In accordance with the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement, on May 15, 1988, the USSR began withdrawing its military contingent from Afghanistan. The process was designed to last 9 months.
I submitted my first report on transfer to Afghanistan six months after being drafted into the army. On my chest I wore the badge of a 3rd class specialist, and on each shoulder strap there were two “snot” (badges) of a junior sergeant. An added bonus was the knowledge Tajik language, almost identical to Dari, spoken by almost half the population of Afghanistan. Only the pronunciation was different.
All this, in my deep conviction, allowed me to hope for a positive decision, so I entered the company office, almost without worry. Having reported as expected, he handed the piece of paper with his report to the company commander. He tiredly rubbed his eyes, first glanced at him, then read more carefully. After a long pause, he turned his eyes to me, and his head began to shake finely.
It was bad sign. Our major had already been “beyond the river” and returned from there with a military medal, which included a shell shock. Everyone in the regiment knew that when a company commander was nervous, he began to develop a tic.
“So you’re going to war, sergeant? What do you know about it?” - He asked, sighing heavily and adding something uncensored in a low voice.
Judging by the intonation, I realized that the question was rhetorical, and decided to follow the precepts of Peter I, taking on “a dashing and stupid appearance.”
The major was not impressed by my acting efforts, and his next sigh was even deeper and heavier, and even more obscene.
“Understand, son, war consists of only five percent of exploits and glory, everything else is pain, blood, dirt and death! Therefore, here is my answer to you, believe me, someday later you will thank me for this,” he growled he, tearing my report to shreds.
Goodbye, Afghan, this ghostly world
I realized the truth of the company commander’s words when my neighbor Vanya returned from Afghanistan. Friends who didn’t smell war considered it best to celebrate his demobilization with a trip to the Varzob Gorge, a favorite countryside vacation spot for Dushanbe residents.
We walked along a mountain path in search of a convenient place for a picnic, and I noticed Vanka’s gait. He walked, carefully choosing the place for each next step, bending slightly, constantly turning his head in all directions. And when spring thunder suddenly rumbled in the sky, he somehow deftly tumbled over the nearest boulder, snatching a non-existent machine gun from behind his back.
That evening, Vanka, previously indifferent to alcohol, got completely drunk, and at night shouted: “Perfume!” - rushed out of the tent to go outside. The picnic was hopelessly ruined. In the morning I took him home, fortunately he was across the fence from mine, and handed him over to my grandfather. Ivan lived in the neighborhood for several more years and left for Russia as soon as he buried his grandfather. But during all this time, he never spoke about his time spent in Afghanistan.
In the same way, my friend Ato did not like questions about the army. We only knew that he served in the "musbat" ("Muslim battalion" - GRU special forces, formed from representatives of the peoples Central Asia) and participated in the storming of the Taj Beg Palace, the residence of the then ruler of the DRA Hafizullo Amin. They came in the second wave, after the KGB special groups “Grom” and “Zenith”, but we heard nothing from him except the grinding of teeth about the details of that attack.
We are no longer destined to return to Afghanistan
I still visited the other side of Pyanj, although after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, for the first time in the late 90s.
The “visit” was completely illegal and only 40 kilometers deep into the adjacent territory, as it was carried out accompanied by guys from the OGSR (a separate special reconnaissance group, special forces of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia). I cannot reveal the details, the operation is still classified, I will only say that it took place without a single shot being fired, and this is the main criterion for success for such units.
A couple of years later, I arrived in Afghanistan officially, with a visa stamp in my passport and a travel document in my pocket. The purpose of the trip was an interview with the Lion of Panjshir - the famous Afghan military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. The most combat-ready Soviet army at that time was unable to capture it small homeland- Panjshir Gorge, even after conducting a large-scale operation.
They say that the Taliban, after seizing power in Kabul, took control of all the main routes leading to Panjshir and sent their negotiators to Masood. They offered him to surrender with honor, saying that almost the entire country was under their control, all communications were cut and his troops would not survive the blockade. Ahmad Shah, taking off his pakul (national felt headdress), threw it to the ground with the words: “As long as we have at least such a piece of our homeland left, we will continue to fight!”
I found the commander-in-chief of the Northern Alliance in the village of Khoja-Bahauddin - one of his temporary residences. Despite being very busy, Masud received me with interest; after all, we were fellow tribesmen and spoke the same language, and agreed to give me an interview that same evening. The conversation lasted more than an hour. In the end, I asked him about the past war with the shuravi, as the Afghans called the Soviet soldiers.
“The Shuravi were worthy opponents. Not because they fought bravely. There was blood between us, but they didn’t need our land. They didn’t come to conquer us, but to change us. Lately, sometimes it seems to me that it would have been better for them to succeed.” “,” he answered after a long pause.
Many Afghans who witnessed that war also treat the shuravi with respect. Young people, for the most part, look at all foreigners, without exception, with suspicion and hostility. But middle-aged people remember how citizens of the USSR built houses for them, built plants and factories, treated children and adults. They do not expect such an attitude from current foreign “benefactors”.
The enemy we haven't finished off
30 years after the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the fire of war in this long-suffering war has not died down, but, on the contrary, has flared up even stronger.
NATO took the place of the USSR, but during the 16 years of its stay here, the coalition did not achieve any significant successes. Increasingly, words are heard from the highest floors of the Capitol that the situation with the US military presence in Afghanistan has reached a dead end. The head of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, believes that Washington is losing the war.
But the White House, with tenacity worthy of better use, continues to try to put out the fire with gasoline, increasing the number of its military contingent. American generals consider this a universal recipe for achieving victory. We all know what this leads to.
The war in Afghanistan has turned from a liberation war into a terrorist war, and the country itself has become a springboard where extremists of all stripes flock from all over the world. Every day there are reports of terrorist attacks in which both military and civilians are killed.
After the Soviet army left Afghanistan, the local government lasted three years and was overthrown only after Moscow stopped supporting Kabul with arms and ammunition. Western experts are confident that if US President Donald Trump now decides to withdraw coalition troops, then the government of Ashraf Ghani will face the same fate, only much faster.
Third toast, even the wind on the slopes died down
On the battlefields in Afghanistan, according to official data, about 15 thousand residents of Tajikistan gave up their international duty, 366 of them returned “as a cargo of 200” on board the “Black Tulip” (an AN-12 plane that delivered the bodies of dead servicemen to the Union).
Two Tajik citizens were awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union - guard senior sergeant Alexander Mironenko (posthumously) and senior lieutenant Nabi Akramov.
In Tajikistan, they always follow with great attention what is happening in the neighboring country; we have 1,400 kilometers of common border with Afghanistan and at least as many thousands of years of common culture.
And yet geographical names Bagram, Kunduz, Panjshir, Puli-Khumri and others will find a response in the heart of every resident of the post-Soviet space born in the 60-70s of the last century. And the Tajik word “bacha” (boy, guy) generally became a universal password among internationalist soldiers.
Let's leave it to political scientists to debate whether this war was really necessary. Personally, today I want to say one thing: “Honor and glory to you, shuravi!”
Remember them, Russia: dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from AfghanistanToday I’ve been listening and watching programs all day dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and once again I’m convinced that I don’t know anything about our “unpredictable past”. But she was already “big” - she turned 32 when ours entered Afghanistan. It was someone else’s war, and only 25 years later did I suddenly acutely realize that “there is no such thing as someone else’s grief”...
Glory to all who honestly fulfilled their duty, and eternal memory to those who did not live to see this day!
The Afghan war fell on the shoulders of yesterday's schoolchildren
There are serious reasons to believe that Afghanistan did not bring closer, but delayed the collapse of the USSR, and if not for the betrayal of the top, the collapse would not have happened at all. Amin needed Soviet troops for a short time to fight his opponents, then they were supposed to be “thrown in”, approximately.
trophies
But the Soviet Government decided to take the lead, destroying the dictator during a brilliant operation by Soviet special forces, storming his palace.
The Afghan issue is very complex and multifaceted, but in general terms the situation was something like this.
Yesterday's Soviet Schoolchildren 1984
The Afghan war fell on the shoulders of conscripts - yesterday's Soviet schoolchildren. Our boys showed themselves very worthy, showing themselves to be brilliant warriors, capable of not only fighting bravely, but also professionally mastering the most complex military equipment.
A set of items to survive in a battle against the Mujahideen.
The conditions of service were difficult - infectious diseases were added to the difficult climate and war. The population of Afghanistan has an extremely low level of hygiene, and the country has powerful natural foci of typhoid, cholera, plague, dysentery, infectious hepatitis, malaria and other dangerous diseases. Of those who served in Afghanistan, despite vaccinations, more than half fell ill. The Soviet medical service worked perfectly - death from disease was very rare.
medical unit
Their opponents were very serious - Soviet Army they had to deal not only with the rebels, but with well-trained and armed with the latest weapons special forces units of Western countries, only of Afghan and Pakistani origin, operating on terrain that was perfectly familiar to them.
captive spirits
American public security guarantees to Pakistan against a Soviet attack acquired particular significance. With the inaction of the USSR leadership, this turned Pakistan into a refuge for the Mujahideen. They carried out strikes from Pakistani territory with almost impunity and fired at Afghan territory and our soldiers.
The confused Soviet leadership did not dare to strike Pakistan. The Kremlin elders, not to mention the traitors who replaced them, were busy “fighting for peace,” wanting to come to an agreement with the West at any cost. And this “became” as a result the destruction of one’s own country.
Most best way the struggle for peace means the destruction of the enemy. By at least- creating and maintaining an army that is guaranteed to destroy any enemy.
Soviet troops found themselves in a strange position in Afghanistan - they were not tasked with defeating the enemy, and this is the main task of the army.
The war was not carried out at full strength and was reduced mainly to the protection of cities and cargo. The units of the 40th Army (about 100 thousand) were not enough to finally solve the Afghan problem - the total number of “dushmans” exceeded 200 thousand fighters, of which from 70,000 to 100,000 were trained professionals. The Afghan army was weak and overrun by enemy agents. Its commanders often used their units for intertribal “showdowns.” The civil war in Afghanistan did not stop; it continued even between warring factions of the Mujahideen, various tribes, religious groups, and so on. Several million Afghans fled the country.
This was not an occupation of the country; the main task of the Soviet troops was to help the pro-Soviet elite stay in power. Soviet Union he did not behave nearly the way “civilized countries” behave in occupied countries; he never plundered Afghanistan, but on the contrary provided great economic assistance. One can discuss and doubt how reasonable this was, but it was so.
In total, in the territory of the DRA in 10 years, military service 620,000 Soviet troops. Soviet troops mainly guarded roads, strategic and industrial facilities, and cities. Together with Afghan units and subunits they conducted fighting of various scales to eliminate armed detachments and opposition groups, and also stopped attempts to deliver weapons and ammunition by caravans to the territory of the DRA from Pakistan and Iran.
There is no doubt that if the Soviet Army had been given the task of destroying the Mujahideen as it should be, then the enemy would have been finished off, as it was with the Basmachi in the 20s and 30s. It is impossible to win if the enemy hits with all his might to destroy, and his powerful opponent only sluggishly shrugs it off, trying not to get involved. This applies to both the Afghan war and the USSR-US confrontation itself at that time.
The Americans carefully calculated the losses of the Soviet Army, comparing them with their own losses in Vietnam. From the point of view of the Reagan administration, Soviet losses were not that great, and the US President wanted them to increase. This, according to American strategists, would lead to demoralization of the Soviet Army.
In Afghanistan, died in battle, died from wounds (including after dismissal), went missing, was captured - 12,423. Killed in disasters and accidents 1,795, died from illnesses (including after dismissal) 833. In total, 15,051 people died in combat and non-combat incidents. For comparison, the Americans lost more than 58 thousand killed in 7.5 years of the war in Vietnam (of which American ground forces conducted intensive operations for 4 years) (of which more than 47 thousand were combat losses).
53,753 people were wounded in Afghanistan, and 415,932 people fell ill over 10 years. (considering that one person can get sick several times).
Losses (dead) by year are distributed as follows:
| 1979 | 86 people |
| 1980 | 1,484 people |
| 1981 | 1,298 people |
| 1982 | 1,948 people |
| 1983 | 1,446 people |
| 1984 | 2,343 people |
| 1985 | 1,868 people |
| 1986 | 1,333 people |
| 1987 | 1,215 people |
| 1988 | 759 people |
| 1989 | 53 people |
After the peak in 1984, despite the frantic efforts of our enemies, the losses of the Soviet Army have steadily declined. There was no talk of any loss of combat effectiveness or demoralization, unlike Vietnam. Soviet troops showed very high resilience, the will to win, combat skill and the ability to learn. The comparison was clearly not in favor of the United States.
The losses of the dushmans were monstrous, in general, no one counted them, they often talk about a million (!) killed Mujahideen, in all likelihood, from 400 to 600 thousand rebels were destroyed. According to the USSR General Staff, in 1981 alone, which was not the most successful year for the Soviet Army, the forces of the anti-Soviet coalition lost, according to the most conservative estimates, over 20 thousand killed and about 8 thousand prisoners; the number of wounded Mujahideen was estimated at approximately 60-80 thousand. This the number seems quite plausible - then the ratio of losses was comparable. For comparison, over 10 years of intense fighting, the Vietnamese communists (including partisans) lost more than 1 million people, fighting not only with the Americans, but also with the army of South Vietnam.
Since the mid-80s, special units of the GRU and the KGB of the USSR, using intertribal contradictions, began to practice bribery and pitting various groups of Mujahideen against each other, which gave very good results. As a result of clashes brilliantly provoked by Soviet services, large number dushmans and they were never able to form a united front, no matter how hard the American and Pakistani intelligence services tried to do so.
The Afghan war began to reach a dead end - the 40th Army received neither reinforcement nor orders to decisively deal with the enemy, and the enemy, despite the efforts made, could not achieve success. All attempts by the dushmans to seize the initiative led to huge losses. But then Gorbachev arrived in time. At the XXVII Congress in 1986, he made a statement about the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops. In 1988, the author of “perestroika” pledged to withdraw troops within 9 months.
ETERNAL MEMORY TO THE DEAD INTERNATIONALIST WARRIORS
25 years have passed since that February day in 1989 when the last Soviet soldier left the soil of Afghanistan. 24 years ago on this day the bloody Afghan war ended. The Soviet Union lost more than 15 thousand people killed. In total, 650 thousand of our guys passed through the crucible of Afghanistan. They left to serve as boys and returned as veterans. Today they are the keepers of the memory of that war, of exploits, of glory, of fallen comrades. The Afghan war divided many biographies into “before” and “after”. Someone, tempered by the fire of Afghanistan, found himself in life, but the war broke the destinies of many children and undermined their health. But, in spite of everything, they honestly fulfilled their civic duty, remaining faithful to the oath to the end. “Hot Spots” showed that our guys are worthy of the heroism of their fathers and grandfathers who defeated fascism during the Great Patriotic War.
February 15 became a day of remembrance not only for soldiers who went through the crucible of the Afghan war, but also for other veterans of local wars - those soldiers and officers who resisted international terrorism in “hot spots” near and far abroad. Since World War II, 1.5 million Russian military personnel have taken part in armed conflicts outside the country. You can assess the events that took place in different ways, but no one will ever doubt the valor and perseverance of our soldiers. Honor, dignity, and patriotism do not go into reserve.
On February 15, 2017, Russia will mark the 28th anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On this day, participants in the 10-year Afghan war will remember their comrades and honor the memory of fallen internationalist soldiers.
History of the Afghan War
The first soldiers of the USSR Armed Forces were sent to Afghanistan in December 1979. The leaders of the USSR motivated their actions - the introduction of a limited contingent of troops into the territory of Afghanistan - by a corresponding request from the Afghan government and the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation, concluded a year earlier.
A few weeks later, the UN General Assembly, at its Extraordinary Session, adopted a resolution expressing “deep regret”, concern about the situation with refugees and calling for the withdrawal of “all foreign troops.” But the resolution was not binding, and therefore it was not implemented.
A limited contingent of Soviet troops found themselves drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.
The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. On the one hand, the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) took part in the conflict, on the other, the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans), which was supported by US military specialists.
Withdrawal of a limited contingent of the USSR Armed Forces from Afghanistan
All the years while the civil war was going on in Afghanistan, the world's progressive community appealed to the USSR to withdraw the military from this country. Over time, especially after the death of Brezhnev, in the Soviet Union itself they began to increasingly demand the return of soldiers to their homeland.
If earlier the Soviet government placed the main emphasis on a forceful solution to the Afghan problem, then after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, the tactics were radically changed.
The policy of national reconciliation was put at the forefront of the political vector. This was the only way to get out of the protracted conflict. Negotiate, convince, don’t shoot!
Some clarity in long and stubborn negotiations was achieved in April 1988, when representatives of the UN and the Foreign Ministries of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the so-called Geneva Agreements. This document was created to finally resolve the unstable situation in Afghanistan. According to the Geneva Agreements, the Soviet Union was required to withdraw a limited contingent of its troops within 9 months.
The withdrawal began in May 1988, and ended on February 15, 1989 - it was on this day that the last Soviet soldier left the territory of this country forever. Since then, in the Soviet Union, and later in Russian Federation and states - former republics of the Land of the Soviets, began to celebrate February 15 as a day of remembrance of internationalist soldiers.
Losses of the Afghan war
During 10 years of the terrible and bloody Afghan war, the USSR lost almost 15 thousand soldiers. According to official statistics, more than 53 thousand people received wounds, concussions and various injuries.
The people of Afghanistan also suffered huge losses during this war. There are still no official statistics on this matter. But, as the Afghans themselves say, during the hostilities hundreds of thousands of their compatriots died from bullets and shells, and many went missing. But the worst thing is that huge losses among the civilian population occurred precisely after our troops left. Today in this country there are about 800 thousand disabled people who were injured during the Afghan war.
Boris Gromov on the results of the Afghan war
Colonel General Boris Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army, who withdrew troops from the DRA, in his book “Limited Contingent”, expressed the following opinion about the results of the actions of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.
“I am deeply convinced: there is no basis for the assertion that the 40th Army was defeated, as well as for the fact that we won military victory in Afghanistan,” Boris Gromov shares his thoughts. - At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country unhindered, fulfilled their tasks - unlike the Americans in Vietnam - and returned home in an organized manner. If we consider armed opposition units as the main opponent of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans did only what they could.”
Since January 1987, Soviet troops largely stopped conducting active offensive combat operations and entered into military clashes only in the event of an attack on their places of deployment. According to the commander of the 40th Army, Colonel General B.V. Gromov, “the commander was obliged to carry out retaliatory or, depending on the situation, preemptive combat actions only in order to prevent the mass death of our people and even eliminate such a threat.”
In 1987, the policy of national reconciliation, adopted and approved at the Plenum of the PDPA Central Committee in December 1986, began to be implemented in Afghanistan. According to this policy, the PDPA officially renounced its monopoly on power; in July 1987, a law on political parties was published, approved by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA.
This law regulated the creation and activities of political parties. Only in October, at the all-party conference of the PDPA, the resolution “On the urgent tasks of strengthening the unity of the PDPA in the context of the struggle for national reconciliation” was approved and signed by all delegates. After all, the split of the party into two wings – “Khalq” and “Parcham” – continued to operate.
On November 29, the Supreme Council of Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga, was held in Kabul. On November 30, the Loya Jirga approved the Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan, the country's president, Najibullah, was elected, who announced to the delegates of the Afghan parliament that the ceasefire would continue until July 15, 1988. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan, by agreement of both parties, was supposed to be carried out within twelve months.
Already in the second half of January 1987, the opposition carried out a decisive offensive against both the Soviet and Afghan garrisons, not leaving peaceful villages without attention.
The very presence of the 40th Army did not allow the Mujahideen to irrevocably achieve their goals of overthrowing the DRA government. At the same time, the opposition parties regarded the policy of national reconciliation primarily as a weakness state power and only intensified the struggle to overthrow it. The combat activity of Mujahideen detachments increased under the conditions of a unilateral ceasefire by Soviet and government troops.
In November–December, one of the largest operations, Magistral, was carried out to unblock Khost. Taking advantage of the absence of Soviet units in the Khost district, by the fall of 1987, the dushmans restored one of the largest transshipment bases, “Javara,” which Soviet troops had destroyed in the spring of 1986. There was a danger of creating a provisional government of opposition forces in Khost. It was decided to plan and conduct a large joint military operation of Afghan and Soviet troops and provide the population of Khost primarily with food, as well as other types of material resources, and thwart the plans of the opposition to form an alternative government in Afghanistan.
The forces of the 108th and 201st motorized rifle divisions, the 103rd airborne division, the 56th separate air assault brigade, the 345th separate parachute regiment, etc. took part in this operation from the 40th Army. The Afghan army attracted the forces and assets of five infantry divisions, one tank brigade and several special forces units. In addition, more than ten tsarandoy and state security battalions took part in the operation.
The situation on the Gardez-Khost highway was difficult. First we had to conquer the Seti-Kandav pass - it is located at an altitude of three thousand meters. The opposition faction in the area consisted mainly of the paramilitary Jadran tribe. This tribe was not subordinate to any government at all and acted as its leaders saw fit. In the 80s, the leadership of the Mujahideen formations was carried out by Jalaluddin, a native of this tribe.
As negotiations with Jalaluddin proved fruitless, Operation Highway was launched on 23 November. By the end of November 28, the advanced units captured the Seti-Kandav pass. Then negotiations began again with the leaders of the warring Jadran tribe. But on December 16, the troops were forced to continue fighting. On December 30, the first trucks with food moved along the highway to Khost.
During a visit to the USA in December 1987, M.S. Gorbachev said that the political decision to withdraw Soviet troops had been made. Soon in Geneva, delegations of the USSR, USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan sat down at the negotiating table with the aim of developing a political solution to the Afghan problem. On April 14, 1988, five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan were signed.
According to these agreements, which came into force on May 15, 1988, Soviet troops must leave Afghanistan, and the United States and Pakistan pledged to completely stop funding the Afghan rebels.
The Soviet Union strictly fulfilled all its obligations. By August 15, 1988, half of the Limited contingent had been withdrawn. For the withdrawal of Soviet troops, directions were determined: in the west - Kandahar - Shindand - Kushka, in the east - routes united in Kabul from Ghazni, Gardez and Jalalabad, then through the Salang pass to Puli-Khumri and Termez.
In the summer of 1988 (from May 15 to August 15), Soviet troops were withdrawn from garrisons such as Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Faizabad and Kunduz. At the same time, hostilities against opposition groups did not stop.
Of course, the opposition would have been branded as incompetent if it had not taken advantage of the opportunity. Since the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it began to act with even greater assertiveness throughout the country.
Since mid-May, rocket attacks on Kabul have become regular. Previously cut paths along which military equipment was supplied to the Mujahideen were revived. Fortified areas, bases, and warehouses were urgently revived and re-created in the areas bordering Pakistan and Iran. The supply of weapons increased sharply, including surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 30 kilometers, Stingers, etc.
The result, of course, was immediate. Afghan aviation activity has been significantly reduced. From May 15 to October 14, armed opposition forces shot down 14 airplanes and 36 helicopters of the Afghan Air Force. They made an attempt to take control of some provincial centers. On June 24, Mujahideen detachments managed to capture for some time the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshahr.
More than 2 thousand people took part in the battles for the city from the opposition. In July, the center of the Zabol province, the city of Kalat, was subjected to a long siege and assault. The besiegers were defeated by troops brought in from other regions, but Kalat is small locality with approximately 7 thousand inhabitants - was severely destroyed
Colonel General B.V. Gromov, summing up the results of this year, in his book “Limited Contingent” said: “As a result of the combat activities of the 40th Army during 1988, the opposition units were significantly weakened. Together with units of the Afghan armed forces, we did a lot of work to clear areas along the highways. After failed negotiations with the opposition during military operations, we inflicted significant damage on the Mujahideen.
Soviet troops captured more than 1,000 anti-aircraft mountain installations and more than 30,000 rockets for them, more than 700 mortars and approximately 25,000 mines, as well as a significant amount of small arms and more than 12 million rounds of ammunition. In the second half of 1988, the forces of the 40th Army captured 417 opposition caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran. However, the Mujahideen continued to pose a threat to the Afghan government."
In November, after the departure of the Soviet brigade, the opposition, in collusion with officials of the Second Army Corps of the Afghan Army, attempted to seize power in Kandahar. The coup was averted. But this did not de-escalate the situation; it continued to heat up both here and in other provinces - as fewer and fewer Soviet military units remained in the DRA.
The Soviet side complied with the Geneva agreements. By February 15, 1989, the 40th Army left the territory of Afghanistan. All events after the withdrawal of Soviet troops confirmed that the status quo was maintained in this country only thanks to the presence of Soviet troops there.
www.coldwar.ru - link
By the mid-1980s it became clear that current policy The USSR is reaching a dead end regarding Afghanistan. The limited contingent of Soviet troops in the DRA, together with local government forces, did not allow the Mujahideen to take control of the country's large cities, but they were not able to completely neutralize the armed gangs of oppositionists.
The Mujahideen, in turn, despite generous financial support and arms assistance from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern Islamic monarchies, were unable to overthrow the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.
However, between May 15 and August 15, 1988, over 50 thousand Soviet soldiers, that is, half of the entire Limited Contingent, left Afghanistan.
The rest of the Soviet units had to be active military work, eliminating pockets of Mujahideen resistance and intercepting caravans with weapons. According to the commander of the 40th Army, Colonel General Boris Gromov, in the second half of 1988 alone, his units managed to intercept 417 caravans with weapons for the Mujahideen coming from Pakistan and Iran.
If you believe the data of the American newspaper The Washington Post, then during the period of troop withdrawal, that is, when the USSR’s intention to leave Afghanistan was documented, the Mujahideen killed 523 Soviet soldiers.
However, the losses of militants during the same period numbered in the thousands, because Soviet soldiers knew how to fight very well.
The Americans and their allies were counting on the rapid fall of the Najibullah regime.
However, contrary to their expectations, the government of Mohammad Najibullah managed to stabilize the situation, repelling the attacks of the Mujahideen.
Moreover, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Najibullah gained wider support from various sectors of Afghan society, and his successful policy of national reconciliation found more and more supporters.
Perhaps Afghanistan would not have been mired in war for another two decades if at that moment the West, and primarily the United States, had taken a sober look at the situation. However, a burning desire to destroy the “pro-Soviet regime” forced the American “hawks” to continue to feed the opposition.
Hardly anyone in America realized that the United States was currently digging a hole for itself.
Najibullah's policy was ruined by the betrayal committed by the authorities of the new Russia after the fall of the USSR. Boris Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, under whom foreign policy The Russian Federation became completely subordinate to US interests, entered into behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Mujahideen, while simultaneously stopping the supply of weapons, ammunition and fuel to the Afghan government.
While the Afghan opposition continued to be generously sponsored by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Western countries, government forces lost the resources to resist. As a result, in April 1992, Kabul fell and power passed to the Mujahideen.
Mohammad Najibullah (seated) with his brother General Shahpur Ahmadzai. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org
Mohammad Najibullah took refuge in the UN mission in Kabul. But with the fall of the pro-Soviet regime, peace did not come to Afghan soil. Yesterday's allies in the war against the “infidels,” the Mujahideen, started a bloody feud, challenging each other for power. The sparks of this conflict reached Central Asia, turning into a full-scale civil war in Tajikistan.
Four years of chaos in the country ended with the most radical Islamists from the Taliban movement, also created with the participation of the US CIA, coming to power.
After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, Mohammad Najibullah was captured in a UN mission and brutally killed. The regime established by the Taliban in Afghanistan made even the most fierce opponents of the USSR among the Mujahideen, for example, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who began to seek help from the Russian authorities to fight the Taliban, shudder with horror.
May 15, 1988 - the day the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.
AiF columnist Vladimir Svartsevich, an eyewitness to those events, recalls how it happened.
Vladimir Svartsevich, together with the first units of the Soviet troops, made a 600-kilometer journey from the Afghan city of Jalalabad on the border with India to the Uzbek city of Termez on the state border of the USSR.
More than 600 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers passed through Afghanistan. The leadership of the USSR could no longer hide the numbers of our losses. Difficult and grueling, classified for many years for the Soviet people the war, which lasted 2238 days, claimed more than 14 thousand lives of our soldiers.
On this day, the implementation of the Geneva agreements on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan began.
The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within nine months, by February 15, 1989, with half of the troops to be withdrawn within the first three months.
And in the first three months, 58,183 troops left Afghanistan. And another 50,100 people returned to the USSR between August 15, 1988 and February 15, 1989.
It was long haul home.
The day before, I flew on an AN-24 plane to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, from where the first column of Soviet troops was supposed to leave - to witness this event.
Each of the journalists was wearing a parachute - just in case. From an altitude of about 6000 meters, we did not land, but almost fell onto the airfield runway, which was briefly illuminated by searchlights. They hardly saw the city - they immediately went to a press conference, which was organized by local authorities in the only hotel in the city.
The event ended before it began - the hotel came under mortar fire. We stood pressed against the wall, with shards of glass falling from broken windows nearby. Everyone prayed to God that the mine would not cover us.
After this we returned to 15th GRU special forces brigade, with which we had to go in the first column on armor to Kabul.
Soviet soldier in Afghanistan. Goodbye Afghanistan!
On that day, 29 years ago, we woke up long before dawn. On the huge platform, car engines roared.
The leaving personnel were preparing for the ceremonial formation. It was then that some of these shots were taken. 
The places of the Soviet troops were already occupied by the Afghan army, Tsaranda (militia), and Afghan security units (MGB). The military camps were handed over to them fully equipped - barracks, bathhouses, canteens. Everything is in exemplary army order.
Even the beds were made with new linen, bedside rugs were laid, and in the barracks there were even slippers at the soldiers’ bedside tables.
Equipment and weapons were transferred in good condition. Air conditioners, televisions, and refrigerators remained with the Afghans. Even the situation in the commander’s offices was preserved, and the water supply worked properly.
It seemed as if the soldiers had only left the barracks for a minute.
As one of the brigade veterans, special forces commander Colonel Yuri Starov, recalled, the next day he decided to say goodbye to his residential module, in which he spent two years.
It would be better if he didn't do this. Everything that Starov saw shocked the military officer - literally within a day, the military town was plundered. All valuable property, even bed linen, was stolen and sold through dukans - Afghan trading tents. There were no doors or window frames left in the premises.
And at that time, for some reason, the special forces were taking back to their homeland rusty, empty safes that no one needed..
May 1988 was especially hot, and already at eight in the morning the temperature in the shade was about 50 degrees, and the sun continued to “crush” all living things, heating up the armor, on which it was impossible to sit - the comparison with a frying pan was real.
Our guys stood on a huge platform, in ironed field uniforms with awards, with snow-white collars. The rays of the merciless sun were reflected on thousands of soldiers' combat boots, polished to a shine. 
About 15 thousand Afghans, ordinary peasants, local nobility and Afghan pioneers came to say goodbye to the “shuravi”. The farewell was touching. Pressing one hand to their heart, the old people wished “shuravi” a happy journey, local pioneers gave flowers, and handed the soldiers postcards with quotes from the Koran in Russian.
And finally, the solemn march rang out - “Farewell of the Slavyanka”. In ceremonial steps, with unfurled banners, the Soviet boys loaded onto the equipment.
The engines roared, the first column, through the human women and children who formed a living corridor, headed towards Kabul. And fresh flowers flew onto the Soviet armor. It was at this moment that most of my shots were taken. 
The road to Kabul is winding, dangerous, unpredictable and amazingly beautiful. The gorges are so deep that the river flowing through them seems like a stream. Sometimes the rocks seemed to simply close overhead. Occasionally, along the road, like milestones, there stood simple obelisks to our drivers who died here, and under the slopes - the skeletons of burnt cars. 
It was difficult for the equipment to reach the mountain pass; the engines were choking from the heat and lack of oxygen. Time seemed like an eternity. 
A rally of one hundred thousand took place in Kabul. The speakers spoke politically literate words, and the speech of the head of Afghanistan, Najibullah, lasted 40 minutes.
And just over 500 kilometers remained to the Motherland - the state border of the USSR in the Termez region, and every soldier’s heart was yearning to go home.
And so - hello, native land!
The sounds of engines, ceremonial marches, the tears of thousands of local residents, wives, fathers, mothers of our soldiers and officers who met us, merge into one big celebration.
On the banks of the Amu Darya, in a beautiful grove, all soldiers are invited to a gala dinner. Twelve districts of the Surkhandarya region have their own dastarkhan table: golden pilaf, excellent lamb, fresh vegetables and scalding green tea. Everything is very tasty, just like at home. But again the command sounds: “Get to the cars!”
...Eternal memory to those who remained in Afghanistan forever.
The author's opinion may not coincide with the position of the editors