Second Pacific Squadron in the Korea Strait.

Unlike the Japanese fleet, the II Pacific Squadron, which had passed half the world, did not seek to impose a battle on the enemy. The main task of the Russian ships after the fall of Port Arthur was to break through to Vladivostok, to which they went along the shortest route - through the Tsushima Strait. The squadron was discovered by an auxiliary Japanese cruiser on the morning of May 27, after which the Japanese fleet weighed anchors and headed towards the enemy.

Around 11 am, a Japanese cruiser detachment (4 cruisers) approached the Russian squadron, at which the battleships fired several volleys, after which the Japanese cruisers retreated. By this time, the ships of the Russian squadron were reorganized into battle formation.

The beginning of the battle.

At 13:20, the main Japanese forces were discovered moving from east to west and crossing the course of the Russian squadron. After 20 minutes, the Japanese ships were to the left of the wake of the main Russian forces, and the previously fired cruising detachment went south and prepared to attack the auxiliary Russian ships that were behind the main forces.

"The Loop of Togo".

At 13:40 - 13:45, the Japanese armored ships of the 1st and 2nd detachments began a sequential turn on a course parallel to the wake column of the Russian battleships. At this moment, a unique situation developed, which, apparently, was the mistake of Admiral Togo: the Russian battleships took their places in the ranks, the auxiliary forces were to the right, and the Japanese ships, due to the turn that had begun, could not use all their guns, because. the ships that completed the turn were in front of the ships of the column, which had not yet completed the turn. Alas, in order to take full advantage of this situation, the distance had to be noticeably closer (by the time the Japanese began to turn around, it was more than 30 cables).

At 13:49, the flagship Knyaz Suvorov opened fire on the Mikasa, followed by Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, Oslyabya and Oryol. Three coastal defense battleships and the Shisoy Veliky fired at the Nissin and Kasuga. At 13:51 the Japanese ships also opened fire.

The death of the "Oslyabi" and the failure of the "Prince Suvorov".

At the beginning of the battle, both sides demonstrated high firing accuracy: by 14:20 Mikasa, Knyaz Suvorov and Oslyabya, as well as the armored cruisers Asama and Iwate, were seriously damaged. By this time, the Asama, which was poorly controlled due to damage to the rudders, began to exit the battle, the Mikasa, which received 29 hits, including shells of the main caliber, turned away and left the zone of destruction of most of the Russian guns.

Unfortunately, the damage to the Japanese ships did not greatly affect their combat capability, but in the Russian squadron everything was much worse: the Prince Suvorov, engulfed in flames, stopped obeying the helm and began an uncontrolled circulation to the right, and the Oslyabya, which received the most hits (in the first phase battle, the Japanese fire was concentrated on it) turned to the right and sank at 14:50.

After the failure of the "Prince Suvorov" and the death of the "Oslyabi", the "Emperor Alexander III" stood at the head of the wake column of the Russian squadron, the Russian forces continued to move north. The Japanese forces on the left made a turn "all of a sudden" and turned to the Russian ships on the left side (Nissin stood at the head of the column).

This maneuver solved several problems at once: it made it possible to use the guns of the undamaged side, gave rest to the exhausted gunners, and made it possible to eliminate damage to the starboard side, which had received a fair amount of Russian shells. During the rebuilding, the Japanese were under heavy fire: the Asama, which left the ranks, was again heavily damaged, a fire started on the Fuji, which almost led to the explosion of shells from the aft turret. The parties parted, which gave a respite to both the heavily damaged Russian ships and the noticeably less affected Japanese.

The second phase of the battle.

The fierce battle resumed at 15:30 - 15:40: by this time the Japanese had made the second turn "all of a sudden" and the enemy columns again moved parallel to the north, showering each other with shells. The "Emperor Alexander III", "Eagle" and "Sisoy the Great" received heavy damage.

"Prince Suvorov" by this time already did not represent any combat value, although it kept afloat. Since the Japanese blocked the path of the Russian column, the Borodino, which was in its head, led the squadron to the east. At 16:17, the opponents lost sight of each other and the battle was again suspended. At 17:30, the destroyer "Buyny" removed the wounded commander of the squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, and 19 people from his headquarters from the burning "Prince Suvorov".

End of the day's fight.

The battle resumed at about 17:40 and went according to the same scenario, with the only difference that the composition of the Second Pacific Squadron noticeably thinned out. The main blow of the Japanese this time fell on the battleships "Orel" and "Borodino", but at first it suffered the most and already barely afloat "Emperor Alexander III": it, noticeably lagging behind the main forces, came under fire from the ships of the 2nd Japanese combat squad. After heavy shelling, the flaming battleship rolled over and sank very quickly.

Around the same time, a fire broke out on the Borodino, and then the ammunition of the 152-mm gun detonated from a hit by a Japanese shell. At 19:15, the battleship Borodino sank. At the same time, the battle actually ended due to sunset.

Night attacks by destroyers and the surrender of Admiral Nebogatov's ships.

After sunset, the Japanese destroyers went on the attack, before that they had practically not participated in the battle. The battleships Navarin and Sisoy Veliky were heavily damaged and sunk, the crew of the Admiral Nakhimov sank, and the rest of the ships scattered. The second Pacific squadron finally ceased to exist.

The next day, most of the surviving Russian ships surrendered. 6 ships, incl. the cruiser "Aurora" reached neutral ports, where they were interned. The cruiser "Almaz" and 2 destroyers reached Vladivostok.

Overall result of the battle.

In general, when describing the results of the Tsushima battle, the word “rout” would be most appropriate: the powerful Russian squadron ceased to exist, losses exceeded 5,000 people, and the Russo-Japanese war was finally lost.

The reasons for the defeat, of course, were many: both the long path traveled by the Second Pacific Squadron and the controversial decisions of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, and insufficient training of Russian sailors, and unsuccessful armor-piercing shells (about a third of the shells that hit Japanese ships did not explode).

For the Japanese, the Battle of Tsushima became a matter of national pride, and with good reason. It is interesting that two ships that participated in that battle have survived to this day: the Japanese flagship Mikasa and the Russian cruiser Aurora, both ships in the status of museums are permanently parked.

110 years ago, on May 27-28, 1905, the Tsushima naval battle took place. This naval battle was the last decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese War and one of the most tragic pages in the Russian military chronicle. The Russian 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Zinoviy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky suffered a crushing defeat from the Imperial Japanese Navy under the command of Admiral Togo Heihachiro.

The Russian squadron was destroyed: 19 ships were sunk, 2 were blown up by their crew, 7 ships and vessels were captured, 6 ships and vessels were interned in neutral ports, only 3 ships and 1 transport broke through to their own. The Russian fleet lost its combat core - 12 armored ships designed for linear squadron combat (including 4 of the latest Borodino-class squadron battleships). Of the more than 16 thousand crew of the squadron, more than 5 thousand people died and drowned, more than 7 thousand people were captured, more than 2 thousand were interned, 870 people went to their own. At the same time, Japanese losses were minimal: 3 destroyers, more than 600 people were killed and wounded.

The Tsushima battle was the largest in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet and finally broke the will to resist the military-political leadership of the Russian Empire. Tsushima inflicted terrible damage on the Russian fleet, which had already lost the 1st Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur. Now the main forces of the Baltic Fleet have perished. Only with great efforts, the Russian Empire was able to restore the combat capability of the fleet for the First World War. The Tsushima disaster caused great damage to the prestige of the Russian Empire. Petersburg succumbed to public and political pressure and made peace with Tokyo.

At the same time, it should be noted that in military-strategic terms, Tsushima meant little, despite the heavy losses of the fleet and the negative morale effect. Russia has lost control over the situation at sea for a long time, and the fall of Port Arthur with the death of the 1st Pacific squadron put an end to this issue. The outcome of the war was decided on land and depended on the moral and volitional qualities of the military-political leadership and the resources of the countries. Japan was completely exhausted in military-material, economic-financial and demographic terms.

The patriotic upsurge in the Empire of Japan had already faded, crushed by material hardships and severe losses. Even the Tsushima victory caused only a short burst of enthusiasm. The human resources of Japan were depleted, among the prisoners there were already old people and almost children. There was no money, the treasury was empty, despite the financial support of the United States and England. The Russian army, despite a streak of failures, mainly caused by unsatisfactory command, had just entered into full strength. A decisive victory on land could lead Japan to a military-political catastrophe. Russia had the opportunity to throw the Japanese out of the mainland and occupy Korea, return Port Arthur, and win the war. However, Petersburg broke down and, under the pressure of the "world community", went to a shameful world. Russia was able to take revenge and regain its honor only under I.V. Stalin, in 1945.

Start of the hike

The underestimation of the enemy, hatred moods, the extreme self-confidence of the government, as well as the sabotage of certain forces (like S. Witte, who convinced everyone that Japan would not be able to start a war earlier than 1905 due to lack of money), led to the fact that Russia at the beginning of the war did not have sufficient forces in the Far East, as well as the necessary shipbuilding and repair capacities. At the very beginning of the war, it became obvious that the Port Arthur squadron needed to be strengthened. Admiral Makarov repeatedly pointed out the need to strengthen naval forces in the Far East, but nothing was done during his lifetime.

The death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk", when almost the entire crew of the flagship died, along with the commander of the squadron Makarov, had the most negative impact on the combat capability of the Pacific squadron. An adequate replacement for Makarov was not found until the end of the war, which was another evidence of the general degradation of the Russian Empire and, in particular, the rottenness and weakness of the military leadership. After that, the new fleet commander in the Pacific, Nikolai Skrydlov, raised the question of sending significant reinforcements to the Far East. In April 1904, a fundamental decision was made to send reinforcements to the Far East. The 2nd Pacific Squadron was headed by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky. Rear Admiral Dmitry von Felkerzam (he died a few days before the Battle of Tsushima) and Oscar Adolfovich Enkvist were appointed junior flagships.

According to the original plan, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to reinforce the 1st Pacific Squadron and create decisive naval superiority over the Japanese fleet in the Far East. This led to the release of Port Arthur from the sea, disruption of the sea communications of the Japanese army. In the future, this was to lead to the defeat of the Japanese army on the mainland and the lifting of the siege of Port Arthur. With such a balance of forces (battleships and cruisers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron plus squadron battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron), the Japanese fleet was doomed to defeat in an open battle.

The formation of the squadron was slow, but the events in the Yellow Sea on August 10, 1904, when the 1st Pacific squadron under the command of Vitgeft (died in this battle) could not use the available opportunities to inflict serious damage on the Japanese fleet and break through part of the forces to Vladivostok, forced accelerate the start of the trip. Although after the battle in the Yellow Sea, when the 1st Pacific Squadron practically ceased to exist as an organized fighting force (this was especially true of morale), it refused to break through to Vladivostok and began to transfer people, guns and shells to the land front, the campaign of the Rozhdestvensky squadron had already lost original meaning. By itself, the 2nd Pacific squadron was not strong enough for independent action. A more sensible solution would be to organize a cruising war against Japan.

On August 23, in Peterhof, under the chairmanship of Emperor Nicholas II, a meeting of representatives of the naval command and some ministers was held. Some participants warned against the hasty departure of the squadron, pointing to the poor preparation and weakness of the fleet, the difficulty and duration of the sea voyage, the possibility of the fall of Port Arthur before the arrival of the 2nd Pacific squadron. It was proposed to postpone the dispatch of the squadron (in fact, it had to be sent even before the start of the war). However, under pressure from the naval command, including Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the issue of sending was resolved positively.

Completion and repair of ships, supply problems, etc., delayed the exit of the fleet. Only on September 11, the squadron moved to Revel, stood there for about a month and moved to Libau to replenish coal reserves and receive materials and cargo. On October 15, 1904, the 2nd squadron left Libau with 7 battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 7 light cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers, 8 destroyers and a detachment of transports. Together with the detachment of Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov, who later joined the forces of Rozhdestvensky, the composition of the 2nd Pacific squadron reached 47 naval units (of which 38 were combat units). The main fighting force of the squadron consisted of four new squadron battleships of the Borodino type: Prince Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino and Eagle. More or less, the high-speed battleship Oslyabya could support them, but it had weak armor. The skillful use of these battleships could lead to the defeat of the Japanese, but this chance was not used by the Russian command. The cruising component of the squadron was planned to be strengthened by the purchase of 7 cruisers abroad, in order to seriously increase the power of the Rozhdestvensky squadron, but this was not possible.

In general, the squadron was very diverse in terms of strike power, armor, speed, and maneuverability, which seriously worsened its combat capabilities and became a prerequisite for defeat. A similar negative picture was observed in the personnel, both command and private. The personnel were recruited hastily, he had poor combat training. As a result, the squadron was not a single combat organism and could not become one during a long campaign.

The campaign itself was accompanied by great problems. It was necessary to go about 18 thousand miles, not in the way of their own repair base and supply points. Therefore, the issues of repair, supply of ships with fuel, water, food, treatment of the crew, etc., had to be decided by ourselves. To avoid a possible attack by Japanese destroyers on the way, Admiral Rozhdestvensky kept the squadron's route a secret, deciding to enter French ports without prior approval, relying on the military alliance of Russia and France. The supply of coal was transferred to a German trading company. She was supposed to supply coal in the places indicated by the Russian naval command. Provisions were taken over by some foreign and Russian companies. For repairs on the way, they took with them a special steamer-workshop. This ship and a number of other transports with cargo for various purposes constituted the squadron's floating base.

An additional supply of ammunition needed for firing practice was loaded onto the Irtysh transport, but shortly before the start of the campaign, an accident occurred on it, and the transport was delayed for repairs. The ammunition was removed and sent by rail to Vladivostok. "Irtysh", after repairs, caught up with the squadron, but without shells, delivering only coal. As a result, the already poorly trained crews lost the opportunity to practice shooting on the way. To clarify the situation along the route, special agents were sent to all states near the shores of which the Russian fleet passed, who were supposed to monitor and notify Admiral Rozhdestvensky about everything.

The campaign of the Russian squadron was accompanied by rumors of an ambush by Japanese destroyers. The result was the Hull Incident. Due to command errors in building the squadron, when the squadron passed Dogger Bank on the night of October 22, the battleships first attacked the English fishing vessels, and then fired on their cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. The cruiser "Aurora" received several damages, two people were injured. On October 26, the squadron arrived in Spanish Vigo, where it stopped to investigate the incident. This led to a diplomatic conflict with England. Russia was forced to pay a large fine.

On November 1, Russian ships left Vigo and on November 3 arrived in Tangier. Having loaded fuel, water and food, the fleet, according to a previously developed plan, was divided. The bulk of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, including the new battleships, went around Africa from the south. Two old battleships, light ships and transports under the command of Admiral Fölkersam, which, due to their draft, could pass the Suez Canal, moved through the Mediterranean and Red Seas.

The main forces on December 28-29 approached Madagascar. On January 6-7, 1905, the Fölkersam detachment joined them. Both detachments joined in Nosi-be Bay on the western coast of the island, where the French allowed parking. The campaign of the main forces around Africa was extremely difficult. British cruisers followed our ships to the Canary Islands. The situation was tense, the guns were loaded and the squadron was preparing to repel the attack.

There were no good stops along the way. Coal had to be loaded directly into the sea. In addition, the squadron commander, in order to reduce the number of stops, decided to make long transitions. Therefore, the ships took a large amount of additional coal. For example, new battleships instead of 1 thousand tons of coal took 2 thousand tons, which, with their low stability, was a problem. In order to receive such a large amount of fuel, coal was placed in rooms that were not intended for this - batteries, living decks, cockpits, etc. This greatly complicated the life of the crew, who were already suffering from tropical heat. The loading itself during ocean waves and intense heat was a difficult task, taking a lot of time from the crews (on average, armadillos took 40-60 tons of coal per hour). People exhausted by hard work could not rest normally. In addition, all the premises were littered with coal, and it was impossible to engage in combat training.

Hike photo source: http://tsushima.su

Task change. Continuation of the campaign

The Russian squadron remained in Madagascar until March 16. This was due to the fall of Port Arthur, which destroyed the original tasks of the squadron. The original plan to unite the two squadrons in Port Arthur and seize the strategic initiative from the enemy was completely destroyed. The delay was also associated with complications in the supply of fuel and problems with the repair of ships in the roadstead.

Common sense demanded that the squadron be called back. The news of the fall of Port Arthur inspired even Rozhdestvensky with doubts about the advisability of the campaign. True, Rozhdestvensky limited himself only to a resignation report and hints about the need to return the ships. After the end of the war, the admiral wrote: “If I had even a spark of civil courage, I would have to shout to the whole world: take care of these last resources of the fleet! Don't send them to extermination! But I didn't have the spark I needed."

However, negative news from the front, where after the battle of Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur, the battle of Mukden took place, which also ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, forced the government to make a fatal mistake. The squadron was supposed to arrive in Vladivostok, and this was an extremely difficult task. At the same time, only Rozhdestvensky believed that the breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok would be a success, at least at the cost of losing part of the ships. The government still believed that the arrival of the Russian fleet in the theater of operations would change the entire strategic situation and make it possible to establish control over the Sea of ​​Japan.

Back in October 1904, the well-known naval theorist, Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Klado, under the pseudonym Priboi, published a number of articles in the Novoye Vremya newspaper analyzing the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In them, the captain gave a detailed analysis of the performance characteristics of our and enemy ships, comparisons of the training of the naval command and crews. The conclusion was hopeless: the Russian squadron had no chance in a collision with the Japanese fleet. The author sharply criticized the naval command and personally Admiral General, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who was the Chief of the Fleet and the Naval Department. Klado proposed to mobilize all the forces of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. So, on the Black Sea there were four battleships of the “Catherine” type, the battleships “Twelve Apostles” and “Rostislav”, the relatively new pre-dreadnought “Three Saints”, the “Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky” was almost completed. Only after such a mobilization of all available forces could a reinforced fleet be sent to the Pacific Ocean. For these articles, Klado was stripped of all ranks and dismissed from service, but further events confirmed the correctness of his main idea - the 2nd Pacific Squadron could not successfully resist the enemy.

On December 11, 1904, a naval conference was held under the chairmanship of Admiral General Alexei Alexandrovich. After some doubts, it was decided to send reinforcements to Rozhdestvensky's squadron from the remaining ships of the Baltic Fleet. Rozhdestvensky at first took the idea negatively, believing that "rot in the Baltic Sea" would not strengthen, but weaken the squadron. He believed that it was better to reinforce the 2nd Pacific Squadron with Black Sea battleships. However, Rozhdestvensky was denied access to the Black Sea ships, since it was necessary to bargain with Turkey so that the battleships would be allowed through the straits. After it became known that Port Arthur had fallen and the 1st Pacific squadron had died, Rozhdestvensky even agreed to such an increase.

Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar. The first to arrive was a detachment of Captain 1st Rank Leonid Dobrotvorsky (two new cruisers "Oleg" and "Izumrud", two destroyers), which was part of Rozhdestvensky's squadron, but lagged behind due to ship repairs. In December 1904, they began to equip a detachment under the command of Nikolai Nebogatov (3rd Pacific Squadron). The battleship "Nikolai I" with short-range artillery, three battleships of coastal defense - "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin" and "Admiral Ushakov" (the ships had good artillery, but had poor seaworthiness) and an old armored Cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" In addition, the guns of these battleships were badly worn out during the training of personnel. In the whole composition of the 3rd Pacific squadron there was not a single modern ship, and its combat value was low. Nebogatov's ships left Libava on February 3, 1905, February 19 - passed Gibraltar, March 12-13 - Suez. Another "catching up detachment" was being prepared (the second echelon of Nebogatov's squadron), but for various reasons it was not sent to the Pacific Ocean.

Rozhestvensky did not want to wait for the arrival of Nebogatov's detachment, looking at the old ships as an extra burden. Hoping that the Japanese would not have time to quickly repair the previously received damage and bring the fleet to full readiness, the Russian admiral wanted to break through to Vladivostok, and decided not to wait for Nebogatov. Relying on a base in Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky hoped to develop operations against the enemy and compete for supremacy at sea.

However, fuel supply problems delayed the squadron for two months. All this time there was a drop in the combat capability of the squadron. They fired little and only at fixed shields. The results were poor, which worsened the morale of the crews. Joint maneuvering also showed that the squadron was not ready for the task. Forced inaction, nervousness of command, unusual climate and heat, lack of ammunition for firing, all this had a negative effect on the morale of the crew and reduced the combat effectiveness of the Russian fleet. Discipline fell, which was already low (there was a significant percentage of "penalty" on the ships, who were gladly "exiled" on a long voyage), cases of disobedience and insults to command personnel became more frequent, and even a gross violation of order on the part of the officers themselves.

Only on March 16, the squadron began to move again. Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. The reception of coal was carried out on the high seas. On April 8, the squadron passed at Singapore and on April 14 stopped in Kamran Bay. Here the ships were supposed to carry out current repairs, take coal and other supplies. However, at the request of the French, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. On May 8, Nebogatov's detachment arrived here. The situation was tense. The French demanded the speedy departure of the Russian ships. There was a fear that the Japanese would attack the Russian squadron.

Action plan

On May 14, the squadron of Rozhdestvensky continued the campaign. To break through to Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Korea Strait. On the one hand, it was the shortest and most convenient way, the widest and deepest of all the straits connecting the Pacific Ocean with Vladivostok. On the other hand, the path of the Russian ships lay near the main bases of the Japanese fleet, which made a meeting with the enemy very likely. Rozhdestvensky understood this, but he thought that even at the cost of losing several ships, they would be able to break through. At the same time, giving the strategic initiative to the enemy, Rozhdestvensky did not accept a detailed battle plan and limited himself to a general setting for a breakthrough. This was partly due to the poor training of the squadron crew; during a long voyage, the 2nd Pacific squadron was able to learn only joint navigation in the wake column, but could not maneuver and perform complex rebuilding.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron received an installation for a breakthrough to the north, to Vladivostok. The ships were supposed to fight off the enemy in order to break through to the north, and not beat him. The battleships of all detachments (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armored detachments of Rozhdestvensky, Fölkersam and Nebogatov) were to act against the Japanese battleships, maneuvering to the north. Part of the cruisers and destroyers were given the task of covering the battleships from the attacks of the Japanese destroyer forces and transporting command to serviceable ships in the event of the death of the flagships. The remaining cruisers and destroyers were supposed to protect auxiliary ships and transports, remove crews from dying battleships. Rozhdestvensky also determined the order of command. In the event of the death of the flagship of the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov", the captain of the 1st rank N.M. battleship "Borodino", etc.

Commander of the Russian squadron Zinoviy Petrovich Rozhestvensky

To be continued…

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The shock of the Russian sailors who survived Tsushima is easy to understand. The shock of real events turned out to be too heavy to free oneself from the hypnosis of the overwhelming superiority of Japanese weapons and try to understand the true reasons for the death of the squadron.

Indeed, Russian armor-piercing shells had serious drawbacks: a small amount of explosives, an extremely tight fuse (designed to fire only after the shell penetrated the armor), which is why they often did not explode when they hit the unarmored part of the side or the superstructure. Of the twenty-four 305-mm shells that hit the Japanese armored ships, eight (33%) did not explode. This, no doubt, had a negative impact on their effectiveness. But Russian shells in Tsushima pierced the armored casemates of 152-mm guns on Mikasa and Shikishima (Terni's six-inch armor), on Azuma - Krupp's six-inch armor. The Asama cruiser suffered the most - the shell pierced the thick armor of the aft end and damaged the steering.

In Japanese 305-mm high-explosive projectiles with a very sensitive fuse, 8.5% of the mass was occupied by shimose (lyddite, or melinite), which was superior in blasting action to smokeless powder of Russian counterparts. On the other hand, Japanese shells did not penetrate even thin armor and had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

"Eagle" received about 70 hits by shells with a caliber of 152 to 305 mm. The external picture of the destruction was impressive - numerous holes in the unarmored side, crippled superstructures, destroyed and burnt rosters and rowboats. The ship was severely damaged, losing 41 killed and 87 wounded.

However, he retained the course and a significant part of the fighting capacity, including three 305-mm, five 152-mm and ten 75-mm guns. None of the Japanese shells penetrated the armor. The effect of enemy hits affected the intensity of the armadillo's fire; nevertheless, on May 14, he fired one hundred and eighty-five 305-mm and more than eight hundred 152-mm shells at the enemy.

"Mikasa" received about 40 hits and lost 113 people. On the ship, apart from small ones, one 305-mm and two 152-mm guns failed. The battleship fired at the same time no faster than the "Eagle"; he expended 124 shells of the main caliber. Therefore, the quality of the Japanese ammunition does not give grounds for recognizing it as the main factor that decided the outcome of the battle. The imperfection of the ships of the Borodino type, which in difficult conditions showed good survivability, was not such.

The main reason for the death of four Russian ships was not the miraculous effect of Japanese shells (by the way, the Japanese abandoned them after the war), but a huge number of hits. Battleships of the Borodino type kept intact their armored side to the very end, which provided the necessary buoyancy. However, numerous hits led to the formation of huge holes in the light unarmored board, where water was poured from shells constantly bursting near. The incessant fires played a fatal role; during their extinguishing, a huge amount of water was thrown onto the decks. Getting inside, it contributed to a decrease in stability and the appearance of a roll. By itself, he was not dangerous, since with an established hold service he quickly straightened. The position changed when they did not have time to straighten it and it reached 6-7 degrees. At the same time, holes in the light side and cannon ports entered the water, which caused loss of stability and capsizing. One of the factors contributing to this was the overload of the squadron ships, which led to the fact that the upper armor belt was immersed in water with a list of 6.5 degrees instead of 10.5 according to the project.

The rate of the Japanese command on high-explosive shells was not the best way to destroy armored ships. She demanded an indispensable condition - a huge number of hits. During the battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese failed to do this with a single battleship of the Port Arthur squadron. Such a super-density of hits on Russian ships could only be given by the consistent concentration of all the ships of the Japanese battle line on one or two targets at the same time, which could be ensured by a maneuver, which was the “line over the T”. The maneuver chosen by Togo allowed him to destroy the Russian armored squadron with artillery fire. In fact, for the Japanese admiral, this was the only real opportunity to achieve a decisive victory, everything depended on whether he could outplay the Russian commander in tactics. Only one thing was required from Rozhdestvensky - to prevent the enemy from putting a "line" over his column. What really happened is public knowledge.

Thus, the Japanese won the victory due to superiority in tactics, in particular, in the tactical use of artillery. This allowed them to use their weapons in a favorable situation and, by concentrating fire on the best Russian battleships, achieve a large number of hits. Their impact was sufficient to disable and destroy three battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabi types.

With good shooting accuracy (3.2% of hits from the number of large and medium-caliber shells fired), the Japanese hit four Borodino-class ships, which received at least 265 shells out of about 360 that hit 12 Russian armored ships. Only 10 shells hit the battleships of the Nebogatov detachment, but they themselves were in unfavorable firing conditions and, with a high consumption of ammunition, did not achieve noticeable success.

The quality of the shooting of Russian battleships, of course, reduced the fire impact of the enemy. Therefore. with fairly high accuracy in particular cases and sufficient intensity, the overall firing efficiency of the armored detachments of the Russian squadron turned out to be three times lower than that of the enemy - only 1.2% of hits, which, with the exception of Mikasa and Nishin, are fairly even distributed along the Japanese battle line.

The Japanese maneuver was aimed at creating favorable conditions for the operation of artillery and served as an effective means of evading Russian fire. On the contrary, the Russian ships were connected by a 9-knot squadron speed and direction of movement, which made it much easier for the Japanese to cover the head of the squadron.

In total, 22 Russian warships went to the bottom, 5045 Russian sailors were killed, drowned, burned alive. Russia, having suffered a catastrophe unprecedented in the history of its fleet, was thrown into the category of minor maritime powers.

The experience of the Russo-Japanese war was carefully studied by experts from all maritime powers. He had a great influence on the further development of fleets and naval art. Thus, the theorists recognized the reception of head coverage as a classic and recommended it as universal.

Increased combat distances reduced the importance of medium-caliber guns; this required a revision of the artillery weapon system. There was a need to develop new methods of fire control, which would ensure its effectiveness at long distances. The use of powerful high-explosive shells made it necessary to further increase the area of ​​​​the side armor, and an increase in the combat distance - to strengthen the horizontal protection. The importance of survivability and stability of ships, as well as superiority in speed, was clearly revealed.

This clearly implied the need to create battleships of a new type instead of squadron battleships.

Retired Captain 1st Rank P.D. BYKOV

Preparation and campaign of the 2nd Pacific squadron

The first months of the Russo-Japanese War clearly showed that the tsarist government was unprepared for war.

The underestimation of the enemy's forces and his military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained preponderance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take steps to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in terms of the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his submissions and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was revised with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, which received the name of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that ended in construction, as well as part of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was supposed to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

In view of the fact that, in terms of its composition, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent tasks, its dispatch was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships, Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.

Ship composition of the squadron

The main core of the squadron sent to the theater of operations consisted of four new battleships: “Alexander III”, “Prince Suvorov”, “Borodino” and “Eagle”, of which only the first was tested in 1903, the construction of the rest was completed after the start of the war , and they have not yet passed all the required tests. In particular, on the battleship "Eagle" they did not have time to test large-caliber artillery. These new modern battleships, which developed a speed of 18 knots, were heavily overloaded before entering the Far East, as they had to take on board increased stocks of ammunition and food. In addition, during the completion of the battleships, various auxiliary devices were installed on them that were not provided for by the original project. As a result, the draft was 0.9 m higher than designed, which increased the displacement of the battleships by 2000 tons. The consequence of this was a large decrease in their stability, as well as the survivability of ships. Of the rest of the battleships, only the Oslyabya belonged to the modern, already sailing ships. But it was a weak armored ship, which also had 256 mm guns instead of 305 mm.

The battleships Sisoy the Great and Navarin were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305-mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203-mm guns, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had a wide variety of armament, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the rest of the ships were of an outdated design.

An even greater variety in terms of their tactical and technical elements was represented by the cruisers that were part of the squadron. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, modern were "Oleg", "Aurora", "Pearl" and "Emerald". The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, Svetlana and Dmitry Donskoy were old ships, and Almaz was an armed yacht.

Of the cruisers, two - "Pearl" and "Emerald" were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. "Oleg" and "Aurora" had a deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. Svetlana had a speed of 20 knots, and Almaz - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, Dmitry Donskoy, had only 16 knots. The weakness and insufficiency of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to give the squadron as high-speed scouts five armed high-speed steamers - Ural, Kuban, Terek, Rion and Dnepr, which joined at different times: to the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very small. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Brave”, “Peppy”, “Fast”, “Trouble”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Flawless”, “Loud” and “Terrible”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and developed a speed of no more than 26 knots.

Despite the fact that the decision to send the squadron was made in April, it took a very long time to form and equip it.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, the work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

Most of the squadron personnel arrived on the ships in the summer of 1904, and only the commanders and some of the specialists were appointed earlier and were on them during construction. Therefore, neither the officers nor the crew had enough time to study their ships well. In addition, on the ships of the squadron there were many young officers who were prematurely released from the naval cadet corps on the occasion of the war, as well as those called up from the reserve and transferred from the merchant fleet, the so-called “ensigns of the reserve”. The former did not have sufficient knowledge and experience, the latter needed to update their knowledge; the third, although they had experience and knowledge of maritime affairs, did not have any military training. Such a staffing of the ships of the squadron with officers was caused by the fact that there were only enough personnel to fill the most responsible positions on the ships.

Preparation and organization of the squadron

Before leaving the Baltic Sea, the squadron in full force never sailed, and only separate detachments of ships made several joint campaigns. Therefore, practice in joint navigation and maneuvering was insufficient. During the short stay in Reval, the ships of the squadron were able to carry out a very limited number of firings, especially since the amount of practical ammunition received for this was less than expected. Torpedo firing from destroyers was also insufficient. The material part of the torpedoes was not prepared, therefore, during the first firing, many torpedoes sank.

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the coast of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationship and influence of the detachment commanders on their subordinates and the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with the resolution of various minor issues that could be resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander himself did not have the correct organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag-captain was only an executor of the orders of the commander. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, the squadron, when entering the theater of operations, did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of transition

Ensuring the passage of the squadron from the Baltic Sea to the theater of operations, provided that throughout its entire journey (about 18,000 miles) Russia did not have a single base of its own, was a very complex and difficult task.

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repair and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhdestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

In view of the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the squadron commander decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on about. Madagascar. For greater safety of the passage, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments on the subject of a squadron calling at any specific ports, since this would have made his route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some particular issues, such as the duration of the stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron parking, and the possibility of communication with the squadron on the way, etc. Some private questions, such as, for example, the protection of ships during their passage through the Suez Canal, were also resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, diplomatic preparations for the transition were not made.

Because of this, the passage of the squadron was extremely complicated due to the protests of foreign states when the squadron entered a particular port, the reduction of the parking time, the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.

A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, because the time of the squadron's arrival in the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be carried out abroad, it was decided to involve foreign firms in this.

Thus, the possibility of moving the squadron to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their performance of contracts. As expected, such an organization of supply could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on about. Madagascar.

The issues of supplying the squadron with coal were so concerned with the squadron commander that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships received reinforced food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be carried out on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign firms. For the repair of ships on the way, the squadron was given a specially equipped steamship-workshop "Kamchatka". This ship and several other transports with cargo for various purposes constituted the squadron's floating base.

The news that the Russian government sent such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire path of the squadron's movement, up to a direct attack on the squadron and sabotage performances.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it sought ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where various surprises could await the squadron. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agents of the security department of the police department, which willingly took over the organization of the protection of the squadron's route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee either an uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, or the provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, securing the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the organization for the protection of the squadron created on the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident when the squadron crossed the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hull Incident”.

Departure of the squadron and the Hull incident

The completion of new ships, supply issues, etc. - all this delayed the departure of the squadron. On August 29, the squadron arrived at Revel and, having stood there for about a month, moved to Libau to receive materials and replenish coal reserves; On October 2, the squadron left for the Far East. However, on October 2, not all ships left. Two cruisers, part of the destroyers and transports were not yet ready and had to catch up with the squadron on the way.

The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here, Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about the sighted suspicious ships and about the allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were to be anchored sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. In the first two detachments were destroyers, in the next two - cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last detachment of new armadillos was anchored. Such a division of the squadron: Admiral Rozhestvensky considered it the most expedient from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of a collision at night, in the event of any unforeseen delays along the way. The vanguard detachments were not assigned the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would give the main forces, which, moreover, marching without guards, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not in any way meet the requirements for organizing the passage of a squadron in wartime.

The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22 o'clock. Around 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment approached the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the transport workshop “Kamchatka” reported on the radio that it was attacked by destroyers.

During the passage of the Dogger-bapka ahead of the armadillo detachment, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which went to the intersection of the detachment's course and approached it. The squadron decided that the battleships were threatened with an attack, and opened fire. But when the searchlights were turned on, it turned out that the fishing boats were shot. The fire was stopped. However, in the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left beam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were seen, on which fire was also opened. But after the very first shots, it turned out that these were Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. Two people were wounded on the Aurora and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel, on October 13 it arrived in Vigo (Spain). Here the squadron lingered until the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called "Hull Incident", was resolved.

There is reason to believe that England, which was hostile to Russia and was in alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which worsened Russia's position in the Far East.

After the Hull Incident, the British government threatened to break off diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that had arisen, agreeing to compensate for the losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

The transition of the squadron to about. Madagascar

On October 19, a detachment of new battleships left Vigo and on October 21 arrived in Tangier (North Africa), where by that time the entire squadron had concentrated. Having loaded coal, provisions and taking water, the squadron, according to a previously developed plan, was divided into two detachments. The battleships Sisoy the Great, Navarin, together with the cruisers Svetlana, Zhemchug, Almaz and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, went through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to Madagascar, where they were supposed to rejoin the squadron.

The navigation of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way proceeded without any special complications. By December 15, all ships arrived at their destination.

The rest of the ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. "Korea", "Malaya" and "Meteor" led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky - went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stop along the way, and coal was loaded on the high seas. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long crossings. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. So, for example, new battleships received a double amount of coal - instead of a thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To receive such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in residential decks, cockpits, anti-mine artillery batteries and other places, which utterly hampered the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in the intense heat on the ocean swell and excitement was a great difficulty and took a lot of time. On average, armadillos took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and, thus, the parking time was spent on loading and emergency repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, remained without rest. In addition, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were littered with coal, it was impossible to carry out any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment came to Madagascar. Here, Admiral Rozhdestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both detachments of the squadron joined in Nosi-be Bay (the western coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stop. Here the squadron stood from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron, and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the raid.

3. Complications in the further supply of the squadron with fuel.

The situation at the time of the arrival of the squadron to Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron's campaign

The defeat of the Russian Manchurian army and the 1st Pacific squadron, which ended with the surrender of Port Arthur, caused serious concern in the ruling spheres of Russia. Getting involved in this adventure, the government hoped for an easy and quick victory. However, these calculations did not materialize. The defeats at Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur - that's what the war brought to Russia instead of the desired victory.

The arrival of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron, the 2nd Pacific squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of further movement of the squadron, since after the loss of Port Arthur by Russia, the squadron was forced to go. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhdestvensky believed that in connection with the changed strategic situation, the squadron's immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing part of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had finally failed. In this regard, Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait in Madagascar for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers "Oleg" and "Izumrud" and destroyers "Gromky" and "Grozny", was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name of the 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after the departure of Rozhdestvensky. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old squadron battleship Nikolai I, the coastal defense battleships General-Admiral Apraksin, Admiral Senyavin, Admiral Ushakov, and the old armored cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. "Nicholas I" was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305-mm guns. The coastal defense battleships were armed with 256-mm guns, although long-range, but not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. This squadron did not have a single modern ship.

Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

When Rozhdestvensky received news of the fall of Port Arthur and learned about the government's point of view on the further goals and objectives of the 2nd squadron, he decided to go to the East alone, without waiting for the 3rd Pacific squadron, which he looked at only as a burden. Believing that the Japanese fleet would not have time to repair all the damage received during the blockade of Port Arthur and in battles so soon, Rozhdestvensky hoped that he could still break through to Vladivostok, and decided to leave as soon as possible. The government allowed him to do this, but unexpected complications with the supply of coal delayed the departure of the squadron by almost two months.

The unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inactivity due to the lack of coal and shells for practical firing - all this had an extremely negative effect on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had already declined markedly by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting the commanding staff and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.

The lack of a supply of shells made it impossible to make up for the most important shortcoming—to teach the squadron how to shoot. The Irtysh transport, on which additional ammunition for training firing was loaded, was delayed when the squadron left Libava. It had an accident and was left to be repaired. At the same time, the ammunition from it was unloaded, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhdestvensky was not informed about this. At the end of the repair, the Irtysh went to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of the much-needed ammunition for firing practice on the way. During the stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The joint maneuvering of the squadron showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and parking on about. Madagascar did not rise at all and she remained still unprepared for the task.

On March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was able to move on and weighed anchor.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhestvensky did not report his further route in order to achieve the secrecy of the transition. And at that time, the 3rd Pacific squadron, which left Libau in February, was on its way to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East with the same goal, did not know where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. On the way, coal was received six times on the high seas. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, anchored in Kamran Bay, where the ships were supposed to make repairs, load coal and receive materials for further navigation. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, the 3rd Pacific Squadron joined it.

The camps in Kamran Bay, and then in Van Phong Bay, were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, on the other, an attack by the Japanese could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg, in which, referring to poor health, he asked to be replaced upon arrival in Vladivostok by another commander.

Transition from Indochina to Korea Strait

After joining the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov, the 2nd Pacific squadron moved on on May 1. The immediate task of the squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, considered a breakthrough to Vladivostok, based on which the squadron was to develop operations against the Japanese fleet.

In the Sea of ​​Japan, the squadron could pass through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperouse. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to take the shortest route through the Korea Strait, the widest and deepest of all. However, this path lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great navigational difficulties, and besides, the strait could be mined (this was allowed by the depths). The passage through the La Perouse Strait in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky because of the fogs prevailing here, because of navigational difficulties and the lack of coal for this longer transition.

The decision to go through the Korea Strait created the most favorable conditions for the Japanese fleet to fight, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting with the Japanese, but still the latter would be in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would be able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The way through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific squadron in the most disadvantageous position.

Having decided to go through the Korea Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the Japanese fleet forces to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet to themselves. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers Rion and Dnepr were sent to the Yellow Sea, which separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports when the squadron approached the Saddle Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest commercial port, connected by telegraph cables with all major port cities, including Japanese ones.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freeing itself from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.

After the separation of auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: battleships marched in the right column - the 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhdestvensky's flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - "Oslyabya" (Felkerzam's flag), "Sisoy the Great", "Navarin" and the armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"; in the left - the 3rd armored detachment - "Nikolai I" (Nebogatov's flag), coastal defense battleships "Apraksin", "Senyavin", "Ushakov", the cruiser "Oleg" (Enqvist's flag), "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy" , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, which consisted of the cruisers "Svetlana" (branded pennant of Captain 1st Rank Shein), "Almaz" and "Ural", walked ahead in the formation of a wedge - at a distance of 3-4 cab. from the squadron. The cruisers "Zhemchug" and "Emerald" kept on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left at the squadron went in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the head Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, the tugboats Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The course of the squadron was determined by the course of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward in formation; on hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate the signs of the Red Cross.

In this order, the squadron approached the Korea Strait. The squadron was moving in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming ships, only one was detained, the rest did not even look around. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full coverage. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhdestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korea Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet in it. In addition, he believed that the advancement of scouts would only help the enemy to detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that with the superiority of the Japanese in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by intelligence to perform any maneuver.

Rejection of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky's reference to the desire to keep the squadron's movement secret does not hold water at all, since the squadron could easily be detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which actually happened.

Leaving six transports with the squadron had no good justification, since they did not have any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their protection. In addition, the presence of the slow-moving transport "Irtysh" reduced the squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific squadron, Admiral Rozhestvensky did not take any measures to secrecy of movement, did not organize reconnaissance behind the enemy, and did not accelerate the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13-14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships that were part of the squadron, its marching order was very difficult. The squadron marched in the ranks of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to carry fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; the headlights were extinguished. All the lights were open on the hospital ships that sailed at the tail of the squadron, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, about whose close location she knew from intercepted radiograms.

On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested at the places provided for by the combat schedule.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhdestvensky was on the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov". The junior flagships, Rear Admirals Nebogatov and Enkvist, were on the battleship Nikolai I, and the second on the cruiser Oleg. Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that became part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were 4 new battleships of the Borodino type. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and a strong overload of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their fighting qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water, and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship “Oslyabya” was very different from them - a seaworthy, but weak in armor and artillery ship (“Oslyabya” was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers, and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the peculiarities of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were much stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

A comparison of these figures shows that the Japanese ships were better armored and had greater speed. The artillery on the Japanese ships was twice as fast as the Russian one, which allowed the Japanese to throw out a much larger number of shells in one minute.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosives, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, in terms of high-explosive action, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimose) in Japanese shells was approximately twice that of the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that the Japanese ships were significantly superior in artillery preparation to the Russians, and also that the Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than that of the Japanese (60 versus 39 percent) .

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. Against 9 Russians, the Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of various obsolete and auxiliary ships.

When the 2nd Squadron entered the Korea Strait, the Japanese fleet was at its base at Mozampo. The commander of the fleet, Admiral Togo, was on the battleship Mikasa. The flag of the head of the 2nd squadron, Vice Admiral Kamimura, was on the armored cruiser Izumo. The observation line was deployed between about. Quelpart and the Goto group of islands.

Around 2 o'clock. 25 min. the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, the left flank ship of the sentinel chain, discovered the lights of the hospital ship Eagle, and then identified the entire squadron. At 4 o'clock. 25 min. a radiogram was given about the appearance of the Russian squadron. The Japanese fleet immediately began to prepare for deployment. The reconnaissance cruisers began to converge on the place where the Russian squadron was discovered. By dawn they had taken their places around her. At 5 o'clock. all warships went to the places designated according to the deployment near about. Okinoshima.

The Russian squadron on the intensive work of the Japanese telegraph stations concluded that it had been discovered, nevertheless, Admiral Rozhdestvensky made no attempt to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

At dawn, Japanese cruisers were discovered, heading parallel to the Russian squadron. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. Considering ; that the distance to the Japanese cruisers was too great to conduct successful firing, he decided not to send his cruisers out of fear that they might meet in the fog with superior Japanese forces.

Daytime battle May 14

On the morning of May 14, the weather was hazy, visibility 5-7 miles, wind 3-1. At 7 o'clock. Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment to take their places behind and cover the transports. Thus, not only did he not interfere with the reconnaissance of the Japanese, but he himself voluntarily abandoned it and went forward, not knowing where the enemy was. At 9 o'clock. armored detachments were reorganized into one wake column, having 4 new battleships in front. The transports and the cruisers covering them were on the right behind. Japanese scouts kept in full view of the squadron all the time. At 12 o'clock. the squadron lay down on a course of 23 °. Then Admiral Rozhdestvensky made an attempt to deploy the squadron to the front line.

Without doubting that the Japanese cruisers observing the squadron were reporting to Togo all the data on its movement, on the basis of which the Japanese commander was also preparing for the corresponding deployment before the battle, Rozhdestvensky decided, using the finding fog strips, to bring down the enemy’s calculations. To do this, he thought to change the formation at the moment when he found the fog and the Japanese cruisers lost sight of him. But as soon as the rebuilding was started, the fog cleared, and it was not possible to fulfill the plan. Rozhdestvensky did not finish the rebuilding that had begun, and raised a canceling signal. The squadron ended up in two wake columns: on the right - four new battleships, on the left - all the rest.

Since the movement of the Russian squadron still took place in front of Japanese intelligence officers, Admiral Togo had all the data on the composition of the Russian squadron, its course and rebuilding. After weighing everything, he decided to strike at the left column, which consisted of weaker ships. Admiral Togo's plan was to attack the head of the Russian column with armored ships, and for this purpose, taking advantage of the advantage in speed, he went to the intersection of her course. At the same time, light cruisers were to attack the transports and the cruisers covering them.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into two detachments: the 1st detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Togo and the 2nd detachment (6 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Kamimura.

At 13 o'clock. 30 min. from the Russian squadron, to the right of the nose, the Japanese fleet was discovered, going to cross the course. Admiral Rozhdestvensky immediately began to line up his ships in one wake column. This rebuilding was not yet completed when the Japanese, having moved to the port side of the Russian squadron, began to make a successive turn to the left in order to enter the intersection of its course. This turn put the Japanese ships in a precarious position. Turning sequentially for 24 points, they described the loop in almost one place, without being able to shoot themselves.

At the time of the turn, the distance between the lead ships of the Russian squadron and the flagship of Togo, the Mikasa, was no more than 38 cables. At this moment, at 13:00. 49 minutes, the flagship battleship of the Russian squadron "Suvorov" opened fire. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron had the opportunity at the very beginning of the battle to strike the enemy at his lead ships. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky failed to take advantage of the unfavorable position of the Japanese during the turn. Remaining in the same wake column, he deprived his new high-speed battleships of the opportunity to get close to the enemy at a distance advantageous to them. In addition, in the middle of the Russian squadron, some ships prevented each other from firing, and the end ones fell behind. Therefore, the fire of Russian ships did not cause much damage to the Japanese.

Three minutes later, the Japanese ships returned fire. The distance by this moment has decreased to 35 cables. Four lead Japanese ships concentrated their fire on the Suvorov, six on the Oslyaba, and two on the Nikolai I. Having an advantage in the course, the Japanese began to overtake the Russian squadron, going into her head.

Japanese artillery carried out great destruction on Russian ships; especially suffered two flagship. At 14 o'clock. 25 min. the battleship "Oslyabya", having a large list, failed and after 25 minutes rolled over and sank. At 14 o'clock. 30 min. due to damage to the rudder, the battleship Suvorov failed to the right. Its masts and yards were knocked down, all the halyards were burned, so that it was impossible to raise any signals. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The battleship Alexander III became the lead battleship, which, not knowing why the Suvorov had failed, first followed it, but then turned to the left, intending to pass to the north under the stern of the Japanese battleships, which were to the right of the Russians.

It was the decisive moment of the battle. After the failure of the flagship battleship, the Russian squadron, which had no battle plan and now, in addition, was deprived of leadership, was doomed to defeat. Valiantly fighting the Japanese, she tried one way or another to break through to Vladivostok.

Noticing the turn of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned “all of a sudden” on the back course in order to again go to the head of the Russian squadron. At the time of the turn, they were covered by their armored cruisers, which increased their fire on the Russian ships, remaining on the same course, and then turned after the battleships. Due to the fact that the darkness thickened and visibility decreased, the battle stopped temporarily. All attempts by the Russian squadron to break through to the north failed. The Japanese each time went to the intersection of the course, hitting mainly the lead ships.

At 16 o'clock. 20 minutes. the fog thickened again to such an extent that the fighting ceased. The Russian squadron, now having the lead Borodino, turned south. The Japanese temporarily lost the Russians. In search of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned north, and the armored cruisers went south. The Russian battleships, heading south, approached their transports and cruisers, which were fighting off the Japanese cruisers. With their fire, they drove off the Japanese cruisers, and one of them was so badly damaged that he had to leave for the nearest port. Japanese armored cruisers approaching the battlefield opened fire on the Russians. Borodino, followed by the entire squadron, gradually turned north.

At 18 o'clock. 06 min. Japanese battleships approached and, going in an almost parallel course, concentrated 32 cab. fire on "Borodino" and "Alexander III". The Russian ships veered to the left. At this time, the destroyer "Buyny" was approaching the squadron, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was, who was filmed along with his headquarters at about 17:00. from Suvorov. On the destroyer, a signal was raised to transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov. Although this signal was rehearsed by some ships, it was not seen on the Nicholas I, and therefore around 19:00. the destroyer “Imperfect” approached him, from which the order of Rozhdestvensky to lead the squadron to Vladivostok was transmitted by voice.

Meanwhile, the squadron continued to move north. Around 19 o'clock she lost two more battleships: at 18 o'clock. 50 min. rolled over and died "Alexander III", at 19 o'clock. 10 minutes. died in the same way "Borodino". At 19 o'clock. 10 minutes. Japanese destroyers attacked the wrecked Suvorov and sank it.

The moment of the death of these ships coincided with the end of the day's battle. The sun went down, twilight came, and Admiral Togo led his armored ships to the north, to about. Even let, lying on the way from Tsushima to Vladivostok, hoping that the Russian ships will go this way. For night attacks against Russian ships, he sent destroyers.

During the daytime battle, Russian cruisers, following the order of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, kept close to the transports, guarding them, and did not conduct reconnaissance. Therefore, the Russian squadron did not know at all where the Japanese fleet had departed.

In the advancing darkness, Japanese destroyers approaching from the north, east and south were visible from the Russian squadron, and only in the southwest it was clear.

Admiral Nebogatov, who at that time took command of the squadron, went to the head of the squadron and turned to the southwest in order to evade the attack. The cruisers also turned and went ahead of the armored squadron, the formation of which was broken, and the ships only approximately held their places.

This ended the day's fight. On this day, the Russian squadron lost three new battleships and one old one. Many ships were heavily damaged.

Of the Japanese ships, the Kasagi cruiser, which was out of order, received the most severe damage. Of the other ships, the flagship battleship of Admiral Togo “Mikasa” was most severely damaged, which was hit by more than thirty shells. The inside of the front conning tower, the front and rear bridges were damaged on it, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, several casemates were broken, and the decks were pierced. More than ten Russian shells hit the Sikishima. The Nissin received several hits on the turrets of guns, and three large guns were broken and part of the bridge was demolished. There were 95 sailors and officers killed and wounded on this ship, Vice Admiral Misu, who was holding the flag on the Nissin, was wounded.

The battleships Fiji, the armored cruisers Asama, Yakumo, Iwate, and Kassuga were also damaged. This battle day abounded with many examples of endurance and courage of Russian sailors, who showed knowledge of their business and fulfilled their duty to the end. So, the artillery conductor Kalashnikov from the "Sisoya the Great" caused a big fire on the Japanese cruiser "Iwate" with a successful hit of the projectile. The artillery quartermaster from the same ship, Dolinin, and the sailor of the 1st article Molokov, when the cellar with ammunition was flooded on the ship, took turns diving into the water and getting shells. The helmsman of the cruiser "Oleg" Belousov and signalmen Chernov and Iskrich timely noticed a torpedo fired by a Japanese destroyer. The cruiser managed to turn away,. and the torpedo passed by. The Aurora, which was moving in the wake, also “was warned by the signalmen from the Oleg and managed to evade the torpedoes. One of the officers of the cruiser "Aurora" wrote about the behavior of the sailors in battle: "Our teams held themselves in battle beyond praise. Each sailor showed remarkable composure, resourcefulness and fearlessness. Golden people and hearts! They cared not so much about themselves as about their commanders, warning about every enemy shot, covering the officers at the moment of rupture. Covered with wounds and blood, the sailors did not leave their places, preferring to die at the guns. Didn't even go to dressings! You send, and they - “It will be in time, after, now there is no time!” Only thanks to the dedication of the team, we forced the Japanese cruisers to withdraw, sinking two ships from them, and putting four out of action, with a large roll. What an officer from the Aurora wrote about the sailors was typical not only for this cruiser, but for all ships of the Russian squadron.

Fight on the night of May 14-15

With the onset of darkness, the Japanese launched a series of attacks, using all their destroyer forces for this - about 40 large and small destroyers. The attack began at about 9 pm and continued until 11 pm, when the Japanese destroyers lost sight of the Russian squadron. Four Russian ships were hit and one of them was lost. Repelling attacks and evading Japanese destroyers, Russian ships lost each other and subsequently acted independently.

Only the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov was united, along with which the only surviving new battleship Eagle and the cruiser Izumrud were sailing. Departing to the southwest, Admiral Nebogatov turned north at about 9 p.m. to go to Vladivostok. Taking into account the experience of Port Arthur, Admiral Nebogatov did not open searchlights at night and evaded the attacks of destroyers; none of the ships were damaged. However, on the morning of May 15, at about 10 o'clock, the detachment was surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet. Without showing any resistance, Nebogatov surrendered the ships (4 battleships). And only the cruiser "Emerald", having disassembled the signal of surrender, gave the most full speed and, breaking through the ring of Japanese ships, headed for Vladivostok. On the way there, he went into Vladimir Bay, where he ran into stones and, on the orders of his commander, was blown up. The team came to Vladivostok by land.

The cruiser detachment led by the cruiser "Oleg", evading the Japanese destroyers, went south. Part of the cruisers fell behind and, having lost their flagship, turned north to go to Vladivostok.

Only the cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Pearls" were United. They went south all night and in the morning they were south of the Korea Strait. The commander of the cruisers, Rear Admiral Enquist, intending to break through to Vladivostok on his own, first decided to go to a neutral port in order to make some corrections. Believing that Shanghai was too close to Japan, Enquist went to the Philippine Islands, where he arrived on May 21. Here in the port of Manila the cruisers were interned.

The rest of the Russian ships went in single order. The ships of the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky, repelling the attacks of the destroyers, unmasked themselves by turning on the searchlights, and as a result received torpedo hits.

The cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was the first to be torpedoed at about 21:00, then the battleships Sisoy Veliky, Navarin, and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. However, only one battleship Navarin was killed by a torpedo at night, the rest stayed on the water until morning and then were destroyed by their teams.

On May 15, at about 4 p.m., the destroyer Bedovy, to which the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff were transferred, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and, without making any attempt to fight or leave, surrendered. Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron, along with his entire staff, was captured.

The destroyer "Grozny", following together with the "Bedov", seeing that the latter had raised the signal to surrender, gave full speed and went to Vladivostok, pursued by a stronger Japanese destroyer. Entering into battle with him, "Terrible" caused him such severe damage that the Japanese destroyer was forced to stop the pursuit. Without a compass, with serious damage, "Grozny" nevertheless came to Vladivostok.

At about the same time that Grozny was fighting, the battleship Admiral Ushakov valiantly perished. This old ship, due to the damage received in the daytime battle, lagged behind and sailed alone to the north. At 17 o'clock. 30 min. two armored cruisers of the Japanese approached him and offered to surrender. The commander of the battleship Captain 1st Rank Miklukha-Maclay opened fire in response to the Japanese proposal. At 18 o'clock. 10 minutes, when the entire combat reserve was used up, on the orders of the commander, the battleship was destroyed by its crew.

Somewhat later, at about 19:00, the cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, approaching about. Even years, was overtaken by six Japanese light cruisers. Despite such a disparity in forces, the commander of the Dmitry Donskoy, Captain 1st Rank Lebedev, entered the battle, firing on both sides. With the onset of darkness, the cruiser, having a number of serious damages, took refuge under the shore of about. Even years. Japanese ships lost it and went to sea. Although this heroic ship fought off an enemy superior in strength, the damage received by it in this battle was so significant that Dmitry Donskoy could not go further and was flooded at great depths, and the crew was brought ashore.

In addition to the destroyer Grozny, the cruiser of the 2nd rank Almaz and the destroyer Bravy arrived in Vladivostok. The latter, separated from the squadron, evaded to the shores of Japan and thus avoided meeting with Japanese ships. It was all that was left of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Results of the battle

In the Battle of Tsushima, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, the rottenness of the autocracy and the disastrous nature of its policy were fully revealed. Tsushima went down in history as an ominous monument to tsarism. At the same time, Tsushima serves as a symbol of the courage and greatness of Russian sailors. They, despite enormous difficulties, conducted the first 220-day voyage in the history of the fleets of an entire squadron from the Baltic through the North Sea, the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, covering 18,000 miles.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of the ships of the squadron were obsolete, the shells were bad, and the mediocre tsarist admirals were essentially unable to control the battle, the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy. They fought heroically and selflessly against the Japanese.

In this battle, the failure of the high command of the squadron was fully revealed.

1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, who ignored all the experience of fighting at Port Arthur, did not prepare his ships for the battle, which he himself considered inevitable.

2) There was no battle plan. Therefore, the only desire of the squadron was to go one way or another to Vladivostok.

3) There was no reconnaissance, so the appearance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet overtook the Russian squadron, which had not completed its combat formation.

4) The leadership of the battle and the transfer of command were not organized.

5) The Russian squadron entered the battle in a disadvantageous position, only the lead ships could fire.

6) The connection in one wake column of new and old ships was impractical, as it made it impossible to use the most powerful ships to the full.

7) Maneuvering in one wake column, which was the only thing the squadron was capable of, allowed the Japanese to cover the head.

8) Incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron helped the Japanese destroyers to successfully attack the Russians.

9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having made a seven-month transition.

With regard to the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:

1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modern technically equipped and faster and better trained. This provided more flexible maneuvering.

2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.

However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in combat.

1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized, the Japanese cruisers did not follow the main Russian forces, being carried away by the battle with the transports. Because of this, the Russian battleships broke away from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.

2) The deployment of Japanese destroyers was incomplete. The maneuver of Admiral Nebogatov knocked down their calculations, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.

The results of the attacks show the insufficient training of the destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three of them hit the same ship.

findings

1) The Battle of Tsushima was decided by artillery weapons, the growth of which during the war was expressed in: a) the transition to new methods of firing, which made it possible to conduct concentrated fire from several ships at one target; b) in the use of new high-explosive projectiles of considerable force, which produced enormous destruction in the unarmored parts of the ship and caused large fires.
2) In the battle of Tsushima, an attempt was made to use torpedoes in daylight combat. Although it did not have serious results, it led in the future to the development of this issue. The destructive effect of torpedoes was insufficient. Only one ship was killed by torpedoes.
3) The Battle of Tsushima confirmed the previously revealed need for the success of the attack by aiming destroyers at the enemy. At the same time, the need was confirmed. refusal to use searchlights when repelling an attack by destroyers.
4) The Battle of Tsushima showed the need to strengthen the freeboard armor in order to provide the ships with the necessary combat stability.

The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had a tremendous impact on the further course of the entire war. All hopes for her, a favorable outcome, finally collapsed.

The government of Nicholas II hastened to conclude peace, which was signed in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905.

Tsushima battle

TVD	Pacific Ocean
Place	Tsushima Island, East China Sea
Period	Russo-Japanese War
The nature of the battle	pitched battle

Opponents

Side force commanders

Side forces

Tsushima battle(Japanese 対馬海戦) - the largest battle in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet, which took place on May 27-28, 1905. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky by the forces of the United Japanese Fleet under the command of Admiral H. Togo . The results of the battle finally predetermined Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, and also significantly influenced the development of world military shipbuilding.

general information

The sudden start of the Russo-Japanese War with a night attack by the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron gave the Japanese the opportunity to gain strategic initiative and superiority over Russian naval and land forces. In order to strengthen the Russian fleet and then gain dominance at sea, the command decided to form the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons.

The preparation of the 2nd TOE was delayed from April to September 1904 due to various difficulties associated with the supply, repair, completion and commissioning of new ships of the 1898 program. By the end of September, the completed squadron nevertheless concentrated in the Libava region, having refueled with coal and water and provisions, after which on October 2 she began to move to Vladivostok. Having made an unprecedented transition of 18 thousand miles, which required many efforts, Rozhdestvensky's squadron entered the Korea Strait on the night of May 14.

Characteristics of the parties involved

Russian side

Compound

Naval Action Plan

Z. P. Rozhdestvensky set the squadron the task of reaching Vladivostok by breaking through at least part of the squadron (this was contrary to the directive of Nicholas II, which demanded to “take possession of the Sea of ​​Japan”), which is why he chose the shortest route that ran through the Korea Strait. The Vice Admiral could not count on any significant assistance from the Vladivostok squadron, and also refused to conduct reconnaissance. At the same time, the Russian commander did not develop a detailed battle plan, giving only a few general instructions to individual ships. That is, the squadron was supposed to bypass Japan and not engage in battle until it arrived in Vladivostok. did not comply and doomed the squadron to death. You can say he sabotaged the transition and simply presented the squadron to the enemy.

The commander of the Russian fleet, Vice-Admiral Zinoviy Rozhestvensky, is criticized by historians for the fact that he adhered to defensive tactics in the battle against the Japanese. Since leaving the Baltic, he spent very little time preparing the crew, in particular the gunners, and the only serious maneuver was made only on the eve of the battle. A strong impression is created that he did not trust his subordinates and did not inform them of his battle plans, and during the battle he himself was going to lead the ships from his flagship Suvorov.

Japanese side

Compound

Naval Action Plan

The main goal of Admiral H. Togo is to destroy the Russian squadron. He, knowing about the passive tactics of the Russians following in the wake columns, decided to act in small maneuverable formations (4-6 ships), which, using their speed, would attack the Russian wake column from favorable heading angles. The primary goals of these formations are the head and end ships of the column. Intelligence data added confidence to the Japanese admiral, thanks to which he knew where, in what composition and how the Russian squadron was moving.

The course of the battle

Time	Event
On the night of May 14 (27), 1905, the Russian squadron approached the Tsushima Strait. She moved at a 5-knot speed in three columns, observing blackout. A reconnaissance detachment marched ahead in the formation of a wedge. The main forces marched in two wake columns: on the left the 3rd armored detachment and in its wake a detachment of cruisers, on the right - the 1st and 2nd armored detachments.
04 h 45 min.	Admiral Togo on board IJN Mikasa, receives a radiogram from the scout of the auxiliary cruiser IJN Shinano Maru, containing information about the location and approximate course of the Russian squadron.
06 h 15 min.	Admiral Togo, at the head of the United Fleet, leaves Mozampo to meet the squadron of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky, which entered the eastern part of the Tsushima Strait
07:14	The Russian squadron notices the Japanese class 3 cruiser IJN Izumi. It becomes clear that the Russian connection has been detected, but Rozhdestvensky does not cancel his order and maintains radio silence.
OK. 11 o'clock	A detachment of Japanese cruisers ( IJN Kasagi, IJN Chitose, IJN Otowa, IJN Niitaka), were fired upon by "Oslyabey", "Prince Suvorov" and battleships of the III detachment and hastily retreated. By order of Rozhdestvensky "do not throw shells", the inconclusive firing was stopped.
12:00 pm - 12 hours 20 minutes	The 2nd TOE changes its course to Vladivostok and maintains a 9-knot speed. Japanese reconnaissance cruisers are again discovered, which forces Rozhdestvensky to cancel the maneuver he had begun to build a front of 12 battleships.
13 hours 15 minutes	"Sisoi the Great" by signal reports the discovery of the main forces of the Japanese fleet, crossing the course of the squadron from right to left.
13h 40 min.	The Japanese ships crossed the course of the Russian squadron and began to turn to a course parallel to it, so as not to diverge on counter courses (and to avoid a short-term battle).
Daytime battle May 14
13 h 49 min.	"Prince Suvorov" fired the first shots at IJN Mikasa from a distance of 32 kb. Behind him, Alexander III, Borodino, Oryol, Oslyabya, and possibly Navarin opened fire on the Japanese flagship. Shisoy the Great and all three coastal defense battleships are firing at Nissin and Kasuga, after 5-10 minutes. opened fire and "Nicholas I" and "Admiral Nakhimov".
13 hours 51 minutes	First shot from IJN Mikasa, after which the rest of the Japanese ships begin firing: IJN Mikasa, IJN Asahi, IJN Azuma- according to "Suvorov"; IJN Fuji, IJN Shikishima and most armored cruisers - according to "Oslyaba"; IJN Iwate and IJN Asama- according to "Nicholas I".
OK. 14 o'clock	Flagship Togo IJN Mikasa comes out from under the fire of "Borodino", "Eagle" and "Oslyabya", having received in the first 17 minutes. battle 19 hits (five of them - 12-inch shells). From 2 p.m. no more than twelve large-caliber guns fired at it. Despite the flooding of the coal pit as a result of breaking through casemate No. 1, it was not possible to disable the ship.
14h09 min.	As a result of Russian artillery fire, only IJN Asama, which is 40 min. got out of the fight.
OK. 14h 25 min.	"Oslyabya", which received serious damage from the first minutes of the battle (the bow turret was destroyed, the 178-mm armor plate of the main belt came off, a hole formed in the bow of the left side along the waterline, which caused flooding), and the Prince Suvorov, enveloped in fires, went out of order. This led to the loss of combat control of the main forces of the squadron.
14 hours 48 minutes	The Japanese ships, turning "all of a sudden," rebuilt and began to fire on the Borodino.
OK. 14 h 50 min.	"Oslyabya" rolled over and began to go under water.
15:00 min.	Sisoi the Great and Navarin received holes near the waterline, the commander was mortally wounded on the last ship.
15h 40min	The beginning of the battle between Russian forces led by "Borodino" and the Japanese at distances of 30-35 kb, which lasted about 35 minutes. As a result, all the towers of the "Prince Suvorov" were put out of action, the commander of the "Borodino" was seriously injured, a fire started on the "Sisoy the Great", due to which the ship was temporarily out of action. "Alexander III" was heavily damaged. From the firing of Russian ships, heavy damage was received IJN Mikasa and IJN Nisshin.
5:30 p.m.	The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the completely out of action "Suvorov" the surviving officers of the headquarters and the wounded in the head Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky.
5:40 p.m.	The Russian squadron led by the Borodino was fired upon by a detachment of Admiral Togo that had overtaken it, which led to the stretching of the Russian system and lagging behind the Alexander III column.
18 h 50 min.	"Alexander III", being fired upon by H. Kamimura's cruisers from a distance of about 45 kb, lost stability, rolled over to starboard and soon sank.
19h00 min.	The wounded Rozhdestvensky formally handed over the command of the squadron to N.I. Nebogatov with the order to go to Vladivostok.
19 hours 10 minutes	"Borodino", possibly as a result of hits by 12-inch shells from IJN Fuji, which led to the explosion of ammunition, rolled over to starboard and sank.
19 hours 29 minutes	"Prince Suvorov" was finally sunk as a result of four torpedo hits fired point-blank by Japanese destroyers.
OK. 20 o'clock	N. I. Nebogatov, following the last order of the commander, headed for Vladivostok, increasing the speed to 12 knots.
As a result of the daytime battle, four of the five best Russian battleships were sunk; "Eagle", "Sisoy the Great", "Admiral Ushakov" received serious damage, which affected their combat capability. The Japanese won this battle largely due to their tactics: general and use of artillery (concentration of fire on the lead ships of the Russian squadron, high firing accuracy).
Fight on the night of May 14-15
At night, Nebogatov's squadron was attacked by Japanese destroyers, from which the already damaged ships mostly suffered. In general, Russian ships successfully repelled mine attacks (perhaps due to the lack of searchlights and distinctive lights). From the fire of Russian ships, two Japanese destroyers (Nos. 34, 35) were killed, and 4 more ships were seriously damaged.
OK. 21 o'clock	The cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", having found itself after turning on the combat lighting, received a mine hole in the bow coal pit.
OK. 22 o'clock	Whitehead's mine, fired from a Japanese destroyer, hit the Navarin's stern, causing it to sink to the stern turret. The "Vladimir Monomakh" also received a mine hit in the bow.
23h 15 min.	As a result of the mine explosion, the Sisoy Veliky lost steering control.
OK. 02 o'clock	The damaged Navarin was discovered by Japanese destroyers, who fired 24 Whitehead mines at it. The battleship, which received hits, soon sank.
Separate fights on May 15
On the afternoon of May 15, almost all Russian ships trying to reach Vladivostok on their own south of Evenlet Island were attacked by the superior forces of the Japanese fleet.
OK. 05 o'clock	The destroyer "Brilliant" was flooded by her crew south of about. Tsushima.
05 h 23 min.	As a result of an unequal battle with a cruiser IJN Chitose and fighter IJN Ariake, which lasted more than an hour, the destroyer "Imperfect" was sunk.
08 h 00 min.	The battleship "Admiral Nakhimov" was flooded north of about. Tsushima.
10 h 05 min.	"Sisoi the Great" sank as a result of being hit by a Japanese mine.
10 hours 15 minutes	A detachment of Admiral Nebogatov's ships (battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" (flagship), "Eagle", "General-Admiral Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin") ended up in a half-ring of five Japanese combat detachments and surrendered. Only the rank II cruiser Izumrud managed to break out of the Japanese encirclement.
OK. 11 o'clock	After an unequal battle with 2 Japanese cruisers and 1 destroyer, the crew of the cruiser Svetlana was sunk.
14h00 min.	The crew scuttled "Vladimir Monomakh".
5:05 p.m.	The commander of the 2nd TOE, Vice-Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, who was on the destroyer Bedovy, surrendered.
18 hours 10 minutes	The Russian battleship Admiral Ushakov was sunk by the Japanese cruisers Yakumo and Iwate.

Chronology on maps
red - Russians
white - Japanese

Losses and results

Russian side

The Russian squadron lost 209 officers, 75 conductors, 4761 lower ranks, killed and drowned, a total of 5045 people. 172 officers, 13 conductors and 178 lower ranks were wounded. 7282 people were taken prisoner, including two admirals. 2110 people remained on the captured ships. The total personnel of the squadron before the battle was 16,170 people, of which 870 broke through to Vladivostok. Of the 38 ships and vessels participating from the Russian side, they sank as a result of the enemy’s combat action, flooded or blown up by their crews - 21 (including 7 battleships, 3 armored cruisers, 2 armored cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 transport) , surrendered or were captured 7 (4 battleships, 1 destroyer, 2 hospital ships). Thus, the Almaz cruiser, the Bravy and Grozny destroyers, and the Anadyr transport could be used to continue hostilities.

Japanese side

According to the report of Admiral Togo, a total of 116 people died on the Japanese squadron, 538 were wounded. According to other sources, 88 people were killed on the spot, 22 died on ships, 7 in hospitals. 50 invalids turned out to be unfit for further service and were fired. 396 of the wounded recovered on their ships and 136 in hospitals. The Japanese fleet, as a result of fire, lost only two small destroyers - No. 34, 35 and the third No. 69 - as a result of a collision with another Japanese destroyer. Of the ships that participated in the battle, shells and fragments did not hit the cruisers Itsukushima, Suma, Tatsuta and Yaema. Of the 21 destroyers and 24 destroyers hit by fire, 13 destroyers and 10 destroyers were hit by shells or shrapnel, and several were damaged due to collisions.

Main Consequences

The tragedy that occurred in the waters of the Korea Strait had a serious impact on Russia's internal political situation. The defeat led to the rise of the socio-political movement in the country, including the revolutionary-separatist nature. One of the most severe consequences for the Russian Empire was the fall of its prestige, as well as its transformation into a minor maritime power.

The Battle of Tsushima finally tipped the scales in favor of Japan's victory, soon Russia was forced to conclude the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. The final dominance of the sea also remained with Japan.

From the point of view of military-technical influence on the development of shipbuilding, the experience of the Tsushima battle once again confirmed that the main means of striking in battle was large-caliber artillery, which decided the outcome of the battle. Medium-caliber artillery, due to the increase in combat distance, did not justify itself. This led to the development of the so-called "big guns only" concept. An increase in the penetration ability of armor-piercing and destructive high-explosive shells required an increase in the armor area of ​​the ship's side and reinforcement of horizontal armor.