FROM THE GERMAN-FASCIST INVADERS

Hitler's invaders managed to temporarily capture your hometown.

Now the forces of the Red Army have increased significantly. The enemy is suffering huge losses; over the last 10 days of fighting near Kalinin, the invaders lost over 5 thousand killed and wounded. The city of Kalinin is surrounded by the Red Army and will be liberated in the coming days.

Comrades!

Help the Red Army. Beat the invaders from the rear, give them no rest day or night, tear telephone, telegraph and electric wires, set fire to warehouses, headquarters, cars and tanks, and block the streets. Hit the invaders from around the corner. By doing this you will speed up the liberation of your hometown.

Our cause is just - the enemy will be defeated. Long live the heroic Kalinin residents!"

Soviet units near Kalinin

The combat report of the General Staff of the Red Army says:

“The 29th Army with its left flank units continued to conduct offensive battles with the enemy:

183 and 174 SD - no changes;

As a result of an enemy counterattack, the 246th Infantry Division retreated to the KRASNOVO area, where it went on the defensive;

The 252nd Rifle Division advanced in the direction of the OPARINO area and fought for the capture of the REBEEVO area;

The 375th Rifle Division was concentrated in the previously planned area.

The 31st Army, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, continued to develop its offensive in the area south and southeast of the city of KALININ:

256 Infantry Division firmly held its positions:

250 RD with 143 TB fought stubborn battles to capture the AKSINKINO area;

247 Infantry Division with 159 TB fought for the capture of the SALYGINO - GRISHKINO - ALEXANDROVKA region;

The 119th Infantry Division captured the MARINO - SHCHERBININO - POMI-NOVO - OSEKINO area and fought for the capture of the OBUKHOVO area;

262nd Infantry Division captured the CHUDOVO area and continued to advance on the ZAKHEEVO and PODSOSENE areas;

5th Infantry Division captured the TRUNOVO-LOBKOVO-PERKHUROVO area and fought with the enemy in the STEPANKOVO and KOZLYATYEVO area;

54 cd - in the area 0.5 km east of AKSINKINO;

46 cd captured the region REDKINO - BYKOVO - TURYGI-NO - ZAPOLOK - ARTEMOVO - STARIKOVO - LUKYANOVO and developed success in the direction of the EZVINO region;

359 Infantry Division - on the march to a new concentration area.

On December 15, army units captured: 5 tanks, 9 guns, 25 vehicles, 4 motorcycles."

The command of the Kalinin Front assumed that the 9th Army would fight for Kalinin, but this turned out not to be the case.

The commander of the Kalinin Front, I. S. Konev, writes:

“The enemy tenaciously clung to Kalinin. But the 31st Army, although slowly, moved forward. By the end of December 15, the fascist command had completely used up all its reserves.

His grouping in the city itself and to the south was covered from both flanks. The position of the fascist German troops in the Kalinin area was complicated by the fact that the 30th Army of the Western Front at that time was successfully advancing to the Lama River and threatened to reach the rear of the enemy’s 9th Army.

On the night of December 16, after the Nazis managed to force the 246th Division of the 29th Army to leave Danilovskoye and retreat to the Volga, enemy troops began to withdraw from Kalinin.

In order to escape from the encirclement that threatened them, the Nazis were forced to abandon a significant amount of materiel and military equipment."

Fedor Von Bock, as mentioned above, approved the decision of the 9A command to withdraw troops from Kalinin so that they would not fall into the “Kalinin cauldron.” They were waiting for Hitler's approval. Franz Halder described all this in one day on December 15:

“The troops of the 9th Army are withdrawing in perfect order. The command of the army group intends to hold the front ledge near the Volga until the evening of 17.12 in order to ensure the orderly withdrawal of units of Reinhardt and the 9th Army.

Heusinger reports. The withdrawal of the troops of Army Group Center should be carried out, if necessary, in such a way that they reach the line at Staritsa by 20.12.

In Kalinin today preparations will begin for the evacuation of our troops. It is still unknown whether the evacuation of troops from Kalinin will take place. This will depend on the situation.

The order to withdraw troops to the Staritsa line has not yet been given. The rear line will be lengthened. It runs along the line Kursk, Orel, Kaluga, Gzhatsk."

Later that day, Halder learned of Hitler's decision:

“From negotiations with Jodl, I found out that the Fuhrer agrees to the withdrawal of the 9th Army, 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups to the Staritsa line.

Regarding the further withdrawal of troops, Jodl wants to talk with the commander-in-chief. He raises the question of whether it is possible to transfer the 218th Infantry Division from Denmark.

The 9th Army repelled enemy attacks and is preparing to retreat to the line at Staritsa. There is a shortage of food. There are losses of vehicles."

Alfred Jodl conveyed Hitler's approval for the withdrawal of troops from Kalinin

Having received the highest approval, the command of the 9th Army withdrew the main forces of the 161st and 129th infantry divisions from Kalinin on the night of December 16, leaving strong rearguards for cover.

When leaving, the Germans blew up the Volzhsky Bridge

Overcoming their resistance, the 243rd Infantry Division of the 29th Army occupied the northern part of the city by 3 o'clock on December 16th. By 11 o'clock the right-flank units of the 256th Infantry Division of the 31st Army broke into Kalinin.

By 13:00 the city was completely liberated from the Nazi invaders. The enemy units that did not have time to leave the city were completely defeated.

Broken German equipment in Kalinin

A copy of the telegram from the command of the Kalinin Front to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the release of Kalinin

Red banner over the liberated city

"29th Army the left flank units, having broken the stubborn resistance of the enemy, captured the city of KALININ and fought to complete the encirclement of its Kalinin group, together with units 31st Army:

183 and 174 SD - without changes;

The 246th Infantry Division, holding KRASNOVO with one regiment, fought with two regiments to capture the DESHEVKINO-DANILOVSKOE area;

252nd Infantry Division captured OPARINO - REBEEVO district and drove stubborn the battle for mastering the highway KALININ - OLD MAN Location on east of OPARINO;

The 243rd Infantry Division, having captured the city of KALININ, continued to destroy the remnants of the enemy in the southern and southwestern parts of the city of KALININ;

The 375th Infantry Division defended the previous line with one regiment, with the remaining units from 9.00 on 16.12 advancing in the direction of NEKRASOVO;

22 skis. The baht advanced in the direction of ANDREIKOVO.

31st Army, overcoming stubborn resistance and enemy counterattacks, she conducted offensive battles along her entire front:

The 256th Infantry Division captured the BOL area. PEREMERKI, SIMANOVO, ANDREIKOVO, VOLODINO, NEGOTINO and, overcoming enemy minefields, by the end of the day on 16.12 it reached the southeast of the outskirts of the city of KALININ;

The 250th Rifle Division fought for the capture of the LEBEDEVO area (6 km south of the city of KALININ);

247th Infantry Division captured KUROVO district (6km south of the city KALININ);

359 SD Vela the battle for mastery SALGGINO - GRISH-KINO district, but had no success;

The 119th Infantry Division, repelling counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, captured the OBUKHOVO area and continued to advance on ZAKHEEVO;

262nd Infantry Division fought for the capture of the IZMAILOVO - ZHEL-

Nino;

5 sd came out to the EZVINO district;

46 cd fought for the capture of the LUKYANOVO - GRIGO-RIEVO area."

Ivan Konev writes:
"On December 16, Kalinin was liberated as a result of joint actions by troops of the 29th and 31st armies."

Red Army soldiers enter the liberated city of Kalinin

Soviet artillerymen are transporting a 76-mm cannon mod. 1933 in the center of liberated Kalinin

Soviet cavalrymen on the streets of liberated Kalinin

M.A. Begaikin, major, former battalion commander of the 937th regiment of the 256th Infantry Division writes:

“On December 13, inspired by the successes of the offensive battles, the regiment’s soldiers stormed the village of Koltsove, and then Small and Bolshaya Peremerki, the villages of Bobachevo, Bychkovo, and by the end of December 15 they reached the eastern outskirts of Kalinin

Intelligence reported that the Germans, hiding behind barrage groups, were preparing for a hasty retreat. This gave us strength. The regiment attacked and by the morning of December 16 reached the KREPZ plant.

Developing a further offensive, the regiment reached Vagzhanov Street and on Sovetsky Lane united with the units of General Polenov.

Kalinin was ours."

During the occupation, the Germans destroyed a lot.

Panoramas of the destruction caused by the Germans

School No. 14, turned into a stable by the Germans and then burned down

M. Shchedrin writes:

“On December 16, the 256th Division, advancing under heavy fire to the southeastern outskirts of Kalinin, liberated Bolshie Peremerki and Borovlevo, and by night cleared Nikulino and Krivtsovo of the enemy.

At the same time, the 243rd Division of the 29th Army burst into the city from the north. The 250th Division of the 31st Army, having captured the village of Lebedeve, stormed the enemy’s city fortifications from the south.

And now the hour has come. The news spread across the front - Kalinin is free! A red flag fluttered over the city...

The city was disfigured. We saw blown up and burned buildings of factories and residential buildings, mountains of rubble, rubble in the streets, cemeteries dotted with crosses in place of squares.

But we had no doubt that life would return."

As a result of intense 11-day offensive operations by the armies of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (from December 5 to 16), a significant defeat was inflicted on the 86th, 110th, 129th, 161st, 162nd and 251st enemy infantry divisions, which made up almost half of all forces of the 9th. th field army.

Colonel General I.S. Konevin the House of Officers

Residents of Kalinin return to the liberated city

Residents tear down German sign boards

Although during this period the Soviet troops failed to achieve the complete destruction of the enemy group, the victory won near Kalinin was a major operational success for the Red Army, ensuring the advancement of the right wing of the Western Front and creating more favorable conditions for the development of the further offensive of the Kalinin Front in the southwestern direction.

I. Konev writes:

“Despite a number of significant shortcomings in the organization of the offensive of the front troops, the liberation of Kalinin was a major operational success for our troops.

This strengthened the position of the right wing of the Western Front and created the preconditions for a new powerful offensive, which later unfolded in connection with the return of the 30th Army to the Kalinin Front, as well as the arrival of the 39th Army from the reserve headquarters."

Commander of the Kalinin Front troops, Colonel General I.S. Konev presents government awards to soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battles for the liberation of Kalinin

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the Western Front to transfer the entire 30th Army to the Kalinin Front from 12 noon on December 16th. Its task is to strike at the rear of the 9th Army, which was defending against this front.

The left flank of the 30th Army was ordered to occupy Staritsa, and the right flank was ordered to intercept all communication routes of the enemy Kalinin group from the south and southwest in order to complete its encirclement.

The dividing line between the Western and Kalinin fronts was established along the line of Rogachevo, Art. Reshetnikovo, Kotlyaki, Fedorkovo, Bol. Ledinki (all points for the Kalinin Front inclusive).

In this regard, the command of the Western Front instructed the commander of the 1st Shock Army to take over the sector from the 30th Army south of the new demarcation line and, during the further offensive, to direct the main army group in the direction of Teryaeva-Sloboda, Yaropolets, Knyazhi Gory.

This transfer, made at the height of the operation, must be admitted, was premature, as it disrupted the interaction of the armies on the right wing of the Western Front and weakened the force of the 1st Shock Army, forcing it to expand its offensive zone in the very course of the battle, while making complex regroupings .

During the operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front advanced 60-70 km in the Torzhok-Rzhev direction, and 100-120 km in the Kalinin-Rzhev direction. The German 9th Army was defeated, but Soviet troops failed to encircle and destroy it.

Victory, albeit not complete, was achieved.

On May 9, 2012, our country celebrated the 67th anniversary of the Great Victory. On this day, it is customary to bow to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, who provided us with a bright future without wars and the loss of their loved ones, without destruction and suffering. It was a time that many people now cannot understand or feel.

On October 13, 1941, the advanced units of the German troops approached the city of Kalinin. The hastily assembled fighter squads and militia could not resist the 2nd armies and the mechanized corps of the Wehrmacht. The fascist tanks did not meet worthy resistance from the Soviet troops, the fascist battalions crossed the Volga and came close to Kalinin.

Street fighting ensued, and by the morning of October 15, Soviet troops left the city. By capturing Kalinin, Army Group Center partially solved the problem, thereby creating a dangerous situation for further advance towards Moscow. Fierce fighting continued around the city, but Soviet units were forced to retreat. Occupied Kalinin the whole place was in the power of the Nazi invaders.

In Kalinin, life was very difficult under occupation. A curfew was established from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. The mayor of the city ordered all specialists and workers of the city to appear for registration at the city government. The administration was located on Krasnoarmeyskaya Street (now the street). Crossing the Volga and Tvertsa rivers on ice was strictly prohibited. An order was also issued by the commandant's office to carry out public executions of all those suspected of having connections with the partisans, to shoot without distinction of gender, those who were found with weapons, and teenagers detained without passes were ordered to be flogged.

The population of the occupied city had no information about the actual state of affairs on the fronts; rumors were spread that Moscow was surrounded by the Germans, the Red Army had nothing to fight with, no weapons and food.

Already in October it was frosty and cold in Kalinin. During the day, when it got warmer, the Germans appeared on the streets and walked around the streets in only their jackets, without overcoats. Some rode bicycles with red tires, which were unusual for us.

As eyewitnesses recall, the Nazis had a clear organization of air defense. Our air raids and artillery shelling continued regularly. Attempts to drive out the Nazis did not stop from the first days of the occupation of the city. Once our troops managed to capture a railway bridge across the Volga, but failed to hold an important strategic facility.

The Germans tried to advance north, they even got to, but were repulsed by our troops. There was practically not a single day or night without shots, explosions, or fires. During the days of bombing and shelling, residents waited in shelters. When repelling our air raids, the Germans organized a clearly coordinated defense.

As soon as a group of our planes appeared in the sky and approached a certain point, the city, as if on a single command, seemed to explode, spewing fiery trails of bullets and shells towards the planes. Some planes left, dropping bombs anywhere, others took a reverse course, many of them were shot down. One of our bombers fell in the area of ​​Khlebnaya Square (now Tverskaya) and did not explode.

In the suburbs of Kalinin, the villages of Staroye and Novoye Kalikino were destroyed. In the surviving houses of Old Kalikino, Germans settled down, roasting chickens, slaughtering piglets, and drinking alcohol. The remaining village residents were forced to cook food, heat stoves, and local residents were not allowed to go to the forest. Residents hid their property and remaining food supplies from the Nazis as best they could.

In the city, on Revolution Square, monuments to Lenin and Stalin have been thrown off their pedestals, and in the park there are many birch crosses on the graves of German soldiers. On the pedestal, instead of a statue of a leader, there is a huge swastika. The Germans did not touch the monument to Pushkin and the bust of Karl Marx.

Soon by December 1941, the intensity of German movement in the city began to increase. The columns reached out to Proletarka, it became clear that the Nazis were leaving the city in an organized manner. By the evening of December 15, the Germans blew up bridges in the city, set fire to many buildings, and Malye Peremerki was also on fire.

The fighting continued into the night. By 3 o'clock in the morning, the 243rd Rifle Division liberated the northern part of Kalinin, and by morning they broke through to the station. By 11 o'clock, December 16, 1941, the city was occupied by our troops.

The city lay in ruins, industrial enterprises were destroyed, bridges were blown up, the railway station was badly damaged, the Youth Theater, cinemas, schools, 7,700 residential buildings were destroyed, the water supply and sewerage network, tram tracks, and radiotelephone network were damaged. From the hands of the fascists in occupied Kalinin More than 2,000 townspeople died.

By the end of December 1941, the city began to come to life, a bakery and a bathhouse were operational, electricity was supplied to residents' homes, and on December 30, orders and medals were awarded to Red Army soldiers in .

Local authorities returned to the city. A canteen and a hairdresser's salon were opened on Belyakovsky Lane. The miraculously surviving Zvezda cinema began showing films.

By February 1942, tram service was restored and schools began to open. Life in Kalinin gradually began to improve.

I will be glad to see your comments.

At the beginning of October 1941, the military situation of the Soviet Union became very close to a state defined by the term “catastrophe.”

Despite the fact that the Barbarossa blitzkrieg encountered stubborn resistance from the Red Army, Hitler's Germany was close to achieving one of its main goals: the capture of Moscow.

City of strategic importance

The Nazi breakthrough in the Vyazma area, followed by the encirclement of the Soviet armies, created a situation in which there were practically no units left on the way to Moscow capable of resisting.

On October 12, 1941, the advanced units of the Nazis approached Kalinin (Tver). The city with a population of 216 thousand people was not just a large industrial center. The largest transport arteries converged here: the Moscow-Leningrad highway, the Volga waterway and the Oktyabrskaya Railway.

The Nazis planned to use Kalinin not only as a strong point for a further attack on Moscow. In the future, from here, Wehrmacht strategists intended to strike in the direction of Leningrad, Yaroslavl, and Rybinsk.

In theory, defense lines were prepared on the approaches to Kalinin. But the advancing Germans passed them without a fight: there were physically no troops to protect them.

German sign to the city of Kalinin, 1941. Photo: RIA Novosti / Pavel Kasatkin

“I arrived in Kalinin and found myself in a very difficult situation”

Future Marshal of Victory Ivan Konev ended up in Kalinin under dramatic circumstances: he was threatened with a tribunal after the disaster near Vyazma, but the one who intervened Zhukov saved Konev, making him his deputy and sending him to restore order in the Kalinin direction.

“On October 12, as commander of a group of troops, I arrived in Kalinin and immediately found myself in a very difficult situation,” Konev wrote in his memoirs.

“Difficult situation” is putting it mildly. German hordes were moving towards the city, and the Soviet group existed only in theory. In Kalinin itself, only cadets and fighter squads made up of workers remained.

Headquarters understood that the situation was deplorable, and urgently transferred everything they could collect. At that moment, the Germans were approaching the city on one side, and trains with units of the 5th Infantry Division on the other. Lieutenant Colonel Telkov.

To say that the division was weakened is to say nothing. The three rifle regiments had an average of 430 soldiers armed with rifles, plus 7 heavy and 11 light machine guns. The artillery consisted of 14 guns of 76 and 122 mm caliber, as well as six anti-tank guns.

Artillerymen fire near the city of Kalinin, 1941. Photo: RIA Novosti / Alexander Kapustyansky

Defense units were hacked with flamethrower tanks

Parts of the division were ordered to take up defensive positions and hold out at all costs along with the cadets and militia. It was necessary to gain time for new reinforcements to arrive.

On the morning of October 13, fighting began to boil. The Germans threw aircraft and tanks into battle, trying to crush pockets of Soviet defense.

It was not possible to knock the Red Army soldiers out of their positions on the move. On the night of October 14, the 256th Infantry Division arrived in the city. General Goryachev.

But still these forces were extremely small. By the morning of October 14, the Nazis targeted Kalinin with a group consisting of the 1st Tank Division, the 900th Motorized Brigade and parts of the forces of the 36th Motorized Division. In total, this striking fist numbered about 20,000 people.

According to some estimates, the attackers outnumbered the defenders by eight times, which, it would seem, left no chance for the Soviet units.

Nevertheless, the fighting on the outskirts and in Kalinin itself was stubborn and fierce. German officers who participated in the battles recalled that the Russians fought for every strong point and had to use flamethrowers and flamethrower tanks to take them.

By the morning of October 15, the 5th Infantry Division, having lost about 400 people killed and wounded from its more than modest strength, was forced to retreat to the outskirts of Kalinin, to the line of the Konstantinovka - M. Peremerki - Kotovo stations.

The 256th Rifle Division, after fierce fighting, also retreated to new lines, but together with the advanced units of the 8th Tank Brigade that came to the rescue Colonel Rotmistrov and the 16th Border Regiment prevented the Germans from breaking through to Torzhok.

Soviet soldiers in Kalinin, 1941. Photo: RIA Novosti

Going to their death: how a tank brigade raid horrified the Nazis

The Nazis captured Kalinin, but big problems arose with plans for further advancement. Hastily created task force General Vatutin with a total number of 20,000 people, supported by 200 guns and mortars and 20 tanks, cut off the German group that had pulled ahead and defeated it by October 21.

By this time, by decision of the Headquarters, the Kalinin Front was formed, to which four armies of the Western Front were transferred. Ivan Konev was appointed commander of the front.

The raid of the 21st Tank Brigade went down in history. A unit hastily formed in Vladimir was given the task of going to the rear of the Kalinin group of Germans, facilitating the operation to liberate the city.

It was a desperate move. The tankers marched without cover from enemy air strikes, breaking through areas equipped with anti-tank guns.

Of the 27 T-34 tanks and 8 T-60 tanks that moved to Kalinin on the morning of October 17, only 8 reached the city itself. Tank senior sergeant Stepan Gorobets passed through Kalinin from west to east, spreading panic among the Nazis. The T-34 crew managed to destroy one enemy tank, up to 20 vehicles and several dozen Nazis.

In total, the 21st brigade during the raid destroyed 38 enemy tanks, up to 200 vehicles, 82 motorcycles, about 70 guns and mortars, at least 16 aircraft at airfields, 12 fuel tanks, and a large number of soldiers and officers.

The brigade's losses were also very heavy: 25 tanks and 450 personnel. In this raid they died the death of the brave Heroes of the Soviet Union Mikhail Agibalov And Mikhail Lukin, awarded a high rank for the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

Broken German tanks near Moscow. Photo: RIA Novosti / Samariy Gurariy

“The chances of bypassing Moscow from the north and south at the same time were very slim”

The fierce resistance of the Soviet troops and the counterattacks forced Commander of Army Group Center von Bock On October 23, decide to suspend offensive operations in the Kalinin area.

While remaining in the hands of the Germans, the city was so close to the front line that the Nazis were unable to take advantage of all its advantages.

Commander of the German 3rd Panzer Group Hermann Hoth wrote in his memoirs: “The 3rd Tank Group, due to a lack of fuel, was stretched between Vyazma and Kalinin and got stuck in this area, getting involved in heavy fighting near Kalinin, and was already experiencing a shortage of ammunition. Large combat-ready enemy forces, concentrated along the left bank of the Volga and north-west of Rzhev, hung over its flank. Thus, the chances of bypassing Moscow from the north and south at the same time were very low.”

The front in the Kalinin direction has stabilized at the line Selizharovo - the Bolshaya Kosha River - the Darkness River - the northern and eastern outskirts of the city of Kalinin - the western bank of the Volga Reservoir.

Red Army soldiers demonstrate the first German banners captured in the battles for the liberation of the city of Kalinin. Photo: RIA Novosti / Alexander Glichev

Liberation

Attempts by the Soviet command to recapture Kalinin were unsuccessful. On the other hand, the activity of our troops pinned down 13 infantry divisions of Army Group Center, which the Nazis were unable to use in the direction of the main attack during the November offensive on Moscow.

On December 5, 1941, units of the Kalinin Front launched a counteroffensive. By the end of December 9, units of the 31st Army Major General Yushkevich, having broken through the enemy defenses, advanced 15 km and created a threat to the rear of the enemy group in the Kalinin area.

The threat of encirclement loomed over the German group. Despite all the strategic importance of Kalinin, the Nazis decided to retreat. By 13:00 on December 16, 1941, the city of Kalinin was completely cleared of enemy troops.