Yuri Andropov's Fifth Point Many Russian authors were interested in Yuri Andropov's... nationality. The fact is that in most official biographies this “important” item was absent. We will not once again quote all the "evidence" that Yuri

What the special department did The special department of the Cheka was organized according to the order of the Department of Affairs of the Cheka No. Gleb Ivanovich Bokiy was appointed his chief. Although officially the special department appeared much later - on May 5, 1921, when the Small Council

What did the Fifth Glaucus do? Contrary to popular belief, the employees of this division of the Lubyanka looked after not only dissidents, but also solved many other tasks in the field of ensuring state security. We will not go into detail about all

FIFTH He died on an October evening in 1995 at a respectable age of eighty-two. The last years were terrible: not only tedious, slowly killing old age, which was slightly brightened up by the new young wife, was tormented, it infuriated and oppressed the hype raised by

Fifth day of the war “The next day, Sasha and I treated Heineman to breakfast. He told us the latest news from the front, which circulated in the imperial office and differed sharply from the victorious reports published by the German newspapers. In fact, the position

Forming a negative public opinion around the KGB, the media (both Western and many domestic) tried to give the state security the image of a sinister department that was engaged only in "political investigation" in order to suppress "dissent" in the country. Under false, far-fetched pretexts, the 5th Directorate, and then other counterintelligence units of the KGB, were disbanded, and most of the employees were dismissed without presenting any claims. Others wrote resignations on their own initiative. Having lost the 5th Directorate, the country was essentially left without a special unit responsible for ensuring the country's internal security. This is a paradox, and, perhaps, a crime, which descendants will have to deal with.

For a long time, the fifth division of the KGB of the USSR was headed by Fedor Alekseevich Shcherbak, who was called none other than the patriarch of the Soviet counterintelligence. His people successfully carried out work to protect state secrets from foreign intelligence, this KGB team exposed more than a dozen agents of Western intelligence services. He also has a lot of prevented preconditions for emergencies and accidents. Of particular note are the actions of the Chekists of this unit related to the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy. After receiving the first information about it, F. Shcherbak immediately flew to an emergency, took a personal part in the investigation of its causes and organized the permanent work of his operational staff here. Mikhail Malykh, Vitaly Prilukov, Nikolai Sham and others arrived in Chernobyl in shifts. All of them acquired the most unique experience in liquidating the consequences of such accidents, and all of them “caught” increased doses of radiation at the same time. But no one gave in, not one of the Chekists tried to evade the performance of life-threatening duties.

Who benefited from this course of events? When the 5th Directorate of the KGB was created, the experience of such foreign departments was carefully studied. And I want to emphasize right away that many of their activities were recognized as completely unsuitable for imitation and any borrowing. Here, in order to be correctly understood, I am again forced to turn to documentary materials of foreign origin. The function of protecting the existing system is colloquially called "political investigation", and special units for its implementation exist in many developed countries of the world, by no means being a Soviet "invention". For the uninitiated, and especially for those misled by false propaganda, I can say that in the UK the functions of political investigation are entrusted to the MI5 Security Service, in France - to the Central Directorate of General Information (DTSRG), in Germany - to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFF). But the most powerful special body in the world that has been dealing with “internal intelligence” since 1936 is the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Organizationally, the FBI consists of a headquarters located in Washington, 10 departments, 56 regional offices and 390 separate points. The main function of the department is to collect information about various public organizations in order to determine the degree of their danger to the US political system. In the fight against "subversive elements," the FBI makes extensive use of undercover capabilities, electronic eavesdropping, perusal of correspondence, computer computing centers, and other modern means and methods of activity. And the organizational core of all the activities of the FBI was the official system of administrative registration. It arose and began to develop in the United States before the Second World War.

The system of administrative registration is of great importance for the operational activities of the FBI and other counterintelligence services. Through it, a record is kept of individuals and organizations that are of increased interest to the FBI and that need to be kept under review. It helps to compile lists of citizens who are not admitted to special facilities and to classified data. These people cannot be hired for work related to secret documents, not only in state institutions, but also in private firms that carry out military orders or have advanced equipment and technology. According to information published in the press, already in 1977 the FBI had a file cabinet of 58 million cards, as well as more than 6.5 million dossiers. In addition to this, the army's counterintelligence services had 100,000 dossiers on Americans - mainly those who participated in the anti-war movement.

This is far from a complete picture of the FBI's activities in the field of political investigation. US intelligence agencies, in addition to administrative registration, have extensive computer records of Americans and foreigners permanently residing in the US. In addition, the FBI has access to electronic databases of many US government agencies. For example, the Office of Technology Assessment of the US Congress published a report in 1985, which indicated that the computer memory of 97 federal agencies contains information on almost every adult American. Currently, a project is being developed to create the largest computer system that will simultaneously store systematized information for more than 100 million people.

Nothing like this existed in the work of the 5th Directorate and the KGB as a whole, such a large-scale "study" of fellow citizens was not even thought of, was not planned.
The system of KGB bodies did not provide for and did not exist operational records like the American system of administrative registration, which undoubtedly leads to infringement of civil rights. At the same time, the functions of ensuring internal security in all countries are implemented by some kind of “standard”, similar methods of operational activities, which allow collecting information about organizations and individuals dangerous to the state.

Political investigation is one of such forms. Why, then, in America this phenomenon is presented to the public as a natural necessity that protects the country from troubles and cataclysms, while in Russia, at the suggestion of the so-called "architects" and "perestroikas", it was and is considered as a painful syndrome, as violence against a person?

True, the American-style political investigation has one feature that made it more “democratic”, or something, than the similar activities of the special services in the USSR. Unlike our country, where high party officials were protected from the "attention" of the internal security services, the FBI does not bypass the attention of those in power. Before him, everyone is on an equal footing. It is known that as part of its activities, the FBI also carries out a number of so-called applied investigations for its own purposes, as well as for other federal departments. These investigations are carried out in accordance with special presidential directives, ministry orders, or directions from the Attorney General (Minister of Justice). For example, a thorough check of the biographical data and personal qualities of candidates for responsible positions in federal departments is carried out. In short, political investigation in America is on a grand scale and, it must be said, quite reliably serves the interests of the Americans.

In the memory of many Muscovites, and perhaps readers of this article from the library of the forum http://www.forum-orion.com, the terrible experiences of the 70s associated with the explosion in the subway are apparently preserved. It was the employees of the former 5th Directorate who led the search, and then neutralized a group of nationalist maniacs who had made explosive devices and brought them into the car. Chekists worked day and night, not only in Moscow, but also in many other cities of the country, where a new atrocity could be prepared. And it was prevented, because at the Kursk railway station a few months later analogues of explosive devices were seized, which led to the criminals.

Recalling those events, I would especially like to note that the Chekists not only prevented a new monstrous atrocity, but on the basis of their investigation developed an additional metro security system, which turned out to be very reliable and, as far as I know, made it possible, about ten years later, to detect and neutralize even more powerful explosive devices left at two Moscow metro stations by other criminals. Without belittling the work and merits of many other Chekists, I would like to name here the names of those who directly participated in these events. Among them are E. Zyazin, O. Kalinin, I. Komarov, E. Kasparov.

During the search for the criminals who carried out the explosion in the Moscow metro, the Chekists developed special methods for investigating the scene and searching for criminals by the slightest remaining signs and details. These techniques are still used today in the work of security agencies, and therefore it is impossible to talk about them in detail. But two examples can still be given. In the eighties, the security officers, for example, discovered a workshop where a timely defused explosive device was made, planted again in the subway, according to a very unusual and rather unexpected sign. On the package in which it was placed, through careful examination, they found pollen from the flowers of a very rare tree that grew in only two botanical gardens in our country. Behind the fence of one of them was a workshop ...

Another example. The maniac-murderer, whose victims were more than 30 women in Belarus, was tracked down by specialists from the 5th Directorate on the basis of a short note left at the scene of the last crime. It contained the words: "Cops, x ... you will find me." The handwriting was somewhat changed, but some of its features made it possible to organize a targeted operational search and, in the end, led to the criminal. He was "figured out" by KGB employees who owned a unique, perhaps unparalleled in other special services, method of searching for the perpetrators of anonymous documents with threats. On the basis of their own experience, as well as taking into account international practice, a coherent system of measures was debugged in the 5th Directorate to identify such persons harboring terrorist intentions. By way of explanation, in particular, one of the characteristic details of this technique can be cited. It is logical and simple: a person who has grown up in a given decade uses the most characteristic expressions of his time. It is unlikely, for example, that a person in the 1970s would use the word "summit". Most likely, he will write the word “meeting” or “meeting”, and if he has a criminal past, then “gathering”.

It is important to emphasize that the operational methods and records developed in the 5th Directorate were created for the sole purpose of searching for persons who have committed crimes that threaten the security of the state and society. These techniques also served to solve another, in my opinion, even more important task - the prevention of such crimes, that is, the identification of the persons who conceived and prepared them. And I do not know of cases when they would be used for other purposes.

The main function of the 5th Directorate of the KGB was to combat activities aimed at preparing or committing especially dangerous state crimes, which meant, first of all, crimes that had the specific goal of undermining or weakening the existing power in the country. As you know, the main article of the criminal code, which was within the competence of the department, was article 70 - anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Later, Article 190 (1) was added to it - this is the spread of deliberately false fabrications that discredit the state and social system.
Yes, in the history of the KGB, the 5th Directorate and some of its territorial divisions, there were operational cases, the documentary materials of which, confirmed by testimonies, made it possible to prosecute a number of persons under Articles 70 and 190 (1). The guilt of each of them was determined by the court, and not by employees or investigators of the KGB. And by the way, most of the people convicted under those articles ended up in the camp of the destroyers of the former USSR, and now they are directly cooperating either with the Western intelligence services or with foreign reactionary forces in causing damage to the Russian Federation. If necessary, I can give their names and give specific facts ...

Unfortunately, the leadership of the USSR after the death of Yu.V. And moreover, I want to repeat that "above" a lot of efforts were made to paralyze the activities of the Chekists. But despite the most powerful moral persecution and systematic "reform", which resulted in irreparable personnel losses, the state security agencies continued to conscientiously fulfill their functional duties and, first of all, to obtain the most important information about external and internal threats to the country's security.

Andropov expanded the network of local KGB bodies and formed new departments in the central apparatus in order to more reliably cover all aspects of the country's life. But he immediately singled out the main, from his point of view, link - control over the spiritual state of society. The Hungarian experience told him that the main danger to socialism came from ideological erosion.

A month and a half after arriving at Lubyanka, on July 3, 1967, Andropov sent a note to the Central Committee, in which he describes the actions of subversive forces aimed at "creating anti-Soviet underground groups, inciting nationalist tendencies, and reviving the reactionary activities of churchmen and sectarians."

The new chairman of the KGB signaled that under the influence of an ideology alien to us, some of the politically immature Soviet citizens, especially among the intelligentsia and young people, are developing a mood of apoliticality and nihilism, which can be used not only by obviously anti-Soviet elements, but also by poetic talkers and demagogues, pushing such people to politically harmful actions.

Andropov proposed the creation of units in the center and in the localities that would focus on combating ideological sabotage.

On July 17, 1967, the Politburo supported Andropov’s proposal: “Create an independent (fifth) Directorate for organizing counterintelligence work to combat enemy ideological sabotage in the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In the KGB of the republics, the KGB in the territories and regions, to have, respectively, the fifth Directorate-departments-departments ... "

In order to please the Central Committee of the CPSU and emphasize the ideological nature of the new structure, they took a party worker as the first head of the department. On Staraya Ploshad, Alexander Fedorovich Kadashev, Secretary of the Stavropol Territory Committee of the CPSU for Propaganda, was recommended for this role.

Kadashev graduated from the Tula Mechanical Institute in the spring of 1941. He was not mobilized into the army, because he worked as a foreman at a military factory No. 172, which was evacuated to Perm. From the factory he was taken to the Perm City Party Committee as an instructor in the industrial department. A year later, they were sent to study at the Higher Party School, from there they were invited to work in the propaganda and agitation department of the Central Committee of the ICP (b).

Alexander Kadashev wanted to study, in 1952 he entered the Academy of Social Sciences, where he defended his Ph.D. thesis, after which he went to Arkhangelsk for five years as the secretary of the regional committee. In 1960, he was transferred to the larger Stavropol Regional Committee, but put in a smaller position - the head of the department. However, two years later he became secretary of the regional committee and sat in this chair for five years. The most famous Stavropol resident, Mikhail Gorbachev, was in charge of a department in the regional committee. He was elected secretary of the regional committee after Kadashev was transferred to the KGB. Alexander Fedorovich was dissatisfied with his appointment to the committee, but submitted to party discipline.

Major General Filipp Denisovich Bobkov was appointed first deputy to Kadashev. He told how late in the evening he was invited to the office of the chairman of the KGB and Andropov suggested that he move to the new department for combating ideological sabotage. Bobkov had been deputy head of the second main department for six years and was also dissatisfied with the appointment. Apparently, he considered this a demotion and did not assume that the transition to the fifth department opened the way for him to a great career.

In his memoir, Bobkov writes that he was skeptical about Andropov's idea: whether the new administration would become an analogue of the secret political department of the NKVD, which dealt with the political opposition.

No, the new management must meet the challenges of today, - objected Andropov. - Now there is a powerful psychological attack on us, this is a real ideological war, the question is being decided: who wins. We must know the plans and methods of work of ideological opponents. It seems to me that the main task of the created department is a deep political analysis of the situation and, if possible, the most accurate forecast.

It is difficult to question a conversation in which he himself was not present, but Philip Denisovich's warning about repeating the experience of the NKVD looks naive. The struggle against "anti-Soviet elements," as this line was called in the practice of state security, never stopped. The corresponding unit was called a department or department, changed its serial number, but remained during the Khrushchev thaw. In this direction, the operative worker Bobkov grew up.

In February 1960, the then chairman of the KGB, Alexander Nikolaevich Shelepin, following Khrushchev's line, abolished the fourth department, which was engaged in the fight against anti-Soviet elements and was in charge of the intelligentsia, as an independent structure. Shelepin believed that keeping track of writers, artists, actors was not the main task of the KGB, and there was no need to keep a whole department for this. He transferred a slightly reduced apparatus and these duties to the second main department.

The same Bobkov, who served in the fourth department, headed the department in the second head office, and then received a promotion and became deputy head of all counterintelligence, but was still in charge of work among the intelligentsia. So Philip Denisovich could not but understand that Andropov simply wants to give work among the intelligentsia a new scale and scope. Another thing is that Bobkov, apparently, expected to head the department himself. But Yuri Vladimirovich, one must understand, explained to him: it is important for the Central Committee that the ideological department be headed by a party worker.

Bobkov didn't fail. Kadashev did not take root in the security system and after a little over a year he himself asked to find another place for him. He was not sent to party work; as a candidate of sciences, he was sent to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU to head the department of party building. When he began to get sick, he wrote a statement with a request to transfer him from the nomenklatura position of the head of the department (he was entitled to the corresponding material benefits) simply to scientific employees. This is the only case in the history of the Institute. People who knew him said that Alexander Fedorovich was an exceptionally decent and honest person.

From May 1969, Philip Denisovich Bobkov headed the Fifth Directorate. He will work in the department for many years and eventually become an army general and first deputy chairman of the KGB.

Georgy Arbatov writes that Andropov was pleased with his idea, saying with joy:

I removed work with the intelligentsia from counterintelligence. You can't treat writers and scientists as potential spies. Now everything will be different, other people will take care of the affairs of the intelligentsia, and the emphasis will be placed primarily on prevention, on the prevention of undesirable phenomena.

Yuri Vladimirovich had a remarkable ability to adapt to his interlocutor. He carried on the conversation so deftly that different people, often with opposing political views, sincerely considered the KGB chairman to be their like-minded person.

I remember very well the story of my father after the meeting with Andropov. Having resolved a specific issue, Yuri Vladimirovich started a conversation on general topics. My father, a very frank and open person, spoke about the need for changes. Why not nominate at the elections not one candidate for deputies (this is pure profanation!), but at least two? The next elections to the Supreme Soviet were just being prepared...

Andropov listened to him very attentively and, hearing these words, asked again:

So you think so too?

Father left Andropov inspired and confident that he had found a like-minded person in the person of Yuri Vladimirovich. Then it turned out that the chairman of the KGB considered any political reforms mortally dangerous for a socialist society...

It is not surprising that the Fifth Directorate of the KGB took over the functions of the political police. Here is one of the first actions of the new structure - a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU dated August 30, 1967:

“The State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR has information that Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Head of the Department of Philosophy Faculty of Moscow State University Zinoviev Alexander Alexandrovich, born in 1922, in the period 1957-1958 took part in gatherings of young specialists-philosophers, at which he spoke with negative views on certain issues of the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

In September 1960, Professor Klein of Columbia University was in Moscow as an autotourist, who brought and handed Zinoviev a letter from the American Comey David. Klein and Komi are known to the state security agencies as persons who were directly involved in the processing and recruitment of Soviet citizens to work for American intelligence.

An analysis of the letter, obtained by operative means, shows that it touches upon issues that go beyond the scope of correspondence of a scientific nature. In particular, the author of the letter was interested in the state of logic as a science in the USSR, exchanged Zinoviev's attitude to the theory of Marxism-laziness of the lower-mv, asked to identify individual scientists working in Soviet scientific institutions and to report on what they were working on.

The answer to the letter given by Zinoviev to Klyany was found in a specially equipped hiding place in the American's car. From 1960 to 1965, Zinoviev corresponded with Klein and Komi, systematically sent them Soviet publications on philosophical literature.

In the past, Zinoviev abused alcohol, on the basis of which quarrels arose in his family. Currently, Zinoviev is divorced from his wife.

This is an absolutely pathetic denunciation, worthy of the pen of an envious colleague, and not of a huge institution, which was the state security committee. But such was the real level of work of the fifth department. Moreover, the document testifies to the scale of surveillance and undercover apparatus, because the philosopher Zinoviev recalled statements ten years ago. It became obvious that every contact of a Soviet person with a foreigner was recorded and considered as criminal...

Even in the Central Committee, where this denunciation had to be dealt with, the paper was considered unimportant. On October 6, 1967, the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central Committee reported:

“Zinoviev was invited to the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In a conversation and in an explanatory note, Zinoviev basically confirmed the facts indicated in the information of the State Security Committee, but considered his connection with Klein and Komi as with scientists.

Given that Zinoviev's direct connection with the Americans Klein and Komi has not been maintained since 1965, we would consider it possible to confine ourselves to a conversation with Zinoviev in the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Alexander Zinoviev was a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences and headed the department of logic at the university. The actions of the Chekists played a role in the fact that the philosopher finally parted ways with the existing system. In 1976, his most famous book, Yawning Heights, appeared abroad, a sharp satire on the Soviet system. In 1978 he emigrated. After perestroika, he returned, he was published a lot, Zinoviev's books were a great success ...

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov never worked in production, did not create anything with his own hands. I didn't know the economy or real life. I felt confident only in the sphere of ideology. Therefore, he was engaged in intellectuals, artistic and scientific, tried to influence the situation in literature and art.

“This confirms my old idea about the unreality of real life and the omnipotence of literature, which does not reproduce, does not reflect, but creates reality,” writer Yuri Nagibin noted in his diary. - There is no other reality than literary. That is why our leadership seeks to correct literature, not life. It is important that everything looks good in literature, but no one is interested in how it was in reality.

On November 14, 1967, Andropov sent a note to the Central Committee about the mood among the intelligentsia, which also cannot be called anything other than a denunciation:

“According to the information received by the State Security Committee, a group of scientists and representatives of the creative intelligentsia in the amount of more than 100 people signed a document in which the policy of our party and the state in the field of the press is deliberately distorted, the question of the abolition of censorship and the abolition of Glavlit is raised, the essentially unlimited right of any person, group of persons to publish any printed publications, to stage performances, produce and show films, organize exhibitions and concerts, and carry out radio - and TV shows.

Among the signatories are academicians Leontovich, Sakharov, Kapitsa, Knunyants, writers Kosterin, Kaverin, Kopelev, composers Peiko, Ledenev, Karetnikov, artists Birger, Zhilinsky and others. This document is addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. A copy of the document obtained by the measures taken by us is sent in the order of information.

The Committee is taking additional measures to suppress the activities of the organizers of this document.”

How cleverly the Chekists inflated their worth! The signatories of this document did not hide it at all, on the contrary, they dutifully handed it over to the Presidium of the Supreme Council. There was no need to obtain this document by KGB methods. And in general, why “stop” the activities of respected people, many of whom have done much more for their homeland than all the services that persecuted them? They did not propose anything that would go beyond the constitution.

This appeal could not be brought under the definition of "ideological sabotage". So, strictly speaking, the KGB went beyond its competence. But this is exactly what Andropov wanted to do: to burn out any dissent, especially if it is expressed publicly. Under Andropov, the political police flourished. The creation of a separate department, as expected, increased the number of cases against the intelligentsia. The fact that the days of the second main office was a third-rate task became the main one for the fifth department. The Chekists, freed from the need to look for spies, who were still not enough for such a large committee, zealously took up the intelligentsia.

In the fifth department, six departments were formed (see the reference book by A. Kokurin and N. Petrov “Lubyanka. Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB. 1917-199U):

the first department - counterintelligence support of cultural exchange channels, work through creative unions, research institutes, cultural institutions;

the second department - counterintelligence operations - together with intelligence - against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states, suppression of the activities of the People's Labor Union;

the third department - counterintelligence support of student exchange, suppression of hostile activities among students and teachers;

the fourth department - counterintelligence work among religious, Zionist and sectarian elements, opposition to foreign religious centers;

the fifth department is curatorial, it provided assistance to territorial bodies in preventing mass antisocial manifestations. In addition - the search for authors of anti-Soviet documents;

the sixth department - analysis of the enemy's ideological sabotage, planning and information work.

After the assassination attempt on Brezhnev in 1969, the seventh department was formed with the task of "identifying and revealing persons who intend to use explosives and explosive devices for anti-Soviet purposes", in other words, the fight against those who planned an attempt on the life of the leaders of the party and state.

In the summer of 1973, the eighth department appeared, which was given the task of "identifying and suppressing acts of ideological sabotage by subversive Zionist centers." This department was personally supervised by the head of department.

The following year, two more departments were created at once.

The ninth was charged with "conducting the most important developments on persons suspected of organized anti-Soviet activities." It stood out as an independent structure of the department, which dealt with the most prominent dissidents, such as Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov.

The tenth department was supposed to help the second department fight "against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states and foreign anti-Soviet organizations."

In the summer of 1977, the eleventh department appeared, which was charged with carrying out "operational-Chekist measures to disrupt the subversive actions of the enemy and hostile elements during the preparation and holding of the 1980 Summer Olympics" in Moscow. After the Olympics, the department remained - it was in charge of sports and medicine.

A small group, as the twelfth department, was instructed to establish contacts with colleagues from the socialist countries.

In February 1982, two additional divisions were formed.

The thirteenth department was in charge of informal youth movements - punks, hippies and the first domestic fascists. Fourteenth - journalists. In November 1983, the fifteenth department appeared, which was engaged in the Dynamo sports society, which traditionally belonged to the Chekist department.

I was told in detail about the work of the Fifth Directorate by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Nikolaevich Kichikhin, who had worked in Bobkov's department since 1977. The lieutenant colonel drank with a political temperament. During his service in the committee, he dealt with the Soviet Germans, who were evicted from their homes during the war years. In the years of perestroika, Alexander Kichikhin supported the demands of the Germans to restore the Autonomous Republic of the Volga Germans, which was liquidated in the forty-first, spoke at rallies.

How many people did you employ? I asked Kichikhin.

When I arrived, about two hundred. It was the smallest department in the central apparatus of the KGB. Others consisted of many thousands. On the eve of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, our management grew to six hundred people. All departments have been enlarged. If before the Olympics, for example, there was a small division involved in sports and athletes, then during the Olympics, about five hundred employees were concentrated in this area.

(The KGB and the Olympics are a separate issue. During the days of the Olympics, the Moscow department of the KGB was strengthened - two thousand employees of the central apparatus, nine hundred security officers from all over the country, and more than four hundred cadets and teachers of the Oryol School of Communications passed into its operational subordination.

For mass events, the Moscow KGB received two specially equipped staff buses and vehicles with all types of communications. After the Olympics, many officers were awarded orders. The head of the KGB department in the capital, General Alidin, received the Order of the Red Banner - as for a military operation - and the badge of the laureate of the USSR State Prize.)

Who worked in the fifth department? Were they distinguished by something in the KGB apparatus?

We differed from all other departments in that we had very few "golden youth", people with connections, someone's sons.

Was your management considered unprestigious?

Guys with connections settled in the first head office, in intelligence, because it was the surest way to go abroad. But we considered our management more significant than others.

The Fifth Directorate BETTER than anyone on the committee knew what was going on in society. Intelligence dealt with foreign affairs. Most of the counterintelligence was also aimed at foreigners. And only we did all the dirty work and studied the moods and processes in society. We did not see life from the window of a personal car, we did not study it from the newspapers. We believed that our analysis of the processes in society is necessary for the leadership of the country, will help our leaders to make the right decisions, to correct something.

Did you really believe in it?

We were told this at every meeting. After all, inside the committee there was a constant psychological treatment of employees. Top down and bottom up. I mean, we brainwashed each other. Filipp Denisovich Bobkov led the Fifth Directorate for fifteen years and, when he was appointed deputy chairman of the KGB, continued to supervise us. Bobkov, hiring, himself talked with each newcomer.

General Bobkov is considered responsible for the entire campaign against dissent.

If not for Bobkov, this struggle would have been waged by the methods of the thirty-seventh year. The instructions that came from the Central Committee of the CPSU and which he was obliged to fulfill, Bobkov nevertheless transformed into orders not to destroy, but to persuade, Philip Denisovich, from my point of view, is a highly competent person. But he could not go beyond the framework of the system, determined by the orders of the authorities, on the one hand, and information from below, on the other. Inasmuch as I have been in government for ten years, I have not dealt with the repressed peoples, I can give such an example. Since 1969 we have been writing memos to the Central Committee of the CPSU stating that it is necessary to restore the autonomy of the Volga Germans.

What has changed since he left?

When Bobkov was promoted to deputy chairman, many thieves appeared in the management. They were seated exclusively in the exit departments. This, of course, was the department for working with the creative intelligentsia, because with writers, artists, musicians, as well as with athletes, it was possible to travel abroad. Skillful guys got there. They took away albums, booklets from the "fined" artists and distributed them to the right people. The department that dealt with youth attached the right children to the university. Every July, the department compiled a corresponding list ...

Did the management really imagine the situation in the country?

We had reliable information about what was happening. But, sending certificates and reports to the Central Committee, to the Council of Ministers, we had to give them a form corresponding to the line of the Party. For example, the Crimean Tatars were actively fiddling with the highest echelon of power, and we were instructed to “not allow extremist actions” - that is, terrorist acts, disruption of the transport and economy, strikes. We did all this. But we realized that the movement of the Crimean Tatars will not subside until their issue is resolved. When we sent a certificate to the Central Committee, we, of course, wrote about extremists, but at the same time we proposed ways of a political solution. On Staraya Square they read our papers, but they did not want to decide anything. And we received verbal, naturally, instructions to plant.

But how could a competent and well, according to your elephants, knowledgeable member of the committee be engaged in strangling the domestic intelligentsia?

Imagine yourself in the place of any management employee. If you do not consider dangerous what the authorities consider dangerous, you will simply be removed. Many employees adjusted to the opinion of their superiors, reported what they wanted to hear from them. If the general thinks writer N is not good, how can I say that he is good?

Materials about the activities of the Fifth Directorate, made public after the transformation of the KGB, paint a picture of the massive penetration of KGB agents into all creative unions, theaters, and cinema. Is it really true?

Some people from this environment cooperated with us and tried to use the committee in order to convey something very important to the country's leadership and somehow improve our life. Others hoped to advance in life or receive some material benefits. We helped publish a book, go abroad, get an apartment, put a telephone.

Did you pay big money to your agents?

Paid agents were a rarity in our administration. Our contingent did not need money. Well, women agents were given flowers on March 8...

What did the Fifth Directorate really do? It not only followed the mood of the intelligentsia, surrounding prominent people with its informants, but also tried to influence the processes in the creative environment.

“The State Security Committee received materials about the mood of the poet A. Tvardovsky. In a private conversation, he stated:

“Those who are trying to whitewash Stalin today should be ashamed, because in their hearts they do not know what they are doing. Yes, they know what they are doing, but they justify themselves with high political considerations: this is required by the political situation, state considerations! .. And from zeal, they themselves begin to believe in their writings. You'll see, at the end of the year Literaturnaya Gazeta will publish a review of Novy Mir: what a meaningful and interesting magazine it is now! And do you think there will be readers who will believe? There will be. And the subscription will grow. An ordinary reader, as they like to say, he believes the printed word. He will read ten articles about the fact that we have no censorship, and on the eleventh he will believe ... "

Reported in order of information.

Chairman of the State Security Committee

Y. Andropov»

What was so special about Alexander Tvardovsky, the author of Terkin, beloved by the country, a truly national poet, that his words were recorded by the Chekists and reported to the Central Committee? Nothing, but he is in disgrace, forced to leave his favorite offspring - the magazine "New World" and is included in the number of those who are being watched.

On February 20, 1972, on the eve of the famous German writer Heinrich Böll’s arrival in Moscow, Andropov sent a note to the Central Committee with a recommendation “to instruct the secretariat of the Union of Writers of the USSR to conduct a conversation with Bell, during which to tell him about the rumors spread by Solzhenitsyn ...”

Why on earth does the KGB give instructions to the Writers' Union? In fact, the Chekists are taking on the role of the Central Committee. But even in the party apparatus no one dares to object.

They followed the classic of Russian literature Leonid Maksimovich Leonov. He was quite orthodox. How did he attract the attention of the Chekists?

“Among the entourage of the prominent writer L. Leonov, it became known that he is currently working on an autobiographical manuscript covering the events of the period of collectivization, the famine of 1933, which is allegedly not intended for publication.

One of the chapters of the manuscript is called “Dinner at Gorky's”, which describes the meeting between M. Gorky and I.V. Stalin and K. E. Voroshilov, which was attended by the author of the work. Characterizing the participants of the meeting mostly positively, Leonov notes at the same time I.V. Stalin elements of suspicion, and K.E. Voroshilova portrays a somewhat limited person.

In other words, the very intention of Leonov to write a book about Stalin and other long-dead Soviet leaders in itself aroused suspicion and a desire to interfere with the writer.

After the death of the "People's Academician" Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, KGB officers arrived at his house, ransacked the archives and interrogated his relatives.

“His correspondence with the Central Committee of the CPSU, the MK of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on issues of scientific activity and the situation around him was discovered.

In addition, during the conversation with the sons of Lysenko T.D. it was found that they, their mother and sister kept one copy of the photocopy of the report "On the situation in Soviet biological science" with amendments by I.V. Stalin, with whom the academician spoke in August 1948 at a session of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences. IN AND. Lenin.

One of these copies of a photocopy of the report is the relatives of academician Lysenko T.D. They refused to hand over them, they keep them as a family heirloom and assured that they will not give them to anyone and will not allow them to be used for negative purposes ...

Due to the fact that if they get to the West, these documents can be used in a way that is unfavorable for the USSR, they were taken to the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Trofim Lysenko's infamous report could not possibly have been a secret document. At one time it was widely published in the Soviet press. The appearance of this report marked the beginning of the destruction of genetics in our country, which most disastrously affected agriculture ... Chekists illegally seized "family heirlooms" only to hide the fact that Lysenko's report was read and ruled by Stalin himself. In other words, in 1976 the KGB was firmly guarding Stalin's reputation.

Was it for this purpose that on February 24, 1977, the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution on strengthening control over the preparation and publication of memoirs?

The resolution was adopted after Andropov's letter to the Central Committee, which stated that "the US special services and propaganda centers became more active against those persons who worked in important state and party posts in order to take possession of their archives, diaries and memories for purposes hostile to our country."

The materials prepared by the Fifth Directorate are direct denunciations of the masters of literature and art who "undermine the authority of the authorities." The performances of the Taganka Theater and the Lenin Komsomol Theater were vilified for "ambiguity", for attempts to "ridicule Soviet reality in an allegorical form." The KGB was even annoyed by the fact that "the moral instability of individuals has become a highly desirable topic for some film and theater workers."

Here are excerpts from the memos of the State Security Committee:

The contradictory image on the screen and in the theater of the image of V.I. Lenin. In the film “On the Same Planet”, where the actor Smoktunovsky plays the role of Lenin, Lenin looks very unusual: there is no revolutionary Lenin here, there is a tired intellectual ... "

It is difficult to find justification for the fact that we are tolerating the essentially politically harmful line of the Novy Mir magazine... Criticism of the Youth magazine is, in essence, not taken into account by anyone, and no one draws the necessary conclusions from this. The magazine from issue to issue continues to publish dubious products ... "

Was the State Security Committee tasked with assessing theaters and literary magazines? But the KGB understood its role in this way: there were few spies, and it would be ridiculous to maintain such a huge apparatus for their sake. Andropov and the Fifth Directorate believed that the main threat to the party apparatus and the entire socialist system came from free speech.

On February 7, 1969, Yuri Vladimirovich reported to the Central Committee and the distribution of “extra-censorship literature”, called “samizdat”: “In recent years, ideologically harmful materials have been distributed among the intelligentsia and youth in the form of essays on political, economic and philosophical issues, literary works, collective letters to party and government authorities, to the courts and prosecutors, memoirs of “victims of the personality cult” ...

It would seem, what is wrong with the fact that young people think about the most important issues of life, are interested in their own history, and turn questions to the authorities?

But Andropov was sure that the dissemination of such literature "causes serious damage to the education of Soviet citizens, especially the intelligentsia and youth ... (a significant number of people involved in the activities of" samizdat "have been prevented with the help of the public. Several malicious authors and distributors of documents discrediting the Soviet state and social system have been prosecuted."

“The State Security Committee has data on the ideologically defective orientation of the play “Under the Skin of the Statue of Liberty” based on the works of Y. Yevtushenko, which is being prepared for production by Y. Lyubimov at the Moscow Drama and Comedy Theater. The public viewing of the performance took place on June 12, 1972.

According to a number of sources, the performance clearly shows ambiguity in the interpretation of social problems and a shift in ideological orientation towards the promotion of "universal values". As representatives of the theatrical community note, the performance shows the desire of the theater director Lyubimov to tendentiously develop the motives "power and people", "power and creative personality" in relation to Soviet reality ... "

At the same time, in personal communication with creative people, the chairman of the KGB wanted to seem like a liberal person and refused to admit that the committee forbade someone something.

I once had a personal meeting with Andropov, - Yevgeny Yevtushenko said in an interview with Moskovsky Komsomolets. - I was invited to America. The Writers' Union told me that the KGB objected. I really wanted to go. I called Andropov's office and asked for an appointment. A few days later he accepted me.

Yevtushenko complained to the chairman of the State Security Committee that he was not allowed into the United States, citing the opinion of the KGB. Andropov became indignant:

What cowards in your Writers' Union! They can't decide anything on their own. We're dealing with matters of national security here, and they want to put such small matters on our shoulders. We didn't mind your trip. This is what they came up with for you to justify themselves.

After these words, Yevtushenko recalled, it seemed to him that Andropov would now pick up the phone, call the Writers' Union and blast the reinsurers and cowards. However, he did not. Instead, Andropov turned the conversation to another topic:

By the way, I want to share with you my first impression of you. I first saw you at a meeting with Khrushchei. I paid attention to your eyes. They reminded me of the eyes of the boys from the Petofi Circle, who hanged the Communists in 1956 ... Yevtushenko stood up:

I never wanted to hang anyone. My mother is a communist, but she is one of the most honest people...

On December 20, 1980, KGB chairman Andropov reported to the Central Committee that some Moscow students intended to hold a rally in memory of the remarkable musician John Lennon from the world-favorite Beatles.

The desire of students to express their love for a famous musical group had nothing to do with politics. But like any unauthorized event, it was considered dangerous for the Soviet government. Therefore, Andropov reassured his comrades in the Politburo, the State Security Committee "is taking measures to identify the initiators of the gathering's logo and control the development of events,"

“According to information received from operational sources, the chief director of the Moscow Taganka Drama and Comedy Theater Yu. Lyubimov, while preparing a new performance about the actor of this theater V. Vysotsky, who died in 1980, is trying from a tendentious position to show Vysotsky’s creative path, his relationship with cultural bodies, to present the actor as a great artist-“fighter”, allegedly “undeservedly and deliberately forgotten by the authorities” ...

Events dedicated to the memory of the actor at the burial site at the Vagankovsky cemetery in Moscow and in the theater at the end of the performance may cause unhealthy excitement on the part of Vysotsky's admirers and the theater environment and create conditions for possible manifestations of an antisocial nature.

Former leaders of the Fifth Directorate like to say that they were engaged in analytical work, studied the processes that took place in society, and tried to solve the most complex national problems. But documents have been preserved that indicate that they were engaged in petty police work.

In early March 1975, Andropov sent a note to the Central Committee.

“Zionist circles in Western countries and Israel, using the upcoming religious holiday of Jewish Passover (March 27 of this year), organized a mass shipment of parcels with matzah (ritual Passover food) to the USSR, counting on inciting nationalist sentiments among Soviet citizens of Jewish origin ...

Taking this into account, as well as the fact that at present the Jewish religious communities are fully provided with matzo baked directly on the spot, the State Security Committee considers it necessary to confiscate parcels with matzo coming from abroad.

In this regard, we consider it expedient to instruct the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Communications of the USSR to issue appropriate instructions to the customs and postal services.

Many documents of the Fifth Directorate of the KGB have been made public, and one can unbiasedly promise what it was doing in reality. One of the reports reported, for example, that the Fifth Directorate was collecting materials on playwright Viktor Rozov and philosopher Yuri Koryakin, included sixteen agents in the USSR Olympic delegation (agents! Not security guards, that is, they did not care about the safety of athletes, but were going to monitor them), received information about the situation in the family of composer Dmitry Shostakovich and materials about ideologically immature moments in the work of satirist writer Mikhail Zhvanetsky , opened a case against the outstanding literary scholar Sergei Sergeevich Averintsev, checked the Soviet citizens who had contacts with Svyatoslav Nikolaevich Roerich during his arrival in the USSR ...

The successes of the Fifth Directorate included the fact that the young athlete, who was supposed to go to the match in the GDR, was not allowed there because she let slip that she would like to marry a foreigner ... In addition, it was reported in the same document that applicants entering the M. Gorky Literary Institute were checked. On the basis of compromising materials, several people were not allowed to take the exams...

The fact of publishing, through his agent in the journal Our Contemporary, an article about the émigré writer Lev Kopelev, exposing his ties with the anti-Soviet centers of the West, was also presented as an achievement.

A special department in the fifth department dealt with the emigrant organization People's Labor Union (NTS).

How serious was the NTS among the state security officers? - I asked another former employee of the Fifth Directorate about this (he did not want his name to be mentioned).

Many of our employees on the sidelines of the administration spoke quite frankly: if the KGB had not reinforced the NTS with its agents, the union would have collapsed long ago. But before introducing an agent, he must be properly prepared, give him a dissident name, allow him to carry out some kind of action, so that he has authority abroad. In addition, each of them had to take with them some worthwhile information, express interesting ideas - the fruit of our creativity. So it turned out that we fed the NTS with personnel, and, so to speak, intellectually. The situation was exactly the same with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. If you look at the lists of OUN leaders, it turns out that almost every second person was our agent.

But the leaders of the NTS, with whom I spoke, are sure that, say, there were no KGB agents in the closed sector of the NTS. Everyone there knew each other almost from childhood.

They can't even imagine the complex ways in which agents were introduced into the Russian emigration. People were sent before the war, and communication with them was restored many years later, when they were completely integrated into emigration and no one could doubt their reliability,

And why, in this case, did the KGB spend so much effort and money to fight an organization that did not pose a threat?

By sending agents to the People's Labor Union or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the committee actually served itself: the relevant units simply provided themselves with a "front of work." And the staff of the Fifth Directorate increased precisely because the infiltrated agents made the same NTS a more significant organization, and therefore, in order to combat it, it was necessary to strengthen the work of the KGB. Frankly speaking, if the NTS had been properly attacked in those years when the committee had absolute power, it could have been done away with in one year. But it was beneficial for the committee to keep this structure in a half-dead state: there was no harm from it, and the committee swelled ...

Andropov said that the enemy uses foreign tourists for espionage and ideological sabotage, was against the expansion of trips of Soviet citizens abroad and objected to emigration.

Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, recalls that when the issue of leaving the country was discussed, “Leonid Ilyich said quite sharply: “If someone does not like living in our country, then let them live where they feel good *. He was against any special obstacles placed on these people. Yuri Vladimirovich, it seems, had a different point of view on this issue ... ".

The chief director of the Lenkom Theater Mark Anatolyevich Zakharov told in a newspaper interview how in 1983 the theater went to Paris with the play “Juno” and “Avos”. In Paris, the artists went only in fives, each five had its own leader. About a week before returning to Zakharov, a KGB officer assigned to the artists appeared. In the hotel, he refused to talk, saying that they could eavesdrop on enemy intelligence services. They walked for a long time through the Bois de Boulogne, and the Chekist showed the chief director a list of artists who could stay in France. Zakharov tried to convince him that no one was going to stay, and he was right...

Leningrad poet Viktor Borisovich Krivulin published self-published magazines "37" and "Northern Post". The publications were not of a political nature, it was a purely literary publication. The poet was called to the KGB and offered:

If you want to live normally, cooperate with us. Or move to the West.

In 1972, the State Security Committee reported to the Central Committee that a month after the death of the biologist and popular science fiction writer Ivan Antonovich Efremov, who, as it turned out, was being followed, KGB officers of the USSR carried out a thirteen-hour search in his apartment "with the aim of possibly detecting anti-Soviet-1 literature on content."

Andropov did not ignore the artist Ilya Sergeevich Glazunov. But in this case, Andropov proposed to act not with a stick, but with a carrot, far beyond the competence of the State Security Committee.

Here is his note to the Central Committee of the CPSU:

“Since 1957, the artist Glazunov I.S. has been working in Moscow, who has proven himself in different ways in various strata of the creative community. On the one hand, a circle of people has formed around Glazunov that supports him, seeing him as a gifted artist, on the other hand, he is considered an absolute mediocrity, a person who revives the bourgeois taste in fine arts.

At the same time, for many years Glazunov has been regularly invited to the West by prominent public and state figures who commission him to have their portraits painted. The glory of Glazunov as a portrait painter is quite great.

He painted Finnish President Kekkonen, the kings of Sweden and Laos, Indira Gandhi, Allende, Corvalan and many others. In a number of states, his exhibitions were held, about which there were positive reviews from the foreign press. On behalf of Soviet organizations, he traveled to Vietnam and Chile. The cycle of paintings made there was shown at special exhibitions. This position of Glazunov, when he is readily supported abroad and cautiously accepted among Soviet artists, creates certain difficulties in shaping him as an artist and, even more difficult, his worldview.

Glazunov is a man without a sufficiently clear political position, there are, of course, flaws in his work. Most often, he acts as a Russophile, often slipping into openly anti-Semitic sentiments. The confusion of his political views is sometimes not only alarming, but also repulsive. His impudent nature, elements of arrogance also do not contribute to the establishment of normal relations in the creative environment.

However, it is hardly expedient to push Glazunov away because of this. The demonstrative non-recognition of him by the Union of Artists deepens the negative in Glazunov and can lead to undesirable consequences, if we keep in mind that representatives of the West not only advertise him, but also try to influence him, in particular, inducing him to leave the Soviet Union.

In view of the foregoing, it seems necessary to carefully consider the situation around this artist. Perhaps it would be expedient to involve him in some public cause, in particular, in the creation of a museum of Russian furniture in Moscow, which he and his entourage are persistently striving for. Please consider."

I remember well how in those days an “asset” was gathered in the mansion of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR on Komsomolsky Prospekt, and a colonel from the Fifth Directorate spoke with anger about individual representatives of the creative intelligentsia who sold themselves to the West. The greatest outrage was caused by pianist Vladimir Feltsman, who agreed to play at the residence of the American ambassador in Moscow. The writers were grateful to the colonel for his trust and frankness and asked for the closest cooperation and interaction. These were the right writers.

The wrong ones thought and talked about the disastrous processes in Soviet society.

“During the Brezhnev period of stagnation,” says academician Vyacheslav Vsevolodovich Ivanov, the son of a writer famous for revolutionary plays, “a lot was done to destroy public morality and devalue spiritual values. Cynics were in power, who simply had no conscious ideology, no convictions - neither communist nor any other. There was reliance on the secret police as the only argument. There was political hypocrisy, a set of supposedly emasculated communist clichés, and the suppression of dissent.

And this hypocrisy, this cynicism destroyed both the regime that existed in the country, and the country itself, as it existed as the USSR ... "

How many dissidents were there in the country, with whom the huge state security apparatus fought?

In 1947, he was serving a sentence of 851 political prisoners, of which 261 were imprisoned for anti-Soviet propaganda. There were 68,000 (!) “prophylactic” ones in the country, that is, those who were summoned to the KGB and warned that the next time they would be summoned by an investigator and charged, this would be followed by a trial and a camp. Warned, the chairman of the KGB reported to the Central Committee of the Party, the emergence of 1800 anti-Soviet groups and organizations with the help of agents. In other words, were many citizens in the country ready to act against the Soviet regime?

Dissidents were imprisoned under two articles of the Criminal Code. The tougher Article 70 was adopted under Khrushchev and was called "Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda." She assumed severe punishment: imprisonment for a term of six months to seven years. In addition, they were also sent into exile for a period of two to five years. If there was nothing to present to the accused, the court could be satisfied with a mere exile. Andropov called anti-Soviet propaganda "a particularly dangerous state crime."

Under Brezhnev, on September 16, 1966, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Article 190 was introduced into the Criminal Code, which established criminal punishment "for the dissemination in oral and written form of deliberately slanderous fabrications discrediting the Soviet state and social system." Punishment - imprisonment up to three years, or correctional labor up to a year, or a fine up to one hundred rubles. It seems that the article is softer than the 70th, but anyone could be imprisoned under this article ...

On December 29, 1975, Andropov sent Brezhnev an extensive note about political prisoners. During the first eight Andropov years, 1,583 people were convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

The Chekists sent those accused under Articles 70 and 190 for examination to the V.P. Serbian. For twenty-five years, three hundred and seventy people who were accused under these two articles got to the examination. If the doctors agreed with the representatives of the KGB, then instead of a trial, the accused was sent for compulsory treatment. Conditions in these medical facilities were as harsh as those in places of detention. Forced medical procedures are painful and humiliating. And it was more profitable for the KGB to declare a person a schizophrenic than to judge him as an enemy of the Soviet regime.

Anatoly Prokopenko, the former head of the Special Archive, where secret documents were stored, said in an interview with the Trud newspaper:

In a memorandum to the Central Committee in 1967, KGB Chairman Andropov, Prosecutor General Rudenko, and Interior Minister Shchelokov literally shocked the imagination of Politburo members with the scope of daring socially dangerous manifestations, committed, of course, by mentally ill people.

The note cited examples of an “unheard of” challenge to the Soviet authorities: this is Krysenkov, who wished to blow himself up with a homemade bomb on the Red Square; this is someone who entered the Mausoleum and almost split Ilyich’s sarcophagus; this is Dedyuk, obsessed with the search for "truth" and committed an act of self-immolation on the square in front of the KGB building. The authors of the note argued that there were not enough existing psychiatric hospitals for such a number of dangerous mentally ill citizens. Soon the psychiatric Gulag expanded by five more hospitals.

State Security Colonel Mikhail Lyubimov, a foreign intelligence resident in Denmark, heard Andropov speak with conviction to his subordinates:

Comrades, almost all dissidents are sick people.

On April 29, 1969, Andropov sent a proposal to the Central Committee on the use of psychiatry to fight dissidents, after which a secret decree of the Council of Ministers appeared. Doctors were instructed to compile a list of mental illnesses, the diagnosis of which would allow the defendants to be recognized as insane and sent to special hospitals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In 1978, the top party leadership instructed a commission headed by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin to study the mental state of Soviet society. The commission concluded that "in recent years the number of mental patients has been increasing." Conclusion: in addition to eighty ordinary psychiatric hospitals, it is necessary to build eight more special ones.

The end of political psychiatry came only under Gorbachev in 1988, when sixteen prison hospitals were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health, and five were closed altogether. About eight hundred thousand patients were hastily removed from psychiatric records ... At the same time, Yuri Vladimirovich did not want to go down in history as a strangler of freedom, so rumors spread that Andropov was a liberal at heart and a patron of the arts.

Somehow, a presentation came from the Central Committee for the awarding of orders to a group of actors and directors, - recalls his Assistant Igor Sinitsyn. - Yuri Petrovich Lyubimov was also on the list. Andropov wrote against his last name - no. I was surprised and said: “Yuri Vladimirovich, it will immediately become known that it was you who crossed out Lyubimov.” He immediately crossed out his "no" and wrote: "I agree."

On January 7, 1974, the fate of the writer Alexander Isaevich Solzhenitsyn was discussed at the Politburo. Work on the documentary study "The Gulag Archipelago" - about the system of terror in the Soviet Union - overwhelmed the patience of the members of the Politburo. They no longer wanted to see Solzhenitsyn at large. Two options were considered - to plant or expel from the country. Members of the Politburo leaned towards the first option, but the final decision was postponed. Brezhnev and Andropov came to the conclusion that getting rid of a writer is easier than jailing him.

“If, for some reason, the event to expel Solzhenitsyn fails, I think that it would be necessary to initiate a criminal case against him (with arrest) no later than February 15th. The prosecutor's office is ready for this."

On February 12, Solzhenitsyn was arrested. He was charged with treason. The next day he was deprived of Soviet citizenship and deported to Germany.

A pleasantly excited Andropov said to Academician Chazov:

You know, we are very happy. We managed to send Solzhenitsyn to the West. Thanks to the Germans, they helped us a lot.

The chairman of the KGB was happy, and the shame for the country was incredible. Solzhenitsyn by that time had become the most famous Soviet writer.

As for Academician Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, who became a dissident, Andropov said in his circle that he would be happy to get rid of him too. Chazov wrote that he proposed to let Sakharov go abroad for treatment.

Andropov replied irritably:

It would be the best option for us, for me in the first place. But there is an official conclusion from the Minister of Medium Machine Building Slavsky and the President of the Academy of Sciences Alexandrov that Sakharov continues to be the bearer of state secrets and his travel abroad is undesirable. Nobody wants to step over this paper and I can't.

Academician Sakharov was sent into exile, where he was bullied, but this man alone did more for the country than the entire army of Chekists and Central Committee members who persecuted him for many years and shortened his life. He always remained a patriot and thought about the interests of the fatherland. Once, at Sakharov's apartment, a conversation turned on atomic matters, recalled his colleague, physicist Lev Vladimirovich Altshuler. Once they worked together on the creation of nuclear weapons.

Let's move away from this topic, - said Andrei Sakharov. - I have security clearance. You too. But those who are eavesdropping on us now do not. Let's talk about something else.

For many years there has been a debate: to whom do we owe the hydrogen bomb? Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov Or is it still Soviet intelligence, which has been stealing American atomic secrets for years?

As early as 1942, Nobel laureate Enrico Fermi, who fled from fascist Italy to America, was the first to speak about the possibility of creating thermonuclear weapons. He shared his idea with the man who was destined to bring it to life, the American Edward Teller. The German communist physicist Klaus Fuchs, an agent of Soviet intelligence, worked in Teller's scientific group.

Information about Teller's work came to Moscow. The study of these materials was entrusted to Yakov Borisovich Zel'dovich, a future academician and three times Hero of Socialist Labor.

What is the principle of operation of thermonuclear weapons?

Atomic energy is released during the decay of the constituent parts of the atomic nucleus. To do this, plutonium was given the shape of a ball and surrounded by chemical explosives, which were detonated simultaneously at thirty-two points. A synchronized explosion instantly squeezed nuclear materials and a chain reaction of the decay of atomic nuclei began.

The thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb is based on the reverse process - fusion, the formation of nuclei of heavy pimentions by fusion of nuclei of lighter elements. In this case, an incomparably large amount of energy is released. Such synthesis occurs on the Sun - however, at temperatures of tens of millions of degrees. The main problem was how to replicate such conditions on Earth. Edward Teller was the first to come up with the idea that the energy of an atomic explosion could be used as a fuse for a hydrogen bomb.

The gigantic temperatures that occur during thermonuclear reactions excluded the possibility of an experiment. It was a job for mathematicians. In the United States, the first computers were already in full use.

In the Soviet Union, cybernetics was recognized as a bourgeois pseudoscience, so all calculations were made on paper. Almost all Soviet mathematicians were occupied with this work.

Calculations showed Zeldovich that the design of the hydrogen bomb proposed by Edward Teller did not work: it was not possible to create such a temperature and compress hydrogen isotopes in such a way that a spontaneous fusion reaction began. On this work could well stop. Moreover, Klaus Fuchs has already been arrested for espionage, and Moscow has lost information about what is happening with the Americans.

But then a young physicist Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov was sent to Arzamas-16. He solved this problem. Such insights happen only to geniuses and only at a young age. Moreover, Sakharov did not want to deal with nuclear weapons. He was only interested in theoretical physics. Andrei Sakharov, with the help of another future academician, Vitaly Ginzburg, came up with a different design of the hydrogen bomb, which went down in the history of science as a "spherical puff". For Sakharov, the hydrogen isotope was located not separately, but in layers inside the plutonium charge. Therefore, a nuclear explosion made it possible to reach both the temperature and pressure necessary for a thermonuclear reaction to begin. The hydrogen bomb was tested in August 1953.

The explosion turned out to be much stronger than an atomic one. The impression was terrible, the destruction monstrous. But Sakharov's puff was limited in power. Therefore, soon Sakharov and Zeldovich came up with a new bomb,

Andrei Sakharov armed our country with the most destructive weapons in human history. The Soviet Union became a superpower, and a balance of fear was established in the world that saved us from World War III. For his services, Sakharov was elected to the Academy of Sciences. He received three "Stars" of the Hero of Socialist Labor, the Stalin and Lenin Prizes - according to a closed list, of course. Twice the Hero was supposed to erect a monument in his homeland, three times the Hero was also in Moscow, but his very name was a big secret.

He worked on the creation of hydrogen weapons as long as there were tasks in this area for a physicist of his level. But when these problems were solved, his brilliant brain turned to other problems. After the creation of hydrogen weapons, Academician Sakharov found himself in a narrow circle of the most valuable scientists for the state. There were very few of these names - Kurchatov, Khariton, Keldysh, Korolev ... The state provided these people with a fabulous - for those times - life, creating all the conditions for fruitful work. The highest officials of the state were polite, kind and helpful with them. They could easily call Khrushchev, and then Brezhnev, and they knew that they would be listened to attentively, that they would be listened to. And all of them were aware of their unique position, valued not only material benefits, but above all the opportunity to do what they love, great science, appreciated the fact that for the sake of implementing their scientific ideas, entire scientific institutions were created and the state spared neither money nor resources. This was appreciated by absolutely everyone - except for Sakharov.

Andrei Dmitrievich was strikingly indifferent to material wealth. Huge - according to those concepts - money received in the form of numerous awards, he transferred - half to the Red Cross, and half - for the construction of an oncological center. They didn't even thank him for it. On the contrary, this caused misunderstanding and discontent among the authorities. Easily and simply, Sakharov gave up his high position, position, car with a driver, from a clinic for his superiors. He was not at all interested in honors and glory, which is so important for everyone else.

He was worried about something else. He was the first to talk about the danger of the weapon he created. The tests of thermonuclear weapons alone cause irreparable damage to mankind. And then he thought about the injustice of the world around him and realized that he could not stand aside when the authorities treat their own people so cynically and indifferently, and those who dare to protest end up in prison or in a psychiatric clinic.

He could have been cunning, as many of his colleagues were cunning, who, like him, were indignant at what they saw, but did not want to quarrel with the authorities. And they achieved their cunning, knowing how to behave with superiors. Sakharov was a direct and frank person.

Entire units of the KGB were sent to fight the academician. They followed his every move, recorded all his conversations, surrounded him with informers, stole his manuscripts. There was no work, the Chekists invented it in order to prove to the authorities how skillful and useful they were and from what dangerous enemy they were defending their socialist homeland. Sakharov wrote a letter to Brezhnev, handed it over to the reception room of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Andropov reported to the Central Committee that his Chekists had managed to intercept this dangerous document...

All Sakharov's behavior remained incomprehensible to the authorities. Both the Central Committee and the KGB sincerely believed that he, as an immature teenager, fell under a bad influence. And all this is written in the declassified documents of the KGB. The Chekists, led by Andropov, followed Sakharov for many years, and did not understand him, they blamed everything on his wife ~ Elena Georgievna Bonner. They proceeded from the fact that without it he did nothing but physics. He was exiled to Gorky, away from prying eyes, and many would be glad if he did not return from there at all ...

The fight against ideological sabotage.

The 5th Directorate was established by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 17, 1967 and by order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 0097 dated July 25, 1967 on the basis of units of Service No. 1 of the 2nd Main Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Initially, the staff number was 201 people, by 1982 it had grown to 424 people. On August 29, 1989, it was transformed into the Department "Z" (protection of the constitutional order). Disbanded in September 1991.

Curators:
TsVIGUN Semyon Kuzmich (October 16, 1967 - May 21, 1971), deputy, since November 24, 1967 - 1st deputy chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR;
CHEBRIKOV Viktor Mikhailovich (May 21 - November 30, 1971), Deputy Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR;
BOBKOV Filipp Denisovich (February 16, 1982 - January 18, 1983), Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR - Head of the 5th Directorate, probably remained the curator until his resignation on January 29, 1991;
LEBEDEV Valery Fedorovich (1991), Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR;

Chiefs:
1. KADASHEV Alexander Fedorovich (August 4, 1967 - December 1968)
2. BOBKOV Philip Denisovich (May 23, 1969 - January 18, 1983), major general, from November 2, 1972 - lieutenant general;
3. ABRAMOV Ivan Pavlovich (January 1983 - May 1989), lieutenant general;
4. IVANOV Evgeny Fedorovich (May 1989 - January 30, 1991), Major General;
5. VOROTNIKOV Valery Pavlovich (January 30 - September 25, 1991), Major General;

In terms of staff, the head of the Department had one first deputy and two deputies.

1st deputy chiefs:
BOBKOV Philip Denisovich (August 15, 1967 - May 23, 1969), major general;
MARKELOV Ivan Alekseevich (September 1974 - August 1979), major general;
PROSKURIN Vasily Ivanovich (for 1985 - August 1987), major general;
DENISOV Yuri Vladimirovich (... - 1989), major general;
VOROTNIKOV Valery Pavlovich (1989 - January 1991), major general;

Deputy chiefs:
SEREGIN Sergey Matveyevich (1967 - 1973), colonel, since November 2, 1972 - major general;
OBUKHOV Konstantin Mikhailovich (1967 - 1970), colonel;
Nikashkin Viktor Semenovich
ABRAMOV Ivan Pavlovich (1973 - 1983), major general;
MARKELOV Ivan Alekseevich (July - September 1974), major general;
PYASTOLOV Konstantin Terentyevich (for 1985), major general;
CHIRIKOV Lev Nikolaevich (1979 - for 1981), major general;
MAKHMEEV Kalil Makhmeevich (for 1980)
GOLUSHKO Nikolai Mikhailovich (April 1983 - May 1984), major, since 1983 - lieutenant colonel;
PONOMAREV Vitaly Andreevich (November 1984 - December 5, 1985), major general;
LEONTIEV Valentin Valentinovich
SHADRIN Vasily Pavlovich (for 1985 - 1988), major general;
STRUNIN Vladimir Sergeevich (... - 1987), major general;
LEBEDEV Valery Fedorovich (May 15, 1987 - January 27, 1988), lieutenant colonel, since December 14, 1987 - colonel;
KUBYSHKIN Evgeny Dmitrievich (as of 1987), major general;
DENISOV Yuri Vladimirovich (for 1987), major general;
VOROTNIKOV Valery Pavlovich (1988 - 1989), colonel, since 1988 major general;
BALEV Yuri Vasilyevich (1989 - 1991), colonel;
KARBAINOV Alexander Nikolaevich (... - 1990), major general;
FEDOSEEV Ivan Vasilyevich (1990 - 1991), major general;
MOROZ Alexander Vasilyevich (... - 1991), colonel;
Dobrovolsky G.V. (as of August - September 25, 1991), major general;
PERFILIEV Igor Valentinovich (April - September 25, 1991), colonel, since 1991 - major general;

• Leadership (chief, deputy chiefs, party committee, Komsomol committee)
• Secretariat
• 1st department (science and culture)
• 2nd department (emigration, nationalism, foreign centers of ideological sabotage)
• 3rd department (universities)
• 4th department (religion)
• 5th department (unrest, search for authors of anti-Soviet documents, fight against terrorism)
• 6th department (information and analytical)
• Personnel group
• Mobilization work group

In the future, the structure of the Office underwent the following changes:

• In August 1969, the 7th Department (Terrorism) was created
• In July 1973, the 8th Department (Zionism) was established
• In May 1974, the 9th department (anti-Soviet organizations) was created, the 2nd department was divided into the 2nd (nationalism, Ukrainian and Baltic emigre organizations) and the 10th department (the rest of the emigre organizations)
• In June 1977, the 11th department was created (ensuring the security of the Olympic Games, after 1980 - sports, medicine, science)
• In the mid 70s. the 12th group was created (liaison with the security agencies of the socialist countries)

In February 1982, the 13th department (informal youth movements) and the 14th department (media) were created

In November 1983, the 15th department was created (sports society "Dynamo")

After the reorganization into Directorate "Z", by order of the KGB No. 00140 of September 26, 1989, a new structure was announced:

• Leadership (chief, deputy chiefs, party committee, Komsomol committee)
• 1st department (foreign centers of ideological sabotage)
• 2nd department (fight against nationalism)
• 3rd department (informal associations and organizations, Zionism)
• 4th department (religious organizations)
• 5th department (combating organized crime and riots)