Heavy cruiser "Blucher"

heavy cruiser- This is a subclass of artillery cruisers. Their construction was carried out in 1916-1953. Until 1930, heavy cruisers were called "Washington" however, in 1930, according to the London Naval Treaty, the term "heavy cruiser" was officially introduced to distinguish them from smaller light cruisers armed with artillery of caliber no more than 155 mm. The artillery caliber of heavy cruisers was 203 mm, and the standard displacement was 10 thousand tons, and the artillery caliber was 203 mm. In the system of naval weapons, heavy cruisers occupied an intermediate position between light and battle cruisers. Heavy cruisers were actively used in World War II and made up an important part of the fleets of all the leading maritime powers. At the end of the war, a small number of units remained in the USA, Argentina, and Spain. In 1991, after a long stay in reserve, the last ships of this class were decommissioned.

Standard "Washington" cruiser

In 1915, the British Admiralty ordered a series of cruisers to industry, having dealt with the German raider cruisers, ordered a series of cruisers to industry, fearing new hypothetical German raiders with powerful weapons. These cruisers were to surpass any promising German cruiser in every respect. Since the armament of the expected opponents was supposed to be in the form of 150-mm guns, the Admiralty wished to see the largest-caliber artillery on the newest "raider fighters", which would still allow manual loading, and at the same time would surpass the German 150-mm guns in terms of firing range. As a result, the new cruisers received 190-mm guns. However, the construction of Hawkins-class cruisers was eventually delayed, and the ships did not get into the First World War.

In 1922, at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments, a decision was made to limit the quality characteristics of ships, including cruisers. The British did not want to part with the latest and very expensive ships, so they insisted on adopting the characteristics of the Hawkins as standard. This was greatly facilitated by the impression that the Hawkins made on the naval circles of the world. For example, the United States and Japan immediately began to develop cruisers, at least as good as the British novelties.

As a result, the main contracting parties reacted quite favorably to the wishes of the British delegation. This is how articles XI and XII of the Washington Treaty of 1922 appeared, which prohibited the construction of cruisers with a displacement of more than 10 thousand tons (English long tons) and with artillery larger than 203 mm. The number of newly built cruisers was not limited, but there were total restrictions on the tonnage of the fleet in the proportion: 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, respectively, for the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Since a moratorium was declared on the construction of battleships, "cruising" fever began.

Cruiser (Dutch kruiser from kruisen - cruising, sailing along a certain route; pl. cruisers or cruisers) - a class of combat surface ships capable of performing tasks independently of the main fleet, among which may be the fight against light fleet forces and enemy merchant ships , defense of formations of warships and convoys of ships, fire support of the coastal flanks of the ground forces and ensuring the landing of amphibious assault forces, laying minefields and others.

Since the second half of the 20th century, the trend towards the enlargement of combat formations to provide protection from enemy aircraft and the specialization of ships to perform specific tasks has led to the practical disappearance of general-purpose ships, such as cruisers, from the fleets of many countries. Only the Russian, US, and Peruvian navies currently use them.

Until the end of the 1950s. cruisers were the most developed and relatively numerous class of ships. Artillery has always been their main force. The creation of rocket weapons expanded the tasks facing the cruisers. Many cruisers in most countries of the world have undergone major modernization. Instead of guns, they received missile systems, modern radio-electronic and hydroacoustic equipment. Thus, a new type of cruisers appeared - missile cruisers, which began to carry out their service side by side with artillery cruisers.

Project 68-bis artillery cruiser, according to NATO classification - Sverdlov class

Artillery cruisers subdivided into heavy and light - depending on the caliber of the main artillery. The era of these ships is gradually fading into the past. Since the early 1960s not a single new artillery cruiser was launched, and those that are are all in reserve. Missile cruisers, or URO cruisers, are also divided into heavy and light, but depending on the displacement.
Usually cruisers with a displacement of 15,000-28,000 tons are classified as heavy, and ships with a displacement of 5,000-12,000 tons are classified as light. The main task of URO cruisers is the combat protection of large groupings of ships, including aircraft carrier formations. Depending on the armament, missile cruisers can successfully fight enemy submarines, surface ships and aircraft.

Typical URO cruisers became American ships of the Lehi and Velknap type built in the 1960s. They have a displacement of 7800-7900 tons and a top speed of 32 knots. Their armament consists of two launchers of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, two twin launchers of Terrier anti-aircraft missiles and an Asrok anti-submarine complex.

A special place among surface ships is occupied by URO nuclear cruisers. The first American cruiser of this type, Long Beach, with a displacement of 17,100 tons, entered service in 1961. The use of a nuclear reactor removed restrictions on cruising range and made it possible to design superstructures in a new way.
"Long Witch" - a cruiser on which there is no armor, but it is literally stuffed with all kinds of electronics that allow you to detect the enemy for many kilometers. However, despite a number of undoubted advantages, the Americans intend to abandon the further construction of ships of this type due to their high cost and complexity.

Further development of the URO nuclear cruisers was expressed in the creation of the Bainbridge ships (displacement 8590 tons) and Trakstan (9200 tons). These ships have the same fore and aft design, an extended forecastle and a high freeboard, which reduces the ship's flooding. For better protection against weapons of mass destruction, most of the deck mechanisms and devices are removed below the deck and inside the superstructures.

In the mid 1970s. The same-type nuclear-powered missile cruisers "California" and "South Carolina" entered service. Their total displacement is 11,000 tons, and the maximum speed is 36 knots. From 1976 to 1980, the US Navy included nuclear-powered cruisers URO "Virginia", similar in appearance and characteristics to cruisers of the "California" type.

Missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay and helicopter Skorsky MH-60S Sea Hawk. 2008

In 1983, the new cruiser URO "Ticonderoga" (with a displacement of 9600 tons) entered the water - the lead ship in a series of 26 units. Power plant with a capacity of 80,000 liters. With. provides a full speed of 30 knots. A feature of Ticonderoga is an unusual deck covering with light honeycomb panels made of non-combustible materials.
The cruiser has powerful weapons: a new Aegis anti-aircraft system, two Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers, a pair of Standard anti-aircraft missiles and Asrok anti-submarine missiles, artillery of two 127-mm and two 20-mm guns, and also two triple-tube torpedo tubes. This long list is completed by a pair of anti-submarine helicopters. Such an abundance of weapons led to an overload of the cruiser, which is why the speed and stability of the vessel leave much to be desired. Despite this, by the mid-1990s 25 more such ships entered service, with the last 17 armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The most powerful strike weapons (16 Bazalt anti-ship missiles, 104 Fort and Osa anti-aircraft missiles) are carried on board by Russian Slava-class cruisers, which is why they were even dubbed "aircraft carrier killers." The last of them - "Chervona Ukraine" - replenished the Pacific Fleet in February 1990. There is no nuclear power on the "Slava": it is replaced by a conventional gas turbine installation. The only nuclear-powered ships in the Russian Navy are heavy cruisers of the Kirov type (displacement 25,860 tons, length 250.1 m, speed up to 32 knots), the last of which, Petr Velikiy, was launched in 1989.

Demonstration plate with the image of the heavy cruiser of the project 82 "Stalingrad"

Even before the end of the Great Patriotic War, in January 1945, by order of the Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, a commission was formed from the leading specialists of the Naval Academy, which prepared, based on an analysis of the experience of the war, materials on the type and main tactical and technical elements of promising ships recommended for inclusion in the new shipbuilding program. On this basis, in the summer of 1945, the GMSH developed proposals for the Navy on a ten-year plan for military shipbuilding for 1946-1955. According to this plan, on January 1, 1956, the Soviet Navy was supposed to have in its composition, in particular, the following large surface combat ships: four battleships, 10 heavy cruisers with 220-mm artillery, 30 cruisers with 180-mm artillery, 54 light cruisers with 152-mm artillery, six squadron and six small aircraft carriers.

These proposals provided for the creation of a fleet capable, according to the ideas of that time, to operate effectively in all maritime theaters, including open ones, but were utopian from a production and economic point of view. Therefore, at a meeting held on September 27, 1945, I.V. Stalin, with the participation of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, leaders of the shipbuilding industry and the command of the Navy, they were reported to N.G. Kuznetsov in a somewhat abbreviated form. Stalin spoke in favor of reducing the number of battleships (build one pre-war bookmark battleship and lay two new ones in three to four years), proposed increasing the number of heavy cruisers by arming them with 305-mm rather than 220-mm artillery, but then agreed to the caliber proposed by the Navy. He rejected 180mm main cruisers and recommended focusing on heavy and light cruisers. With aircraft carriers, the Secretary General offered to wait (then he agreed to two small ones, which, however, did not fall into the plan). Speaking about the general direction of the development of the fleet, he said: “... in the next 10-15 years, our squadrons will be defended. It's another matter if you're going to go to America... since we don't need it, we don't have to overstrain our industry."

Based on the results of this meeting, taking into account the adjustments made by the NKSP, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, by a decree of November 27, 1945 "On the ten-year plan for military shipbuilding", approved the program for the construction (delivery) of ships of the Navy and the program for laying battleships and cruisers, in addition to those already provided for delivery. The new program, in fact, was a further development of the pre-war plan to create a "big fleet", however, it was no longer battleships that became its dominant, but heavy cruisers. By 1955, inclusive, it was planned to hand over four heavy cruisers of project 82 and lay three more units. The completion of the project 23 battleship was not included in the plan. This was taken care of by the leadership of the NKSP, who foresaw that due to the lack of thick armor and many components, the completion of even one battleship would again become an intractable problem. The laying of two battleships of project 24 was supposed only in 1955.

The absence of unfinished battleships and heavy cruisers of the pre-war laying in terms of surrender has already predetermined their fate. Nevertheless, in order to develop proposals for the fate of unfinished ships, a commission was formed in August 1946 under the chairmanship of Deputy Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry I.I. Nosenko.

If in relation to the hulls of "Soviet Ukraine", "Soviet Russia", "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" her recommendation was unequivocal - to disassemble, then for the head battleship "Soviet Union" the commission offered two options: to disassemble or complete according to the corrected project (as- in no way did Stalin recommend that one old battleship be completed). In favor of the completion was the presence at the Baltic Shipyard of 19.5% of the hull of the head battleship that was preserved with technical readiness, and in Molotovsk - three sets of imported GTZA, which could be installed on it after appropriate alterations. The arguments against were reduced primarily to the fact that the project 23 developed in 1936-1939 was already largely outdated.

The hull of the battleship "Soviet Union" on the slipway of the plant number 189. The picture was taken by the American naval attaché in 1947.

But there were more convincing arguments. Thus, the adjustment of the project and the release of working drawings would require about three years of work for TsKB-17 with its release from other work. The workload of other organizations should also be taken into account. All this would adversely affect the development of projects for ships of the new program. In addition, the commission noted that the completion of one battleship with individual equipment would cause great difficulties in placing orders for its manufacture. First of all, this will affect the supply of armor of the maximum thickness, the production of which was not mastered until 1941, therefore, the tense situation with armor will become even more complicated. The same will be the case with the manufacture of towers, launchers and electrical equipment. In terms of labor intensity, the completion of the "Soviet Union" was approximately equal to the construction of five to six light cruisers of project 68 bis (the latter was considered more preferable by the commission). This point of view of the SME was also supported by the Navy.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, by a decree of March 24, 1947, “On unfinished ships of pre-war and military construction”, adopted the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I.S. Yumashev and the Minister of the shipbuilding industry A.A. Goreglyad about dismantling for scrap a number of unfinished ships that have been mothballed since 1941, including the battleships Sovetskaya Ukraina, Sovetskaya Rossiya, heavy cruisers Sevastopol and Kronstadt. The resolution of the Council of Ministers, which expressed agreement with the proposal of the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry to dismantle the unfinished battleship "Soviet Union", took place on May 29, 1948.

Heavy cruisers of the type "Stalingrad"

The construction of heavy cruisers of project 82, envisaged for delivery by a ten-year military shipbuilding plan for 1946-1955, was originally planned to be carried out at factories No. 402 in Molotovsk and No. 444 in Nikolaev, two ships each. In addition, it was supposed to additionally lay down one cruiser in 1953 and two more cruisers in 1955. The new ships were designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War and progress in the development of naval weapons and equipment.

The history of the design of heavy cruisers of project 82 began even before the start of World War II and turned out to be very complex and dramatic. To a large extent, this was the result of increased attention and significant influence in the development and adoption of decisions on the main issues of their creation by I.V. Stalin, who at that time was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR. In the first book of memoirs by N.G. Kuznetsov "On the eve" it was noted that I.V. Stalin had a special, hard to explain addiction to heavy cruisers.

After the signing in August - September 1939 of the Soviet-German non-aggression, friendship and border treaties, as well as a trade and credit agreement, negotiations began between October of the same year between the delegations of representatives of the USSR and Germany, culminating in the conclusion in February 1940 of an economic agreement, which provided for the supply to the USSR, in exchange for raw materials, of a wide range of engineering products, including weapons and military equipment. In connection with the reorientation, with the outbreak of World War II, of the German shipbuilding industry to the large-scale construction of submarines (due to the curtailment of the program of surface military shipbuilding), there was a possibility of acquiring several warships suspended by the completion of construction there.

Therefore, when on a business trip to Germany in the fall of 1939, the first Soviet trade and procurement commission headed by the People's Commissar of the USSR Shipbuilding Industry I.T. Tevosyan, the specialists of the NKSP and the Navy, which were part of it, were instructed to familiarize themselves with and negotiate the acquisition of two or three heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type with 203-mm artillery, which had been mass-produced since 1935 (at that time, two ships of this type had already been transferred German fleet, and three were completed afloat). This would make it possible to replenish our fleet with valuable combat units at an accelerated pace, without reducing the number of ships under construction and planned for construction.

As a result of negotiations, the German side agreed to sell the USSR only one unfinished, the last in the series, cruiser "Lutzow", which had a technical readiness of about 50%, while pledging to ensure the supply of weapons and equipment to complete its construction and send a group of its specialists (the shipyard-builder to Bremen and its main contractors) for the period of completion of the ship. At the end of May 1940, in accordance with the concluded economic agreement, "Luttsov" (since September of the same year - "Petropavlovsk") arrived in tow in Leningrad and was put at the outfitting wall of plant No. 189.

Model of a heavy cruiser project 82, made in accordance with 073 1947

Its acquisition (as well as the leader of the Italian-built destroyers "Tashkent") provided our specialists with the opportunity to get acquainted with the latest foreign military equipment, take into account foreign experience and introduce a number of advanced technical solutions for that time when creating new Russian-built Navy ships. In addition, this partially solved the issue of rational use of the reserve of outfitting workers available (before the launch of large ships on the stocks) at the leading Leningrad shipbuilding enterprises. If the German side fulfilled its obligations, the ship could be transferred to the Navy in 1942.

The heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type had more powerful artillery armament than the light cruisers of Project 68 (of the Chapaev type) being built at that time for our fleet, an inclined side armor belt with an armor thickness of 80 mm (equivalent to 100 mm vertical armor), stabilization of 105-mm universal gun mounts. They practically solved a number of topical and complex problems of military shipbuilding, on which Soviet specialists were working at that time: the introduction of welded structures of the hull and superstructures, the use of steam of high parameters (63 atm, 450 ° C), automatic control of the main elements of the power plant, an increase in the cruising range for due to the higher efficiency of the power plant, the use of roll stabilizers, a high degree of saturation of the ship with electrical equipment of direct and alternating current.

For the technological study of the working design documentation (RKD) coming from Germany for the cruiser "Lutzow" (project 83), a special "Bureau L" was organized in the building of the outfitting shop of plant No. 189. The translation of this RKD into Russian, its reissue according to the normative documentation in force in the USSR and the solution with the help of German specialists of the design issues that arise during the completion of the ship were assigned to TsKB-17, as a developer of cruiser projects.

After the acquisition of the "Luttsov" and a thorough study of the design documentation for it, the question arose of the advisability of creating on this basis more advanced ships of the same subclass, armed with 203-mm artillery, which would be a further development of a number of innovative solutions of project 83. At the direction of N.G. The Kuznetsov General Military School prepared a preliminary design specification for the design of a similar ship (project 82) with the same composition of the Civil Code artillery, which was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in mid-May 1941. In accordance with this OTZ, the purpose of the ship was to solve the following main tasks: combat with heavy cruisers armed with 203-mm artillery, destruction of enemy light cruisers, support for the actions of friendly light cruisers, laying active minefields, suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for landings, actions on enemy communications.

On the basis of the approved task, the Design Bureau of the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) of the Navy worked out three options for the main TTE of the ship: according to the OTZ of the GMSh with a displacement of about 25,000 tons; with reduced requirements for armor and speed - about 18,000 tons, according to the proposals of the Design Bureau of the NTK - about 20,000 tons. Based on the results of the study, the NTK reported to the Navy Commander-in-Chief his thoughts on the advisability of changing the preliminary task, which noted the inconsistency of the main TFE specified in the OTZ, purpose of the ship and it was proposed to adopt 220-mm artillery as the main caliber for it (which would ensure the superiority of this cruiser over all existing cruisers with 203-mm artillery), increase the number of 100-mm ZKDB guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, install instead of machine guns 20-mm machine guns, reduce the number of aircraft, reduce the thickness of the armor, speed and cruising range. Clarification of the requirements of the preliminary OTZ was delayed due to the start of the Great Patriotic War.

Taking into account the experience of military operations at sea during the Second World War and the proposals of the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1943-1945, the OTZ for the design of the Project 82 heavy cruiser was repeatedly changed to clarify the main tasks of the ship, the composition of its weapons, armor, displacement, speed and cruising range.

In the second edition of the OTZ, approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in September 1943, the purpose of the cruiser determined the solution of the following tasks: imparting stability to the actions of light forces as part of a squadron and during independent operations, actions on enemy communications, ensuring the combat activity of aircraft carriers and joint operations with them as the main large artillery ship, the suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for the landing.

In this edition of the OTZ, the main caliber was increased to 220 mm, and in addition to the ZKDB (100 mm), a universal one (130 mm) was also provided, the number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns increased significantly, there were increased requirements for seaworthiness (the use of weapons in rough seas up to nine points). With such an increase in armament, the displacement was limited to 20,000-22,000 tons.

According to the OTZ of 1943, TsKB-17 worked out eight variants of the main TFC of the Project 82 ship until the end of May next year. These studies showed the incompatibility of a number of task requirements (in terms of armament, armor volume, displacement and speed).

In the third edition of the OTZ, approved by N.G. Kuznetsov in November 1944, the designation of the cruiser and the main caliber of artillery were retained according to its second edition, the universal caliber was strengthened by eliminating the ZKDB, the caliber of small anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) was increased to 45 mm and, in addition to it, a second caliber was provided - 23 mm, decreased requirements for unsinkability and speed. With these changes, the displacement of the SRT was limited to 25,000-26,000 tons. In September 1945, the value of the second caliber of the MZA was clarified, which was changed to 25 mm.

At the end of 1946, TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 submitted to the Criminal Code of the Navy the results of the study of four options for the main elements of project 82 for the 1944 OTZ of the year. They were considered on January 13, 1947 by a commission led by Admiral I.S. Yumashev. At this meeting, to the question of the commander of the KBF, Admiral V.F. Tributsa - "in what way is project 69 outdated?" - Reporting on the results of the study, the head of the design bureau of TsNIIVK L.A. Gordon replied: "insufficient anti-aircraft artillery armament, lack of radar armament and unsatisfactory unsinkability (mainly due to the lack of bottom protection)". In his conclusion, after discussing the developments, Yumashev noted that "for such a large ship with relatively strong protection, the main caliber of 220 mm artillery is certainly small."

By the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 17, 1947, N.G. Kuznetsov was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Admiral I.S. was appointed in his place. Yumashev, before that commander of the Pacific Fleet. Therefore, further consideration of the design issues of the heavy cruiser of project 82 and the adoption of decisions on them took place without Kuznetsov.

At the end of January 1947, the issues of creating cruisers for the Soviet Navy were considered at a special meeting on military shipbuilding in the Kremlin with the participation of I.V. Stalin, where he expressed the wish to have 305-mm main artillery on them. Following the meeting, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 28, 1947, the ministries of the Armed Forces (MVS) and the shipbuilding industry (SME) were instructed to work out a number of options for project 82 with 305-mm and 220-mm main artillery artillery and submit them to the government for consideration within two months.

In pursuance of this order, in early February of the same year, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Yumashev approved the OTZ to study these options. The assignment for the development of variants of project 82 with a 305-mm main battery, the purpose of the ship was determined by the solution of the following tasks: imparting combat stability to light forces operating as part of maneuverable formations; destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203-mm and 152-mm artillery in a sea battle; inflicting powerful artillery strikes on especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coasts (both in independent operations and in interaction with the coastal flank of friendly troops and landings).

When developing these options, it was necessary to consider different compositions of artillery of the main caliber (8-12 305-mm guns in two- or three-gun turret mounts) and universal (130-mm or 152-mm guns in two-gun turret mounts), with the same composition of the MZA (45 -mm and 25mm machine guns). In terms of aviation armament, it was necessary to consider two options: the first with four ejection fighters-reconnaissance-spotters (with storage of two of them in the hangar) and two rotary catapults, the second - without aircraft based on the ship. Full speed was set at least 32 knots (option - 33 knots), cruising range - 6000 miles at an economic speed of 18 knots, ensuring the use of weapons in a sea state of 7–8 points.

The OTZ requirements for the development of Project 82 variants with 220-mm artillery differed from the 1944 assignment. The main caliber ammunition was reduced from 170 to 125 rounds per barrel, the number of 130-mm universal (long-range anti-aircraft) guns - from sixteen to twelve, the ammunition of 45-mm machine guns from 1500 to 1000 rounds per barrel. The number of 25-mm machine guns increased from twenty to thirty-two, and their ammunition was reduced from 3,000 to 2,500 rounds per gun.

In the middle of the same month, by order of the SME, L.V. was appointed acting chief designer of project 82. Dikovich (before that - the head of the hull department of TsKB-17, who had extensive experience working on light cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and 68, heavy cruisers of project 69 and battleships of project 23, head of design studies for project 82).

Based on these OTZs, the TsNIIVK design bureau developed and in March 1947 submitted to the Navy Criminal Code eight variants of a ship with a displacement of 25,300 to 47,800 tons, and TsKB-17 in April of the same year presented 14 variants of a ship with a displacement in the same limits. Based on the results of their development, TsNIIVK prepared a TTZ project for the design of a heavy cruiser.

At the same time, in order to ensure the study of TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 on the instructions of the Artillery Directorate of the Navy, TsKB-34 of the Ministry of Armaments resumed work on the creation of a 305-mm naval artillery turret, interrupted with the start of World War II.

According to the technical design of the turret MK-15 with the swinging part of the B-50 for project 69, with a barrel length of 54 calibers, they could provide an initial projectile velocity of 900 m / s and a firing range of 257 kbt. On the new 305-mm installations, it was supposed to introduce the achievements of technical progress of that time: remote control of the guidance of towers and barrels and radar fire control, increase fire safety and survivability, reduce by 25 people (approximately 30%) the number of personnel serving the installation.

At the end of March 1947, the Deputy Minister of Armaments, V.M. 290 kb.

Of the variants of project 82 worked out by the Navy OTZ in August 1947, the ministers of the Armed Forces, shipbuilding industry and armaments (respectively N.A. Bulganin, A.A. Goreglyad and D.F. Ustinov) presented three options for consideration by the government: two with 305 -mm and one with 220-mm main guns.

In their report to Stalin, it was noted that the presentation of the first two versions of the ship (with the same armament and different thicknesses of the armor of the main side belt) is explained by the difference in the positions of the MVS and SMEs in terms of the optimal thickness of the armor.

The MVS recommended for approval for further design option I with a thickness of 200 mm armor, which provides protection for the main vital parts of the Project 82 ship from 203 mm enemy shells from a distance of 70 kbt and a greater degree of freedom of maneuvering in battle, which was its important tactical advantage. The SME proposed to accept option II with a corresponding reduction in displacement and an increase in full speed, since the 305-mm main caliber artillery allows the Project 82 ship to successfully fight enemy heavy cruisers with 203-mm artillery at long distances, and provided with a 150-mm armor belt the protection of the ship from such shells from a distance of 85 kbt is sufficient.

Option III (cruiser with 220-mm artillery) was seriously inferior to options I and II in terms of fire power and combat survivability. Its advantages over them were only a higher (by 1.5 knots) full speed and a lower (25%) displacement. Such a ship could quite successfully fight cruisers with 203-mm artillery. However, a ship with 305-mm artillery was capable of not only destroying well-known enemy cruisers, but also successfully fighting stronger ships, the appearance of which in foreign fleets was not excluded at that time. Such an advantage in terms of fire power and freedom of maneuvering in battle fully justified the increase in displacement by 10,000 tons and the loss of 1.5 knots of speed.

1 - steering and tiller compartments; 2-smoke equipment; 3 - placement of mechanisms of mooring capstans; 4 - team premises; 5 - club; 6 - power plant No. 4; 7 - 305-mm three-gun turret SM-31; 8 - wardroom for midshipmen and chief foremen; 9 - quadruple 45-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun SM-20-ZIF; 10 - cellar 45-mm ammunition; 11 - spare command post; 12 - AP radar "Fut-B"; 13 - AP radar "Salp"; 14 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 15 - operational felling; 16 - cabin and camping cabin of the flagship; 17 - stabilized pickup post SPN-500-82; 18 - department of auxiliary boilers; 19 - quadruple 25-mm AU BL-120; 20 - shower officers; 21 - navigational cabin and aggregate radars "Neptune" and "Nord"; 22 - AP radar "Fut-N"; 23 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 24 - KDP SM-28; 25 - air defense post; 26 - AP radar "Neptune"; 27 - observation posts for submarines; 28 - main command post; 29 - combat information post; 30 - flagship salon; 31 - 130-mm two-gun AU BL-109A; 32 - ship commander's office; 33 - mechanical workshop; 34 - placement of mechanisms for anchor and mooring capstans; 35 - trim compartment; 36 - chain box; 37 - hydroacoustic station "Hercules"; 38 - provisional pantries; 39 - baffle of the sump pump; 40 - room for refrigeration machines; 41 - room for diesel generators; 42 - power plant No. 1.43 - cellar of 305-mm shells; 44 - cellar 305-mm charges; 45 - cellar 130-mm ammunition; 46 - bow central artillery post; 47 - receiving radio center; 48 - post of energy and survivability (PEZH); 49 - wardroom for officers; 50 - room for turbogenerators and power plant No. 2; 51 - gyropost; 52 - central navigation post; 53 - boiler room; 54 - engine room; 55 - operating room; 56 - room for turbogenerators and power plant No. 3; 57 - baffle of the evaporation plant; 58 - team bath; 59 - corridor of electrical wires; 60 - empty compartments; 61 - corridor systems; 62 - drinking water tank; 63 - wash water tank; 64 - spare post of energy and survivability; 65 - cellar of small arms ammunition; 66 - cellar of training ammunition; 67 - ship workshops. A - longitudinal section; B - I platform; B - II platform

During the next consideration by the government of issues on the heavy cruiser of project 82, which took place only in March 1948, Stalin approved for further design the variant recommended by the MVS with 305-mm artillery, 200-mm main armor belt, standard displacement of 40,000 tons and a full speed of 32 uz. He instructed to speed up the creation of such cruisers and subsequently systematically personally controlled the progress of their design and construction. After choosing the ship option, the TTZ project prepared in 1947 for its development was corrected by the Navy and agreed with the SME, and then, in April 1948, with a draft government decree on its approval, it was submitted to the Council of Ministers. By a decree of August 31 of the same year on the design and construction of the lead heavy cruiser of project 82, this TTZ was approved. L.V. was approved as the chief designer of this project. Dikovich.

The TsKB-17 draft design was developed from the end of 1947 and submitted to the Navy and SMEs in March 1949 in four versions, which differed in the placement of artillery of the UK and MZA, as well as the composition (in terms of the number and steam output of the main boilers) and the location of the power plant.

The L-3-6 variant had a rhombic placement of 130-mm BL-110 installations, 12 boilers at 80 t / h in four KOs, two MOs. In the B-3-8 variant, four UK installations were placed on each side, and 12 boilers of the same steam capacity were placed in six KOs. Option L-2-4 had a rhombic placement of BL-110, four MKOs (two boilers for 130 t / h and one GTZA in each). In the L-2-6 variant (which the bureau and the customer recommended for technical design), the placement of universal-caliber artillery and power plant was similar to the L-3-6 variant, but each of the KOs housed two main boilers (instead of three) for 130 tons / h.

L.V. Dikovich, chief designer of the Project 82 heavy cruiser

Taking into account the tight deadlines for the creation of heavy cruisers of project 82 (the technical project had to be completed at the end of 1949 to ensure the start of construction of two ships in the 3rd quarter of the next year), TsKB-17 began technical design in April 1949. However, in the autumn, when the Kremlin considered the results of the development of the preliminary design submitted by the Navy and SMEs for approval, I.V. Stalin unexpectedly asked the chief designer Dikovich a question: “Is it possible to increase the speed of the ship so that our heavy cruiser can catch up and destroy the enemy’s ship, which is less powerful in terms of armament and protection, and get away from any stronger ship in a timely manner?”

Such a wish of the “leader of the peoples” was taken as an indication to change the TTZ, approved by the government just a year ago. As a result, the preliminary design developed by TsKB-17 was not approved, and in the protocol of its consideration it was noted that the ship had too much displacement and insufficient speed.

Heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", design view

After this meeting, the bureau began an accelerated development of the preliminary stage of the technical design (with the selection of new main dimensions and the processing of general layout drawings), which was completed in December 1949. Ensuring a full speed of 35 knots required an increase in the power of the power plant by almost 30% (with the installation of an additional number of main boilers and the development of new GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp). To solve the large-scale task of creating a new, unique power plant, the teams of the Special Design Bureau for Boiler Building (Head and Chief Designer GA. Hasanov), the design bureau of the Kharkov Turbine Generator were involved. Nevsky Machine-Building and Kirov Plants. To compensate for the increase in the mass of the power plant and the specified reduction in the displacement of the ship, it was necessary to reduce the number of 130-mm and 45-mm gun mounts, as well as develop and implement a number of other measures.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", view of the propeller group

Due to the large overload of TsKB-17 (where, simultaneously with the development of project 82, a significant amount of work was carried out to complete the tests of five light cruisers of project 68K and deploy large-scale construction of new light cruisers of project 68-bis), in October of the same year, it was decided to transfer work on project 82 to the newly created TsKB-16 (head - N.N. Isanin), for which he became the main order. In order to ensure the continuity of design work and the timely release of design documentation for construction plants, about half of the employees of TsKB-17 were transferred to the new bureau from February 1950 - all those employed in the work on project 82.

In January 1950, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.A. Malyshev. From fragments of his diary published in 1997 in the journal Istochnik, it is known that in early March 1950, in the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin, a meeting was held on project 82 with the participation of Malyshev, Yumashev and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy P.S. Abankina. Stalin asked the sailors for what purposes they thought to use such a cruiser. After the answer: "to fight the enemy's heavy cruisers," he objected that "we have nothing to get involved in the battle with the enemy's heavy ships. The main task of a heavy cruiser should be different - the fight against enemy light cruisers. It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it would panic the light cruisers of the enemy, disperse them and smash them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit. He must be able to escape from the blow of heavy enemy ships.

Then Stalin proposed a number of measures to reduce the displacement of the cruiser. When the sailors began to object to some of them, he made a number of comments on the composition of universal and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as on the ammunition load of artillery of all calibers, noting that it was stupid to put 130-mm anti-aircraft guns on a cruiser with a firing ceiling of 16 km - the enemy would bomb it from heights from 500 to 1500 m, therefore, MZA is needed. At the same time, Stalin also ordered to reduce the number of MZA provided for by the project - "such a ship will always have guards that should protect it."

To the objections of the sailors against the reduction in ammunition (with reference to the large number of shells on the ships of the US and British navies), Stalin replied: “You don’t blindly copy the Americans and the British, they have different conditions, their ships go far into the ocean, breaking away from their bases. We are not thinking of waging ocean battles, but we will fight near our shores and we do not need to have a large ammunition supply on the ship. In this regard, he also allowed to reduce the cruising range and noted that “it is impossible to create a ship that would have all the advantages. You can have advantages either in speed, or in armor and weapons.

Further, Stalin asked where it was planned to build the lead cruiser. Having received an answer that he was in Leningrad, he said that he would first of all like to have two heavy cruisers on the Black Sea, “where you need to have a large fleet, ten times more than now, and be able to firmly lock the Dardanelles. Secondly, build heavy cruisers for the Baltic.

Taking into account the above remarks by I.V. Stalin on the preliminary design and the results of the development of the preliminary stage of the technical project, presented by the newly formed Naval Ministry (VMM) and SMEs, the Council of Ministers of the USSR by a decree of March 25, 1950 approved the main elements of the assignment for the development of technical project 82 with partial changes to the TTZ, approved in August 1948. They concerned an increase in full speed to 35 knots (due to a decrease in the composition of the artillery of the UK and MZA, the amount of ammunition of all calibers, a reduction in displacement to 36,000-36,500 tons, cruising range and autonomy) and allowed the SME without adjusting the preliminary design to proceed with the technical, with its submission for government approval in February 1951. At the same time, SMEs were ordered to start construction of two Project 82 ships at factories No. 444 (formerly No. 198) in Nikolaev and No. 189 in Leningrad in the second quarter of the same year, with their delivery to the Navy in 1954 and 1955, respectively. The decision of the VMM and SSP on the preliminary materials of the technical project 82, related to the choice of the main dimensions and the general location of the ship, was approved in September 1950.

According to the memoirs of the head of the weapons department of TsKB-16 V.I. Efimov, who had to go on long business trips to Moscow three times during the consideration and approval of project 82 in SMEs, VMM and the government, the central office then worked according to a special regime: the ministries started the working day at 9 am, from 19 to 22 h there was a break for rest, then returned to work, where they stayed until 2 or 3 am. During these evening hours, government meetings were held with the participation of Stalin, and it was possible to call in senior officials of ministries, heads of enterprises and chief designers. Chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich repeatedly reported together with the Minister of the shipbuilding industry A.A. Goreglyad (later - with V.A. Malyshev) about the design and construction of these cruisers personally by I.V. Stalin in his office in the Kremlin.

In October 1950, N.N. Isanin and L.V. Dikovich was awarded the title of chief designer of the first (highest) degree, established by a government decree of October 15, 1949.

During the design, a significant amount of research and development work was carried out. The most important of them were: determination of the optimal variant of the theoretical contours of the ship's hull based on the results of testing the running and seaworthiness of scale models in the experimental pools of the Central Research Institute. acad. A.N. Krylov and TsAGI them. NOT. Zhukovsky, testing the stability of side and deck armor by shooting and blowing up cemented and homogeneous armor plates, choosing the optimal design of the PMZ by blowing up twenty large-scale (1: 5) compartments, studying the impact of “muzzle gas cones” of gun mounts, prototyping of the main premises of the power plant, power compartments , ammunition cellars and main combat posts; theoretical studies of various issues related to the use of new technology.

A number of experimental works carried out were distinguished by their special novelty and large volume. Tests of large-scale PKZ compartments by detonation were carried out by an interdepartmental commission chaired by the director of TsNII-45 V.I. Pershina. Based on them, TsKB-16 developed an optimal design that had significant advantages over well-known foreign ones (with the same resistance to explosion energy - 10% less weight).

Major experimental work was also carried out: shooting and undermining armor plates, as a result of which the optimal ship armor scheme was determined, studies of the effect of muzzle gases on personnel and superstructure structures, which made it possible to solve the issue of rational placement of artillery installations and open combat posts.

In December 1950, the technical project 82 was completed and in February of the following year it was submitted for consideration and approval by the VMM and SMEs.

The main co-executors and contractors of TsKB-16 for weapons, mechanisms and equipment did not stop developing their projects and design documentation even during the period of adjusting the elements of the ship. Therefore, already at the beginning of 1951, they were able to transfer the RKD into production. A number of samples of auxiliary mechanisms of the power plant were manufactured and adopted by the MVK, thanks to the combination of the stages of design, production of RKD and pre-production, by the end of 1950.

By government decrees and orders from SMEs, dozens of teams from research institutes, design bureaus and shipbuilding and related industries, including such large enterprises as Izhorsky, Kirovsky, Metallichesky im. Stalin, Bolshevik, Electrosila, Novokramatorsky, Barricades, Kharkov Turbine Generator Plant, Kaluga Turbine Plant and many others. M.S. was appointed chief observer of the GUK of the Navy. Mikhailov, who headed the supervision of the Navy during the design and construction of Project 23 battleships before the war.

From the end of 1950, without waiting for the approval of the project, TsKB-16, by decision of the VMM and SMEs, began to issue design documentation to ensure the deadlines set by the government for the start of construction of the KRT of project 82 simultaneously at both construction plants. Based on the results of consideration of the technical design materials, in mid-April 1951, a joint decision was issued by the VMM and SME, in accordance with which the bureau corrected the documents defining the main TFC of the ship. In May of the same year, VMM and SMEs presented them to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which, by a decree of June 4, 1951, approved the technical project 82, the main TFC of the ship and measures to ensure its construction.

On November 14 of the same year, a government decree was adopted on the construction of a third heavy cruiser at factory No. 402 in Molotovsk.

In accordance with the technical design, the purpose of the ship was:

Giving combat stability to light forces operating as part of mobile formations both near and far (at sea, in the ocean) from their shores;

Direct cover for especially important convoys at the sea crossing from the actions of enemy cruising forces;

Destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203 mm and 152 mm artillery in a sea battle;

Delivering powerful artillery strikes against especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coasts, as in independent operations. missions, and in cooperation with the flank of their troops and in support of the landing.

According to the approved project, the heavy cruiser was supposed to have artillery: nine 305-mm main guns in three-gun SM-31 turret mounts (total ammunition - 720 rounds); UK - 12 130-mm in two-gun tower installations BL-109A (2400 rounds); MZA - 24 45 mm in SM-20-ZIF quad assault rifles (19,200 rounds) and 40 25 mm in BL-120 quad assault rifles (48,000 rounds + 2,400 in fenders).

The PUS system of the More-82 Group of Companies was provided by the KDP SM-28 (rangefinder base 8 and 10 m) and two firing radar stations (RLS) Zalp. The 2nd and 3rd GK towers had "Grot" radio rangefinders. Launchers of the universal caliber "Zenit-82" (three sets) were provided by three SPN-500 with firing radar "Anchor". Three towers of the Criminal Code had radio rangefinders "Stag-B". The fire control of anti-aircraft guns CM-20-ZIF was carried out by three Fut-B radar systems.

The radio-technical armament included the Guys-2 airborne target detection radar (a place was reserved for the installation of the Vakhta airborne early warning radar), the Rif surface target detection radar, and the Fut-N detection and target designation radar. Electronic warfare equipment included the Mast search radar and the Coral jamming radar. Two heat direction finders "Solntse-1p" and a hydroacoustic station (GAS) "Hercules-2" were envisaged.

The main armor belt of the citadel (the length of 57.6% of the length of the ship along the DWL) was made of welded 180-mm homogeneous armor, had an angle of inclination from the vertical of 15 ° and protected the side below the average 70-75-mm main armor deck; the deepening of its lower edge amidships under the waterline was 1.7 m. The traverse bulkheads of the citadel had a thickness of up to 140 (bow) and 125 mm (stern). The upper tween deck was protected by 50 mm side and upper deck armor. The armor of the lower deck in the citadel was 15–20 mm thick. The extremity armor included a 50 mm side belt and the same armor on the middle deck. The walls of the main command post had a thickness of up to 260 mm, the roof - 110 mm; wire protection pipe - 100 mm; frontal armor of the GK towers - 240, their side walls - 225, roofs - 125 mm, the rear wall acting as a counterweight - 400–760 mm (from three plates), barbettes of the GK towers - 200–235 mm. The towers of the Criminal Code and their barbettes were protected by 25 mm armor.

The vertical armor of the citadel provided protection against 203-mm armor-piercing shells from distances of 65-75 kbt, and horizontal armor - up to 175 kbt. The rest of the vertical and horizontal armor was chosen based on protection against 152-mm high-explosive shells and 500-kg high-explosive bombs dropped from a height of 3000 m.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 81.7 sp. (see aft):

1 - fan room; 2 - midshipman's cabin; 3 - corridor; 4 - 305-mm turret AU SM-31; 5 - modular switchgear; 6 - fan enclosure; 7- room for the team; 8 - KATS-100; 9 - electrical equipment room.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 108 sp. (see aft):

I - boiler room; 2 - equipment for receiving fuel; 3 - corridor; 4 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 5 - aggregate radar "Rif-A"; 6 - vestibule; 7 - flagship cabin; 8 - command post of communication; 9 - main command post; 10 - 45 cm signal spotlight;

II - heat direction finder "Solntse-1P"; 12 - direction finder frame; 13 - VHF antenna of the R-610 radio station; 14 - antenna post (AP) radar "Fakel-MZ"; 15-AP radar "Mast"; 16-APRLS "Fut-N"; 17-APRLS "Fakel-MO"; 18 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 19 - VHF radio antenna R-609; 20 - AP radar "Zalp"; 21 - KDP SM-28; 22 - pelorus; 23 - combat information post; 24 - aggregate radar "Anchor"; 25 - modular radar "Fut-N".

PMZ, covering the vital compartments of the ship (ammunition cellars, main posts, power plant premises) throughout the citadel from undermining a charge of 400–500 kg (in TNT equivalent), consisted of three to four longitudinal bulkheads. Of these, the second (8–25 mm) and third (50 mm) were cylindrical, while the first (8–45 mm) and fourth (15–30 mm) were flat. The volumes between the first (second) and third bulkheads were used for fuel (which, as it was consumed, was replaced by outboard water). To increase the length of the armor protection vertically, additional armor plates 20-100 mm thick were hung on the third (main protective) bulkhead of the PMZ.

Also, for the first time in domestic shipbuilding, these heavy cruisers also provided for a three-layer bottom protection, made along a longitudinal-transverse system throughout the citadel. Its height from the outer skin to the third bottom was 2250 mm. The outer skin was made of armor 20 mm thick, the second bottom had a thickness of 18, and the third - 12–18 mm. The value of the maximum charge, the explosion of which at a distance of 5 m from the bottom had to withstand such protection, was estimated at 500 kg.

The hull of the ship was carried out mainly along the longitudinal framing system with the distance between the frame frames in the area of ​​the citadel up to 1.7 m, at the ends - up to 2.4 m and was divided by the main transverse bulkheads (thickness from 6 to 20 mm), from the bottom to the lower deck , into 23 waterproof compartments. The sectional assembly of the hull from three-dimensional and flat sections, adopted according to the principle technology developed in the project, with the widespread use of welding, significantly reduced the slipway period for the construction of the ship.

A four-shaft power plant (four GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp each and 12 main boilers with a steam capacity of 110 t / h each with steam parameters of 66 atm, 460 ° C) for that time could become the most powerful in the world. In the electric power system, for the first time in the domestic practice of shipbuilding, it was planned to use an alternating three-phase current (380 V, 50 Hz), it was supposed to use eight turbogenerators with a capacity of 750 kW each and four diesel generators with a capacity of 1000 kW, located in four power plants.

Developed in 1950 at the Naval General Staff, the tentative project of the staff of this heavy cruiser (1712 people and 27 people of the formation headquarters) provided for the commander of the ship the rank of rear admiral, for the first mate, political officer and commanders of BCH-2 and BCH-5 - captains 1st rank.

The new heavy cruiser, in essence, was a repetition of the pre-war project 69, but at a qualitatively new technical level. Its only foreign analogues were two "large" US Navy cruisers of the "Alaska" type, which entered service in 1944 and were considered unsuccessful ships.

For 1951, it was planned to advance work on the lead ship by 10%. During the year, TsKB-16 handed over to the construction plant about 5 thousand sets of design documentation, which was supposed to ensure the manufacture of 19 thousand tons of hull structures (more than half the mass of the entire ship). However, the supply of metal and armor by the metallurgical enterprises of the country turned out to be irregular, which, together with the failure to meet the deadlines for the reconstruction of slipway "0", delayed the laying of the ship.

By the end of 1951, the main counterparty work was at different stages of execution: from the completion of the development of design documentation to the delivery of finished products and their delivery to the construction plant. The manufacture of GK SM-31 turret mounts began, field tests of 130-mm mounts and MZA were carried out, field tests were completed with the firing of armor plates. Debugging of prototypes of the main and auxiliary boilers was carried out. The interdepartmental commission accepted ten head samples of auxiliary mechanisms and heat exchangers, six more were presented for interdepartmental tests, four for factory tests, and the working drawings for the rest of the samples were at the final stage.

In the summer of 1951, N.G. Kuznetsov was recalled by Stalin from the Far East (where from February 1950 he commanded the 5th Navy) and appointed Naval Minister to replace Yumashev. After four and a half years of disgrace, N.G. Kuznetsov again had to deal with the creation of a heavy cruiser of project 82.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 176 sp. (see in the nose):

1 - aft engine room; 2 - radio communication post; 3 - midshipman's cabin; 4 - galley; 5 - gyropost; 6 - ventilation shaft of the engine room; 7 - post of communication with aviation; 8 - cabin PKB; 9 - AP radar "Coral"; 10, 11 - antennas of the VHF radio station R-610; 12 - AP radar "Fakel-MO"; 13 - AP radar "Fakel-MZ"; 14 - antenna UKVR-609; 15 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 16 -AP radar station "Zalp"; 17 - spare command post; 18 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 19 - bakery; 20 - aft central and switching post of the main caliber; 21 - fuel tank.

*With an increased supply of provisions and fresh water.

When getting acquainted with the elements of this cruiser and the decisions made in his absence, to the question: “What is the idea of ​​​​such a ship?”, Head of the GUK VMM N.V. Isachenkov replied: “Comrade Stalin said that “this ship should dictate the distance of the battle to the enemy due to its speed.” Summing up the results of the meeting, N.G. Kuznetsov described the cruiser as "a heavy, obscure ship. The end does not seem to justify the means. A very expensive ship ... ".

8 during November - December 1951, 12 bottom sections of the first pyramid of the hull of the head cruiser of project 82 (serial number 0-400, chief builder - M.A. Pudzinsky) were submitted and installed on the upper free part of the slipway "O" of plant No. 444. The rest of the slipway was at that time occupied by the hull of the project 68-bis light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, laid down in February of the same year, which was to be launched at the end of 1952. The laying of the lead ship "Stalingrad" took place on December 31, 1951, it was scheduled to be launched by November 6, 1953.

On September 9, 1952, the second ship (serial number 0-406, chief builder - V.A. Neopikhanov) was laid down on the slipway "A" of plant No. 189, which was given the name "Moskva". A month later, in the northern dock chamber of the slipway workshop of plant No. 402, the assembly of the hull of the third ship (serial number 0-401, chief builder - A.F. Baranov) began, which had not received a name before the cancellation of the order. According to some reports, this plant received an order for a second ship, the construction of which, however, was not started. The delivery of all three ships was scheduled (according to plan) for 1954–1955.

At the beginning of September 1951, by a joint decision of the SME and VMM, the specifications and drawings of the general arrangement of the technical (contractual) project were approved. Along with the continuation of the development of the design documentation for it, the contractual design for serial ships was adjusted, with changes made according to the experience of building the lead ship, according to joint decisions, as well as according to the results of development and prototype work. In order to take prompt measures at the construction plants in Nikolaev and Molotovsk on issues requiring urgent solutions with the participation of the designers of TsKB-16, branches of the bureau were organized there, performing the functions of architectural supervision and technical assistance.

Despite the systematic control over the construction of heavy cruisers of project 82 and the main counterparty supplies for them by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry V.A. Malysheva, the planned tasks were not fulfilled for them, the backlog from the approved schedule reached several months. The actual technical readiness of the ships on January 1, 1953 was 18.8%, 7.5% and 2.5% (instead of 42.9%, 11.5% and 5.2% according to the plan).

A month after the death of I.V. Stalin, the construction of all three heavy cruisers of project 82, on the basis of a government decree of April 18, 1953 and in accordance with the order of the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering I.I. Nosenko on April 23 of the same year was stopped.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad" in the exposition of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad"

These works were interrupted at a high degree of readiness of the main equipment for the ships under construction. Contractor work on the manufacture (and partial installation on the lead ship) of weapons was fully completed. power plant, turbo and diesel generator sets, a number of auxiliary mechanisms, heat exchangers, ship devices and equipment, automation systems, devices for various purposes and other technical means.

In June 1953, the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy decided to use part of the hull of the unfinished cruiser "Stalingrad", including its citadel, as a full-scale experimental compartment to test fire tests in field conditions for the resistance of the structural (armor and mine) protection of the ship to impact new models of naval weapons, testing their fuses and combat units.

Branch No. 1 of the bureau in Nikolaev was instructed to develop documentation for the formation and equipment of the compartment, its lowering from the slipway and towing to the test site. The work on the experimental compartment was led by K.I. Troshkov (chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich was appointed chief engineer - deputy head of TsKB-16).

In 1954, the compartment was launched, and in 1956-1957 it was tested by shooting with cruise missiles, armor-piercing artillery shells, bombs and torpedoes, without losing buoyancy even in the absence of forces and means of damage control on it, which confirmed the high efficiency provided by the cruiser protection project.

The closest analogue and opponent of the Project 82 heavy cruiser is the American "big cruiser" Alaska, armed with 305-mm main guns

The unfinished hulls of the other two cruisers were cut for scrap on the stocks of factories No. 189 and No. 402. On January 19, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the manufacture of four 305-mm railway batteries for the coastal defense of the Navy using 12 SM-33 oscillating parts of the SM-31 tower installations Project 82 ships with their delivery to the Navy in 1957-1958.

By a government decree of March 19 of the same year “On the use of material assets left over from the termination of the construction of Project 82 ships”, the ministries of transport engineering and shipbuilding industry were instructed to ensure the storage of the reserve for the production of eight GTZA TV-4 at the Kharkov Turbine Generator Plant, and at factories No. 402 and No. 444 - machine and boiler equipment. The Ministry of Defense Industry was instructed to transfer to the Ministry of Defense 12 oscillating parts 2M-109, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant for the gun mounts BL-109A of the lead ship.

The work on the creation of the latest heavy cruisers, although, due to objective circumstances, did not end with the expected results, they were very interesting and significant, given the extremely short time frame for the creation of Project 82 ships. This was voiced in the assessment of the work of TsKB-16 and its main collaborators from the government.

At the end of 1953, the bureau received a special cash award for a significant contribution to solving technical problems in the design and construction of heavy cruisers, performing a significant amount of development work, timely provision of working design documentation to all three builders and providing them with effective assistance in resolving issues that arose. in the process of building Project 82 ships. The design and construction of these ships demonstrated the high scientific and technical potential of our country, which further ensured the successful solution of a number of new and broader tasks.

The citadel of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", turned into an experimental target compartment for testing new types of weapons. In May 1955, a 150-meter compartment was thrown aground during a storm at the entrance to the Sevastopol Bay. He managed to be removed from the stones only in July 1956.

It should be noted that the Project 82 heavy cruisers were the only and last heavy artillery ships in the world laid down after the end of World War II. In the United States in 1946-1949, only five heavy cruisers with 203-mm main gun artillery (total displacement up to 21,500 tons) launched during the war years were completed, and two “large” heavy cruisers of the Alaska type built in 1944 ”(with 305-mm main gun) have been mothballed since 1947 and were scrapped by the beginning of the 1960s.

Project 24 battleship

The preliminary OTZ for the new battleship (project 24), developed since January 1941, was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov on May 8, 1941. The assignment stated that “the main purpose of the battleship is to fight enemy battleships both in the seas adjacent to our territory and on ocean routes. As an additional purpose, the LK can be used to suppress large-caliber coastal batteries, destroy fortified positions on the enemy's flanks and shell rear facilities.

While maintaining the main guns and secondary armaments under project 23, the number of 100-mm ZKDB barrels increased to 16 (in new stabilized installations) and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns - up to 44. mm universal tools. The number of airborne seaplanes increased to six, a requirement was put forward to ensure the reception of an aircraft from the water on board at an 18-knot course. Provision was made for the placement of six to eight 150-cm combat searchlights.

The armor was supposed to protect the vital parts of the ship from the penetration of 406-mm armor-piercing shells at distances from 80 to 200 kbt (at heading angles of 0-75 ° and 105-180 °), as well as from 1000-kg armor-piercing bombs dropped from a height 5000 m

The PMZ was supposed to withstand the explosion of a 500-kg charge, and bottom protection was also provided. The full speed was set to at least 30 knots. The cruising range of 18 knots was set at 10,000 miles, and the autonomy in terms of provisions was 25 days. The war prevented the deployment of work on this OTZ.

In connection with the change in the specialization of TsKB-4 at the end of 1943, work on battleships was transferred to TsKB-17, where they were first headed by V.V. Ashik (since April 28, 1942 - chief designer of project 24), and then F.E. Bespolov. On the basis of military experience, “Clarifications” approved by N.G. were made to the preliminary OTZ. Kuznetsov on June 15, 1944. They concerned, first of all, the replacement of 152-mm and 100-mm artillery with 130-mm universal (at least 12 twin guns), and 37-mm machine guns with 45-mm (at least 12 quadruple). The former main variant (12 152 mm and 16 100 mm guns) became an additional one.

In addition, the requirements for the structural protection and survivability of the ship were developed. So, the extremities had to be protected from 406-mm high-explosive shells at distances from 80 to 200 kbt, and it was necessary to take measures to ensure that the battleship could withstand multiple simultaneous torpedo hits. The full speed (30 knots) was maintained, and the cruising range at 18 knots was reduced to 8000 miles. The Clarifications also included a requirement to place radar equipment on the ship.

In 1944-1945, the development of project 24 was carried out with an eye on the Montana-class battleships planned for construction in the United States. Later, when it became known about the cancellation of the order for these ships that had not been laid down back in 1943, the only worthy opponents of our new battleship could only be American ships of the Iowa type, based on the battle with which the subsequent development of project 24 was going on, although from time to time "Montana" suddenly reappeared as his opponent. This happened, apparently, due to the fact that the Iowa TFEs served as an insufficient incentive to improve the characteristics of the Project 24 battleship. Voroshilov SP. Stavitsky, proposals were developed for the OTZ for the battleship, the construction of which was supposed to be included in the draft military shipbuilding plan for 1946–1955. She recommended a "medium" battleship with a standard displacement of 75,000 tons with a main battery in the form of nine 406-mm guns.

The Navy's bid for 1946–1955, filed in August 1945, called for the construction of nine battleships. To the credit of our naval commanders, the application also included six squadron and six escort aircraft carriers. However, they were substantiated by N.G. Kuznetsov, not as the main striking force of the fleet (which was clearly shown by the Second World War), but as just a means of providing air defense for ships at sea, and were eventually I.V. rejected by Stalin. By this time, he had somewhat changed his previous attitude towards battleships, and at a meeting on September 27, 1945, devoted to the consideration of a new ten-year program, the leader’s statements on battleships came down to the following: “If I were you, I would reduce the number of battleships even more” (after N.G. Kuznetsov that their number in the application was reduced to four). In the program for the construction (delivery) of ships of the Navy for 1945–1955, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of November 27, 1945, battleships were not listed, only two battleships were laid down in 1955.

December 19, 1945 N.G. Kuznetsov approved the final OTZ of the Navy for the Project 24 battleship. The main purpose of the ship was:

1. Destruction in a sea battle of all classes of surface ships both near and far (at sea, in the ocean) from their shores.

2. Strengthening the striking ability of the maneuverable naval formation of the fleet and giving it combat stability.

Additional assignment was:

1. Delivering powerful artillery strikes to suppress or destroy operationally important coastal installations and naval bases.

2. Ensuring large landings with their own artillery fire.

3. Direct cover for especially important convoys at the transition from enemy naval forces.

The displacement of the ship was not specified, but the draft was limited at full displacement - no more than 10.5 m.

The artillery armament of the ship (three 406-mm three-gun, 12 130-mm two-gun, 12 45-mm four-gun artillery mounts and 60 25-mm machine guns in quad and twin mounts) was set close to that adopted on the latest US Navy battleships of the Iowa type. , however, it was also necessary to work out the option traditional for our fleet: a PMK of 12 152-mm guns and a ZKDB of 16 100-mm guns. Provision was made for "radar installations to ensure firing of all calibers, four 150-cm searchlights with remote control and guidance from PUS and radars", as well as two jet 24-barreled anti-submarine bombers. Aviation armament was planned to consist of six seaplanes and two catapults on the poop.

Surveillance facilities were to include radar for "long-range and short-range observation of the air and sea in a circular view, guidance of air defense fighters and guidance of their battle", as well as radar for jamming, identification and navigation. Radio communications were received in a composition that ensured its maintenance at distances up to 8000 miles.

The basic requirements for armor, PMZ, unsinkability, full speed and cruising range were practically the same as in the OTZ of 1941 with the "Clarifications" of 1944. A new requirement was the installation of a roll damper, which moderates its amplitude to 5–6 ° in waves of 8–9 points (in which the use of weapons should have been ensured).

Naval theorist, professor of the Navy, Vice Admiral S. P. Stavitsky

According to the plan for the design of ships and vessels of the Navy approved by the government in October 1946, the issuance of TTZ for the Project 24 battleship was planned in 1949, the development of a draft design - in 1951, and technical - in 1952. It should be noted that during the preparation and adoption of these decisions, battleships (about 40 units) were owned by all the major maritime powers, and their construction continued. So, in the USA, the battleship "Kentucky" ("Kentucky") - the fifth type "Iowa" (construction was discontinued in 1950), in France - "Jean Bart" ("Jean Bart") - the second type "Richelieu", completed in 1949, and in England - "Vanguard" ("Vanguard"), which entered service in the spring of 1946.

Midship shangout of a battleship of project 24, preliminary version (1943)

Under these conditions, the desire of the political leadership and command of the USSR Navy to continue, as before the war, the construction of strong artillery ships looked quite natural. However, if the United States and England had numerous aircraft carriers in their fleets and under construction (about 150 units, of which 106 were escort ones; 30 units were under construction), then in our country, contrary to the experience of the Second World War, a negative attitude towards aircraft carriers was planted. Meanwhile, their absence in our fleet made it almost impossible for its surface forces to successfully solve combat missions on the high seas due to the impossibility of providing their air defense with shipborne weapons alone. About this after the removal from office in 1947, N.G. Kuznetsov and his associates, the new command of the fleet preferred not to think.

In 1948, work on project 24 (together with a group of specialists headed by acting chief designer F.E. Bespolov) was transferred from TsKB-17 to the newly formed TsKB-L (from the end of 1949 - TsKB-16), where was carried out, in the main, the study of various particular issues. By June 1949, the TsNIIVK Design Bureau (headed by L.A. Gordon) developed 14 variants of the pre-draft project (11 with 406-mm and three with 457-mm GK artillery). The options differed mainly in the number and location of universal caliber guns (24 130 mm, 24 152 mm, 12 152 mm and 16 100 mm, 12 152 mm non-universal and 16 100 mm), as well as armor schemes. The standard displacement of ships reached 80,000–100,000 tons, the speed was in the range of 28–29 knots.

To develop recommendations for the further development of the project 24 battleship, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy P.S. On June 21, 1949, Abankin organized a commission chaired by Captain 1st Rank N.V. Osiko. The commission's recommendations were as follows:

406-mm artillery is insufficient for a full-fledged solution to the problem of combating Iowa-class battleships, so it is necessary to work out options for a battleship with four two-gun and three three-gun 457-mm mounts. Taking into account the possibility of improving the ballistic characteristics of 406-mm guns, as well as the availability of working drawings of the MK-1 turret, continue work on the option with three 406-mm triple gun mounts;

The most acceptable option with a universal caliber of 12 130-mm two-gun installations; in order to increase the number of barrels of the UK, “it is highly desirable to develop a quadruple 130-mm gun mount”;

Take anti-aircraft guns in the composition: 16 45-mm quad and 10 25-mm quad. Aviation armament shall be excluded;

Radio equipment should be provided as part of: radar for detecting surface targets "Reef", radar for detecting air targets "Guys-2", early warning radar for air targets, navigation radars, firing radars "Zalp", "Grot", "Anchor", "Stag- B", "Foot-B", identification system, jamming station, heat direction finding station "Solntse-1", GAS "Hercules-2";

Side armor should not be penetrated by a 406-mm armor-piercing projectile weighing 1115 kg with an initial velocity of 900 m / s at distances of 80 kbt or more at a heading angle of 60 °, and traverse armor - starting from a distance of 100 kbt at a heading angle of 70 °. Onboard underwater protection should be designed for a contact explosion of 900 kg of TNT.

The General Staff of the Navy approved the recommendations of the commission, determined the maximum allowable draft of the battleship at 11.5 m, and also approved the configuration of the battleship - 2700 people (of which 164 officers, 200 midshipmen and chief stars) and, in addition, the headquarters - 83 people (of which 50 officers, 12 midshipmen and chief officers).

On September 7, 1949, the conclusions of the commission were reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy I.S. Yumashev. The report also said that as a result of a survey of the competent institutions of the Navy on the issue of creating a battleship, the following answers were received from them:

NTK and VMAKV them. Krylova are in favor of a powerful large battleship with a displacement of 80,000 and 100,000 tons, respectively, with a speed of 30 knots;

Project 24 battleship, XIII version (1950):

1 - 25 mm BL-120 assault rifle; 2 - three-gun 406-mm tower MK-1M; 3- two-gun 130-mm artillery mount BL-110; 4 - SPN-500 with an antenna post (AP) of the Yakor firing radar; 5 - KDP2-8-10; 6 - AP firing radar "Zalp"; 7 - AP radar for early detection of air targets; 8 - quadruple anti-aircraft 45-mm machine gun CM-20-ZIF; 9 - AP firing radar "Fut-B"; 10 - AP radar for detecting surface targets "Reef"; 11 - heat direction finder "Sun"; 12 - separation of vane propellers; 13 - department of diesel generators; 14 - cellar 406-mm ammunition; 15 - boiler room; 16 - turbine compartment; 17 - department of turbogenerators. A - side view; B - top view; B - hold

VMA them. Voroshilova and chief supervising project 24 engineer-captain 1st rank I.M. Short recommend relatively small ships with a small number of main guns so that instead of one large battleship, two small ones can be built, while the VMA them. Voroshilova recommends arming the ship with 457 mm and 180 mm artillery;

I.S. Yumashev approved the conclusions of the commission, deciding to develop the battleship in versions with three 457-mm three-gun and three 406-mm three-gun mounts and in sub-variants with quadruple 130-mm universal gun mounts.

On the instructions of the ANIMI TsKB-34 MOP in the second half of 1949 completed the study of a three-gun 457-mm turret with cellars. It significantly surpassed the world-famous ship guns both in terms of firing range (up to 52 km) and projectile mass (up to 1720 kg), and in terms of its weight and size characteristics (the mass is almost twice that of the MK-1M). As a result, the replacement of three 406-mm MK-1M turrets with three 457-mm turrets on the Project 24 ship led to an increase in its standard displacement to 86,000 tons.

I.V. Stalin was periodically interested in the state of work on the battleship, expressing dissatisfaction with their slow progress and large displacement of the ship. At the beginning of 1950, he instructed "to take care of the fastest development of the TTZ and presenting it for government approval." At the same time, he noted that "our designers are passionate about the large displacement of ships and, apparently, inflate the displacement of the battleship." On the other hand, according to V.A. Malysheva at a meeting on March 4, 1950 I.V. Stalin on the given I.S. Yumashev, the question of the battleship, said, "that if you have nothing special to do now, take care of the battleship," and when asked what guns to put on it, he answered that no more than nine 406-mm.

On March 21, 1950, the materials of project 24 were considered at the VMM. It was decided to base the TTZ on the XIII version of the pre-draft project in the form of a “medium” battleship with three 406-mm triple-gun, 8 130-mm twin-gun, 12 45-mm quadruple and 12 25-mm quadruple gun mounts without aircraft armament, with armor that provides protection from 406-mm armor-piercing shells at distances of 100–160 kbt, as well as from 1000-kg BrAB (dropped from a height of 4000 m) and from PMZ, capable of withstanding a 900-kg charge - contact for side protection and non-contact for the bottom. The general unsinkability of the ship was to be ensured with the simultaneous flooding of seven to eight compartments, and the combat one - five compartments. To ensure a full speed of 30 knots, the battleship had to have a four-shaft power plant with a total power of 280,000 hp. The cruising range with an 18-knot course was assumed to be 6,000 miles. The standard displacement should not exceed 74,000-76,500 tons with a maximum draft of up to 12 m.

On April 18, 1950, these elements were approved by I.S. Yumashev as a change in the OTZ of December 1945, and his last instructions aimed at the all-round reduction in displacement were given on May 16–18, 1950. The TsNIIVK design bureau, meanwhile, was finalizing the final XIII version of the pre-draft project, which was to fully comply with the TTZ.

406-mm artillery was placed in three three-gun turrets of the MK-1M type, and the second and third of them were equipped with Grotto radio rangefinders. The More-24 PUS system with two DACs was provided with data from two KDPs with 8- and 10-m rangefinders, as well as from two Zalp radars.

The universal caliber included eight BL-110 130-mm two-gun turrets. The PUS system of the Zenit-24 management company had four central posts. Each of them was provided with SPN-500 with the Yakor radar, as well as one Stag-B tower radio rangefinder. ZKBB consisted of 12 SM-20-ZIF 45-mm quad assault rifles with six Fut-B radar control systems, as well as 12 BL-120 25-mm quad assault rifles without radar control.

Radio equipment included a radar for early detection of air targets, a radar for their short-range detection "Guys-2", a radar for detecting air and sea targets "Fut-N", a radar for detecting surface targets "Rif", a state identification system of the "Fakel" type, as well as two heat direction finders -ra "Sun-1". In addition, it was envisaged to search for working enemy radars "Mast" and interfere with their work "Coral", navigation radars, combat information post "Link-24" (two sets), a fighter aircraft guidance system and GAS "Hercules-2".

Radio communications were received in a composition that ensures its maintenance: with a base of 8000 miles, with surface ships and submarines at a periscope depth - up to 500 miles, with aviation - up to 200 miles, in radiotelephone mode with security ships and fighter aircraft - up to 50 miles .

The length of the citadel was 57.5% of the length of the ship in terms of waterline. The main armor belt 6 m high was made of cemented armor 410 mm thick (in the area of ​​the GK towers 425-435-450 mm), giving the armor a slope of 20 ° made it equivalent in penetration to vertical armor 1.25 times thicker. The citadel was limited to 315 mm traverses and 400 mm semi-bulkheads.

Structural midship frame of the battleship project 24 (1950)

The upper belt of the citadel was made of 150-mm homogeneous armor, as was the side outside the citadel between the armored traverses. The barbettes of the main battery towers were 415–500 mm thick. Three armored decks were provided in the citadel: the upper one - 60 mm, the middle one - 165 mm and the lower one - 20 mm, and outside the citadel - 100 mm average. The bow end had 50 mm, and the stern - 30 mm armor belts. Outer skin was also made of structural armor. The GKP had 500 mm walls and a 200 mm roof, the GK turrets had a 600 mm frontal wall, 230 mm side walls and roofs. The towers of the Criminal Code were protected by 50 mm armor.

Such a reservation ensured that the main belt, traverses and decks in the citadel area, as well as the roof of the main command post, were not penetrated by 406-mm armor-piercing shells at distances of 100-160 kbt at heading angles of 0-70 ° and 110-180 °, and the barbets of the main battery towers and the walls of the main command post - by 130 kbt and more, but at all heading angles. Horizontal booking was supposed to protect, in addition, from armor-piercing (up to 1 t) and high-explosive (up to 2 t) air bombs dropped from a height of up to 3000 m, vital premises located below the middle deck. None of the famous battleships in the world had such a powerful armor.

The onboard underwater protection had to withstand a contact explosion of a charge of 850-900 kg at any depth (within the draft), which predetermined the use of contours with "box" type boules. The onboard structural underwater protection had a depth (midships) of 6.2 m and, in addition to the 16 mm side outer skin, included three obstacles (10 + 40 + 15 mm). Closer to the extremities, where the width of the protection decreased, the thickness of the main protective barrier increased to 50 mm. Bottom protection was adopted in the form of a "quarter" bottom height

3 m, that is, in addition to the 20-mm bottom outer skin, it also had three barriers (8 + 30 + 12 mm), forming three chambers, of which only the middle one was filled with fuel. She was supposed to withstand non-contact (at a distance of more than 5 m) explosions of the above calculated charge.

The initial transverse metacentric height with a standard displacement should have been at least 3.0 m, the rolling period was 15–17 s. Unsinkability was to be ensured when eight of any main watertight compartments with a length of at least 80 m were flooded (while maintaining a freeboard of at least 1.0 m). The ship had to be able to use weapons in waves up to 7 points inclusive at a speed of 24 knots, and also to maintain this speed in waves up to 8 points.

The ship's power plant, providing a speed of at least 30 knots (with waves up to 3 points), included four GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp each. and 12 high-pressure boilers KVN-24 with steam output according to software t/h (steam parameters: pressure 65 kg/cm2, temperature 450 °C). The boilers and GTZA were unified with the heavy cruisers of project 82. The power plants were located in four echelons, separated by intermediate compartments. Three auxiliary boilers with a steam capacity of 15 t / h were provided. A feature of the project was the presence in the bow of two propellers with a capacity of 1600 hp each. with an electric drive, providing increased maneuverability at low speeds, as well as movement at a speed of 5.5 knots when the power plant is not working.

The electric power plant, operating on three-phase alternating current (frequency 50 Hz, voltage 380 V), included eight turbogenerators and six diesel generators with a capacity of 1200 kW.

The cruising range with an 18-knot course was 6000 miles, and with a 30-knot course - 2100 miles with a fuel reserve of 8200 tons. lower double-bottom space, filled by 70%). Estimated autonomy in terms of provisions was taken as 25 days. The number of personnel of the ship was to be at least 2500 people.

The standard displacement in the XIII version of the pre-draft project was 72,500 tons (in the TTZ - no more than 70,000 tons), and the total displacement was 81,150 tons, while the displacement reserve was taken equal to 4.51% of the standard displacement. In addition, the maximum draft of 11.5 m specified in the TTZ did not correspond to full displacement, but close to normal (76,000 tons).

The cost of building such a ship, according to TsNII-45, would be 2026 million rubles, that is, it would be almost twice as much as the heavy cruiser of project 82 (1168 million rubles) and six times more than the light cruiser of project 68-bis (average for the series - 322 million rubles).

Comparing the main elements of the ship obtained in the pre-draft project 24 with those of the Iowa battleship, we can state that our promising battleship, with a close armament, but less ammunition per barrel, noticeably surpassed the American one in terms of the power of its constructive protection, both surface and and underwater. This led to its significantly greater (1.4 times) displacement, increased power of the power plant (1.3 times), but a slightly lower full speed.

On May 24, 1950, the prepared TTZ was sent for approval to the SME. Having correctly assessed Stalin's statement (at a meeting on March 4, 1950 on project 82): "... if you have nothing special to do now, take care of the battleship ...", Minister V.A. Malyshev was in no hurry to respond to the task received from the VMM, especially since there was clearly nowhere to build such a battleship in the foreseeable future. Moreover, in the second half of 1950, the SME transferred all work on the battleship, together with F.E. Bespolov by a very small group of specialists from TsKB-16, engaged in the development of "Stalin's favorite" - the heavy cruiser of project 82, at TsNII-45, which obviously gave them a purely research character.

Meanwhile, TsNII-45, having considered the TTZ, recommended that the SME refrain from agreeing on it, noting in its conclusion that it provides for the creation of a typical battleship of the Second World War period and does not take into account the current (1950) state of the enemy’s attack weapons, as well as the prospects for their development . At the same time, TsNII-45 put forward an alternative idea of ​​\u200b\u200bcreating small battleships (for the first time this was proposed by the main observer for the project 24 I.M. Korotkin in 1949), capable of solving tasks inherent in the battleship of project 24 as part of a formation of two or three ships, and single ship - the tasks of the heavy cruiser project 82.

The proposals of TsNII-45 in April 1951 were considered and approved at a meeting of leading specialists and chief designers of the Central Design Bureau for Small and Medium Enterprises. The meeting recommended an in-depth study of such a battleship of limited displacement

Based on the materials presented by TsNII-45, the Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry Malyshev signed a letter on April 13, 1951 to the Minister of the Navy I.S. Yumashev, whose main provisions were as follows:

TTZ provides for the creation of a battleship of the type that existed during the Second World War, and does not take into account the current state of the means of attack and the prospects for their development. Such a battleship will not have an overwhelming advantage over the American Iowa type and therefore cannot be a “destroyer” of battleships, as it is stated in the TTZ. The protection provided by the TTZ is insufficient, there are no requirements for protection against rockets and guided bombs;

Leading specialists of SMEs consider the creation of a battleship according to the TTZ VMM to be inexpedient and not justifying the associated costs of public funds. Therefore, SME proposes to conduct a research design of a battleship of limited displacement, capable of destroying any of the existing enemy battleships in a formation of three ships, and any of the existing heavy cruisers by a single ship;

At the same time, research design of ships with jet weapons capable of fighting modern battleships should be carried out. On this basis, TTZ can be developed for a modern ship with powerful weapons. The SME considers it expedient to jointly enter the Council of Ministers with a proposal to postpone the approval of the TTZ for the Project 24 battleship and to conduct a research design of a new type of battleship in 1951 in order to report to the government the relevant proposals in the 2nd quarter of 1952.

Projection "hull" of the theoretical drawing of the battleship project 24

Answer I.S. Yumasheva V.A. Malyshev, signed by the head of the MGSH A. G. Golovko on May 25, 1951, was purely negative, but little evidence. The proposals of the SMEs were rejected, it was pointed out that the TTZ developed and agreed with the SMEs should be submitted to the government as soon as possible, given that the deadlines have already passed.

Having received such an answer, the SME began to act independently, reporting by letter dated July 23, 1951 to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR NA Bulganin its position on the Project 24 battleship with a request to postpone the presentation of the TTZ for a year in order to carry out additional studies and research during this time.

ON THE. On August 8, Bulganin instructed the VMM and SMEs to report to him on this issue jointly in September, having previously studied it with the commanders of the fleets. After receiving the opinions of the latter, the issue was considered by the MGSH (the proposal of the MSP was rejected by it), but the joint proposals of the VMM and the SME on it were not reported to the government. As you know, in July 1951, N.G., who returned from disgrace, became a minister. Kuznetsov, who was sharply negative about the creation of a new battleship, due to which the fleet ceased to show any activity in this matter.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of the decision of the MSP TsNII-45, in 1951-1952, he completed the work “Justification for the choice of the type of battleship” (head - F.E. Bespolov, responsible executor - retired vice admiral SP. Stavitsky). It concretized the previously expressed ideas about battleships, and carried out design studies of nine variants of the "small" battleship.

It was proposed to arm the ships with one or two main gun turrets (457 or 406 mm) and one medium caliber (180–220 mm). The latter was intended to weaken the enemy battleship during the period of rapprochement with it by incapacitating individual hits of high-explosive shells from long distances of the KDP and artillery radars). A feature of the "small" battleship of the proposed type was the strengthening of the bow armor in order to provide protection against 406-mm shells at distances of 65-133 kbt at the most likely heading angles (0-28 ° on board) in battle.

As shown by the performed joint ventures. Stavits-kim calculations, in most of the possible cases of combat maneuvering, the failure of an enemy battleship will occur earlier than at least one of the ships of the group (two ships with two main main turrets or three ships with one). The “small” battleship with 457-mm artillery would have been the most effective among those considered, however, since there was practically no technical groundwork for it (except for the preliminary studies of TsKB-34), TsNII-45 recommended the option with five 406-mm artillery pieces for further in-depth study main guns in two turrets. The displacement and cost of each of these ships will be close to those of the Project 82 heavy cruiser, which can be built "in sufficient numbers."

The project of a "small" battleship with five 406-mm guns, 1951. However, this ship can be considered "small" rather conditionally: its total project was 44,900 tons!

The relative weakness of the air defense systems of the recommended ship variants is noteworthy. According to Stavitsky, it is most expedient to place the ZKDB not on battleships, but on their escort ships, while it was recommended that battleships be armed with automatic 57-76-mm artillery, as well as "anti-assault" 25-mm machine guns.

On December 30, 1952, a set of materials on the "small" battleship was forwarded to N.G. by a letter signed by Deputy Minister B. G. Chilikin. Kuznetsov, who sent him to the GUK without any comments. Head of GUK N.V. Isachenkov turned to Kuznetsov with a request to instruct the MGSH to consider this issue and at the same time reported on the need to develop the MGSH OTZ of the Navy "for the design of aircraft carriers to provide heavy ships." The MGSH was in no hurry to consider materials on battleships.

With the death of Stalin, the issue of continuing the design and construction of heavy artillery ships ceased to be relevant for the leadership of the fleet and industry, and when the plans for military shipbuilding were adjusted in April 1953, all work in this area, including project 24, was closed by government decree.

Conclusion

In the mid-1930s, the leadership of the Soviet Union made an attempt to bring the country into first-rate maritime powers in one spurt in 10 years. At the same time, the initiative in creating a “large fleet” did not come from the UMS of the Red Army, but exclusively from I.V. Stalin. Moreover, it was even unexpected for the UMS and fleet commanders, who were oriented towards operations using mainly light surface forces, aircraft and submarines.

Decisions to build numerous battleships and heavy cruisers were determined not so much by the needs of the country's defense against potential aggressors as by general political considerations. “The mighty Soviet state must have a marine and ocean fleet that meets its interests and is worthy of our great cause,” declared V.M. Molotov at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b).

The possession of a strong battle fleet at that time was considered as important for a great power as the possession of nuclear weapons after the war. Therefore, it is not surprising that Stalin gave the creation of battleships the highest priority in pre-war shipbuilding, demanding from designers and sailors to create the strongest battleship in the world. Designed in the shortest possible time and hastily laid down in 1938–1940, the Sovetsky Soyuz-class battleships practically met this requirement.

“We will assemble and build for a penny,” said, according to N.G. Kuznetsov, in 1939 I.V. Stalin, ignoring the direct question of the People's Commissar of the Navy about "what will we do with them in the Baltic and the Black Sea if the war starts suddenly." Meanwhile, if we recall the development of events in the Great Patriotic War, it becomes clear that our new battleships and cruisers, had they been built by June 22, 1941, would not have had any noticeable effect on its course. During the entire war, none of our large ships had combat clashes with enemy ships. Our battleships and cruisers mainly provided fire support to the ground forces, and on the Black Sea in the initial period of the war they combined it with transport and unsuccessful raiding operations. The main enemy of these ships was aviation. In the Baltic, it disabled a battleship, and in the Black Sea, one cruiser was sunk and several others heavily damaged. At the final stage, our large surface ships (including the battleship and cruiser received from the allies in 1944) were practically not used at all, taking only part in providing air defense for their bases. Shore Stalin during the war years, large ships "for later"! He did not belong to any other kind of forces.

Project view of the American super battleship "Montana", armed with 12 406-mm guns

The Yamato is the most powerful battleship of World War II. If its real characteristics had become known to Stalin, then the project of the battleship "Soviet Union" would undoubtedly have been redesigned in the direction of further increasing the displacement and strengthening offensive capabilities.

so carefully. Our relative losses in battleships and cruisers (the proportion of those who participated in the war) were the lowest among the fleets of all the warring states (14.3% instead of 25% on average for the fleets of the allied countries).

The Second World War showed that the era of heavy artillery ships and their duels within visual visibility, which lasted over 80 years, was ending, and battleships and cruisers had lost their role as the main strike force of the fleet, giving way to naval aviation (largely carrier-based aircraft) and submarines. So, during the war years, aviation accounted for 47% of the sunk battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers of all the warring countries (for the USSR Navy - 100%), submarines - 28%, surface ship torpedoes - 15%, and naval artillery - only about 8.5%. Cases of sinking battleships by naval artillery fire, even in combination with torpedoes from surface ships, were rare (there were six episodes in the entire war). It is significant that the most powerful Japanese battleships in the world, the Yamato and Musashi, with their 460-mm main guns, did not manage to fire a single shot at the enemy battleships before their death under the blows of American carrier-based aircraft.

Battleships and cruisers withdrew from the war, having proven themselves primarily as a means of fire assistance to ground forces, support for amphibious landings and ensuring the combat stability of aircraft carrier groups.

The fact that heavy artillery ships have lost their former role as the main strike force in the war at sea, giving way to aircraft carriers, and therefore ceased to be a convincing symbol of the naval power of the power that owns them, I.V. Stalin never realized. After the war, he, pushing work on the new project 24 battleship into the background, forced the fleet and industry to concentrate their efforts on the construction of project 82 heavy cruisers, effectively blocking the creation of aircraft carriers in the USSR, which N.G. insisted on. Kuznetsov.

It is interesting to note that for more than a quarter of a century, all subsequent leaders of our country also maintained a staunch dislike for aircraft carriers. The command of our Navy also played along with them, from time to time completely unsubstantiated announcing (wishful thinking) that aircraft carriers had lost their role, were extremely fire hazardous, were good targets for missiles, and the like. This campaign unfolded in the late 1940s as part of the fight against cosmopolitanism, that is, at a time when the leadership of the Naval Ministry zealously demonstrated to I.V. Stalin his activity in the design of a new battleship, suppressed by N.G. Kuznetsov after returning to his post.

As for the purely technical nature of the work on battleships and heavy cruisers, despite their incompleteness, they left a deep mark on our military shipbuilding.

First of all, the development of projects and the construction of heavy artillery ships seriously cooled the ardor of enthusiasts at all levels of leadership, who believed in the mid-1930s that with one "big leap" (as happened in aircraft and tank building, and partly in shipbuilding), with the involvement of foreign technical assistance, it is possible in a matter of years to reach the best world level in large-scale surface shipbuilding by setting up the serial production of large and small battleships (heavy cruisers), several units per year. Plans of this kind turned out to be adventurous, since the country's economy and industry were completely unprepared for their implementation, and reliance on foreign technical assistance made the planned program completely dependent on the emerging foreign policy situation, to stabilize which (in our interests) these ships, in fact, and were intended.

Battleship "Iowa" - the main potential enemy of Soviet heavy artillery ships of projects 24 and 82

The number of large ships under construction had to be reduced, and the deadlines for their delivery were constantly "shifted to the right." In October 1940, it was decided to have only three Project 23 battleships and two Project 69 heavy cruisers under construction. One battleship was built for imported main turbines, and both heavy cruisers for German main artillery. Fragments of propeller shafts and many auxiliary mechanisms were also made abroad. According to the most optimistic forecasts, these ships could enter service no earlier than 1945. There was a deadlock: by the beginning of the impending war, they clearly did not keep up and the continuation of their construction was actually the creation of a reserve for an uncertain post-war future, but such a delay with the construction obviously doomed the laid ships to moral obsolescence. It can be assumed that this situation was fully realized by I.V. Stalin, as a result of which the construction of battleships and heavy cruisers at the end of 1940 was excluded from the highest state priorities and, in fact, left to chance. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why no one was punished for the complete disruption of all previously outlined plans for the construction of heavy ships, and, moreover, the main participants in their creation were twice awarded the Stalin Prizes.

The outbreak of war interrupted the construction of heavy ships and, to a certain extent, masked the failure of their creation. After the war, the issue of completing the construction of battleships and heavy cruisers was removed primarily for production reasons, since there were still neither the necessary weapons, nor thick armor, nor our own main energy, and the corresponding production reserve created before the war turned out to be largely lost.

Proposal for the placement of R-1 missiles on a heavy cruiser of project 82 (stern):

1 - a room for assembling missiles;

2 - rocket R-1;

3 - 130-mm gun mounts BL-110;

4 - 45-mm anti-aircraft guns CM-20-ZIF;

5 - hangar for R-1 missiles;

6 - launch deck.

The lesson learned went to the future. In the first post-war ten-year military shipbuilding program, the largest ships turned out to be, as already noted, less pretentious than battleships, heavy cruisers of project 82, and in a much more moderate amount than before (four units in 10 years). Project 24 battleships in this program were only marked with a bookmark, they were not going to be seriously dealt with in SMEs. With the death of Stalin, large warships disappeared from our shipbuilding programs for a long time. The syndrome of a negative attitude towards them persisted in our military-political leadership at all levels until the end of the 1960s.

Nevertheless, work on the creation of heavy artillery ships was a powerful impetus for the development of the potential of not only shipbuilding, but also other industries that provide it, the fruits of which were already reaped in the post-war period.

In addition, the development and construction of battleships and heavy cruisers not only greatly expanded the scientific and technical backlog of our shipbuilding, becoming its solid foundation, but also served as an excellent school for training experienced personnel of scientists, designers, production workers and managers. It is no coincidence that many participants in the creation of these ships occupied various prominent positions in our shipbuilding industry in the postwar years. In general, it should be stated that the work on the creation of battleships and heavy cruisers was a very instructive and useful stage in the development of domestic military shipbuilding.

One of the latest domestic projects of a large armored ship (cruiser) with turret launchers for YUKHN and 16X missiles. F-25 variant with a normal displacement of about 26,000 tons (TsKB-17)

Heavy cruisers of the type "Stalingrad"

The construction of heavy cruisers of project 82, envisaged for delivery by a ten-year military shipbuilding plan for 1946-1955, was originally planned to be carried out at factories No. 402 in Molotovsk and No. 444 in Nikolaev, two ships each. In addition, it was supposed to additionally lay down one cruiser in 1953 and two more cruisers in 1955. The new ships were designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War and progress in the development of naval weapons and equipment.

The history of the design of heavy cruisers of project 82 began even before the start of World War II and turned out to be very complex and dramatic. To a large extent, this was the result of increased attention and significant influence in the development and adoption of decisions on the main issues of their creation by I.V. Stalin, who at that time was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR. In the first book of memoirs by N.G. Kuznetsov "On the eve" it was noted that I.V. Stalin had a special, hard to explain addiction to heavy cruisers.

After the signing in August - September 1939 of the Soviet-German non-aggression, friendship and border treaties, as well as a trade and credit agreement, negotiations began between October of the same year between the delegations of representatives of the USSR and Germany, culminating in the conclusion in February 1940 of an economic agreement, which provided for the supply to the USSR, in exchange for raw materials, of a wide range of engineering products, including weapons and military equipment. In connection with the reorientation, with the outbreak of World War II, of the German shipbuilding industry to the large-scale construction of submarines (due to the curtailment of the program of surface military shipbuilding), there was a possibility of acquiring several warships suspended by the completion of construction there.

Therefore, when on a business trip to Germany in the fall of 1939, the first Soviet trade and procurement commission headed by the People's Commissar of the USSR Shipbuilding Industry I.T. Tevosyan, the specialists of the NKSP and the Navy, which were part of it, were instructed to familiarize themselves with and negotiate the acquisition of two or three heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type with 203-mm artillery, which had been mass-produced since 1935 (at that time, two ships of this type had already been transferred German fleet, and three were completed afloat). This would make it possible to replenish our fleet with valuable combat units at an accelerated pace, without reducing the number of ships under construction and planned for construction.

As a result of negotiations, the German side agreed to sell the USSR only one unfinished, the last in the series, cruiser "Lutzow", which had a technical readiness of about 50%, while pledging to ensure the supply of weapons and equipment to complete its construction and send a group of its specialists (the shipyard-builder to Bremen and its main contractors) for the period of completion of the ship. At the end of May 1940, in accordance with the concluded economic agreement, "Luttsov" (since September of the same year - "Petropavlovsk") arrived in tow in Leningrad and was put at the outfitting wall of plant No. 189.

Model of a heavy cruiser project 82, made in accordance with 073 1947

Its acquisition (as well as the leader of the Italian-built destroyers "Tashkent") provided our specialists with the opportunity to get acquainted with the latest foreign military equipment, take into account foreign experience and introduce a number of advanced technical solutions for that time when creating new Russian-built Navy ships. In addition, this partially solved the issue of rational use of the reserve of outfitting workers available (before the launch of large ships on the stocks) at the leading Leningrad shipbuilding enterprises. If the German side fulfilled its obligations, the ship could be transferred to the Navy in 1942.

The heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type had more powerful artillery armament than the light cruisers of Project 68 (of the Chapaev type) being built at that time for our fleet, an inclined side armor belt with an armor thickness of 80 mm (equivalent to 100 mm vertical armor), stabilization of 105-mm universal gun mounts. They practically solved a number of topical and complex problems of military shipbuilding, on which Soviet specialists were working at that time: the introduction of welded structures of the hull and superstructures, the use of steam of high parameters (63 atm, 450 ° C), automatic control of the main elements of the power plant, an increase in the cruising range for due to the higher efficiency of the power plant, the use of roll stabilizers, a high degree of saturation of the ship with electrical equipment of direct and alternating current.

For the technological study of the working design documentation (RKD) coming from Germany for the cruiser "Lutzow" (project 83), a special "Bureau L" was organized in the building of the outfitting shop of plant No. 189. The translation of this RKD into Russian, its reissue according to the normative documentation in force in the USSR and the solution with the help of German specialists of the design issues that arise during the completion of the ship were assigned to TsKB-17, as a developer of cruiser projects.

After the acquisition of the "Luttsov" and a thorough study of the design documentation for it, the question arose of the advisability of creating on this basis more advanced ships of the same subclass, armed with 203-mm artillery, which would be a further development of a number of innovative solutions of project 83. At the direction of N.G. The Kuznetsov General Military School prepared a preliminary design specification for the design of a similar ship (project 82) with the same composition of the Civil Code artillery, which was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in mid-May 1941. In accordance with this OTZ, the purpose of the ship was to solve the following main tasks: combat with heavy cruisers armed with 203-mm artillery, destruction of enemy light cruisers, support for the actions of friendly light cruisers, laying active minefields, suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for landings, actions on enemy communications.

On the basis of the approved task, the Design Bureau of the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) of the Navy worked out three options for the main TTE of the ship: according to the OTZ of the GMSh with a displacement of about 25,000 tons; with reduced requirements for armor and speed - about 18,000 tons, according to the proposals of the Design Bureau of the NTK - about 20,000 tons. Based on the results of the study, the NTK reported to the Navy Commander-in-Chief his thoughts on the advisability of changing the preliminary task, which noted the inconsistency of the main TFE specified in the OTZ, purpose of the ship and it was proposed to adopt 220-mm artillery as the main caliber for it (which would ensure the superiority of this cruiser over all existing cruisers with 203-mm artillery), increase the number of 100-mm ZKDB guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, install instead of machine guns 20-mm machine guns, reduce the number of aircraft, reduce the thickness of the armor, speed and cruising range. Clarification of the requirements of the preliminary OTZ was delayed due to the start of the Great Patriotic War.

Taking into account the experience of military operations at sea during the Second World War and the proposals of the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1943-1945, the OTZ for the design of the Project 82 heavy cruiser was repeatedly changed to clarify the main tasks of the ship, the composition of its weapons, armor, displacement, speed and cruising range.

In the second edition of the OTZ, approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in September 1943, the purpose of the cruiser determined the solution of the following tasks: imparting stability to the actions of light forces as part of a squadron and during independent operations, actions on enemy communications, ensuring the combat activity of aircraft carriers and joint operations with them as the main large artillery ship, the suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for the landing.

In this edition of the OTZ, the main caliber was increased to 220 mm, and in addition to the ZKDB (100 mm), a universal one (130 mm) was also provided, the number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns increased significantly, there were increased requirements for seaworthiness (the use of weapons in rough seas up to nine points). With such an increase in armament, the displacement was limited to 20,000-22,000 tons.

According to the OTZ of 1943, TsKB-17 worked out eight variants of the main TFC of the Project 82 ship until the end of May next year. These studies showed the incompatibility of a number of task requirements (in terms of armament, armor volume, displacement and speed).

In the third edition of the OTZ, approved by N.G. Kuznetsov in November 1944, the designation of the cruiser and the main caliber of artillery were retained according to its second edition, the universal caliber was strengthened by eliminating the ZKDB, the caliber of small anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) was increased to 45 mm and, in addition to it, a second caliber was provided - 23 mm, decreased requirements for unsinkability and speed. With these changes, the displacement of the SRT was limited to 25,000-26,000 tons. In September 1945, the value of the second caliber of the MZA was clarified, which was changed to 25 mm.

At the end of 1946, TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 submitted to the Criminal Code of the Navy the results of the study of four options for the main elements of project 82 for the 1944 OTZ of the year. They were considered on January 13, 1947 by a commission led by Admiral I.S. Yumashev. At this meeting, to the question of the commander of the KBF, Admiral V.F. Tributsa - "in what way is project 69 outdated?" - Reporting on the results of the study, the head of the design bureau of TsNIIVK L.A. Gordon replied: "insufficient anti-aircraft artillery armament, lack of radar armament and unsatisfactory unsinkability (mainly due to the lack of bottom protection)". In his conclusion, after discussing the developments, Yumashev noted that "for such a large ship with relatively strong protection, the main caliber of 220 mm artillery is certainly small."

By the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 17, 1947, N.G. Kuznetsov was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Admiral I.S. was appointed in his place. Yumashev, before that commander of the Pacific Fleet. Therefore, further consideration of the design issues of the heavy cruiser of project 82 and the adoption of decisions on them took place without Kuznetsov.

At the end of January 1947, the issues of creating cruisers for the Soviet Navy were considered at a special meeting on military shipbuilding in the Kremlin with the participation of I.V. Stalin, where he expressed the wish to have 305-mm main artillery on them. Following the meeting, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 28, 1947, the ministries of the Armed Forces (MVS) and the shipbuilding industry (SME) were instructed to work out a number of options for project 82 with 305-mm and 220-mm main artillery artillery and submit them to the government for consideration within two months.

In pursuance of this order, in early February of the same year, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Yumashev approved the OTZ to study these options. The assignment for the development of variants of project 82 with a 305-mm main battery, the purpose of the ship was determined by the solution of the following tasks: imparting combat stability to light forces operating as part of maneuverable formations; destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203-mm and 152-mm artillery in a sea battle; inflicting powerful artillery strikes on especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coasts (both in independent operations and in interaction with the coastal flank of friendly troops and landings).

When developing these options, it was necessary to consider different compositions of artillery of the main caliber (8-12 305-mm guns in two- or three-gun turret mounts) and universal (130-mm or 152-mm guns in two-gun turret mounts), with the same composition of the MZA (45 -mm and 25mm machine guns). In terms of aviation armament, it was necessary to consider two options: the first with four ejection fighters-reconnaissance-spotters (with storage of two of them in the hangar) and two rotary catapults, the second - without aircraft based on the ship. Full speed was set at least 32 knots (option - 33 knots), cruising range - 6000 miles at an economic speed of 18 knots, ensuring the use of weapons in a sea state of 7–8 points.

The OTZ requirements for the development of Project 82 variants with 220-mm artillery differed from the 1944 assignment. The main caliber ammunition was reduced from 170 to 125 rounds per barrel, the number of 130-mm universal (long-range anti-aircraft) guns - from sixteen to twelve, the ammunition of 45-mm machine guns from 1500 to 1000 rounds per barrel. The number of 25-mm machine guns increased from twenty to thirty-two, and their ammunition was reduced from 3,000 to 2,500 rounds per gun.

In the middle of the same month, by order of the SME, L.V. was appointed acting chief designer of project 82. Dikovich (before that - the head of the hull department of TsKB-17, who had extensive experience working on light cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and 68, heavy cruisers of project 69 and battleships of project 23, head of design studies for project 82).

Based on these OTZs, the TsNIIVK design bureau developed and in March 1947 submitted to the Navy Criminal Code eight variants of a ship with a displacement of 25,300 to 47,800 tons, and TsKB-17 in April of the same year presented 14 variants of a ship with a displacement in the same limits. Based on the results of their development, TsNIIVK prepared a TTZ project for the design of a heavy cruiser.

At the same time, in order to ensure the study of TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 on the instructions of the Artillery Directorate of the Navy, TsKB-34 of the Ministry of Armaments resumed work on the creation of a 305-mm naval artillery turret, interrupted with the start of World War II.

According to the technical design of the turret MK-15 with the swinging part of the B-50 for project 69, with a barrel length of 54 calibers, they could provide an initial projectile velocity of 900 m / s and a firing range of 257 kbt. On the new 305-mm installations, it was supposed to introduce the achievements of technical progress of that time: remote control of the guidance of towers and barrels and radar fire control, increase fire safety and survivability, reduce by 25 people (approximately 30%) the number of personnel serving the installation.

At the end of March 1947, the Deputy Minister of Armaments, V.M. 290 kb.

Of the variants of project 82 worked out by the Navy OTZ in August 1947, the ministers of the Armed Forces, shipbuilding industry and armaments (respectively N.A. Bulganin, A.A. Goreglyad and D.F. Ustinov) presented three options for consideration by the government: two with 305 -mm and one with 220-mm main guns.

In their report to Stalin, it was noted that the presentation of the first two versions of the ship (with the same armament and different thicknesses of the armor of the main side belt) is explained by the difference in the positions of the MVS and SMEs in terms of the optimal thickness of the armor.

The MVS recommended for approval for further design option I with a thickness of 200 mm armor, which provides protection for the main vital parts of the Project 82 ship from 203 mm enemy shells from a distance of 70 kbt and a greater degree of freedom of maneuvering in battle, which was its important tactical advantage. The SME proposed to accept option II with a corresponding reduction in displacement and an increase in full speed, since the 305-mm main caliber artillery allows the Project 82 ship to successfully fight enemy heavy cruisers with 203-mm artillery at long distances, and provided with a 150-mm armor belt the protection of the ship from such shells from a distance of 85 kbt is sufficient.

Option III (cruiser with 220-mm artillery) was seriously inferior to options I and II in terms of fire power and combat survivability. Its advantages over them were only a higher (by 1.5 knots) full speed and a lower (25%) displacement. Such a ship could quite successfully fight cruisers with 203-mm artillery. However, a ship with 305-mm artillery was capable of not only destroying well-known enemy cruisers, but also successfully fighting stronger ships, the appearance of which in foreign fleets was not excluded at that time. Such an advantage in terms of fire power and freedom of maneuvering in battle fully justified the increase in displacement by 10,000 tons and the loss of 1.5 knots of speed.

1 - steering and tiller compartments; 2-smoke equipment; 3 - placement of mechanisms of mooring capstans; 4 - team premises; 5 - club; 6 - power plant No. 4; 7 - 305-mm three-gun turret SM-31; 8 - wardroom for midshipmen and chief foremen; 9 - quadruple 45-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun SM-20-ZIF; 10 - cellar 45-mm ammunition; 11 - spare command post; 12 - AP radar "Fut-B"; 13 - AP radar "Salp"; 14 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 15 - operational felling; 16 - cabin and camping cabin of the flagship; 17 - stabilized pickup post SPN-500-82; 18 - department of auxiliary boilers; 19 - quadruple 25-mm AU BL-120; 20 - shower officers; 21 - navigational cabin and aggregate radars "Neptune" and "Nord"; 22 - AP radar "Fut-N"; 23 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 24 - KDP SM-28; 25 - air defense post; 26 - AP radar "Neptune"; 27 - observation posts for submarines; 28 - main command post; 29 - combat information post; 30 - flagship salon; 31 - 130-mm two-gun AU BL-109A; 32 - ship commander's office; 33 - mechanical workshop; 34 - placement of mechanisms for anchor and mooring capstans; 35 - trim compartment; 36 - chain box; 37 - hydroacoustic station "Hercules"; 38 - provisional pantries; 39 - baffle of the sump pump; 40 - room for refrigeration machines; 41 - room for diesel generators; 42 - power plant No. 1.43 - cellar of 305-mm shells; 44 - cellar 305-mm charges; 45 - cellar 130-mm ammunition; 46 - bow central artillery post; 47 - receiving radio center; 48 - post of energy and survivability (PEZH); 49 - wardroom for officers; 50 - room for turbogenerators and power plant No. 2; 51 - gyropost; 52 - central navigation post; 53 - boiler room; 54 - engine room; 55 - operating room; 56 - room for turbogenerators and power plant No. 3; 57 - baffle of the evaporation plant; 58 - team bath; 59 - corridor of electrical wires; 60 - empty compartments; 61 - corridor systems; 62 - drinking water tank; 63 - wash water tank; 64 - spare post of energy and survivability; 65 - cellar of small arms ammunition; 66 - cellar of training ammunition; 67 - ship workshops. A - longitudinal section; B - I platform; B - II platform

During the next consideration by the government of issues on the heavy cruiser of project 82, which took place only in March 1948, Stalin approved for further design the variant recommended by the MVS with 305-mm artillery, 200-mm main armor belt, standard displacement of 40,000 tons and a full speed of 32 uz. He instructed to speed up the creation of such cruisers and subsequently systematically personally controlled the progress of their design and construction. After choosing the ship option, the TTZ project prepared in 1947 for its development was corrected by the Navy and agreed with the SME, and then, in April 1948, with a draft government decree on its approval, it was submitted to the Council of Ministers. By a decree of August 31 of the same year on the design and construction of the lead heavy cruiser of project 82, this TTZ was approved. L.V. was approved as the chief designer of this project. Dikovich.

The TsKB-17 draft design was developed from the end of 1947 and submitted to the Navy and SMEs in March 1949 in four versions, which differed in the placement of artillery of the UK and MZA, as well as the composition (in terms of the number and steam output of the main boilers) and the location of the power plant.

The L-3-6 variant had a rhombic placement of 130-mm BL-110 installations, 12 boilers at 80 t / h in four KOs, two MOs. In the B-3-8 variant, four UK installations were placed on each side, and 12 boilers of the same steam capacity were placed in six KOs. Option L-2-4 had a rhombic placement of BL-110, four MKOs (two boilers for 130 t / h and one GTZA in each). In the L-2-6 variant (which the bureau and the customer recommended for technical design), the placement of universal-caliber artillery and power plant was similar to the L-3-6 variant, but each of the KOs housed two main boilers (instead of three) for 130 tons / h.

L.V. Dikovich, chief designer of the Project 82 heavy cruiser

Taking into account the tight deadlines for the creation of heavy cruisers of project 82 (the technical project had to be completed at the end of 1949 to ensure the start of construction of two ships in the 3rd quarter of the next year), TsKB-17 began technical design in April 1949. However, in the autumn, when the Kremlin considered the results of the development of the preliminary design submitted by the Navy and SMEs for approval, I.V. Stalin unexpectedly asked the chief designer Dikovich a question: “Is it possible to increase the speed of the ship so that our heavy cruiser can catch up and destroy the enemy’s ship, which is less powerful in terms of armament and protection, and get away from any stronger ship in a timely manner?”

Such a wish of the “leader of the peoples” was taken as an indication to change the TTZ, approved by the government just a year ago. As a result, the preliminary design developed by TsKB-17 was not approved, and in the protocol of its consideration it was noted that the ship had too much displacement and insufficient speed.

Heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", design view

After this meeting, the bureau began an accelerated development of the preliminary stage of the technical design (with the selection of new main dimensions and the processing of general layout drawings), which was completed in December 1949. Ensuring a full speed of 35 knots required an increase in the power of the power plant by almost 30% (with the installation of an additional number of main boilers and the development of new GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp). To solve the large-scale task of creating a new, unique power plant, the teams of the Special Design Bureau for Boiler Building (Head and Chief Designer GA. Hasanov), the design bureau of the Kharkov Turbine Generator were involved. Nevsky Machine-Building and Kirov Plants. To compensate for the increase in the mass of the power plant and the specified reduction in the displacement of the ship, it was necessary to reduce the number of 130-mm and 45-mm gun mounts, as well as develop and implement a number of other measures.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", view of the propeller group

Due to the large overload of TsKB-17 (where, simultaneously with the development of project 82, a significant amount of work was carried out to complete the tests of five light cruisers of project 68K and deploy large-scale construction of new light cruisers of project 68-bis), in October of the same year, it was decided to transfer work on project 82 to the newly created TsKB-16 (head - N.N. Isanin), for which he became the main order. In order to ensure the continuity of design work and the timely release of design documentation for construction plants, about half of the employees of TsKB-17 were transferred to the new bureau from February 1950 - all those employed in the work on project 82.

In January 1950, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.A. Malyshev. From fragments of his diary published in 1997 in the journal Istochnik, it is known that in early March 1950, in the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin, a meeting was held on project 82 with the participation of Malyshev, Yumashev and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy P.S. Abankina. Stalin asked the sailors for what purposes they thought to use such a cruiser. After the answer: "to fight the enemy's heavy cruisers," he objected that "we have nothing to get involved in the battle with the enemy's heavy ships. The main task of a heavy cruiser should be different - the fight against enemy light cruisers. It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it would panic the light cruisers of the enemy, disperse them and smash them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit. He must be able to escape from the blow of heavy enemy ships.

Then Stalin proposed a number of measures to reduce the displacement of the cruiser. When the sailors began to object to some of them, he made a number of comments on the composition of universal and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as on the ammunition load of artillery of all calibers, noting that it was stupid to put 130-mm anti-aircraft guns on a cruiser with a firing ceiling of 16 km - the enemy would bomb it from heights from 500 to 1500 m, therefore, MZA is needed. At the same time, Stalin also ordered to reduce the number of MZA provided for by the project - "such a ship will always have guards that should protect it."

To the objections of the sailors against the reduction in ammunition (with reference to the large number of shells on the ships of the US and British navies), Stalin replied: “You don’t blindly copy the Americans and the British, they have different conditions, their ships go far into the ocean, breaking away from their bases. We are not thinking of waging ocean battles, but we will fight near our shores and we do not need to have a large ammunition supply on the ship. In this regard, he also allowed to reduce the cruising range and noted that “it is impossible to create a ship that would have all the advantages. You can have advantages either in speed, or in armor and weapons.

Further, Stalin asked where it was planned to build the lead cruiser. Having received an answer that he was in Leningrad, he said that he would first of all like to have two heavy cruisers on the Black Sea, “where you need to have a large fleet, ten times more than now, and be able to firmly lock the Dardanelles. Secondly, build heavy cruisers for the Baltic.

Taking into account the above remarks by I.V. Stalin on the preliminary design and the results of the development of the preliminary stage of the technical project, presented by the newly formed Naval Ministry (VMM) and SMEs, the Council of Ministers of the USSR by a decree of March 25, 1950 approved the main elements of the assignment for the development of technical project 82 with partial changes to the TTZ, approved in August 1948. They concerned an increase in full speed to 35 knots (due to a decrease in the composition of the artillery of the UK and MZA, the amount of ammunition of all calibers, a reduction in displacement to 36,000-36,500 tons, cruising range and autonomy) and allowed the SME without adjusting the preliminary design to proceed with the technical, with its submission for government approval in February 1951. At the same time, SMEs were ordered to start construction of two Project 82 ships at factories No. 444 (formerly No. 198) in Nikolaev and No. 189 in Leningrad in the second quarter of the same year, with their delivery to the Navy in 1954 and 1955, respectively. The decision of the VMM and SSP on the preliminary materials of the technical project 82, related to the choice of the main dimensions and the general location of the ship, was approved in September 1950.

According to the memoirs of the head of the weapons department of TsKB-16 V.I. Efimov, who had to go on long business trips to Moscow three times during the consideration and approval of project 82 in SMEs, VMM and the government, the central office then worked according to a special regime: the ministries started the working day at 9 am, from 19 to 22 h there was a break for rest, then returned to work, where they stayed until 2 or 3 am. During these evening hours, government meetings were held with the participation of Stalin, and it was possible to call in senior officials of ministries, heads of enterprises and chief designers. Chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich repeatedly reported together with the Minister of the shipbuilding industry A.A. Goreglyad (later - with V.A. Malyshev) about the design and construction of these cruisers personally by I.V. Stalin in his office in the Kremlin.

In October 1950, N.N. Isanin and L.V. Dikovich was awarded the title of chief designer of the first (highest) degree, established by a government decree of October 15, 1949.

During the design, a significant amount of research and development work was carried out. The most important of them were: determination of the optimal variant of the theoretical contours of the ship's hull based on the results of testing the running and seaworthiness of scale models in the experimental pools of the Central Research Institute. acad. A.N. Krylov and TsAGI them. NOT. Zhukovsky, testing the stability of side and deck armor by shooting and blowing up cemented and homogeneous armor plates, choosing the optimal design of the PMZ by blowing up twenty large-scale (1: 5) compartments, studying the impact of “muzzle gas cones” of gun mounts, prototyping of the main premises of the power plant, power compartments , ammunition cellars and main combat posts; theoretical studies of various issues related to the use of new technology.

A number of experimental works carried out were distinguished by their special novelty and large volume. Tests of large-scale PKZ compartments by detonation were carried out by an interdepartmental commission chaired by the director of TsNII-45 V.I. Pershina. Based on them, TsKB-16 developed an optimal design that had significant advantages over well-known foreign ones (with the same resistance to explosion energy - 10% less weight).

Major experimental work was also carried out: shooting and undermining armor plates, as a result of which the optimal ship armor scheme was determined, studies of the effect of muzzle gases on personnel and superstructure structures, which made it possible to solve the issue of rational placement of artillery installations and open combat posts.

In December 1950, the technical project 82 was completed and in February of the following year it was submitted for consideration and approval by the VMM and SMEs.

The main co-executors and contractors of TsKB-16 for weapons, mechanisms and equipment did not stop developing their projects and design documentation even during the period of adjusting the elements of the ship. Therefore, already at the beginning of 1951, they were able to transfer the RKD into production. A number of samples of auxiliary mechanisms of the power plant were manufactured and adopted by the MVK, thanks to the combination of the stages of design, production of RKD and pre-production, by the end of 1950.

By government decrees and orders from SMEs, dozens of teams from research institutes, design bureaus and shipbuilding and related industries, including such large enterprises as Izhorsky, Kirovsky, Metallichesky im. Stalin, Bolshevik, Electrosila, Novokramatorsky, Barricades, Kharkov Turbine Generator Plant, Kaluga Turbine Plant and many others. M.S. was appointed chief observer of the GUK of the Navy. Mikhailov, who headed the supervision of the Navy during the design and construction of Project 23 battleships before the war.

From the end of 1950, without waiting for the approval of the project, TsKB-16, by decision of the VMM and SMEs, began to issue design documentation to ensure the deadlines set by the government for the start of construction of the KRT of project 82 simultaneously at both construction plants. Based on the results of consideration of the technical design materials, in mid-April 1951, a joint decision was issued by the VMM and SME, in accordance with which the bureau corrected the documents defining the main TFC of the ship. In May of the same year, VMM and SMEs presented them to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which, by a decree of June 4, 1951, approved the technical project 82, the main TFC of the ship and measures to ensure its construction.

On November 14 of the same year, a government decree was adopted on the construction of a third heavy cruiser at factory No. 402 in Molotovsk.

In accordance with the technical design, the purpose of the ship was:

Giving combat stability to light forces operating as part of mobile formations both near and far (at sea, in the ocean) from their shores;

Direct cover for especially important convoys at the sea crossing from the actions of enemy cruising forces;

Destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203 mm and 152 mm artillery in a sea battle;

Delivering powerful artillery strikes against especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coasts, as in independent operations. missions, and in cooperation with the flank of their troops and in support of the landing.

According to the approved project, the heavy cruiser was supposed to have artillery: nine 305-mm main guns in three-gun SM-31 turret mounts (total ammunition - 720 rounds); UK - 12 130-mm in two-gun tower installations BL-109A (2400 rounds); MZA - 24 45 mm in SM-20-ZIF quad assault rifles (19,200 rounds) and 40 25 mm in BL-120 quad assault rifles (48,000 rounds + 2,400 in fenders).

The PUS system of the More-82 Group of Companies was provided by the KDP SM-28 (rangefinder base 8 and 10 m) and two firing radar stations (RLS) Zalp. The 2nd and 3rd GK towers had "Grot" radio rangefinders. Launchers of the universal caliber "Zenit-82" (three sets) were provided by three SPN-500 with firing radar "Anchor". Three towers of the Criminal Code had radio rangefinders "Stag-B". The fire control of anti-aircraft guns CM-20-ZIF was carried out by three Fut-B radar systems.

The radio-technical armament included the Guys-2 airborne target detection radar (a place was reserved for the installation of the Vakhta airborne early warning radar), the Rif surface target detection radar, and the Fut-N detection and target designation radar. Electronic warfare equipment included the Mast search radar and the Coral jamming radar. Two heat direction finders "Solntse-1p" and a hydroacoustic station (GAS) "Hercules-2" were envisaged.

The main armor belt of the citadel (the length of 57.6% of the length of the ship along the DWL) was made of welded 180-mm homogeneous armor, had an angle of inclination from the vertical of 15 ° and protected the side below the average 70-75-mm main armor deck; the deepening of its lower edge amidships under the waterline was 1.7 m. The traverse bulkheads of the citadel had a thickness of up to 140 (bow) and 125 mm (stern). The upper tween deck was protected by 50 mm side and upper deck armor. The armor of the lower deck in the citadel was 15–20 mm thick. The extremity armor included a 50 mm side belt and the same armor on the middle deck. The walls of the main command post had a thickness of up to 260 mm, the roof - 110 mm; wire protection pipe - 100 mm; frontal armor of the GK towers - 240, their side walls - 225, roofs - 125 mm, the rear wall acting as a counterweight - 400–760 mm (from three plates), barbettes of the GK towers - 200–235 mm. The towers of the Criminal Code and their barbettes were protected by 25 mm armor.

The vertical armor of the citadel provided protection against 203-mm armor-piercing shells from distances of 65-75 kbt, and horizontal armor - up to 175 kbt. The rest of the vertical and horizontal armor was chosen based on protection against 152-mm high-explosive shells and 500-kg high-explosive bombs dropped from a height of 3000 m.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 81.7 sp. (see aft):

1 - fan room; 2 - midshipman's cabin; 3 - corridor; 4 - 305-mm turret AU SM-31; 5 - modular switchgear; 6 - fan enclosure; 7- room for the team; 8 - KATS-100; 9 - electrical equipment room.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 108 sp. (see aft):

I - boiler room; 2 - equipment for receiving fuel; 3 - corridor; 4 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 5 - aggregate radar "Rif-A"; 6 - vestibule; 7 - flagship cabin; 8 - command post of communication; 9 - main command post; 10 - 45 cm signal spotlight;

II - heat direction finder "Solntse-1P"; 12 - direction finder frame; 13 - VHF antenna of the R-610 radio station; 14 - antenna post (AP) radar "Fakel-MZ"; 15-AP radar "Mast"; 16-APRLS "Fut-N"; 17-APRLS "Fakel-MO"; 18 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 19 - VHF radio antenna R-609; 20 - AP radar "Zalp"; 21 - KDP SM-28; 22 - pelorus; 23 - combat information post; 24 - aggregate radar "Anchor"; 25 - modular radar "Fut-N".

PMZ, covering the vital compartments of the ship (ammunition cellars, main posts, power plant premises) throughout the citadel from undermining a charge of 400–500 kg (in TNT equivalent), consisted of three to four longitudinal bulkheads. Of these, the second (8–25 mm) and third (50 mm) were cylindrical, while the first (8–45 mm) and fourth (15–30 mm) were flat. The volumes between the first (second) and third bulkheads were used for fuel (which, as it was consumed, was replaced by outboard water). To increase the length of the armor protection vertically, additional armor plates 20-100 mm thick were hung on the third (main protective) bulkhead of the PMZ.

Also, for the first time in domestic shipbuilding, these heavy cruisers also provided for a three-layer bottom protection, made along a longitudinal-transverse system throughout the citadel. Its height from the outer skin to the third bottom was 2250 mm. The outer skin was made of armor 20 mm thick, the second bottom had a thickness of 18, and the third - 12–18 mm. The value of the maximum charge, the explosion of which at a distance of 5 m from the bottom had to withstand such protection, was estimated at 500 kg.

The hull of the ship was carried out mainly along the longitudinal framing system with the distance between the frame frames in the area of ​​the citadel up to 1.7 m, at the ends - up to 2.4 m and was divided by the main transverse bulkheads (thickness from 6 to 20 mm), from the bottom to the lower deck , into 23 waterproof compartments. The sectional assembly of the hull from three-dimensional and flat sections, adopted according to the principle technology developed in the project, with the widespread use of welding, significantly reduced the slipway period for the construction of the ship.

A four-shaft power plant (four GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp each and 12 main boilers with a steam capacity of 110 t / h each with steam parameters of 66 atm, 460 ° C) for that time could become the most powerful in the world. In the electric power system, for the first time in the domestic practice of shipbuilding, it was planned to use an alternating three-phase current (380 V, 50 Hz), it was supposed to use eight turbogenerators with a capacity of 750 kW each and four diesel generators with a capacity of 1000 kW, located in four power plants.

Developed in 1950 at the Naval General Staff, the tentative project of the staff of this heavy cruiser (1712 people and 27 people of the formation headquarters) provided for the commander of the ship the rank of rear admiral, for the first mate, political officer and commanders of BCH-2 and BCH-5 - captains 1st rank.

The new heavy cruiser, in essence, was a repetition of the pre-war project 69, but at a qualitatively new technical level. Its only foreign analogues were two "large" US Navy cruisers of the "Alaska" type, which entered service in 1944 and were considered unsuccessful ships.

For 1951, it was planned to advance work on the lead ship by 10%. During the year, TsKB-16 handed over to the construction plant about 5 thousand sets of design documentation, which was supposed to ensure the manufacture of 19 thousand tons of hull structures (more than half the mass of the entire ship). However, the supply of metal and armor by the metallurgical enterprises of the country turned out to be irregular, which, together with the failure to meet the deadlines for the reconstruction of slipway "0", delayed the laying of the ship.

By the end of 1951, the main counterparty work was at different stages of execution: from the completion of the development of design documentation to the delivery of finished products and their delivery to the construction plant. The manufacture of GK SM-31 turret mounts began, field tests of 130-mm mounts and MZA were carried out, field tests were completed with the firing of armor plates. Debugging of prototypes of the main and auxiliary boilers was carried out. The interdepartmental commission accepted ten head samples of auxiliary mechanisms and heat exchangers, six more were presented for interdepartmental tests, four for factory tests, and the working drawings for the rest of the samples were at the final stage.

In the summer of 1951, N.G. Kuznetsov was recalled by Stalin from the Far East (where from February 1950 he commanded the 5th Navy) and appointed Naval Minister to replace Yumashev. After four and a half years of disgrace, N.G. Kuznetsov again had to deal with the creation of a heavy cruiser of project 82.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 176 sp. (see in the nose):

1 - aft engine room; 2 - radio communication post; 3 - midshipman's cabin; 4 - galley; 5 - gyropost; 6 - ventilation shaft of the engine room; 7 - post of communication with aviation; 8 - cabin PKB; 9 - AP radar "Coral"; 10, 11 - antennas of the VHF radio station R-610; 12 - AP radar "Fakel-MO"; 13 - AP radar "Fakel-MZ"; 14 - antenna UKVR-609; 15 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 16 -AP radar station "Zalp"; 17 - spare command post; 18 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 19 - bakery; 20 - aft central and switching post of the main caliber; 21 - fuel tank.

*With an increased supply of provisions and fresh water.

When getting acquainted with the elements of this cruiser and the decisions made in his absence, to the question: “What is the idea of ​​​​such a ship?”, Head of the GUK VMM N.V. Isachenkov replied: “Comrade Stalin said that “this ship should dictate the distance of the battle to the enemy due to its speed.” Summing up the results of the meeting, N.G. Kuznetsov described the cruiser as "a heavy, obscure ship. The end does not seem to justify the means. A very expensive ship ... ".

8 during November - December 1951, 12 bottom sections of the first pyramid of the hull of the head cruiser of project 82 (serial number 0-400, chief builder - M.A. Pudzinsky) were submitted and installed on the upper free part of the slipway "O" of plant No. 444. The rest of the slipway was at that time occupied by the hull of the project 68-bis light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, laid down in February of the same year, which was to be launched at the end of 1952. The laying of the lead ship "Stalingrad" took place on December 31, 1951, it was scheduled to be launched by November 6, 1953.

On September 9, 1952, the second ship (serial number 0-406, chief builder - V.A. Neopikhanov) was laid down on the slipway "A" of plant No. 189, which was given the name "Moskva". A month later, in the northern dock chamber of the slipway workshop of plant No. 402, the assembly of the hull of the third ship (serial number 0-401, chief builder - A.F. Baranov) began, which had not received a name before the cancellation of the order. According to some reports, this plant received an order for a second ship, the construction of which, however, was not started. The delivery of all three ships was scheduled (according to plan) for 1954–1955.

At the beginning of September 1951, by a joint decision of the SME and VMM, the specifications and drawings of the general arrangement of the technical (contractual) project were approved. Along with the continuation of the development of the design documentation for it, the contractual design for serial ships was adjusted, with changes made according to the experience of building the lead ship, according to joint decisions, as well as according to the results of development and prototype work. In order to take prompt measures at the construction plants in Nikolaev and Molotovsk on issues requiring urgent solutions with the participation of the designers of TsKB-16, branches of the bureau were organized there, performing the functions of architectural supervision and technical assistance.

Despite the systematic control over the construction of heavy cruisers of project 82 and the main counterparty supplies for them by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry V.A. Malysheva, the planned tasks were not fulfilled for them, the backlog from the approved schedule reached several months. The actual technical readiness of the ships on January 1, 1953 was 18.8%, 7.5% and 2.5% (instead of 42.9%, 11.5% and 5.2% according to the plan).

A month after the death of I.V. Stalin, the construction of all three heavy cruisers of project 82, on the basis of a government decree of April 18, 1953 and in accordance with the order of the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering I.I. Nosenko on April 23 of the same year was stopped.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad" in the exposition of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad"

These works were interrupted at a high degree of readiness of the main equipment for the ships under construction. Contractor work on the manufacture (and partial installation on the lead ship) of weapons was fully completed. power plant, turbo and diesel generator sets, a number of auxiliary mechanisms, heat exchangers, ship devices and equipment, automation systems, devices for various purposes and other technical means.

In June 1953, the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy decided to use part of the hull of the unfinished cruiser "Stalingrad", including its citadel, as a full-scale experimental compartment to test fire tests in field conditions for the resistance of the structural (armor and mine) protection of the ship to impact new models of naval weapons, testing their fuses and combat units.

Branch No. 1 of the bureau in Nikolaev was instructed to develop documentation for the formation and equipment of the compartment, its lowering from the slipway and towing to the test site. The work on the experimental compartment was led by K.I. Troshkov (chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich was appointed chief engineer - deputy head of TsKB-16).

In 1954, the compartment was launched, and in 1956-1957 it was tested by shooting with cruise missiles, armor-piercing artillery shells, bombs and torpedoes, without losing buoyancy even in the absence of forces and means of damage control on it, which confirmed the high efficiency provided by the cruiser protection project.

The closest analogue and opponent of the Project 82 heavy cruiser is the American "big cruiser" Alaska, armed with 305-mm main guns

The unfinished hulls of the other two cruisers were cut for scrap on the stocks of factories No. 189 and No. 402. On January 19, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the manufacture of four 305-mm railway batteries for the coastal defense of the Navy using 12 SM-33 oscillating parts of the SM-31 tower installations Project 82 ships with their delivery to the Navy in 1957-1958.

By a government decree of March 19 of the same year “On the use of material assets left over from the termination of the construction of Project 82 ships”, the ministries of transport engineering and shipbuilding industry were instructed to ensure the storage of the reserve for the production of eight GTZA TV-4 at the Kharkov Turbine Generator Plant, and at factories No. 402 and No. 444 - machine and boiler equipment. The Ministry of Defense Industry was instructed to transfer to the Ministry of Defense 12 oscillating parts 2M-109, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant for the gun mounts BL-109A of the lead ship.

The work on the creation of the latest heavy cruisers, although, due to objective circumstances, did not end with the expected results, they were very interesting and significant, given the extremely short time frame for the creation of Project 82 ships. This was voiced in the assessment of the work of TsKB-16 and its main collaborators from the government.

At the end of 1953, the bureau received a special cash award for a significant contribution to solving technical problems in the design and construction of heavy cruisers, performing a significant amount of development work, timely provision of working design documentation to all three builders and providing them with effective assistance in resolving issues that arose. in the process of building Project 82 ships. The design and construction of these ships demonstrated the high scientific and technical potential of our country, which further ensured the successful solution of a number of new and broader tasks.

The citadel of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", turned into an experimental target compartment for testing new types of weapons. In May 1955, a 150-meter compartment was thrown aground during a storm at the entrance to the Sevastopol Bay. He managed to be removed from the stones only in July 1956.

It should be noted that the Project 82 heavy cruisers were the only and last heavy artillery ships in the world laid down after the end of World War II. In the United States in 1946-1949, only five heavy cruisers with 203-mm main gun artillery (total displacement up to 21,500 tons) launched during the war years were completed, and two “large” heavy cruisers of the Alaska type built in 1944 ”(with 305-mm main gun) have been mothballed since 1947 and were scrapped by the beginning of the 1960s.

The war ended on September 2, 1945, and the question immediately arose before the winners: what to do with the huge fleets left behind? However, to be honest, this problem faced only two powers: Great Britain and the United States, the rest, having calculated their losses, found out that they, in fact, did not have a fleet left. First of all, this applies to France and the Soviet Union, the first "heroically" flooded its entire fleet in Toulon, and the second ... True, even before the war, Stalin had great ambitions, but not a large fleet, and they were pretty battered by Luftwaffe pilots.

Great Britain was the first to get down to business; for its shattered economy, the maintenance of the fleet was a stone around the neck of a drowning man. The "Mistress of the Seas" was forced to admit that from now on her fleet would be strong enough, but only second-class, it was now simply unthinkable to compete with the United States. And no international treaties could change this.

The old battleships that outlived their time were the first to go for scrapping, followed by cruisers. This is not surprising, because even the unfinished aircraft carriers of the Colossus type, and they had to be attached all over the world, fortunately there were still hunters. The heavy cruisers lingered briefly after the end of the war, although one of them managed to distinguish herself, but not in the way that the British cruisers had previously done.

But light cruisers went from hand to hand. It is difficult to say exactly how, but in 1948 the British somehow managed to foist on the Indians the old, old Achilles, which was called the Delhi. Later, Nigeria went to India, Newfoundland and Ceylon went to Peru, Diadem went to Pakistan, Royalist went to New Zealand.

What about new ships? Never mind. The history of the development of the Royal Navy cruisers is over. At the end of the war, projects were prepared for large modern cruisers, designed taking into account the experience of the Pacific War, but they remained on paper. Moreover, of the 5 Tiger-class cruisers already laid down, only 3 were completed, and even then with a long delay - work resumed only in 1954. In addition, they turned into helicopter-carrying cruisers, which was quite reasonable, since the era of artillery ships was over. Therefore, the cruiser project, prepared in 1947, remained on paper.

The French, as we have already said, completed the De Grasse cruiser in the air defense version and built the first and last “keel-built” air defense cruiser Colbert in the history. That is, the two leading maritime powers no longer laid no one artillery cruiser.

The United States did exactly the same as its European allies. All pre-war ships were scrapped, and the American fleet quickly got rid of newer light cruisers. Heavy cruisers were delayed, they had a large displacement, and therefore had a margin for modernization. The Americans completed the Des Moines-class heavy cruisers laid down in 1945, and the Newport News, which is part of this series, became the only artillery cruiser laid down in the West after the end of the war, more precisely on October 1, 1945.

But the command of the Soviet fleet acted quite differently. First, 5 cruisers of the 68-K project were completed, although most historians claim that the cruiser project was adjusted (hence the letter K appeared) taking into account the experience of the war, in fact this is not entirely true. Already at the very beginning of the 1950s, in the West, they switched to installing 76-mm machine guns as anti-aircraft guns, considering that even 40-mm machine guns were not very effective against modern aircraft. Project 68-K cruisers had only 8 100-mm universal guns and a lot of 37-mm machine guns. But these machines could not be compared either with the British Hazemeyer-Bofors or with the American Mk 2 with the Mk 63 control post, since both of these installations had individual radar guidance. That is, even by the standards of 1945, "Chapaev" was defenseless in an attack from the air. Recall that the Yamato had a total of about 200 anti-aircraft artillery barrels, but did it help him much?

And the decision to build project 68 bis cruisers looks completely strange. Okay, Stalin personally insisted on the construction of Project 82 monsters, but who forced Admiral Kuznetsov to order obviously outdated light cruisers? Joseph Vissarionovich did not have an unhealthy predilection for them. There is some truth in Khrushchev's words about Kuznetsov: "He wants to win tomorrow's war with yesterday's weapons," but Khrushchev was a little mistaken, he should have said "the weapons of the day before yesterday's war." The lead cruiser of this series, the Sverdlov, was laid down on October 15, 1949, and the reasoning of Soviet theorists about artillery battles at extreme distances and the “superiority” of the Sverdlov over the American Cleveland in such a collision, as well as the lamentations about the voluntarism of Khrushchev, who sent these ships are for scrap. This is akin to Yaroslavna's crying about the bitter fate of the Izmail-class battlecruisers sent for scrapping in the 1920s. It was not enough for the Soviet Union to have more tanks than the rest of the world put together, so light cruisers in the same proportion needed to be brought in, because the admirals intended to build as many as 25 units. For what?!

Apparently, in order to amuse the inflamed pride, our historians began to tell various fables about the black envy of the British, which was caused by the incomparable qualities of these cruisers. Here are the tales about the deceased diver who examined the underwater part of the Sverdlov during his visit to England, and the fable about some midget submarine that died in the Baltiysk (Pillau) area. Lord, will you seriously argue that a light diver will be able to take a theoretical drawing of the underwater part of the hull, and even at night, if you believe the stories?!

However, in the first post-war years, cruisers of old designs were still operating in all fleets. A large naval war became impossible, and in small conflicts the shortcomings of the old ships did not manifest themselves too clearly.

Yes, cruisers still had to participate in small wars and conflicts. On April 20, 1949, the English frigate Amethyst left Shanghai up the Yangtze to relieve the destroyer Consort, which was guarding the British embassy in Nanjing. Quite unexpectedly, he was fired upon by the artillery of the Chinese Communists. One of the shells hit the bridge, mortally wounding the captain and wounding the helmsman, as a result, the sloop ran aground near Rose Island. The ship still managed to send a radiogram, saying that it had run aground and had heavy losses, as the generator compartment was destroyed by new hits, the bow installations could no longer turn. The stern managed to fire a few shots, but was broken by a direct hit. After that, the wounded senior assistant Lieutenant Weston ordered a ceasefire and the crew was evacuated to the south bank of the river, occupied by the Kuomintang. In total, the English crew lost 22 men killed and 31 wounded.

The Consort arrived to the rescue, which was also fired upon, although it carried as many as seven British flags. The communist batteries were silenced by the return fire of the destroyer, after which the Consort tried to pull the Amethyst from the shallows. The attempt failed, and as a result of the shelling, 10 people were killed on the destroyer and 3 more were injured, and he was forced to retreat.

As a result, on April 25, the heavy cruiser London under the flag of Vice Admiral Madden and the frigate Black Swan moved up the river. Madden hoped the Chinese would show restraint at the sight of the heavy cruiser, but the Communists fired on that too. "London" answered with all the guns and received several hits herself. Another 13 people died and 30 were injured. The frigate remained aground, and the damaged cruiser went to England, where he was scrapped. Only on July 30 did the Amethyst refloat and rush down the river at full speed past the Chinese batteries. On 11 August she finally joined the British ships in Hong Kong.

By the way, the Chinese claimed for a long time that the Amethyst was the first to open fire, and only in 1988 did they admit that it was their provocation. Another interesting detail. The ship's cat "Amethyst" Simon was seriously injured during the shelling, but the doctor bandaged his wounds, and the cat remained at the combat post. During a long forced stay, the frigate was attacked by many rats, and Simon heroically beat off all their sorties. For his heroism, the cat was awarded the Deakin Medal (the highest British award for animals in military service) and the Blue Cross Society Medal (a special award for animals established in Great Britain back in 1897). Simon's name is inscribed on the national memorial plaque among others who distinguished themselves during this incident. But the heavy cruiser clearly had nothing to brag about.

The mysterious fate of the light cruiser Aurora, which the British on May 19, 1948 handed over to the Chinese fleet as compensation for the ships captured in Hong Kong, is also connected with China. She was renamed "Chongqing" and became the flagship of the Chinese fleet, and even took part in the battles. But in February 1949, the cruiser left Shanghai and on March 2 surrendered to the Communists in Wei Hai Wei. The case is completely unprecedented in the history of the war at sea! Of course, there have been isolated cases of flight of small ships with the entire crew, but here's to a whole cruiser ...

It was immediately renamed Chongqing. Don't ask me for details. English historians report that the name "Chung King" was changed to "Tchoung King", but whether this was a different hieroglyphic spelling, I cannot say. Further events are also described strangely. It seems that somewhere in the 20th of March it was sunk by Kuomintang aviation in the port of Taku. We have only one undoubted fact - the cruiser really turned out to be lying on board near the pier in Taku. Later, the ship was raised with the help of Soviet specialists, but in their memoirs there is no indication of damage to the cruiser. It can be assumed that it was either scuttled by its own crew, or simply capsized due to the negligence of the same crew.

The former Aurora was no longer put into operation, but it was renamed three more times: first to Huang He, then to Beijing, that is, Beijing, and, finally, to Guangzhou. Sometime in the 1960s, the ship was dismantled for metal.

Literally immediately after this, the Korean War began, the last war in which classic gunships participated. By the way, it was during the Korean War that the last real naval battle of the 20th century took place, in which cruisers participated. No, of course not, and later there were various incidents, for example, in the Gulf of Tonkin or during the Falklands War. However, there is still no complete clarity about what was happening off the coast of Vietnam, and near the Falklands, British ships simply destroyed converted fishing vessels, which can only be attributed to naval battles with enormous exaggeration. Moreover, both there and there the largest ships were destroyers.

We will look at the events that took place on July 2, 1950 off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula from both points of view. The description is especially piquant because we use a recently declassified work labeled "Only for generals and officers of the USSR Armed Forces." Its content largely explains the intellectual poverty of the Soviet officer corps. The Great Patriotic War taught the Soviet leadership absolutely nothing (remember how Alexander Pokryshkin shot down the Su-2 simply because the profile of the "secret" aircraft was not brought to the attention of ordinary pilots?), And even the secret textbook was stuffed with omissions and outright lies. The simplest example - it does not contain a single word about the participation of Soviet pilots in the Korean War. Well, what can be learned, relying on shameless lies, we have seen more than once.

But air matters do not concern us, we only note that by this time the works of Carig and Pardon, Cagle and Mason had already come out, so it was easy to clarify the composition of the enemy forces, but the Soviet authors wrote what they wrote.

Early in the morning, an artillery support group consisting of the American cruiser Juno, the British cruiser Jamaica and the British frigate Black Swan was near Chumunjin. The allies discovered a detachment of 4 torpedo and 2 artillery boats of the DPRK and went to intercept. The cruisers opened fire from a distance of 55 cables, soon one torpedo boat was sunk, the second lost its course, the third washed ashore. Only the fourth boat managed to escape, hiding behind a smoke screen, Jamaica picked up 2 prisoners. After that, the cruisers began to fire at the positions of the North Koreans near Gangneung.

In the presentation of Korean historians, this first and last naval battle of the Korean War looks different. The DPRK sea hunter division intended to land a small landing in the Chumunjin area. An hour before the landing in the sea, the base was left by a link of torpedo boats under the command of the "courageous commander Lee Gong Ok." A night search yielded no results, but at dawn two American cruisers and a destroyer appeared on the horizon. By this time, the landing had already been landed, and the hunters joined the torpedo boats.

The enemy discovered the boats, increased their speed and went across. However, Kim Gun Ok himself decided to attack the enemy, although he did not have such an order: having discovered the American cruisers and having reported this by radio, he had already completed his task.

4 torpedo boats laid down on a combat course, the distance was rapidly decreasing. “The Americans opened heavy barrage fire. Here and there shells are exploding. Gradually, the white columns of gaps are approaching the daredevils. Here the boats are approaching the zone of continuous enemy barrage. Here they are, maneuvering at top speed, breaking through the curtain of fire. The enemy shifts the fire, trying to thwart the attack of the boats. But it's too late, the goal is very close.

The head boat of officer Choi Den Su fired a torpedo from a distance of 5 cables, it exploded, seriously damaging the American heavy cruiser. Although the American ship maneuvers to avoid the torpedoes, Officer Lee Wang Geun scores a second hit on the heavy cruiser, which is listing heavily.

However, the shooting of the Americans also gives a result, since the boat of officer Yak Kwan I first catches fire, and then loses speed. After receiving a few more hits, he begins to sink. Then a strong explosion is heard on the boat, and when the smoke clears, "on this place only restless waves splashed." By this time, other boats also had dead and wounded.

The commander of the division of sea hunters Ko Jung Men ordered his ships to come closer and open fire on enemy cruisers. Of course, his guns could not cause serious damage to the enemy, but he hoped to divert the attention of the Americans from the torpedo boats.

Kim Gun Ok decided to repeat the attack, as there were still torpedoes on the boats. This time, Kim Do-hyun's boat was the first to go, on which was the division commander. He came close to the cruiser and almost crashed into its side, but failed to launch a torpedo. Later it turned out that a shell fragment damaged the torpedo tube. The boat fired on the cruiser with a machine gun, and then slipped between the damaged ship and the destroyer. Putting up a smoke screen, he safely exited the battle.

The Americans were confused, which Lee Van Geun took advantage of. He managed to get closer to a distance of 3 cables and fired a torpedo that hit the target. The cruiser shuddered and began to sink before the eyes of the Korean patriots.

For this fight, Kim Gong Ok and Lee Wang Geun received the title of Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

And now the third version of the description of the same battle is Soviet. At midnight on July 2, 4 torpedo boats went to sea in order to search for and destroy enemy ships and found enemy ships in the area east of Chhumunjin. The enemy detachment consisted of a Baltimore-class heavy cruiser, a Jamaica-class light cruiser, and a destroyer. The boats were against the background of the dark coast, and therefore the enemy did not see them until the very launch of the torpedoes. The surprise ensured the complete success of the attack, three torpedoes hit the heavy cruiser, another one hit the light cruiser. Both ships were damaged but managed to return to their bases. Two torpedo boats were sunk by enemy return fire, the third was thrown ashore.

The attack by torpedo boats was carried out boldly and decisively and was crowned with complete success. The sailors of the DPRK demonstrated a high level of combat training and courage, reaching the point of salvo at a distance of no more than 3 cables. This is confirmed by the high percentage of hits and the fact that all hit torpedoes exploded.

Well, how did you like these nonsense?! Moreover, all three stories were written, of course, on the basis of completely reliable official archival documents. True, no one heard anything about the sinking of the Baltimore cruiser, but this is the surest proof that it was destroyed. This means that the Americans have something to hide, since they are silent!

By the way, the next day, the Black Swan really almost got into big trouble when it was suddenly attacked by 2 attack aircraft that jumped out of the evening haze from the shore. The frigate did not have time to either react or open fire. True, all its damage was limited to a couple of bursts that whipped over the superstructures, although it could have ended much worse. By the way, pay attention, again "Black Swan"!

The cruiser also fired the last shot in this war. This dubious honor belongs to the American heavy cruiser Saint Paul. A ceasefire agreement had already been signed on June 27, 1953 at 22:00, but the cruiser fired the last salvo at 21:59.

When the Korean War ended, it was time to draw conclusions, and they were deplorable for the old artillery ships. With the advent of jet aircraft, the anti-aircraft gun, in principle, could no longer provide reliable air defense for the ship. It's rocket time. And here the fact that light cruisers did not have the necessary modernization reserve affected, first of all, this applied to small English-built cruisers. None of them was ever converted into a URO cruiser. Even the relatively larger American Clevelands were ill-suited for this, because you had to correlate the cost of costs with the results obtained. It was possible to completely gut the hull and fill it with new weapons, but then it would be cheaper to build a new cruiser from scratch.

However, the Soviet naval commanders did not immediately reach the idea of ​​a missile cruiser. First, flirting with projects of heavy cruisers began, fortunately, the never-realized project 66 appeared - a cruiser with 220-mm guns. And our naval geniuses are beginning to seriously consider the prospects for his artillery duel with the Des Moines at distances of more than 200 cables. It's not even nonsense, it's complete and complete schizophrenia. But this is not enough: in 1954, the development of project 84 begins, in which sailors return to the strange 180 mm caliber. In addition, the mistake made by the British half a century ago is repeated - they are trying to turn a heavy gun into a universal one, giving it an elevation angle of up to 75 degrees. Some dashing historians even suggest that U-2 scouts were going to shoot down from it. In general, the admirals, led by Kuznetsov, tried to rush into the past at full speed, and only Khrushchev's voluntarism managed to stop them. In general, a lot is said about the voluntarism of amateurs, and for the most part bad, but a couple of times it was of great benefit to the navies. Let us recall, for example, the voluntarism of Sir Winnie Churchill, from whom the Royal Navy more than once cried bloody (literally) tears. But only an amateur adventurer could start building the Queen Elizabeth battleships, which helped the British win two world wars at sea. The same can be said about Khrushchev's decision to stop building large artillery ships. With this he guessed, although most often he missed.

It all started with the alteration of old cruisers, the Americans set an example by sending about a dozen ships to the shipyards. As a rule, aft towers were removed from them and launchers of Terrier and Teylos anti-aircraft missiles were installed. The Soviet fleet followed the same path when the Dzerzhinsky cruiser was rebuilt according to the 70-E project. There is only one, but a very significant difference. If on the American cruiser CAG-1 "Boston" there were two twin launchers "Terrier", in the cellars of each of which 72 missiles were stored, then on the "Dzerzhinsky" the twin installation M-2 had an ammunition load of only 10 missiles. Agree, the difference is more than significant. Attempts to install projectile aircraft on cruisers of this period were clearly experimental in nature, and they should not be taken seriously.

But after this, the paths of development of Soviet and American missile cruisers sharply diverge, if not in directly opposite directions, then at least in perpendicular ones. Two completely different classes of ships appear, only by misunderstanding combined into one, called the missile cruiser. The Americans are starting to build ocean-going escort ships, while the Soviet fleet is getting surface combat ships, since the term "missile duel" never caught on. Soviet submarines are becoming the main enemy of American cruisers, and American aircraft carriers are becoming the main enemy of the Soviet ones.

On June 30, 1958, the heavy cruiser SA-123 Albany entered the shipyard for conversion into a missile cruiser. This was no longer a partial alteration, but a complete restructuring of the ship, which had lost all of its artillery. In general, only the hull and cars remained from him, but the profile has changed beyond recognition. For the first time, the Americans used massive pipe masts.

Now the cruiser was armed with 2 twin Teilos missile launchers, 2 twin Tartar missile launchers, 2 127 mm caliber guns and - most importantly! - installation on 8 ASROK anti-submarine missiles and 2 three-tube torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber for anti-submarine torpedoes. The former heavy cruiser has been turned into an escort ship capable of an artillery duel with nothing more than a destroyer. This ship determined the further mainline for the development of American cruisers.

As we have already noted, the Soviet fleet took a completely different path. In June 1962, the Project 58 Grozny missile destroyer entered service, which also became a landmark ship for the Soviet Navy. When Khrushchev, accompanied by Minister of Defense Malinovsky, visited the Northern Fleet, the new ship made a great impression on him, he even decided to go on a visit to England on it. But it is inappropriate for the honor of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to ride on some destroyer, so all 4 ships were hastily transferred to cruisers, although with a displacement of about 4500 tons it looked strange. Such cruisers had ceased to be built half a century ago, but the weapons of the Terrible were much more terrible than the Elswick cruisers once had.

The ship had 2 quad launchers of P-35 anti-ship missiles, 8 more spare missiles were stored in superstructures, and 2 missiles had nuclear warheads. But for the twin installation of the Volna air defense system, there were only 16 missiles - again many times less than on American ships. 2 twin 76-mm installations supplemented the ship's air defense. Anti-submarine weapons were only short-range - 2 built-in torpedo tubes and 2 RBU-6000 twelve-barreled launchers. Although in all the diagrams the ship is depicted with a Ka-25 helicopter at the stern, in fact the car was based on the shore and was taken only in overload.

This very word "overload" determined the general approach of Soviet shipbuilders in the near future. For its displacement, the ship was overloaded with weapons to the detriment of seaworthiness; it was not without reason that experts considered the reloading of the P-35 missile system installations at sea rather doubtful. However, historians Kuzin and Nikolsky found an elegant way to get around this unpleasant definition, their art of verbal casuistry can only be admired. "Foreign experts have not ceased to note since then that the characteristic style in the design of Russian ships is their exceptionally high saturation with firing systems and combat weapons, combined with excellent design." Class!

This trend continued in the future. Our historians consider the Soviet cruisers, stuffed with various weapons, the height of perfection, but the American ones, with their improved seaworthiness and more comfortable living and working conditions for the crew, are obviously bad. Let's be careful: this theory has not been tested in combat conditions. The funny thing is that it was precisely with this congestion with powerful weapons that the Terrible just resembled the very Elswick cruisers with which it all began.

If we consider the changes that took place in naval theory and military shipbuilding somewhere around 1960, then we will be forced to admit that another revolution has taken place, and a revolution much deeper than all the previous ones. It can even be said that everything that happened before does not go beyond the usual palace coups. The Carolingian dynasty ruled for itself and ruled, which had come down to lazy kings (wooden ships), when suddenly energetic Valois (armored ships) appeared and displaced them. And the kingdom, as it was, remains. Then suddenly the Valois was replaced by the Bourbons (dreadnoughts). But the kingdom remains. The Bourbons were replaced by the energetic Napoleon Bonaparte (read - an aircraft carrier). The kingdom was renamed into an empire, but in general everything remained in its place. But there were atomic bombs and rockets - and the whole monarchy flew into hell. Now, completely different tasks appeared before the fleet, the fleet received strategic weapons, and at some point, for the same United States, ballistic missiles on submarines became almost the main component of the nuclear triad.

Accordingly, the tasks of surface ships and cruisers, in particular, were revised. And it's not even about nuclear power plants, which dramatically increased the autonomy of the formations, the main thing was fundamentally new weapon systems. Of particular interest in this regard is the only American cruiser built during this period, the Long Beach. It was designed as a frigate, but already at the design stage, the displacement of the ship jumped to 15,000 tons, and it turned into a real cruiser. The ship received a nuclear power plant and the same weapons as the Albany. It would seem that this is surprising, just a completely adequate escort ship for the new nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise. But around the same time, the nuclear-powered frigate Bainbridge was also built, which had half the displacement and was also ideally suited for this role. The fact is that according to the original project, it was supposed to install Polaris ballistic missiles on Long Beach, turning it into a strategic ship. But this project remained on paper, although the allocated displacement reserve remained. However, for a long time the Americans rushed about projects for installing ballistic missiles on various surface ships, the most extravagant was the proposal to turn Iowa-class battleships into ballistic missile monitors, as described in the book Battleships in Battle, recently published by the Yauza publishing house. But in the end, American admirals left ballistic missiles exclusively to submarines. Similar projects appeared in the Soviet fleet, but they also remained in the subjunctive mood.

So, let's look at the development of missile cruisers in the American and Soviet fleets, and it should immediately be said that they were not as straightforward as it might seem, primarily because of the ongoing confusion with the classification of surface ships.

The Americans engaged in the mass construction of various escort ships, varying in size from the destroyers "Dili" to the same "Long Beach". But missile frigates were considered the main ones - ships larger than the old destroyer, but smaller than the cruiser. The fact is that for a long time it was not possible to squeeze rocket launchers into small ships, the Americans succeeded in this only when their escort destroyers overtook the destroyers of the Second World War period in terms of displacement. In the same way, the displacement of missile frigates also grew, especially when they began to install nuclear reactors en masse. Ships of the "California" and "Virginia" types jumped the mark of 10,000 tons of displacement, and it was somehow indecent to call them frigates, so on June 30, 1975, the previous classification was adjusted, and all these ships were transferred to cruisers. For example, the DLG-16 "Legi" became the CG-16, that is, the missile cruiser. However, the smallest Farragat-class ships were transferred from DLG escort ships to DDG missile destroyers. This confusion was also reflected in the breaking of the traditional system of names of the American Navy, because until now the names of the states were given only to battleships, and now they were suddenly stuck to frigates. Well, even for cruisers ...

A little later, the Americans abandoned nuclear reactors on small ships and turned to gas turbines. In 1980, the new-generation CG-47 Ticonderoga missile cruiser was laid down, on which the Aegis system was installed. At the same time, initially these ships should also have been considered DDG missile destroyers, but the word “cruiser” sounds so beautiful! After it, a larger series of missile cruisers of the Port Royal type is being laid - lumps fly from the established system of names, because these ships already receive former aircraft carrier names - battles won by the Americans or considered as such. But the question is: how long will this classification system last, because missile destroyers, say DDG-87 "Mastin", have already crept close to them in terms of displacement. And will another crowd of missile cruisers appear in the American fleet in the near future?

As for the armament, it remained practically unchanged for half a century (!) With minimal changes. Old missiles were replaced by newer and more advanced ones, new fire control systems appeared - and nothing more. The only fundamental innovation was the installation on almost all large ships of the US Navy, including missile cruisers, of course, Harpoon cruise missiles, which can also carry a nuclear warhead. The cruisers are again returning to the category of strategic ships, although the range of the Harpoon, of course, cannot be compared with the range of the Polaris, and even more so the Trident. Well, the installation of a pair of Vulkan-Phalanx anti-aircraft guns to protect against cruise missiles can be overlooked. After all, who counted the extra Oerlikons put on cruisers during World War II?

But the long and glorious history of British cruisers ended. In 1979, the cruiser-helicopter carrier Blake was withdrawn from the fleet, and the Royal Navy did not receive a single cruiser-class ship again. Even fairly large missile destroyers of the Devonshire and Bristol types, which could well be considered cruisers, remained destroyers. The unfortunate Admiralty was forced to resort to such tricks in order to snatch the money needed for the development of the fleet. As one of the historians correctly noted, as soon as the British Empire collapsed, its support, the British cruiser, disappeared.

The same thing happened in other fleets. The French and Italian cruisers disappeared, Japan no longer built them, at least officially, although the displacement of Chokai-class missile destroyers exceeded 7000 tons, quite well for a modern cruiser. In a word, cruisers as a class (this is not a Marxist wording) remained only in the Soviet and American fleets, and the history of the Soviet missile cruiser turned out to be even more complicated.

Let's go back to our native land. It is difficult to understand further zigzags of Soviet naval thought. I involuntarily return to a phrase that I heard twice from our admirals: the Soviet fleet received those ships that Boris Butoma wanted and could build, and not those that Admiral Gorshkov wanted to receive. But I can neither confirm nor deny this statement. If I turn to them, they will backtrack on their words even today. Or especially Today.

It was supposed to build 16 ships of the Grozny type, but it all ended with four units. The development of a ship with more powerful defensive weapons begins, and project 1134 "Admiral Zozulya" appears. Although the P-35 installations are retained on it, their number is reduced - only two paired ones remain, but the number of SAM launchers doubles, and their ammunition increases. Again, anti-submarine torpedo tubes remain, but now they are becoming five-tube, RBU-6000 installations and new RBU-1000. And most importantly, the ship was originally classified as a UAV - a large anti-submarine ship, which met the requirements of the moment. A new threat appeared on the horizon - American submarines armed with Polaris missiles, and it was necessary to create a means of combating them. However, no one wanted to think: will the Americans, who unconditionally dominate the sea, allow them to hunt for their submarines? NATO aviation will pass these "hunters" like a fox of chickens. Or is the same bet on a preventive unprovoked attack visible here? Say, we'll drown the boats, and at least the grass won't grow there. In any case, the tracking of our artillery cruisers by American aircraft carriers proceeded precisely from this. But then it turns out that the naval doctrine of the USSR did not leave a stone unturned from the "statements of the party and government about the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union." But at the same time, the fleet was announced in advance as one giant kamikaze, because our ships did not even have a shadow of a chance to survive after such an attack. They were doomed.

Along the way, changes began to be made to the project, large anti-submarine ships 1134A, 1134B appeared. Gas turbines appear on ships as engines. By the way, these ships were not called cruisers abroad. For this reason, or because the Soviet admirals were hooked on how the Americans, with a simple stroke of the pen, so dramatically increased the combat power of their fleet, and they wanted the same thing, but in the summer of 1977, Project 1134 ships were transferred to missile cruisers for fear of enemies. By the way, Admiral Gorshkov, apparently realizing the pointlessness of building such ships, proposed re-equipping them with P-500 Bazalt anti-ship missiles. The proposal did not pass, although it gave impetus to the creation of the next series of missile cruisers.

In the mid-1970s, work began on Project 1164 cruisers, apparently, American aircraft carriers were again assigned as the main enemy. The P-500 missile system gave Soviet ships at least a theoretical chance of surviving after a strike on an aircraft carrier task force. This is still not an artillery cruiser, which was forced to follow within line of sight of an enemy aircraft carrier. True, it is not very clear why 130-mm guns appear on ships. As the last frontier of air defense, this caliber is redundant, and in all other senses insufficient. For example, the Falklands War showed that modern automatic guns as a means of landing support are clearly inferior to the old 152-mm, and better 203-mm guns.

By the way, it is curious that also in the mid-1970s, the Americans began developing the CSGN nuclear attack cruiser, but they intend to install a new design 203-mm MCLWG gun on it. The design of the 155-mm AGS gun begins, LRLAP active-rocket projectiles with insane firing range are being created. But how do you imagine aiming a gun at a target at a distance of 67 miles?! This shows that even practical Americans sometimes drifted into the wrong steppe, the main thing is that they managed to stop in time.

The 1164 cruisers carry 16 launchers, which gives them a fairly powerful volley, but at the same time there is a complete lack of constructive protection, which further emphasizes their fate as "ships of one volley".

And after that, our shipbuilding makes a leap forward, ships of project 1144 appear. It is interesting that the task was issued for a large nuclear anti-submarine ship, a project for a nuclear anti-submarine cruiser was signed, and a heavy nuclear missile cruiser entered service.

Alas, there was a relapse of the disease that tormented the French fleet at the end of the 19th century, when five battleships of six different types were built. Among the four cruisers of project 1144, there were no two identical ones, even purely formally, Admiral Ushakov had an index of 1144, Admiral Lazarev, Admiral Nakhimov and Peter the Great - 1144.2, but the last trinity differed from each other in the composition of weapons and CIUS . The reason was prosaic - the factories did not have time to prepare the designed systems, so they put what was at hand at the moment. Of course, temporarily, but there is nothing more permanent than temporary. Some armor appears again on these ships, and for some unknown reason, our historians admire the supposedly original local defense scheme. But excuse me, what was the repeatedly cursed "box protection" of Washington cruisers ?! Or in our country, as has happened more than once, "the party invented the wheel"?

The Soviet fleet received powerful ships with a completely incomprehensible purpose. They would have looked great as part of American aircraft carrier formations, but in the Soviet fleet ... It turned out to be a huge escort ship, armed in addition with the Granit SCRC, by the way, for the first time, Soviet ships caught up with American ones in terms of ammunition load of missiles. It can be assumed that the Project 1144 cruisers were a new reincarnation of the Project 1164 idea with increased combat stability. The only question is, have they really been upgraded? The fact is that the well-known reference book "Jane" pasted on these ships an insulting label "blind pithecanthropus with an atomic club", hinting at the extreme imperfection of electronic systems. But, like many others, this assessment of the qualities of the ship remains purely speculative, not verified by experience (fortunately, not verified).

By the way, even modern Russian experts ambiguously evaluate this project. Some believe that in the guise of "Peter the Great" Stalin's dream of a "bandit cruiser" was embodied, which was pushed through by the Soviet military-industrial complex, which built a ship that was completely unnecessary to the fleet. Maybe that's why the idea arose to "cut" the project 1144 ship in half and get a project 1293 missile cruiser and a project 1199 anti-submarine ship.

Crying was regularly heard in the Soviet fleet about the fact that our ships had nothing to work on coastal targets. “It was painful, bitter and insulting to watch how American battleships processed the Vietnamese coast with their 406-mm guns with almost impunity.” Apparently, our admirals also wanted to process something. There is only one question: what exactly? What landings and where was the Soviet fleet going to land? Were our naval commanders going to get to the American coast on the BDB and land somewhere in the San Francisco area? After all, the Soviet fleet had nothing like ocean landing ships of the Iwo Jima, Tarva, Wasp types. Only now they are going to get it, and even then they have to buy it in France.

The Soviet Navy had some other cruisers, which are simply inappropriate to talk about. For unknown reasons, all Soviet aircraft carriers were first listed as aircraft-carrying cruisers. There were reasons for this, because the same project 1143 was for some reason armed with the Basalt SCRC and a set of anti-submarine systems, quite suitable for any UAV. It seemed that a BOD of project 1134 was glued to the side of a small aircraft carrier like Illustrious at an angle. But it turned out “not a mouse, not a frog, but an unknown little animal”, which did not meet the requirements for either this or that ship. Even real aircraft carriers of project 11435 for some reason fell into this strange class of ships. But the hard fate of the only completed ship of this class, it seems to me, was determined by something else. "Riga" - "Leonid Brezhnev" - "Tbilisi" - "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" ... To rename the ship once is already unfortunately, but there are as many as four different names. Definitely not good.

Little of! You are aware that in those distant times, our ballistic missile submarines were part of the fleet as SSBNs - strategic missile submarines. Here are such pies with kreis ... that is, with kittens they turn out.

This could end the description of the history of the class of cruisers, but it seems to me that it will continue further. Modern weapon systems are becoming more and more bulky and heavy, and accordingly, the displacement of ships is growing. The new American frigates have already crept up to the critical point of 10,000 tons, so another reclassification is likely, and the number of cruisers will jump again. And so on ad infinitum, as long as navies exist, and to abolish them for the time being would be a form of arch-foolishness, it is not necessary to talk about a big war today, but the fight against pirates in the 21st century has again become relevant. The Royal Navy is again forced to revive the seemingly gone forever auxiliary cruisers. Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited, with the help of the fleet, equips nuclear fuel transporters with automatic cannons so that they are not threatened by capture by pirates. In Russia, the option of arming transports with camouflaged launchers of ZM-54 missiles is being considered with the aim of the same sudden strike on enemy aircraft carriers, a directly natural HSK-8 Kormoran is obtained. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to guess what awaits us in the future. It is only clear that the history of cruisers will certainly continue.